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Summarv 
The thesis is a comparative examination of selected security threats and 
vulnerabilities which confronted Kazakstan and Uzbekistan between 1991-96. 
Through this study, the broader economic, political and social processes that 
accompanied their transition from Soviet republican status to independent 
statehood are exemplified. 
The research is concerned with three case-studies which are prime regional 
concerns and will be central to the future development of the republics. These are: 
- Government-minority relations; in Kazakstan between Almaty and the Russian 
community, and in Uzbekistan between Tashkent and the Tajik minority. This 
case-study explores issues of group political consciousness and mobilisation, 
political access and participation, and nation- and state-building; 
- Competition and conflict over the region's riverine waters. The relationship 
between environmental resources, economic development and social stability are 
central to this study. The research suggests that elite and popular attitudes 
towards the exploitation and/or management of environmental resources, resource 
ownership and economic and environmental reform are of as equal significance to 
this debate as are actual environmental degradation and absolute resource 
scarcity; and 
- Islam's ideological and physical challenge to the republics' political and security 
stability. Central to this debate are the issues of the state's ideological foundation, 
regime legitimacy, the blurred nexus between regime and state security, and the 
economic and social context in which political ideas compete. 
The case-studies also offer a challenge to and critique of traditional Realist 
International Relations (M) assumptions on the concepts of state and security, 
because of their characteristics; intra- and/or trans-state in location, frequently 
indirect and non-specific in their consequences, and rooted as equally in the 
subjective and perceptual as they are in the physical realm. Consequently, a 
comprehensive security approach, based upon Pluralist IR. assumptions, has been 
applied. This perspective emphasises the multiple sources of insecurity that the 
two republics are confronted by, and the need for a broad range of policies to 
address such problems, which are particularly acute during transitional periods. 
The principal conclusion drawn from this research is that whilst. ethnicity, the 
environment and religion are not intrinsically destabilising, they were used in an 
aggressive and instrumentalist manner during the late-Soviet and early 
independence periods and have the potential to re-emerge as sources of tension in 
the near-future due to the absence of comprehensive reforms in the region's 
economic, political and social affairs. 
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Glossary of Acronyms and Terms 
Apparat: Party Administrative Apparatus. 
AR/ASSR: Autonomous Republic/Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. 
Ataman: Cossack Leader. 
Aul: Kazak migratory unit. 
CIS: Commonwealth of Independent States. Formed in 1992 after the collapse of 
the USSR- It now contains Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. 
CPSU: Communist Party of the Soviet Union. 
CSCE/OSCE: The Conference on Cooperation and Security in Europe Known 
as the Organisation for Cooperation and Security in Europe after 1994. 
Din wa dawla: A political and religious role for Islam. 
DUMK: The Muslim Spiritual Directorate for Kazakstan. 
DUMSAK: The Muslim Spiritual Directorate for Central Asia and Kazakstan. 
FSU: The Former Soviet Union. 
Goskompriroda: The State Committee on the Environment. 
Hokim: Regional governor in Uzbekistan. 
Hadith: The traditions and sayings of the Prophet, consulted as a source of 
doctrine for issues not made clear in the Quran. 
Haijj: The pilgrimage to Mecca. Muslims are expected to make his journey once 
in their life. 
viii 
Imam: A Muslim spiritual leader. Ranging from a prayer leader to holder of 
supreme religious or political authority. 
IRP: Islamic Renaissance Party. 
Kolkhoz: Soviet Collective Farm. 
Jihad: Holy war or strug,; Ie. Can be used either to designate a war waged in 
accordance with the Shari'a in defence of the faith, or as the personal struggle to 
become a better Muslim. 
Madrasa: Religious school, where the Quran, Islamic law and related subjects are 
studied. 
Mahalla: Uzbek neighbourhood. 
MFA: The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
Mirab: Water master. 
Mullah: Religious teacher or preacher. 
Nomenklatura: The system of political and administrative appointments ftorn 
party approved list. 
NIS: Newly Independent State. 
Oblast: Administrative proviiice, subordinate to SSR. 
Oli Majlis: The Lower House of both Kazakstan and Uzbekistans' parliaments. 
RF: Russian Federation. 
RSFSR: Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic. 
Shilia (ShFite): The brancli of Islam which holds that Ali, Muhammad's cousin 
and son-in-law was his successor. They accept the spiritual authority of 
ix 
Muhammad's direct descendants along the line of Ali. Found mainly in Iran, Iraq, 
Yemen, Pakistan Afghanistan. 
Shari'a: Islamic religious I-aw. 
SNB: The successor to the KGB in Uzbekistan. 
SSR: Soviet Socialist Republic. 
Sunna: traditions of the Prophet and his initial followers. The term Sunni for the 
main branch of Islam derives from this term. Sunni Muslims recognise no divinely 
guided heir to Muhammad's spiritual authority, but accept the temporal authority 
of the caliphs and elected leaders. 
Transoxiana: The land between the Amu Darya and Syr Darya. 
Ulama: Religious leaders. 
Umma: The Muslim community. 
UTO: United Tajik Opposition. 
Wahhabism: Ultraconservative Sunni puritan reformist movement. Eighteenth 
century in origin and is the prevalent form of Islam in Saudi Arabia. 
Waqf. - Religious endowment. 
Viloyet: Post-1991 name for oblast in Uzbekistan. 
Zhuz: Kazak term for Horde. The Kazaks are divided into the Greater (Ulu), 
Middle (Orta) and Small (Kichi) Zhuz. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1. The Ob8ectives of The Thesis 
The aim of this research is to examine three selected security challenges which 
confronted the newly independent states (NIS) of Kazakstan and Uzbekistan, 
during the period of 1991-6. It is not the intention of this study to provide a 
detailed discussion of the entire security milieu of the republics, but rather 
illustrate this through the case-studies. Security has been selected as an example 
of the wider political debate. The issues studied, all non-military in character, the 
author regards as indicative of the broader political issues and processes within 
these transitional societies. The comprehensive security approach acknowledges 
the multiplicity of sources of threats and vulnerabilities, and the need for a 
spectrum of economic, political and social policies, as well as, strictly military 
responses to these. The research aims to illustrate that military threats and 
confrontation are essentially the obvious and ultimate manifestations of serious 
underlying problems. It is the latter that are the focus of the thesis. Examination of 
these is, therefore, a means of assessing post-1991 trends in Kazakstan and 
Uzbekistan. 
The three security concerns under examination are: 
- The presence, and political treatment of minorities in Kazakstan and 
Uzbekistan, respectively: the Russian and Tajiks. The principal focus is the 
government-minority relationship, rather than that between the titular and 
minority groups per se. The reason for this di rection is that government policies in 
Almaty and Tashkent, particularly in the early independence period, on nation- 
/state-building, citizenship, and political participation influence communal 
relations. ' Group mobilisation and competition over identification with and 
control of the state also encourage this analytical approach. 
- Competition over riverine water resources. This case-study examines the 
potential for intra- and inter-state conflict resulting from competition over this 
resource. By undertaking this investigation the regional influence of human and 
natural degradation, inequitable distribution, economic reliance on a single 
resource, and industrial and population growth pressures will be highlighted. The 
declining quantity and quality of resources, often unintentionally and indirectly, 
affects a state's ability to function coherently. These issues will be analysed 
through a pro-environmental security perspective. 
- Islam as an ideological and physical threat to regime and state security: As the 
state is a political construction, as well as, a physical entity, it is equally 
susceptible to challenges to its organisational ideology as it is to physical military 
aggression. The former are far more pervasive and ambiguous in their threat 
potential, and consequently more difficult to respond to. The Islamic revival in 
Central Asia, increased availability of alternative information sources, and the 
economic and population pressures suggest an enhanced political role for religion. 
None of the three subjects under discussion are intrinsically direct military threats 
nor traditionally examined in Realist International Relations (IR. ). In fact, their 
selection was a deliberate attempt to illustrate the limitations of this perspective in 
analysing the contemporary security milieu, in particular of transitional states. 
Although the thesis is critical of the Realist tradition and its over-emphasis upon 
the state as an unitary autonomous actor, the state and national security remain 
central to the study. Whatever the effectiveness or justification of the state in 
dealing with security in general and the subjects discussed in the case-studies in 
particular, it, or more accurately the regime, remains a key source of in/security, 
and the instrument and objective of the parties engaged in competition. The case- 
studies explore the relationships between government and the subjects under 
examination. The state therefore remains axiomatic to the security debate. 
The three issues chosen have the ability to undermine the political and social 
stability of the republics. In the case of water-resources this is frequently indirect, 
and from Islam, the challenge is primarily ideological. Neither, however, are any 
less real. All three have previously resulted in physical conflict in the region and 
have the potential for future violent incidents. They therefore could be regarded as 
principally or solely as military security issues. As the thesis demonstrates, 
however, the causes, implications and management of the issues are essentially 
political not military. Traditional Realist IR: is therefore an inadequate analytical 
tool in explaining the processes at work. 
Crucial to the selection of the case-studies is the manner in which they force one 
to analyse the domestic and external spheres of the state in conjunction rather 
than isolation. The trans-national character of all three poses one of the greatest 
challenges to their effective management and a direct and persuasive criticism of 
the Realist domestic-stability/extemal-insecurity dichotomy. The domestic- 
international nexus questions the primacy and effectiveness of autonomous 
2 
unilateral state action. The state is susceptible to the influence of not only other 
states but also local, regional and global agents and trends, which the case-studies 
highlight. 
A Comprehensive Security analysis based upon the Pluralist IR. perspective has 
therefore been adopted. This approach acknowledges and emphasises the 
multiplicity and interaction of security threats and the need for a broad range of 
policies and responses to address such problems, which are particularly acute 
during periods of transition. (This is discussed further in Chapter 2. ) 
It is the author's belief that the thesis' structure of three detailed case-studies is 
the most effective manner to conduct this debate. In contrast to either a single 
issue thesis or a broad examination of the general security environment, this 
approach enables individual in-depth analysis of each of the issues but also allows 
for the interdependency of political-security issues to be demonstrated. Both of 
these considerations, the author believes are crucial. Without sufficient depth of 
analysis the processes that determine the transition from legitimate political debate 
to violent conflict or management cannot be understood. This would be lost in a 
more universal survey. The question of interdependency between the case-studies 
and other factors is central to this work and therefore dictates the selection of two 
or more case-studies. As the research demonstrates, the case-studies have 
common and/or shared causes, contributory influences, traits and interactions 
between them. These are frequently negative and reinforce the problems and 
impede successful resolution of them on an individual basis. As Vasilii Vasilenko, 
an environmental politics analyst at the Kazakstan Institute of Strategic Studies, 
noted the region's "ecological problems cannot be solved without the resolution 
of its economic and political ones. "' 
3 
1.2. The Thesis: Its Contribution to 
Contemporarv Research on Central Asia 
The thesis is an original and valuable addition to the body of research on post- 
Soviet Central Asia. It can be regarded as such because of four integral features: 
- The combination of issues selected; 
- The application of an established although relatively recent theoretical 
perspective to a new regional case-study; 
- The date and time-span of the study; and 
- The presentation of original primary material. 
Whilst all three of the case-studies selected have been present in existing literature 
on the region's political and security situation, either in isolation or as 
components of broader surveys, there has been only a limited attempt to 
demonstrate their commonalities, interaction or the political implications 
emanating from this combined challenge. ' 
The thesis is principally empirical but it has clear theoretical assumptions rooted in 
the Pluralist IR. Given the republics' recent independence and the presence of 
trans-national issues, Central Asia provides a new region to evaluate established 
theoretical assumptions and models. The c6ntemporary regional ascendancy of 
issues such as inter-state water competition, the revival of national and religious 
identities and economic and political transformations offer new opportunities for 
research. Literature on environmental security and political Islam, particularly 
empirical works on areas with common or relevant features can now be applied, 
assessed and expanded upon via this study. 
The five year time span, ftom the republics' independence, was selected as a 
means of demonstrating the trends that the states have underwent during this 
important transitional period. With hindsight this has also become a useful 
denouement because of regional changes. These are the Russian-sponsored talks, 
in December 1996, between Tajikistan's President Imomali Rahmonov and Said 
Abdullo Nuri, leader of the United Tajik Opposition (UTO), which led to the 27 
June 1997 Moscow accord between the parties; and the northward advances of 
the Taliban in Afghanistan. ' Both of these events have altered the region's 
political environment. The thesis is therefore*an addition to and progression from 
the early post-independence publications' which were expedient and valid 
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responses to the major transformations of the period. Since the brief tumultuous 
period between 1989-92, when nationalism, inter-ethnic violence and Islamic 
"fundamentalism" were regarded as ascendant, omnipresent and malevolent, there 
has been a "second generation" of publications and research which has been able 
to undertake a more long-term assessment of regional trends. This thesis locates 
itself within this reassessment. 
The thesis' primary claim to originality and advancement of regional research is 
not the presentation of new primary material, rather it is its synthesis of existing 
English and Russian language sources into a comprehensive and original 
argument. New material, principally a result of fieldwork in the republics, is 
however presented in the research. This is particularly the case for the study on 
the Tajik minority in Uzbekistan. To date, there are only two articles in English 
specifically focusing upon the community. Both are by Foltz and whilst valuable 
research they are essentially cultural in orientation. ' The TaJik minority is cited in 
numerous general texts on Central Asia. The discussions contained within these 
are, however, limited in detail, scope and frequently in the reliability and expanse 
of their sources. The historic TaJik-Uzbek cultural conflict, TaJik irredentism in 
Bukhara and Samarkand and territorial claims between TaJikistan and Uzbekistan 
are regularly cited as serious security concerns without any detailed analysis or 
critical examination of the actual basis and saliency of these issues. ' The author's 
research on the subject has a high degree of information collected during the 
period of fieldwork in Uzbekistan, both printed material and interviews with TaJik 
academic, cultural and political representatives, a considerable element of which is 
presented in English for the first time. 
The two states offer a comparative analysis of regional security challenges. 
Uzbekistan and Kazakstan were the first and last of the Central Asian republics to 
declare independence from the USSR, Uzbekistan on 31 August 1991, and 
Kazakstan on 16 December 1991. They provide an original opportunity to study 
the political stability and development of transitional states. Both are new states, 
with no precedents of modem statehood, although their Soviet Socialist Republic 
(SSR) status was accompanied by considerable cultural, economic and political 
functions. Critical issues of statehood, for example, civil society, citizenship and 
sovereignty are in transition. 
Although the republics contain the nuclei of titular nations, as political and 
territorial entities they are essentially Soviet constructions. The legacies of Soviet 
5. 
political norms and structures including the. restricted nature of civil society are 
significant. Whilst the region does contain parallels with other post-colonial 
examples, there are crucial distinctions which make the region unique. These are 
principally related to the nature of the Soviet empire, which prevents an easy 
division between the coloniser and colonised. This was referred to by Spechler, 
with reference to Central Asia, as "Welfare Colonialism. "' 
As well as the shared Soviet experience there are other common themes. The 
republics are the most important of the five Central Asian republics (the other 
three are Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan), in terms of population, gross 
domestic product (GDP), and regional and global political status. Both are faced 
with sizeable minority populations, environmental degradation, economic 
difficulties and are neighboured by states with internal conflicts or potential 
expansionist ambitions. 
Having acknowledged these common themes there are crucial differences between 
the republics. At the time of this study's initiation, 1994, the republics' economic 
and political direction were divergent. Kazakstan was pursuing a vigorous reform 
agenda and Uzbekistan a "gradualist" approach, retaining an authoritarian political 
culture and state-regulated economy. By 1996, the differences were less emphatic, 
although they remained considerable and justify the comparative element of the 
study. 
There are also significant underlying differences between the republics in terms of 
the case-studies. These, discussed in greater detail in the relevant chapters, are: 
- The republics' demography and the relative balance between their titular and 
minority communities: As a region, Central Asia is sparsely populated, with an 
average density of 13.4 people per km 
2 
.' This conceals enormous variations. The 
Uzbekistani viloyet of Andijon, within the Fergana Valley, has a population 
2 density of 427 persons/krn , whilst 
in the Kazakstani desert oblast of Qyzlorda, 
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the figure is 3 people/krn . Uzbekistan 
is the most populous and densely 
populated of the Central Asian states. It has a population of approximately 23 
million, 56% of Central Asia's total population. " In 1997, Kazakstan had a 
population of 18,600,700, the second largest in Central Asia. 
Both republics have heterogeneous populations, each containing in excess of 100 
ethnic groups. In Kazakstan, the titular and Russian communities were roughly 
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equal throughout the late-Soviet period, although the Kazak proportion had been 
naturally increasing since the genocide and out-migration of the 1920-30s and the 
European immigration of the 1950s. In the 1989 census the Kazak proportion of 
the total population was 40% and the combined Russian and Ukrainian proportion 
43%. " Only in 1997 did the Kazaks achieve -an absolute majority in the republic. " 
Unlike Kazakstan, the Uzbeks have dominated their eponymous republic's 
population, throughout its existence. They accounted for 77.5% of the total 
population in 1996. " 
There is another key difference between the republics' titular-minority 
relationships. The cultural boundary between Kazak and Russian is marked by a 
series of ethno-cultural indicators; religion, language and historical modes of 
production. " The Uzbeks, like the Russians, arrived as conquerors but rapidly 
assimilated the culture of their subjects, including sedentarisation, greater 
adherence to Islam and Persian literary high culture for example. " The division 
between the TaJiks and Uzbeks is now blurred. Language is a key disinction. The 
Tajik language is a branch of the Iranian linguistic group whilst modem Uzbek is 
based upon Chaghatai Turkic with similar origins to Kazak, but with TaJik 
influences. " Even the TaJik-Uzbek linguistiý distinction is fluid. Bilingualism is 
common, particularly amongst the minority. Approximately 10% of Uzbekistani 
TaJiks considered Russian or Uzbek as their first language in the 1989 census. " 
The Uzbekistani TaJik dialect has considerable Turkic linguistic characteristics 
too. " 
- The geography and hydrology of the republics. The majority of the region's land 
is steppe or desert. Combined, these flat and and lands stretch from southern 
Siberia and the Kazak Steppe to the Kara Kum Desert and Kyzl Kum Deserts of 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. The region is fringed to the south and east by the 
Kopak Dag, the Pamirs (which cover approximately 90% of Tajikistan) and the 
Tien Shan mountains. Crucial to the four Aral Sea basin republics of Kyrgyzstan, 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan plus the two southern Kazakstani 
oblasts of Shymkent (Chimkent) and Qyzlorda (Kyzl Orda), are the two main 
rivers in the region, the Amu Darya and Syr Darya. With the exception of these 
two oblasts, Kazakstan is geographically external of this eco-system. 9 
- The status of Islam in the two republics. Both states, although dominated 
culturally, demographically and politically by Muslims, are constitutionally 
secular. " The political, social and security implications of religion in the two 
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republics is markedly different. In Kazakstan, the division is between the non- 
Muslim (kafir) European/Slav community, the secular though culturally Muslim 
government and the majority of the Kazak community, and a minority of more 
devout Muslims. In Uzbekistan, Islam is more universally and devoutly professed 
by Tajiks and Uzbeks alike. The division is essentially intra-Muslim, between a 
secular though Muslim-based government, a moderate Muslim majority, and a 
sizeable minority of more committed believers. 
1.3. Methodoloxv 
The thesis is essentially an empirical study, for which a variety of English and 
Russian language primary and secondary printed sources were consulted. This 
work is underpinned by a Pluralist theoretical perspective which is discussed in 
detail in Chapter Two and to a lesser extent in the theoretical introductions to 
each of the case-studies. The assumptions and debates contained within the 
theoretical literature consulted are also discussed in the relevant sections. (See 
particularly 4.2) There are however general concerns about the motives, 
methodology and objectives of academic research on the FSU. This section will 
discuss this and the related issues surrounding fieldwork methodology. 
Like its predecessor, Sovietology, the study of the post-Soviet republics has been 
subject to intense debates concerning its coherence, methods and objectives. The 
core issues pertinent to this thesis are: the accessibility and reliability of primary 
material and the objectivity and motivation of actors and commentators. 
To some extent, these problems have legitimate causes. Whilst the republics and 
information pertaining to them has become more accessible in comparison to the 
Soviet era, particularly the pre-glasnost period, deliberate government censorship, 
self-censorship and mis-information remain evident. There has also been reversals 
in freedom of information and speech, particularly in Uzbekistan. These 
difficulties have not clarified events in Central Asia or aided research. This 
paucity, unreliability and control of information consequently is a constant 
difficulty for those attempting to provide a comprehensive analysis of regional 
events. A key problem is avoiding relying upon such information to a degree that 
its limited nature and reliability does not suggest. Such problems were evident in 
some of the publications which emerged after the disintegration of the USSR. 
Initial predictions of a strong Turkish regional role post-1991 were revised when 
greater realism was injected into the analysis of Ankara's ambitious views on 
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economic and cultural ties with the NISs, the pro-Turkish statements of Central 
Asian elites, and foreign policy aims and capabilities of the Central Asian republics 
themselves. " 
Two other problematic issues when consulting primary and secondary material are 
recognised by the author. These are the differences in intellectual standards and 
values between the Soviet and non-Soviet academic traditions, and the political 
impartiality and objectives of both scholastic communities. 
In the case of the former Sakwa highlights a long-standing debate in Sovietology, 
the extent to which Western political science's assumptions discourse, and 
methodology are relevant for the FSU. " Although Sakwa focuses upon Russia, 
this concern is equally applicable for Centrai Asia. Authors such as Gleason and 
Wittfogel have, for example, emphasised the centrality of water in the region's 
culture and politics. " It is argued that this factor has been influential in the 
establishment of regional traits of deference to authority, and the priority of the 
collective over the individual. The region's distinctive political and social 
development makes concepts including civil society, democracy and freedom of 
speech central to western political traditions, not necessarily easy or relevant to 
apply to Central Asia. Elite and popular political attitudes are regarded as 
axiomatic in the development and/or alleviation of the problems discussed in the 
case-studies. Therefore whilst the application of western political concepts is 
problematic the debate surrounding their inclusion is acknowledged and even 
cultivated in the thesis. 
A more disturbing concern is the objectivity and motivations of authors involved 
in this field. Academic interest in Soviet and post-Soviet affairs has been highly 
charged and a sensitive arena. The issue of impartiality of the region's indigenous 
scholars is noted by Sakwa, re-emphasising Pusic's work. '4 Both are sceptical 
about the development of "an objective social science that would be neutral in 
relation to politics and the state and adhere to its own scholarly criteria" in the 
region. " The work of Kazakstani and Uzbekistani authors, frequently schooled in 
Soviet-era academia, has frequently paralleled and supported government views. 
To some extent this is understandable given the nation- and state-building projects 
that have been undertaken after seventy years of Soviet monopolisation of all 
aspects of public affairs. The constraints upon academic independence and the 
level of research standards amongst post-Soviet scholars are however major 
concerns posing serious questions about the reliability of such material. One 
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interview which the author conducted demonstrated both the close academic- 
political elite relationship and the unreliabi. lity of information accessible in the 
region. In this meeting the Kazakstani analyst complained that Russian research 
on northern Kazakstan was biased and inaccurate whilst he offered migration 
statistics at odds with Almaty's own official and easily available figures. " (See 
3.4. v. ) Similar charges of chauvinism and questionable research methods should 
also be recognised in elements of relevant Russian material. " 
Whilst indigenous criticism of the accuracy and motives of extra-regional writers 
has been frequently alarmist, one needs to acknowledge that the objectives of the 
latter group are at times moot. Western and in particular US interests in 
oil/mineral resources, the threat of Islamic Fundamentalism and Iranian and 
Russian regional interests have infused the debate. Starr's "Making Eurasia 
Stable" is an obvious example of this. " The article's acceptance of 
authoritarianism in Uzbekistan is related to its favourable view of a Tashkent- 
Washington alliance against Iranian, Islamist and Russian regional ambitions. 
In addition to the use of printed primary and secondary sources, the thesis also 
drew upon material collected during fieldwork conducted between September and 
November 1996 in the two republics. This exercise had a series of objectives: 
- To test the working hypothesis of the thesis; 
- To furnish distinct and additional primary information, that was unavailable 
outside of the republics, and; 
- To provide the author with a working knowledge of regional political and social 
norms, i. e. the broader environment in which the case-studies are taking place. 
The principal activity of the fieldwork was the conducting of over 40 elite 
interviews. Interviewees were involved in politics, whether at the national and 
general level or more specifically related to one of the subjects discussed in the 
case-studies. They were drawn from academic, cultural, environmental and 
political bodies and institutions as well . as representatives of international 
organisations (IOs. ). This group had several attributes which made them ideal for 
selection in the interview programme. These centred around their access to 
relevant information and direct experience of the issues under discussion. 
- The interviewees' vocational experience meant they had intellectual and practical 
proximity to the issues under examination. This was a key reason for their 
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selection. Rafik Saifulin, Deputy Director of the Uzbekistani Institute of Strategic 
and Regional Studies for example was an advisor to President Karimov, whilst 
Vasily Vasilenko of the Kazakstan Institute of Strategic Studies co-authored the 
Conception of the Environmental Safety of the Republic of Kazakhstan. " In the 
case of the Tajik case-study, active members of the minority, whether in the 
Samarkand movement, at Tashkent Cultural Centre or scholars at the Samarkand 
State University (SamGU), had direct experience in the group's cultural and 
political revival in the last decade and Tashkent's response to this. " The interview 
programme sought to establish a survey, albeit limited, of the views of figures 
closely involved in or holding relevant information on the issues in the thesis. 
- Interviews with this elite group, all representatives of recognised bodies and 
institutions which had previously publicly commented upon the relevant topics 
meant that their responses could be examined in the context of existing statements 
by these individuals, peers and their and other organisations. It was therefore 
possible to evaluate whether there was consistency in attitudes towards the issues 
over time and in relation to different audiences for this information. 
- The target group was also selected due to its collective familiarity in discussing 
the topics in a structured format. 
- Given the two month duration of the field study it would have been difficult to 
conduct a quantitative-based survey programme. The thesis emphasises the role of 
political elites and central government in determining the development of the 
issues under examination and the instrumentalist and political manipulation of 
them. A broader sociological approach would not have necessarily provided 
relevant or detailed information. Popular limited access to and interest in politics; 
unfamiliarity, scepticism and even suspicion over publicly voicing their own 
opinions reduced the value of this research approach. " (This is discussed further 
below. ) Another constraint on public opinion surveys was its requirement of a 
large body of interviews. Financial, language and time considerations precluded 
such an approach. 
The interviews followed a common format. The majority were formal with 
standard general questions concerning the republics' problems and trends asked of 
all the interviewees. These questions were then supplemented by detailed 
questions tailored to the interviewee's field of expertise. Again a relatively 
consistent range of case-specific questions were asked, about inter-ethnic 
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relations, environmental affairs, international relations or security for example. 
The application of a common framework for all the formal interviews established 
a comparative and cumulative, although small, analysis of elite attitudes and 
knowledge. Individuals were given an opportunity at the end of the interview to 
offer any information that the closed questions had not raised. 
Informal interviews were also conducted whenever the opportunity arose, with 
both relevant elites and general acquaintances of the author. These were useful in 
providing the personal dimension towards key topics and gauging general 
opinions on contemporary life. " 
In addition, the author attended the OSCE Seminar on Sustainable Development 
in the Aral Sea Basin Region, in Tashkent 30 October-1 November 1996, which 
not only provided valuable transcripts and documentation on the region's 
environmental crisis but also an insight into the dynamics of regional diplomacy 
and government- IO/Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) relations. Russian- 
language printed material was also obtained during the visit. The collection of 
original material in the republics was of particular importance for the Tajik case- 
study. 
Whilst the material collected from interviews and more informal contacts during 
the period of fieldwork proved valuable, its constraints, as with some of the 
printed sources discussed above, must be acknowledged. These centre around the 
question of obtaining reliable information in the restricted political culture of Post- 
Soviet societies. Information is frequently regarded as a valuable commodity to be 
restricted as much as possible. In fact given the legacy of closed politics in the 
Soviet period, the continued association between access to information and power 
is understandable. The two governments continue to attempt to monopolise and 
regulate the dissemination of information. This issue has been raised by Lubin, 
Sakwa and Wixman. " Another consideration also highlighted by Lubin and 
Wixman is that of interviewees providing answers that they think are either 
expedient for their own safety or what they feel the interviewer wishes to hear. " 
Wixman found that the most open replies on ethnic identity and inter-ethnic 
relations were articulated by the young, students and mothers, especially in mixed 
marriages, whilst academics, institution staff and all officials replied with answers 
that "read like standard textbooks. 
))35 
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As this section has emphasised primary resources, whether oral or printed, and 
secondary literature frequently contains areas of concern, relating to the accuracy, 
impartiality and reliability of information, and the accountability and objectivity of 
concerned individuals. Whenever possible information has therefore been 
corroborated with other sources. In fact, the reliability of source material, 
produced in a region where government and self-censorship remains endemic and 
information channels are limited in number and variety meant that a cautious 
approach has been adopted throughout. 
1.4. The Structure of the Thesis 
The research is divided between the five subsequent chapters. These are as 
follows: 
- Chapter Two: This will establish the theoretical framework of the study. As such 
it will discuss the debates relating to the concepts of state and security. It will also 
provide an overall literature review on security theory in general and 
comprehensive security in particular. 
Chapters Three, Four and Five, will examine the case-studies on government- 
minority relations, water resources, and Islam respectively. Within each will be a 
theoretical section which will examine specific debates not included in Chapter 
Two, an historical section indicating the background and precedents of the 
subjects under discussion and finally the actual case-study. In the case of Chapter 
Three, the two republics will be examined, as far as, possible as separate entities. 
In Chapter Four, on water resource competition, and to a lesser extent Chapter 
Five, on Islam, a more thematic rather than state-based approach will be adopted. 
This is a consequence of the regional and trans-national nature and implications of 
the issues. 
Chapter Six, the conclusion, will summarise the case-studies, emphasising the 
inter-action between them and with other factors, in particular economic issues, 
that have not been specifically discussed in the main chapters. It will then assess 
the case-studies in the wider economic, political and social milieu indicating the 
implications for the republics' contemporary and future political development and 
stability. 
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2. Defining The State and Securitv 
2.1. Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to establish the theoretical framework for the 
subsequent case-studies. Although this thesis is principally an empirical study, it 
has clear theoretical assumptions rooted in the Pluralist International Relations 
(IR. ) tradition which will be discussed in this chapter. 
The central theme security, is a highly contested concept, as the subsequent 
discussions in this chapter and on environmental security in Chapter 4.2 indicate. 
The concept can be directed towards the individual, group, regime, state or globe. 
Its most common form national security, and its reference, the state, are 
themselves contested concepts. This thesis seeks to move beyond the limitations 
of Realist concepts and theories of the state and security. It is the author's 
contention that security threats are more varied in form and origin than traditional 
IR. theory acknowledges. The domestic realm of the state is as equally liable to 
produce security problems, for the state, as the external arena is. Equally, without 
attempting to provide inclusive security for the entire population the integrity of 
the state, both as a physical entity and a legitimate social structure, is weakened. 
In multi-ethnic entities, such as Kazakstan and Uzbekistan, the need for such an 
interpretation is vital. In common with the majority of the world's states, 
Kazakstan and Uzbekistan do not bear close resemblance to the theoretical model 
advanced by traditional political theory. Although the inconsistencies between 
theory and reality are not unusual, the need to define concepts and terminology 
remains imperative. Discussion upon state and security, particularly the internal 
dynamics of the former and the expansion in the application of the latter, will form 
the basis of this chapter. 
2.2. The State 
2.2j. Introduction: The basis for the definition of the state is the trinity of 
"territory, people and a government. "' The term is as much an abstract notion 
2 based upon political theory and international law as it is an empirical entity. This 
definition only partially explains the state's dynamics. It remains a description of 
the constituent elements of the state. 
The state is greater than the sum of its parts. The difficulty in understanding the 
state is the fact that it is both ideological and physical. Its defacto existence and 
ideological identity are of equal relevance. It is easier to classify those influences 
which belong to the ideological nature of the state rather than those which are 
explicitly physical. Organisational ideology, political theory, international law, all 
exist in the realm of the former. Many of its components, such as society, 
government, territory and nation, have abstract relevance, as well as, a physical 
existence. 
Similarly, definition is not aided by the divergence of academic approaches 
towards the subject. IR. has sought to focus almost exclusively upon the external 
context, neglecting the state's internal dynamics. For traditional Realists, the state 
is "an independent political community"' or "(a) territorial association of people 
recognised for the purpose of law and diplomacy as a legally equal member of the 
system of states ... 
for the purpose of their participation in the international 
system. 114 As such the state is an equal and unitary competitor in international 
affairs. The domestic and external arenas are artificially divorced and imbued with 
different qualities. The former is regarded as stable and the latter anarchical and 
competitive. This division helps explain the traditional external-orientation of 
security studies. 
Alternatively, Sociological and Political Science interest has been focused towards 
the domestic arena. These disciplines regard the state as a "set of administrative, 
policing and military organizations, more or less well-coordinated, by an executive 
authority. "5 As such the state consists of the institutions and structures that 
control the state entity described by IR. thinking. Although Buzan believes that 
the Sociological interpretation of the state "is too narrow to serve as a basis for 
thinking about security, " its significance is that it questions the assumed 
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compatibility and homogeneity of state and society, espoused by Realist thinking. 6 
In its place, this more specific definition recognises the divisions between the 
central executive and political elite and society and within society itself 
The state exists and functions on both the domestic and international fronts. It and 
its constituent elements are subject to both internal and external influences. A 
comprehensive definition that combines both the IR. and Sociological 
perspectives is an effective means of analysing the state. As Buzan comments 
"[t]here is nothing other than the momentum of habit and argument to prevent the 
merger of these two views. 1)7 
In accepting that security threats can originate from within the state, as well as, 
externally it becomes necessary to explore the internal dynamics of the state, as 
highlighted by Skocpol. As a result, sources of competition and ftiction between 
the state components can been assessed and also the inter-action between the 
state's internal and external arenas. 
2.2. ii. The Domestic Dynamics of the State: The complexity of the state can be 
illustrated through the study of the relationship between the constituent elements 
of the state: "the idea of the state"; society; state apparatus; and territory. Unless 
the trinity of territory, population and government are subjected to serious 
analysis the internal dynamics and functioning of the state remain ignored and the 
state is perceived, incorrectly, as an autonomous and coherent organism 
impervious to the influence of other agents. Domestic security challenges 
consequently remain hidden. A failure to accept the susceptibility of the state to 
internal and non-military external influences prevents the construction of a 
comprehensive approach towards state security. 
2.2. ii. a The State and State Apparatus: This is possibly the key distinction to 
highlight. It is essential to indicate the separation of these two terms for this work. 
This is because the relationship between the two is possibly the most intimate and 
ambiguous. It has particularly sensitivity in the security sphere. The central 
apparatus, represents the state entity and under international law has the 
monopoly to employ force as a political instrument, both domestically and 
internationally. As the representative of the state, the government's domestic 
sovereignty demands the loyalty and respect of its citizens. The government is 
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able to derive political legitimacy and support from social identification with the 
state. It is therefore easy for the distinction between government and that state to 
become blurred and abused. As 2.2. ii. d. and Chapter 5 demonstrate, however, a 
regime's authority and legitimacy may also be eroded by these social forces. The 
distinction between the two is not aided by the dual use of the term state, as 
previously noted. With a domestic-orientation the Sociological definition of the 
state is, 
"an organisation composed of numerous agencies led and coordinated by the 
state's leadership that has the ability or authority to make and implement the 
binding rules for all the people, as well as, the parameters of rule making for 
other social organizations in a given territory, using force if necessary to have 
its way. "s 
This conceptualisation, corresponding to that of Skocpol, will be referred to by 
the author as the central executive, government or regime. The central executive 
is the ultimate source of authority within the state. It includes the legislative, 
executive and judiciary, enforcement and defence agencies, the civil service, and 
the personnel within these bodies. The term state will refer to the combination of 
government, "the idea of the state, " population and territory. 
It is because the central executive assumes the role of representative of the state 
that government and state have been often perceived as synonymous. I-Estorically, 
regimes have frequently attempted to legitimise and strengthen their own position 
by associating their own identity and survival with that of the state. In states 
where state-building is in its infancy, the distinction regime security and national 
security is regularly abused and regimes may protect their own survival by 
"provoking national security concems. "9 
The survival of the state is not, however, dependent upon the retention of a 
particular form of government. "Governing institutions can change without 
interrupting the continuity of the state. "10 In Buzan's terminology, it is the 
organisational ideolqy, the intellectual basis of the state that has changed. 
(Discussed below in 2.2. ii. d. ) As Vincent acknowledges "[i]f governments were 
totally identified with the State (sic) then each removal of government would 
entail a crisis in the State. ... This point should make us very wary of linking up all 
practices of government with the State. "" Dramatic transformations, including 
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changes in the state's organisational. ideology or territorial fragmentation may take 
place whilst its international recognition and domestic coherence and 
responsibilities remain intact or are assumed by the successor state(s). In the case 
of the USSR, Russia assumed its international obligations including its permanent 
seat on the 
UN Security Council whilst many of the other successor states although they had 
little or no precedent as sovereign states were integrated into the international 
system. 12 The cross-fertilisation and mutual support between the domestic and 
external duties and spheres of the state act as a stabilising factor when individual 
components of the state are under crisis or transformation. 
The conclusion is, however, stark, state and government cannot be equated. The 
central executive, as the sociological approaches emphasises is an element of the 
greater state totality with its own distinctive characteristics and ambitions. 
Buzan's conclusion that "the reduction of the state to mean simply the institutions 
of central government does not work at the international level" is equally 
applicable to the domestic arena. 13 
2.2. ii. b. The State and Domestic Society: The mistaken direct identification of 
state with society is common and most noticeable in reference to the term 
nation. 14 State and nation have tended to become synonymous to a degree that 
leads many to refer to national interests when in fact they mean state interests, 
while others simply refer to a world of nation-states. Stoessinger's declaration 
that the contemporary world is comprised of over one hundred nation-states and 
that the nation-state has become globally ubiquitous is incorrect. 15 Beetham also 
promotes a similar claim, stating that "in the second half of the present century ... 
since the break-up of the colonial empires ... this formation [the nation-state] 
has 
become universal across the globe. " 16 Nation and state are not, however, 
synonymous. 
The Westphalian concepts of state and sovereignty may have now achieved global 
predominance, and nationalism played a central role in this process but the 
international system is not inhabited by nation-stales. The majority of the world's 
states are multi-ethnic in composition. According to the result of one study, only 
one quarter of the world's states can be equated with "the conventional concept 
of the nation-state. " 17 Only 12 of the 132 states in existence in 1972 had 
20 
homogenous populations. In 40%, the population was divided into at least six 
significant groups. 18 Throughout the Former Soviet Union (FSU) many of the 
successor republics have heterogeneous populations. Kazakstan and Uzbekistan 
both have in excess of one hundred national groups. 
The issue of the nation demonstrates the fragmented nature of society. Societal 
divisions may occur along religious, geographical, gender or economic fissures, 
for example. What is vital for the integrity of the state is its ability to produce a 
coherent focus for popular loyalty and identification, which supersedes or placates 
other allegiances, in order to secure consent. 
The state-society relationship is asymmetrical if not hierarchical. 19 Axiomatic to 
the state's dominant position to domestic society is the concept of sovereignty. 
Sovereignty functions at the two levels of the state, the domestic and the 
international. At its most basic state sovereignty has been defined as the "idea that 
there is a final and absolute political authority in the political community ... and no 
final and absolute authority exists elsewhere. , 20 The state is supreme over its 
domestic charge and equal to all other states in the international system. It is this 
supposition which has enabled the state to transcend, assimilate and ftequently 
destroy "all other political units to the extent that it has become the universal 
standard of political legitimacy. 1)21 
Internationally, state sovereignty is recognised and guaranteed by the international 
community. "States are [viewed as] the persons of public International Law" with 
equal rights to exist and pursue their own domestic agendas as they see fit, in 
return for the mutual respect of other states' territorial and political integrity. 22 
The state system bestows upon its members a self-sustaining legitimacy. As 
Walzer noted "it is not [the] purpose [of] international society to establish liberal 
,, 23 or democratic communities, but only independent ones. 
Domestically, sovereignty offers, theoretically at least, the state "unlimited power 
over its citizens, unrestrained by law. ý)24 Sovereignty assumes that the "state is 
able to enforce decisions and ... maintain order within the state. Thus the capacity 
to exercise coercive authority is an essential ingredient. , 25 Internal sovereignty 
sets the state apart from its population as the ultimate authority in their lives, and 
is able to conduct its internal policies towards them without censure. Sovereignty 
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does not presuppose that the goals and security of state and society are 
necessarily conterminous. Sovereignty provides the state with the right to exist 
even if opposed by the majority of its own population. In "the modem world, ... 
states can be less responsive to, and less representative of their societies precisely 
because of their international role, is submerged, ah initio, by the assumption of 
the 'national-territorial' concept. " 26 
The domestic authority and freedom from interference that sovereignty provides 
the state with have become increasingly conditional. Opinion within the 
international community, particularly since the end of the Cold War is gradually 
accepting the possibility of (humanitarian) intervention. 27As former UN Secretary 
General Javier Perez de Cuellar noted that, 
"we are clearly witnessing what is probably an irresistible shift in public 
attitudes towards the belief that the defence of the oppressed in the name of 
morality should'prevail overfrontiers and legal documents. " 29 
This re-appraisal has allowed for legislation to promote humanitarian 
. 
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rom intervention Sovereignty is, therefore neither an absolute legal protection fi 
external criticism and intervention, nor guarantee of domestic legitimacy. 
The state demands and requires the obedience of its citizens. The state, through 
its central executive enforces compliance. The state apparatus is able to fashion 
social norms through its plethora of administrative, legislative and coercive 
instruments and other indirect mediums, including, education policy, official 
historiography and government appointments and contracts, for example. The 
degree to which the state apparatus has consent and legitimacy acceptance is 
paramount to internal peace and stability. Coercion cannot, however, indefinitely 
maintain the state's authority and legitimacy. In fact "[c]oercion and consent are 
not mutually exclusive but complimentary. 00 The balance between the two is 
delicate. The state apparatus, whether democratic or dictatorial in ideology and 
function requires popular support, as well as, the means of enforcement. Consent 
is one of the requirements of the long-term survival of a state, and regime. 
Although the state can exist for short historical periods without societal consent, 
especially through coercion, there is a need for "a widespread ... 
deep-rooted idea 
of the state among the population" for it to ultimately succeed. 31 It is widespread 
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consensus which provides the cohesion and legitimacy of the state, and determines 
much of its character and authority. 32 (Also see below 2.2. ii. d. ) 
The more fragmented a society is, the potential for intra- and state-society tension 
is enhanced. This is because the idea and the cohesion of the state is less 
developed and vulnerable to challenges. However, if the state attempts to forcibly 
establish an unitary state identity, coercing groups to adhere, or to assimilate into 
the dominant identity, conflict is equally possible as non-mainstream groups may 
resist this process, fearful of the threat to their distinct identity and objectives. 
As well as the state's executive authority posing a threat to its own population, 
domestic groups may constitute a challenge to the integrity of the state. Internal 
threats may range from political opposition to the existing government, to 
irredentism or separatism.. As previously mentioned, however, a change of 
organising ideology does not necessary imply the collapse of the state. The 
dilemma in analysing domestic-oriented state security is the question of when a 
government is entitled to employ force to sustain its own position and the 
integrity of the state. Governments often employ national security requirements to 
justify and increase "their powers against domestic opponents. 03 Frequently these 
proclamations are more to do with the maintenance of regime security than state 
security. The state-society, or more correctly government-society relationship 
frequently results in a problem Buzan and Sorensen have recognised - the state as 
34 the primarily source of threat to the individual's security. This is a fundamental 
concern of this work, requiring the need to establish a form of state security which 
is able to confront the multiplicity of threats emanating from and directed at both 
the state and society. 
2.2. ii. c. The State and Territory: The issue of territory can be divided into two 
related spheres, the physical landmass that a state occupies, and the abstract 
identification of a state with a "homeland. " 
At its most basic, territory provides the space and boundaries of a state. The state 
usually occupies a defined and delimited area. Borders, many artificial in origin, 
have become entrenched. "Mutual territorial recognition ... is the foundation of 
contemporary international society. "" 
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This connection between a particular state and a specific geographic area is not 
always static, although the territorial space of the world's present states is less 
flexible than it was in previous eras. Territorial expansion or contraction, although 
it may indicate the state's stature in the international system, or internal 
demographic, economic or political transformations does not necessarily imply the 
total cessation of the state. Temporary loss of the trappings of statehood and 
sovereignty including the forcible integration into another state, such as the 
incorporation of the Baltic states into the USSR or a major move of territory such 
as Poland's post-W. W. II approximate 300 km westward shift did not obliterate 
the existence or the "idea of state" of these republics. 
The other aspect of the state-territory equation is abstract in nature, equally 
emotional as theoretical. As a metaphysical idea, territory provides considerable 
sustenance for nationalism and the state. In the case of Kazakstan, the Kazaks' 
cultural affinity with the nomadic lands, and the Soviet degradation of these lands 
through agricultural, industrial and military practices were significant factors in 
the rise of late-Soviet Kazak nationalism. The Kazakstani Constitution is a prime 
example of the cooption of land and nation in legitimating the state. The preamble 
to the 1995 Kazakstani Constitution declares that "[w]e, the people of Kazakstan 
... create a state on primordial Kazak 
land . "3' This example 
demonstrates the 
manner in which politicians and society alike attempt to construct a concept of the 
state which derives its origins from a previous association between ethnicity and 
territory and mould the state components into a single homogenous ideal. 
2.2. ii. d. The Idea of the State: As a political entity with an ideological, as well 
as, physical foundation the state is exposed to non-material challenges. "Security 
is as much a psychological concept as it is a physical one. 07 "The idea of the state 
is the most abstract component of the model [the state], but also the most 
central. 08 Its main sources are the concepts of the nation and organising 
ideolov. 39 The idea of the state is likely to be based upon, and reflect, the cultural 
and political norms of the dominant group. The Soviet idea of the state, although 
officially internationalist was deeply infused by the cultural, linguistic, and political 
values of the Russian population. Opposition from the other fourteen republics 
towards the centre was often critical of Moscow's perceived Russo-phile stance. 
The termination of the Sibaral project, for example, was regarded as indicative of 
the preferential treatment of Russian interests within this avowed multi-cultural 
and egalitarian state. (See Chapter 4. ) 
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Consent from non-dominant groups is important for the stability and survival of 
the state. The idea of the state must be perceived to encourage their input and 
promote their interests. A number of multi-ethnic post-colonial states have found 
it difficult to establish social cohesion in the face of deep internal divisions. The 
establishment of nation- and state-identities in Newly Independent States (NISs), 
including the balancing the interests of the different social groups is problematic. 
Ethnic or national identity can act as a precursor to the fragmentation of 
heterogeneous states, if poorly managed by governments or fuelled by nationalist 
politicians. 
The organisational ideology of a state and claims to legitimacy to authority can be 
based upon various intellectual sources: democratic consensus; nationalism; divine 
mandate; or the removal of or distancing from foreign domination, for example. 'O 
The latter is of interest given the differing approaches of Kazakstan and 
Uzbekistan towards Russia and the role Islam in the establishment of post-Soviet 
state identities. Security and demographic considerations also affect the differing 
postures. Kazakstan's potential for distancing itself from Russia is restricted and 
not politically advantageous. Negative ideological stances, such as opposition to 
Islamic fundamentalism, can also be used. An effective and accepted ideological 
foundation can enhance state cohesion, regime legitimacy and mitigate pressures 
for material benefits. Park and Parks' work on North Korea and China note that, 
"in order to generate popular support whilst denying the people substantial 
improvements in material well-being the government needs to make 
extraordinary efforts to legitimize its powers. In these efforts, the leadership 
invariably adopts an official ideology with which to indoctrinate and mobilise 
the people. With the help of such an ideology, a regime that is incapable of 
providing the people material incentives and eqonomic opportunities can 
solidify its power base by means of mass mobilization. , 
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Legitimacy is not dependent upon a specific form of government, rather it is 
related to refers to whether citizens regard the existing system as competent, 
"proper and deserving of SUpport. "42 If it is perceived as such consent may be 
granted. 
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The idea of the state may be deep-rooted and widely accepted or superficial, its 
support limited to perhaps the ruling clique. Narrower ideas are more difficult to 
implement and gain consensus. If the foundation myth is strong and broadly 
accepted then the state may be able to survive periods of crisis, without a serious 
threat to its integrity emerging. 43 
Failure to achieve support from the majority influential sections of society can 
weaken legitimacy, and ultimately stability. "If the ideas themselves are weak; or if 
they are weakly held within society; ... then the state stands on 
fragile political 
foundations iv44 Challenges are particularly effective if state-building is still in 
process or the government's legitimacy is weak. Consequently "regime legitimacy 
is a fundamental requisite for national security in many contemporary Third World 
countries. 1)45 
Erosion of legitimacy frequently occurs when the material progress of the state is 
faltering. The failure to provide benefits, both physical and metaphysical, to its 
population, seriously weakens support for the ideological project. The crisis of 
legitimacy and related political and social instability can weaken the security 
capabilities of the state and perceptually enhance the relative strength of internal 
and external threats. "All of this suggests that no government can sustain a sound 
security posture for any length of time if its popularity and bureaucracy have 
grown apathetic and indifferent. "46 
In response, the regime "may invent a new national security ideology and attempt 
to indoctrinate and contain those who oppose the regime. )A7 This can include the 
"creation" of new threats, legitimising the repression of domestic opposition and 
suggest such groups are disloyal and associated with tangible external opponents. 
Azar and Moon, however, declare that the creation of "enemies", for repression 
purposes can be hazardous and counter-productive, potentially destroying both 
state and regime secufity. 49 
The state's poor security capabilities in this heightened security environment may 
also result in the establishment of alliances with more powerful states. These 
alliances are liable to be asymmetrical with the legitimacy-weak state finding itself 
in a dependent position. As discussed in Chapter Five, the issue of foreign 
dependency has been a core source of Islamist critiques of Muslim governments. 
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Attempts to protect the state through this policy can further erode domestic 
legitimacy. 
Gasiorowski's work on the Pahlavi regime in Iran, illustrated the difficulty in 
establishing and perpetuating an effective and popular foundation ideology, in the 
face of material difficulties and a viable alternative. The dynasty sought to identify 
itself and the Iranian state with ancient figures and traditions including the Persian 
leaders, Cyrus and Darius, and Islam. The regime's legitimacy was seriously 
weakened by material factors; corruption, political repression, economic 
inequalities, and foreign dependency and manipulation. Anti-Pahlavi protest which 
culminated in the 1979 Revolution was a fusion of nationalism and a radical 
interpretation of Shi'ism. This combination, which appealed to the working and 
middle classes, was able to undermine the ideological foundation of the regime, as 
well as, criticise its material deficiencies "through the metaphor of Shia Islam. )A9 
Buzan, however, interprets the fall of the Shah not solely as the triumph of 
political Islam but as an example of the twentieth century phenomenon of populist 
victories over autocratic regimes. He concludes that it is difficult to understand 
how dictatorships manage to retain power in this era of the masses and ultimately 
questioned their long-term survival. 50 
As the Iranian example demonstrates, the idea of state is a contested concept. 
Political autarky has become increasingly difficult to achieve. Physical borders are 
permeable to the infiltration of ideas and information. The reported presence of 
Korans printed in Afghanistan and tapes of the Ayatollah Khomeini, in Soviet 
Central Asia demonstrated the difficult in intercepting such material in even the 
most regulated states. " In fact, it is under these conditions that such imports 
become serious threats. The distinction between acceptable dissemination of 
information and cultural expression, and hostile propaganda and ideological 
penetration is unclear. Governments are faced by a difficult if not impossible task 
in filtering the import of ideas into the state. 52 
Ideological security challenges emphasise the blurred nexus between the external 
and domestic, and the subjective and objective. In the case of the former, it is not 
always possible to identify the origins of hostile ideas vAth a specific location. 
Internal opponents may or may not be linked to an external enemy with similar 
ideological stance. Risk perception is significant in this debate. The recipient, may 
perceive an ideological statement in a manner very differently to that in which it 
was intended or in respect of the capabilities supporting it. "Although actors are 
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aware of the difficulty of making their threats and warnings credible, they rarely 
believe others will misinterpret [them]. 7753 One state's "idea of the state" may 
intrinsically contradict that of another. This mutual incompatibility may inhibit 
dialogue and confidence between the parties. 
Equally problematic is that whilst "[flhe idea of the state is a central issue in 
national security ... [it is problematic] how to apply a concept like security to 
something as ephemeral as an idea. 7754 Political threats are directed at the 
organisational stability of the state and because "the state is essentially a political 
entity, political threats may be as much feared as milita . ry ones. "55 
2.2. M. External Influences UDon the State: The state and its internal 
components do not function in isolation. Traditional IR. accepts, if not bases the 
state's foundation and raison detre on its international status. It exists to 
compete in the international system. The international system does legitimate an 
individual state through international agreements, diplomacy and mutual 
recognition of borders. This is frequently an acceptance of previous events. States 
regularly establish de facto sovereignty before the international community's 
recognition. The state's creation and survival is therefore not exclusively a 
consequence of the international system. 
There are a plethora of external influences upon the state and state security. Issues 
such as cross-border nations with separatist or irredentist ambitions, and 
international organisation (IOs) can exist within the Realist paradigm. Other 
influences upon the state challenge Realist assumptions. 56 These agents are not 
just those physically outside of the state, but also those excluded from the 
traditional conceptualisation of the state and international affairs. The term 
external is as much an issue of analytical compartmentalisation as of geographical 
location. The structure and influence of international economics and 
environmental issues cannot be fully explained from a Realist perspective. The 
two have forced states to accept a degree of interdependence and co-operation 
that the Realist image of the "Anarchical Society" would find unrecognisable. The 
state, as an unilateral actor, is unable to deal with some regional and global issues, 
whose trans-national and non-state characteristics are indicative of the 
international system's complexity and interdependency. 57 
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International interdependency frequently regarded as a source of cooperation and 
integration, also has the potential for increased conflict. The latter is a 
consequence of the fact that states and individuals are competing for the same 
resources, and also the tensions between assimilation and competition between 
local and global identities. Globalisation and interdependency have a significant 
and contradictory impact upon group identities too. Paradoxically, the proximity 
they have brought can establish sources of tension to the extent that, 
"humanity is becoming simultaneously more unified and more fragmented. ... Humanity is becoming more integral and intimate even as the differences in 
the conditions of separate societies are widening. Under these circumstances 
proximity, instead of promoting unity, gives rise to tensions promoted by a 
sense of global congestion. " 58 
Bull, in fact, argues that this level of intimacy is inherently unstable and 
confrontational as he does not believes that "the growth of conununications 
[between society of great divergence] Aoes anything to promote global ... 
perspectives and institutions. "" Other authors recognise the contradictory impact 
of the process in that the 
"same globalizing technologies are also encouraging localization processes. 
The loss of autonomy that individuals and groups have experienced through 
the globalization process [leads them to] seek to protect their physical and 
mental interests by reverting to more reassuring affiliations. " 60 
The revival in ethnic and religious identification are examples of this localising 
dynamic generated by globalisation. Thus Kazakstan. and Uzbekistans' integration 
into the international system may heighten domestic tensions. 
It is important to emphasise the manner in which interaction and interdependency 
are vital in the understanding of state security. It is impossible to isolate the 
domestic and international spheres of the state from each other, as the case- 
studies will demonstrate. It is perhaps this association that is the most damning 
criticism of the sovereignty of the state. The domestic-intemational relationship 
destroys the myth of state autonomy. The conventional division between 
sociology and politics is an artificial academic construction. A multi-disciplinary 
approach is needed to understand the position of the state in complexities of an 
interdependent world. 
29 
States, by consent and necessity, are renouncing a degree of sovereignty to 
manage issues clearly beyond their unilateral capabilities. International agreements 
and organisations have managed to elicit some sovereignty away from the state, 
even though these bodies are founded by and organised on behalf of their member 
states. International regimes are engaged in all aspects of international activity. 
These organisations have established their own identities and agendas. 
Membership of these inter-state bodies restricts the state's ability to act 
independently. As a result, 
"regimes and international institutions are coming (sic) to form new centrcs 
of authority that challenge the authority of national governments. Increased 
levels of institutionalisation are therefore placing growing constraints, 
practical and normative, on the sovereignty of states. " 
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The erosion of sovereignty by international regimes has, however, been limited. 
The intemationalisation of global problems and processes may in fact be 
increasing the state's political authority. These new organisations and mechanisms 
are based on collective state membership and co-operation. State's may be 
"willing to trade a degree of legal freedom ... on a particular 
issue in return for a 
greater degree of practical influence over policies of other states and over the 
management of common problems. 1)62 
There has, however, been a transformation in international society. No longer are 
states seen to be independent, self-reliant actors in an anarchical society but 
participants in a complex network, with common responsibilities and goals. The 
international system is moving "beyond Westphalia . 7763 
"Sovereignty has always 
been a socially constructed right: not something that could be claimed solely on 
the basis of power, but a quality grounded in a common and evolving set of 
understandings between a group of states. ý)64 
Newly independent states, frequently post-colonial constructions, and their 
governments are more dependent upon the norms of the international system to 
maintain their legitimacy and integrity than the more developed and homogenous 
states. The lack of internal cohesion and legitimacy can force them to rely on 
external support and norms. This reliance may in fact force them to recognise 
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other norms of human rights and political representation as well as principles of 
sovereignty and non-intervention. As Bess Brown, OSCE Human Dimension 
Officer, in Tashkent, informed the author, "the successor states have signed on to 
be part of Europe, so they must play by Europe's basic [political] standards. ))65 
Trans-national corporations (TNCs) have been even more effective in highlighting 
the complexities of international affairs. These non-state businesses have wielded 
considerable influence over individual states, particularly developing states, and 
the international system as a whole. Trade has throughout history sought to 
establish networks external of the state system. The main focus of interest in the 
global economy, for this thesis, is the manner in which its actions and agents limit 
the independent decision-making abilities of the state. Rosenau believes that 
economics offer the greatest example of boundary shifts in the international 
system, lessening loyalties to the state and encouraging activities and ties "to 
wider and narrower organisational unitS. i766 The capacity of states is "constrained 
by the pressure and constraints of an increasingly globalized world economy. viV 
The fact that TNCs require political goods from the state, including economic 
stability and security and therefore has to enter into a bargaining process with the 
state emphasises networks between state and non-state actors. 
With the exception of the territorial component of the state, the role of the 
environment in IK has until recently been neglected. For Hurrell, the saliency of 
interdependency and the permeability of state sovereignty is emphasised by the 
recent inclusion of the environment into IR. discourse. He declares that, 
"[e]cological challenges force us to reopen questions about the nature and 
limits of state sovereignty. Claims to sovereignty are being called into question 
by the limited capabilities of states to deal with environmental threats, by the 
mobilisation of new social actors around environmental issues, by the loss of 
state control of the workings of the global economy, and by the increasingly 
dense set of international institutional arrangements designed to manage 
environmental problems. Moreover ... growing awareness of environmental 
problems and environmental interdependence has created a new sense of 
planetary consciousness which is leading to a new form of non-territorial 
based political identity and new mechanisms of political organisation and 
action. " 
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States are unable to isolate themselves from the trans-national influences of the 
environment or their ability to act independently. The influence of the 
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environment is frequently regional if not global, indirect, and non-specific requires 
a response that is co-operative and regional, even if the independent state is acting 
for self-interested objectives. (These issues are expanded in 4.2. ) 
2.2. iv. Conclusion: The State Defined: The purpose of this discussion was to 
illustrate the dynamics of the state and recognise the multiplicity of influences 
creating and constraining it. The constituent elements of the state: the idea of the 
state; society; central executive; and territory, all required by the state can be 
temporarily absent or separated. Their character can also change over time. 
Equally their interactions and individual goals are not always harmonious or 
symbiotic. The state is able to sustain major transformations without its survival 
being imperilled. It is apparent that the state can survive changes to its constituent 
elements including territorial loss, a revolutionary change in government, or 
massive human losses providing its governmental and societal base are strong. " 
A constant theme is the manner in which the relationship between these elements 
affects the integrity and security of the state totality. Buzan has established a 
division between weak and strong states, based upon their socio-political 
cohesion . 
7' The weak-strong state dichotomy examines the coherence and 
political validity of the state rather than the relative economic and military power 
of states, external in its projection, that has been IR. 's traditional focus. Weak 
states, Buzan argues, are those in which the idea of the state, the institutions of 
the state and social consent fail to create a clearly defined and coherent basis for 
the state. Social and political fragmentation, frequently along ethnic divisions, is a 
distinct possibility, with the ultimate destruction of the state, resulting in either 
anarchy or the establishment of numerous smaHer state entities. For Buzan, a 
majority of weak states are post-colonial constructions in which the relationship 
between their multi-ethnic society and state have not been consolidated. The 
NISs' state-building projects are likely to include domestic violence, as had been 
the case with the European states in previous centuries. This initial period of 
independence and state-building is a problematic time. Domestic threats and 
vulnerabilities are the principal concern for the recently established governments. 
As Buzan concludes, within the weak state the "idea of the state" and the 
institutions are contested. Threats to the individual, community and regime 
emanate from within the state. " "Factional interests are provided with a 
legitimacy they do not merit, " as competing groups strive to control the state. 72 
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Statehood is maintained through their external role, membership of the 
international community, rather than their domestic authority and legitimacy. 
Strong states, implying a greater sense of societal consent and identification with 
the state, have had a long history to achieve ethnic homogeneity and consolidation 
of state authority. Domestic consent about the "idea of the state" and institutions 
is well developed. Government policies and state security bear greater correlation 
with the interests of wider society. The majority of security threats for these 
integrated states are external in origin. 
This dichotomy is of value in analysing Kazakstani and Uzbekistani security. The 
issue is whether Kazakstan and Uzbekistan can achieve the status of strong state. 
The state components of the two republics are under transition. The "idea of the 
state", society, state apparatus and territory all have ambiguous historical legacies 
and contemporary status. If they are to be successful in the state-building 
enterprise and achieve strong state status then the governments have to be aware 
that the states are neither autonomous nor static structures and cannot be simply 
equated with one of the constituent elements. The states are subject to multiple 
influences and only through addressing the whole of this network can the state 
expect to achieve security. The conclusion will briefly examine the historical 
legacies and current position of the state components in the two republics. 
Beyond the elevation of Kazakstan and Uzbekistans' state apparatus from 
republican to sovereign status and the move towards democratisation, the Soviet 
legacy remains highly evident. The present politicians and civil servants, although 
increasingly titular in composition, are drawn from the former-Communist 
nomenklatura. Both Presidents Karimov and Nazarbaev were previously First 
Secretary of their respective SSRs. 
Post-Soviet political developments have been problematic. Constitutional balance 
of powers between Executive, Legislative and Judiciary have been ignored or 
revised in favour of the Executive. The Uzbekistani President has wide-ranging 
powers including the appointment of the prime minister, cabinet ministers, hokims 
(regional governors) and the right to dissolve the 01i Majlis, Uzbekistan's 
unicameral parliament . 
7' Karimov and Nazarbaev have attempted to personalise 
their presidential rule and imply that the well-being even survival of the republics 
are closely related to the maintenance of their own rule, a sentiment mirrored in 
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Olcott's reference to Nazarbaev as "Kazakhstan's 'Unconventional Weapon. m74 
(This point is discussed further in 3.4. ii. b. ) 
The authority and status of the parliamentary systems, in the two republics, have 
been unstable. In Kazakstan, for example, a presidential slate appointed 
approximately a quarter of the Majlis, and seven of the 42 members of the upper 
75 house, the Senate. (Both were created after the Supreme Kenges was dissolved 
in December 1994. ) Their authority in relation to the Executive has been eroded. 
(See 3.4. ii. b. ) In Uzbekistan, a nascent multi-party democracy has been curtailed. 
Genuine democratic movements including Birlik, Erk and the Islamic Renaissance 
Party (IRP), were outlawed and replaced by government-sponsored parties, the 
Social Democracy Party of Uzbekistan (Adolat), the Progress of the Homeland 
Party (Vataii Taraqqiyoto Partiyasi), the Popular Democracy Party of Uzbekistan 
(the successor to the Communist Party), and the nominally non-affiliated regional 
bloc. 
The two republics' societies have seen cultural changes since independence. In 
both the cultural and political status of the titular nations have become axiomatic 
to the states' identities. This has implications for communal relations. 
In Central Asia individual and group identification with the state is uncertain. 
Traditional identities have been local or supra-national. Although both were 
eroded by Soviet-instigated "nation-building from above" and more natural 
national consolidation trends, sub-state identities remain significant. 76 prior to the 
Soviet national-delimitation, 1920-36, the political entities were not based upon 
the nation. Group and state boundaries were not synonymous. Although groups 
such as the Kazaks and Pamirs by the nature of their lifestyle were concentrated in 
specific areas, the Steppe and Tien Shan mountains, respectively, within the heart 
of Transoxania the proximity of various topographies encouraged contact 
between groups and inclusion into large loose political entities. The khanates of 
Bukhara, Khiva (Khorezm) and Kokand were explicitly multi-ethnic in 
composition. In fact, politics in the khanates functioned by balancing the influence 
and interests of the ethnic groups. Sedentary interest groups, including the multi- 
ethnic army and administration, and the Sufi orders, in particular the 
Naqshbandiyya, were used by the khans to counter Uzbek rivals. 
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Kazak society was based around a nomadism. This form of existence favoured 
small socio-political structures, most notably the aul and zhuz. 77 Larger political 
formations were temporary expedients, used for arbitration, and the raising of 
taxes, men and animals for war. Prolonged or extensive state activity, such as 
excessive demands for manpower, was injurious to the social and economic well- 
being of the society. Migrations would be disrupted, family units dispersed and 
ultimately the state (khan) would be unable to prevent men returning to their auls. 
The ecological interpretation, associated with Masson Smith, regards "the 
nomadic state [as]... weak, and discontinuous [and] the nomad.. a natural 
anarchi St. vy 78 Consequently neither a well-defined sense of a Kazak nation or state 
was developed prior to the influence of Russian colonial administration in the 
nineteenth century. 79 
Sub-state units, such as the Kazak zhuz and Uzbek mahalla (neighbourhood) have 
seen a cultural and political renaissance since independence. Supra-national 
identities, including Islam, Persian and Turkic appellations, have been less 
resistant to national-consolidation. 
The societal divisions with the greatest poignancy for state integrity and security 
are ethnicity in Kazakstan (i. e. Kazak-Russian), and intra-ethnic regional divisions 
in both Kazakstan and Uzbekistan between the three zhuz, and between the 
regions of Bukhara-Samarkand, Fergana, Kashka-Darya--Surkhan Darya, 
Khorezm and Tashkent, respectively. 'O The cross-border nature of the two 
republics' populations is significant. The titular and Russian and Tajik minority 
groups are all present in other states. In fact, the minorities selected are titular 
nations in neighbouring republics. As a result inter-state relations are imbued with 
issues concerning diasporas, irredentism and minority rights. 
The implications from these territorial issue for Kazakstan and Uzbekistan are 
unclear. Buzan's contentions that inter-state territorial conflict is a "characteristic 
of an immature state systenP and that it is only "as states acquire longer histories 
themselves [that] they begin to identify permanently with quite closely defined 
territories" are not encouraging for the two NISs. " Their existing forms were 
constructed by Moscow. The Socialist Soviet Republics' (SSRs) territorial 
delimitation were arbitrary and fluctuated. In the case of Kazakstan any sense of a 
defined Kazak space was only achieved through Tsarist colonial administration. 
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The transient nature of the SSRs saw a series of land transfers between the 
Central Asian SSRs and the Russian Socialist Federation of Soviet Republics 
(RSFSR), did not provided consistent borders in the Soviet period. 82 As a 
consequence, territorial claims, although not advanced by the respective 
governments, remain a sensitive issue. (The cases of Russian territorial interest on 
northern Kazakstan and Tajik and Uzbek counter-claims over Bukhara- 
Samarkand and Khojent are discussed 3.4. v. & 3.5. v. c. ) 
Conversely, for Uzbekistan, two of the pre-Russian khanates, Bukhara and Khiva 
retained their territorial integrity until the Soviet administrative restructuring of 
the 1920s. Carlisle argues that the territorial basis of Uzbekistan has remained 
constant because the Uzbek SSR was a successful expansion of Bukhara, lobbied 
by the Young Bukharans, under Faizulla Khojaev. 83 The mutual recognition of 
existing borders, the basis of the international system, offsets the potential 
plethora of counter-claims of the republics. 
The idea of the state in both republics have, at least superficially, undergone major 
transformation. The Marxist-Leninist ideological framework has been replaced by 
a mixture of democratic, free-market and "Asian values. " The latter has been 
particularly evident in Uzbekistan. " However, the lack of a clear separation 
between the Communist and post-Communist regimes compromises the 
legitimacy of the Almaty and Tashkent governments. 85 
Consequently, the republics of Kazakstan and Uzbekistan have brief historical 
legitimacy, whilst sub-state identities have remained influentual. Their physical 
existence and political legitimacy are founded upon external decisions with limited 
domestic inputs. It is these considerations that pose serious threats and 
vulnerabilities to the political and territorial integrity of Kazakstan and 
Uzbekistan. 
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2.3. The Comprehensive Securitv Concept 
2.3J. Introduction: The aim of this section is to locate the three case-studies 
within the field of security studies. Their incorporation into security is only 
possible through a perspective that acknowledges a role for non-state actors and 
processes. Consequently a comprehensive security approach, based upon the 
Pluralist IR. discourse is advanced. The theoretical and empirical needs for 
advancing this broader image of security will be discussed, in reference to the 
limitations, often self-imposed and acknowledged, of the traditionally dominant 
theories in IR_ and security, the Realist and neo-Realist schools. Due to Realism's 
intellectual near-hegemony over IR. and security it is necessary, firstly, to examine 
and challenge Realist assumptions, especially in relation to empirical realities and, 
secondly, to define and justify the expansion in the scope of security. 
2.3ji. Realist Security Re-examined: The initial post-World War I Idealist 
genesis of the discipline of IR. foundered upon the empirical crises which beset 
the international system: the failure of the League of Nations; the rise of rogue 
states in the 1930s; W. W. 11; and the onset of the Cold War. It is understandable 
that in such a climate of continued threat to individual states and the state system 
that security discourse became acutely focused upon these concerns. 
For Realists, state sovereignty and autonomy, the anarchical nature of the 
international system, and the military and external origin of threats to the state are 
axiomatic. Self-help, including the use of force, is regarded as the best means of 
achieving national security. Systematic stability is achieved primarily through 
unilateral military defence and the balance of power. 86 Security is both clear and 
limited in its application. " Ayoob summarises these points succinctly when he 
states that security is traditionally underpinned by, 
"two major assumptions: one, that most threats to a state's security arise from 
outside its borders and two, that these threats are primarily, if not exclusively 
military in nature and usually require military response. "88 
The first assumption is related to the rather two-dimensional nature of Realist 
state conceptualisation, previously discussed. It is, however, difficult to sustain 
this view that the sole threats to the state are external, and result of military 
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aggression from other states. The state's security is also influenced by the 
network of relationships between internal and external actors. In fact, evidence 
indicates that since 1945 inter-state conflicts have been the exception. 89 All the 47 
conflicts active in 1993 were intra-state in character. 9' Admittedly many of these 
conflicts are struggles for control of the state apparatus or secessionist and 
therefore support the contention that the state is the prime political unit of human 
organisation. The intra-state origins of these conflicts, however, weakens the 
Realist hypothesis that security should be primarily concerned with state-state 
relations and the division between domestic stability and international anarchy. 
Allison's statement that in the FSU "internal threats to regime stability are ... more 
immediate and challenging than direct external threats, although the principal 
internal threats are often perceived as external instigated" also endorses this 
argument. 91 
Azar and Moon argue that intra-state conflicts were ignored by traditional 
security discourse as they were regarded as internal threats to social order rather 
than national security, and would decline as a result of successful state-building 
programmes. 92 Domestic unrest was also regarded as internal policing problems 
not a security threat. The supposed separation of the internal and external spheres 
of the state, the former equated with stability and the latter insecurity is 
unfounded. It fails to expose sub-state security issues, including the relationship 
between an individual's security and his/her ethnicity, class, gender and other 
social identities that may cross state boundaries, as well as, the relationship 
between individuals and communities and the state regime. Examination of inter- 
state conflict does not fully explain the wider security dilemmas facing a 
considerable percentage of the world's population and, by implication, its states. 
As Buzan acknowledges "national security cannot be considered apart from the 
internal structure of the state, and the view from within not infrequently explodes 
the superficial image of the state as a coherent object of security. "9' 
The second of the core Realist principles, as surnmarised by Ayoob, is the pre- 
eminence of military solutions in addressing state insecurity. This prescriptive 
element of Realist security theory is highly problematic, resulting in the security 
dilemma, discussed below. If one can use a medical metaphor, the Realist 
approach seeks only to addresses the symptoms, military threats, rather than the 
causes of the illness. Management or containment of a threat is achieved through 
further reliance on military defence. As a consequence military threats become 
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perceived as the source of tension and the underlying non-military sources are 
neglected. Whilst security policies, defence forces and weaponry are increasingly 
destructive in themselves, they are merely instruments, and it is the underlying 
fundamental concerns that lead to a state resorting to military action that require 
the greatest attention. 94 (See 2.4. iii. b., 2.4. iii. c.; & Chapter 4, for the socio- 
economic costs of defence expenditure, and the health and environmental 
consequences of modem military defence. ) NElitary action is only one possible 
response. Due to the security dilemma it is debatable whether it is the most 
effective. 
Ullman argues that security has remained inextricably linked to military threats 
because this is intellectually less demanding than an attempt to re-appraise the 
definition and remit of security. For Ullman this singular focus is, 
"doubly misleading and therefore doubly dangerous. First, it causes states to 
concentrate on military threats and ignore other and perhaps more harmful 
dangers. Thus it reduces their total security. And second, it contributes to a 
pervasive militarization of international relations. That in the long-term can 
only increase global insecurity. " 95 
It is contentious whether a reliance on arms hardware actually solves the long- 
term and underlying sources of state insecurity. Counter-productive internal and 
external repercussions are common. The 1982 Independent Commission on 
Disarmament and Security Issues Common Security: A Bhteprint for Survival 
(also known as Ae Palme Report) recognised the inherent contradictions of 
Realist security thinking. The Commission argued that unilateral military security 
will not provide complete defence from modem high-technology weaponry or 
alleviate the underlying tensions. Increased military spending whilst attempting to 
counter external threats may increase domestic social-econon-dc vulnerabilities and 
heighten regional tensions. 96 
In terms of external implications, excessive emphasis upon military defence, 
including state arms procurement, is ambivalent and unpredictable. The "security 
dilemma" is a consequence of the state's independent attempt to achieve total 
security, in an anarchical world. They compete with each other for limited 
resources, including security. Total security, the aim of each state (a necessary 
requirement because of the international system's insecurity Realists would argue) 
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is, however, impossible to achieve. One state's attempt to defend itself through 
military protection fuels the insecurity of other states, who will perceive that their 
own security is being compromised and attempt to rectify this through their own 
military build-up. Where the underlying regional political environment is unstable 
"(t)he durability and robustness of a relationship based upon a mutual deterrence 
must surely be suspect. )M In periods of tension, incidents may escalate rapidly 
given each sides fear of the opponent's ability to launch a pre-emptive strike. 
Stability and trust are not encouraged in such an environment. Arms are seen as 
the panacea, as well as, cause of insecurity. Modem weapon systems, particularly 
missile technology combined with nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) 
payloads, make such scenarios more precarious, because of their ability to deliver 
highly destructive warheads rapidly with little warning and ease of penetrating 
defensive systems. This makes pre-emptive strikes the most effective and best 
means of achieving victory. " The security dilemma has become increasingly acute 
due to the difficulty in distinguishing between purely defensive and offensive 
systems and the resulting inability of states to indicate to each other their true 
intentions. 99 "[D]ecision makers seem oblivious to the fact that increasing their 
arms can have undesirable and unintentional consequences. " 100 There is almost a 
negation of the implications, "for all is unpredictable-although hardly 
unexpected. " 10 1 Realists would counter that a balance of power can be reached 
but such a conclusion requires a confidence, rationality and transparency that does 
not fit easily with the anarchical. assumptions of Realism. 102 
The Cold War nuclear balance of power between the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) on the 
European Continent had serious deficiencies. It was achieved through an arms 
escalation of epic economic proportions; strategic assumptions grounded in 
nuclear deterrence; and the failure to curtail, and in many cases the 
encouragement of conflicts elsewhere around the globe. This precarious 
equilibrium had little positive impact on the rest of the world, demonstrating the 
exclusive and competitive nature of Realist theory and practice. The Cold War 
stand-off in Europe probably encouraged an export of conflict to the "periphery" 
and "increased Southern insecurity. ""' Of the 127 conflicts between 1945-88, all 
but two were situated in the Third World. 104 This point illustrates the highly 
selective empiricism of the Realist argument. Its Euro-centric and super-power 
focus failed to recognise the bipolar balance of power's role in peripheral but real 
conflicts. 'O' 
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The security dilemma argument may not be directly and universally applicable to 
the Central Asia in terms of advanced weapon systems, although all the Central 
Asian republics have relatively advanced weapon systems, of Soviet origin, and 
neighbours and potential adversaries with similar systems. 106 The concern over 
pre-emptive strikes and rapid delivery systems has some relevance for Central 
Asia. Although Kazakstan's territorial expanse would enable it to sustain an 
invasion to a greater degree than Uzbekistan, however, one of the reasons cited 
for the move of capital fromAJmaty to Astana was the former's proximity (300 
km) to the Chinese border. 107 
The security dilemma is more relevant for Central Asia in assessing the intentions 
of competing groups, particularly over the issue of offensive-defensive ambiguity. 
Within the FSU region, Posen suggests, that the successor states, in this initial 
period of state-building, are facing this dilemma, uncertain of their own internal 
stability and legitimacy, and unsure of the intentions of their neighbours. As a 
result, they are "doubly vulnerable. " log This analysis emphasis the internal 
considerations for the newly independent states. As yet neither of the 
governments has had to test its domestic legitimacy and support in a period of 
regional crisis. In this transitional period there are "windows of vulnerabilities and 
opportunities" in which states and groups are working out their positions in 
Central Asia's security structure. 109 
In conclusion, Rothstein's critique of Realist security exposes the problematic at 
the heart of its theory and practice. 
"Realism has the ring of truth to it for men compelled to work in an 
environment which they can not always understand and can never adequately 
control. It provides a few simple keys which facilitate understanding (if only, 
inevitably, by oversimplification) and intellectual justification for the failure to 
control (for all is unpredictable-although hardly unexpected) ... What it has done has been to foster a set of attitudes that predisposed its followers to think 
about international politics in a particular narrow and ethno-centric fashion, 
and to set out very clear bounds around the kinds of policies which it seemed 
reasonable to contemplate. And once decisions have been made, it has 
provided the necessary psychological and intellectual support to resist 
criticism, to persevere in the face of doubt, and to use any means to out wit or 
to dupe domestic dissenters. " 110 
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2.3. iii. Economics and Security: This section will briefly examine the 
relationship between economics and security as although it is an important 
subject, the influence of economics upon Kazakstan and Uzbekistans' security has 
not been included as a case-study and therefore a brief discussion is required to 
indicate its significance. Economics has not been selected as a case-study for two 
reasons. Firstly, the relevance of global economics and the transformation of the 
Soviet centrally planned system on contemporary Central Asian politics has 
already been widely acknowledged and therefore as a consequence been studied 
to a far greater degree than other regional issues. "' Secondly, due to the 
interdependency between the factors within the case-studies, the influence of 
economics will be duty recognised in all the subsequent chapters. 
The focus will be upon two concerns. These are: the manner in which global 
economics influences regional and local instability through serious economic 
disparities and competition; and the economic cost of defence expenditure. By 
implication, the examination of economic aspects of security, will further highlight 
the deficiencies in the Realist perspective. 
States only have limited influence over the structure and behaviour of the 
international economic system. As such, it is difficult for individuals, groups and 
states to achieve economic security. The national economy, however, is part of 
the physical base of the state, affecting its domestic and external capabilities and 
well-being. It is also related to the ideological foundations of the state. 
2.3. iii. a. Economics and Domestic Stability: The crucial relationships between 
economics and comprehensive security are in the fields of interdependency and 
justice. 112 According to Buzan "[t]he link between economy and political stability 
generates a set of wide-ranging questions about development that could, not 
unreasonably, be seen as national security issues. "' 13 This statement is consistent 
with the discourse of economic, political and social justice incorporated in 
Pluralist IR. theory. Persistent underdevelopment or rapid economic decline can 
weaken social cohesion and exasperate other sources of friction. Internal conflicts 
often arise because elites are unwilling to alter exploitative social and economic 
relations and structures which work to their advantage. "' 
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2.3. iii. b. The Cost of Defence: Economists have long shown concern about the 
impact of military expenditure upon other areas of a state's social and economic 
development. "5 This concern is particularly acute during arms races, a cause and 
consequence of the security dilemma. Attempts to enhance state security through 
increased military spending may be counter-productive and accelerate a state's 
relative economic, military and political decline. 116 The development, production 
and acquisition of modem weapon systems can transfer economic, political and 
human resources from other spheres of state activity hindering economic progress 
and increasing societal economic hardship and competition. 117 Peacetime military 
expenditure creates less employment than other forms of public spending and has 
been linked to inflationary trends. "' 
The social-economic consequences of military expenditure are qualitatively worse 
for low Gross Domestic Product (GDP) states. Developing World military 
expenditure increased six fold between 1960-86.119 One report highlighted a close 
inverse correlation between levels of state spending on defence, and civilian 
economic development; and between increased military spending and ability to 
withstand the economic crises. 120 Another survey, of 69 states found that military 
spending has a negative impact upon rates of growth in developing states. "' In 
these states, investment and agricultural production were notable sufferers. On 
average a 1% increase in the military share of a state's GDP, according to this 
report, was linked to a 0.23% and 0.18% reduction in the GDP budget on 
investment and agriculture, respectively. The resultant effects upon agriculture 
suggest decline in food output, increased agricultural import dependency, food 
scarcity and greater percentage of income spent on food. Social tensions and 
competition are highly probable. 
In conclusion, the debate on interdependence is advanced by the examination of 
economics and security. One should not ignore the penetrative nature of the 
global economic system on the domestic front. With the exception of the 
environment, it is this issue that has most seriously eroded the distinction between 
the two spheres and the state's ability to act autonomously. 
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2.3. iv. Expanding the Parameters of Security: A growing body of academics 
and practitioners recognises the need for a re-appraisal of the concept of security, 
with greater reference to global realities and the specifics of individual 
scenarios. 122 If, as discussed above, the Realist analysis is an insufficient 
explanation of security realities then how inclusive must the boundaries of 
comprehensive security be? Security is applicable to all levels of human affairs. 
Klare and Thomas, for example, favour an universal application, directed to the 
welfare and health of humanity. 2' As Ayoob warns, however, a too expansive 
conceptualisation may result in the term becoming of little analytical value, 
lacking clarity and precision. 124 This concern can be demonstrated by one vague 
definition, which refers to security as the "assurance of future well being. " 125 
Constructing a comprehensive security structure is, therefore, problematic, due to 
the need to balance analytical precision and a security-focused concept, with the 
breadth of influences relevant to the case-study. A broad but coherent security 
concept is required in which traditional military security is an element. This work 
aims to establish a synthesis between the interdependency of human affkirs, a 
multi-disciplinary approach favoured by advocates of comprehensive security and 
a recognition of the state's continued significance as a key political unit. 
A related problem is the intellectual and semantic connotations that 
comprehensive and security imply. Comprehensive refers to "a broad scope or 
content; including all or much, " whilst security has customarily been applied in an 
exclusive manner, related to boundaries and external enemies and threats. 126 
Central to the premise of a Realist security concept is the external origin of 
threats. Several authors note that in traditional security discourse exclusion and 
division, and seJ( and other are promoted. 127 The presence of these boundaries 
and the language of security is the antithesis of global interdependency and co- 
operation. 128 "These dichotomies, which reflect conventional understandings of 
political space, are necessary for the legitimisation of the concept of national 
security but are incompatible with the search for world security and the security of 
individuals. " 129 The stifling of debate due to the near-monopoly of Realist thinking 
on the subject in the post-W. W. II period, has led to uniform and narrow academic 
and empirical interpretations of the term. There is, however, no reason to assume 
that security must remain within these narrow confines. The positive and universal 
aspects of security need to be emphasised. Comprehensive security analysis is thus 
a dramatic, though pragmatic, refocusing of the core issues of the debate from 
Realist concerns. 
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The idea of comprehensive security has been arrived at through awareness of the 
limitations and possible tensions within Realist IR. theory and empirical evidence 
which places doubt upon its ability to provide "a means of explaining the world, 
let alone providing for stable and peaceful relations, even more so as we have 
moved out of a period dominated by the Cold War into a more complex 
period. ""' Comprehensive security has its origins in Pluralist IR. literature. The 
Palme Report was perhaps the watershed for this approach. 131 It questioned the 
effectiveness of mutual deterrence and unilateral military action. Instead, it 
advocated common security through co-operation not because of altruism but 
mutual self-interest in a complex, small and interdependent world. States, it 
concluded, 
11 cannot achieve security at each others expense. Only through co-operative 
efforts and policies of interlocking national [state] restraint will all the world's 
citizens be able to live without fear of war and devastation. " 132 
The Palme Report, The World Commission on Environment and Development, 
and subsequent comprehensive security texts have argued that the basis for a 
secure world is progress on the interdependent issues of economic and social 
development, political justice and human rights. Non-military issues and non-state 
agents are influential, whilst the impervious nature of state boundaries and the 
distinction between internal and external are challenged. Security is not regarded 
as solely related to the state and military. Realist assumptions and concerns are of 
relevance in particular circumstances but their position requires empirical support 
on a case-by-case basis. In fact, this is a core argument of comprehensive security. 
It is the specific network in which numerous agents interact together under certain 
circumstances that transform them from acceptable political influences to sources 
of conflict. For example, the economic, demographic and military disparity 
between Belgium and Germany has remained relatively constant throughout the 
twentieth century but the potential security threat to the former has fluctuated 
widely as a result of one highly subjective factor, the political intentions of 
Germany's political elites. It is only through a close examination of all the 
influences and the interaction between them that security can be effectively 
understood. The selection of the three studies will demonstrate these points. 
Competition for water resources; the govemment-minority relations; and an 
alternative organisational ideology promote an acceptance of the role of non-state 
actors within the state and the region, and the interdependency between actors 
and agents. 
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2.3. iv. a. Security for Whom?: Moving beyond the narrow confines of the 
Realist approach, "(s)ecurity analysis must resist ... boundary distinctions which 
obscure global structures of inequality that contribute to making certain 
individuals and groups, ... more 
insecure. " 133 Booth urges that the "fundamental 
referents of security" should be the individual and not the state. ", The interests of 
these two are rather difficult to reconcile. Given the fact that Kazakstan and 
Uzbekistan are the subject of this research, the security of sub-state groups and 
individuals are implicitly incorporated into the concept of state security. The 
discussion below highlights the intrinsic contradictions within the national 
security concept and advances in its place a comprehensive concept, state security 
which moves beyond the interest and protection of the governments, accurately 
terined regime security. 
The term, national security, Buzan regards as "the ability of states to maintain 
their independent identity and their functional integrity ... 
[A] conservative 
concept, in as much as it relates to existing states... [no matter] their desirability 
[or] viability. ""' This indicates that the state, or at least its central apparatus, may 
not provide any tangible benefits to its citizens. If one accepts that the state has 
responsibilities towards its citizens and that its own security is enhanced as a 
result, revision in the understanding and purpose of what has traditionally been 
referred to as national security. This re-definition will be entitled as state security. 
The term will be used to describe the security of the (complete) state rather than 
the frequently used term national security which continues the misguided 
connection between the state and nation. National security will be used in this 
work to describe the security of national (ethnic) groups. Azar and Moon partially 
acknowledge this problem in relation to multi-cultural states and their security. 
The security of ethnic groups cannot necessarily be equated with that of their host 
states, which is traditionally referred to as national security. They state that, 
"in such situations, the security of a 'nation' is quite separate from the security 
of the 'state'. It is perhaps more accurate to argue that national security is 
equated with communal security and that state security with that of a ruling 
'regime' that represents a segment of social or communal interest. , 136 
Ra'anan also recognises the distinctions within the concepts of state and security 
when he notes that "many refer to the 'national' interest when in fact they mean 
state interest. )))137 Whilst these statements recognise the state's internal divisions, 
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they fail to establish or define an inclusive security construction for the whole 
state entity. It is this that state security will be used for. 
This redefinition also allows for the inclusion of the domestic dimensions of 
security and thus removes the Realist assertion that societal threats should not be 
regarded as part of the national security debate unless they "precipitate conflict 
beAveen states. ""' State security is comprehensive and progressive in its inclusion 
and goals whilst retaining the state as the focus of study. Common dangers and 
collective responsibilities need to be incorporated in to the agenda. Tickner's 
holds that, 
"[glenuine security for all individuals requires a less militarized model of 
citizenship that valorizes different types of activities which allows women and 
men to participate equally in building the type of state institutions that are 
responsive to the security needs of their own people as well as to those on the 
outside. Such reformulated states could satisfy people's need for identity ... 
while providing a type of security that is not achieved at the expense of the 
security of others. " 139 
This emphasises the need to construct progressive, inclusive forms of state and 
security. 
The more inclusive security concept is expedient in order to address the variety of 
previously neglected concerns. Feminist critiques of security are at the vanguard 
of exposing the structural inequalities and violence not just for women but other 
under-represented groups within societies. "' Axiomatic to all these issues is a 
challenge to the assumption that international political theory is neutral and 
Positivist. 14 1 Traditional security literature and policy fail to recognise the unequal 
consequences of their ideas and actions for a host of "non-core" groups. Many 
feminists along with peace researchers argue that comprehensive security can only 
be achieved after the recognition and reformation of hierarchical social 
structures. 142 Smith's conclusion that this is not the case and that "(i)ntemational 
theory is not so much gender neutral as gender blind, " is equally applicable to 
other periphery subjects, such as the environment, or minority rights, to which it 
should be responsive to. 143 
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National security has been implicitly elite-, and ethnic- (national-) specific in its 
construction and objectives. It has also neglected, frequently intentionally, the 
internal dynamics and tensions within the state, particularly between the central 
executive, and the individual and sub-state groups. The traditional emphasis on 
elites blurs the distinction between regime security and state security. As a result, 
governments frequently implement policies which are neither democratically 
formulated nor advance or protect the interests of wider society, especially those 
of marginalised groups. Unfortunately, many elites regard the security of the state 
and the maintenance of their own position as synonymous. This has enabled 
regimes to usurp the rhetoric of national security in order to repress legitimate 
domestic opposition. As a result, "internal security" is often used not to provide 
individual and group security, or just and harmonious relations but the 
maintenance of the status quo. As political elites are responsible for reacting to 
challenges to the state and formulating policies, their perceptions and concerns are 
valid areas of concern, but the distinction between their own security interests and 
those of the wider state need to be recognised. 
In fact, central government is often the prime source of domestic insecurity. 
According to Buzan, individuals and communities face four categories of threat 
from the state. These result from: 
- Domestic law making and enforcement; 
- State administrative and policing action against its own citizens; 
- Competition over the control of the state apparatus; and 
- The state's extemal security policies. 144 
The latter three are the most significant to this study. They encourage a critical 
view of the state apparatus-society relationship and the difficulty in distinguishing 
between the internal and external arenas. 
A Human Rights Watch report on 53 cases of ethnic violence concluded that 
deliberate government action is as likely cause of conflict as supposed traditional 
communal antagonisms. 14' The period of state-building allows for, if not requires 
some would argue, a greater degree of coercion than would norinally be 
acceptable. Government action against sections within society is often 
accompanied by accusations that internal dissent is sympathetic to or actively co- 
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operating with external enemies. These fears and charges have been evident in 
Almaty and Tashkents' attitudes towards their respective minorities and Islamist 
opponents. 
The transfer of authority within the state also has the potential for internal 
instability. Violent power struggles between rival political elites or communal 
factions pose a direct threat to sizeable, and often uninvolved, sections of the 
population and the political and territorial integrity of the state itself The manner 
in which political power is transferred in Kazakstan and Uzbekistan have yet to be 
tested. The former Soviet republican elites have managed to retain and legitimate 
their positions through elections and referenda even though the legitimacy and 
impartiality of these have been questioned by domestic and international 
observers. 14' The relationship between political and ethno-regional allegiances in 
the two states and the example of Tajikistan do not encourage an optimistic 
prognosis for the transfer of power in the region. Kazakstan and Uzbekistans' 
respective populations may become involved as participants and victims of any 
such struggle. A possible and destructive scenario in both republics would be 
ethnic or regional based competition for power. The potential for state 
fragmentation along these lines is possible. 
A state's foreign policy can also have negative consequences upon its citizens. At 
its most extreme, is the impact of inter-state war. The individual and the 
community will be effected as participant and/or victim either directly or 
indirectly. Within Uzbekistan, ethnic Tajiks, and the secular and Islamic 
opposition to Karimov's regime have all found their position vis-ti-vis the state 
apparatus worsen due to Uzbekistan's involvement in the Tajikistan Civil War. 
Arguably a primary reason for Uzbekistan's involvement in the war was to 
provide a pretext for domestic repression. 147 (See 3.5. v. & 5.13. ) 
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2.3. iv. b. Assessing Threats and Vulnerabilities: When do non-military issues 
become security concerns? This is a crucial point, if one accepts both that 
numerous issues can constitute security concerns and any conceptualisation needs 
to be coherent and specific. Vague all-encompassing definitions, noted previously 
and also in 4.2. fail to distinguish security from the broader political processes. 
Some threats, economic blockades or enemy troop mobilisation, for example, are 
direct and obvious and therefore easy to interpret and respond to. Other issues 
are, however, far more difficult to distinguish from the normal processes of 
economic, political and social affairs. It is the ambiguousness and unpredictability 
of potential security threats that constitutes both the problem of and the need for a 
comprehensive security concept. 
It is the application of "security resources", both material and intellectual, to 
certain issues that in one sense identifies them as security threats. However, 
threats exist and are potentially more dangerous when left unrecognised or not 
responded to. Equally, misapplication of "security resourcee' or mis-identification 
of threats can also increase a state's vulnerability. The more obvious, immediate 
and direct the potential threat is, the greater likelihood is that resources will be 
allocated and prioritised to addressing it. The case-studies under examination in 
this thesis, more pervasive and less obvious in terms of security thinking are 
therefore relatively underrepresented in security analysis, policy, and resource 
allocation. 
Ayoob, who synthesises the multi-dimensional nature of comprehensive security 
analysis with a focus upon the state, argues that issues are elevated to the status 
of threat when "they either affect the survivability of state boundaries, state 
institutions, or governing elites or weaken the capacity of states and regimes to 
act effectively in the realm of both domestic and international PolitiCS. ý7148 "The 
political realm ... 
informed by other areas of human activity" is the prime concern 
of his analysis. 149 
For Splidsboel-Hansen, national security is the interaction of three elements: 
threats, values and vulnerabilities. The threat is the principal focus for security 
thinking, "since without one or more threats the whole notion of achieving 
national security would be rendered superfluous. ""' A threat can be defined as 
so 
"an action or sequence of events that (1) threatens drastically and over a relatively 
brief span of time to degrade the quality of life for the inhabitants of a state, or (2) 
threatens significantly to narrow the range of policy choices available to the 
government of a state or private non-governmental entities ... within a state. 
"151 
Security theories, although not all, recognise five different types of threats: 
military, economic, ecological, political and societal. AJI these threats share one 
characteristic, in that "they are aimed at one or more value; evidently, none of the 
threats can exist in itself, but is only given its existence .. when 
directed at a 
value. " 152 
These values are, according to Splidsboel-Hansen: the idea of the state; the 
institutional expression of the state; and the physical base of the state. The values 
must have an element of vulnerability for the threat to be effective. A weak state 
by its nature is more vulnerable and perceives a greater number of threats to its 
security as a consequence. Security can be improved either by reducing the 
value's vulnerability, or reducing or eliminating the threat itself 153 
The problematic nature of including issues within the remit of security is well 
described by Buzan, who notes the need to contextualise the issue. He writes that, 
"(s)ince threats can only be assessed in relation to a particular state as a target, 
security policy has to take into account not only threats themselves, but also 
the vulnerabilities of the state as an object of security. This is no 
straightforward matter, especially for weak states. Cause-effect relations 
between threats and vulnerabilities are poorly understood at best, even for 
relatively calculable forms of military attack. ... For economic and political 
threats [for example], the problem of distinguishing threats from normal, or at 
least acceptable, activity is much more difficult to begin with. Any sound 
security policy must therefore address threats in both of these ways: dealing 
with them as they come, such as reducing vulnerability by preparing defences 
against invasion; and dealing with their causes, such as seeking peaceful 
settlement of the dispute. " 154 
The existence of threats and vulnerabilities, whilst detrimental to state security 
does not necessarily lead to conflict. Explaining why some scenarios can be 
resolved peacefully and others descend into conflict has proved problematic for 
security study scholars. Numerous politically sensitive situations are referred to as 
latent or potential conflicts. Many of these scenarios do not result in open 
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hostilities. "' Those which do result in conflict follow some general patterns, 
however. The resort to force may be for several reasons, including: 
- Attempts at structural change for either or both of two reasons: 
a) "legitimate" action against a closed system which promotes unjust 
socio-political characteristics and prevents democratic participation and voluntary 
incorporation within the state; and 
b) rejection of the structures and values of the established system. 156 
- Attempts to redress perceived, or actual, victimýisation which can be the result 
of, 
"a) a denial of separate identity of parties involved in the political process, 
b) an absence of security of culture and valued relationships, 
c) an absence of effective political participation through which 
victimization can be remedied. 73157 
The last point is crucial for the transformation of protest to become violent. 15' 
A model with particular validity for all of the three case-studies, is advanced by 
Lewer and Ramsbotham. They argue that the transformation from peaceful debate 
to violent methods, requires three factors: 
-Distinct identity groups; 
-The groups must perceive that they have mutually incompatible goals "which 
cannot be accommodated within the existing political structures; " and 
-The groups pursue these incompatible goals. 
159 
Intrinsic to all of these explanations is that conflict is a response to the denial of 
perceived needs. Debate, compromise, and protest through peaceful channels 
have either proved ineffective, been unavailable or rejected by at least one of the 
parties involved, whether these be communal groups, political elites or states. 
Armed conflict is regarded as an effective and valid means of achieving their 
goals. 
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2.4. Conclusion 
Security is a core requirement for the state. The monopolisation of violence is 
often regarded as the state's most fundamental function. The relationship between 
the state and security is not, however, static or necessarily benign. The security 
milieu is complex. 
The Realist paradigm is unable to fully explain the internal dynamics of the state 
and multiplicity of security threats. The state itself is often a source of insecurity 
for its citizens. One must remain vigilant about the political origins and intentions 
of a government's security policies. With this qualification duly acknowledged it 
is possible to advance a comprehensive security agenda which recognises the 
internal dynamics and tensions of the state and to attempt to accommodate the 
needs of the various actors and address the multiplicity of threats and 
vulnerabilities. Security cannot be dependent solely upon force, military 
capabilities and regime interests. Consensus between government and society, 
issues of development and economic and political justice and inter-state 
cooperation are part of an effective management of security problems. As Booth 
has stated, "without justice, there is potential for conflict. ""O 
To reinforce both Buzan's and Ayoob's assertions, security issues, threats and 
vulnerabilities are highly contextual and subjective. Blanket conceptualisation is 
problematic. As a consequence the security theory and empirical implications of 
the individual case-studies are discussed further in the respective chapters. 
The security milieu of NISs are particularly acute because of the reformulation of 
national and state identities, the political system and domestic and foreign 
relations. The republics of Kazakstan and Uzbekistan face a difficult initiation into 
the arena of the state system. Sovereignty and other trappings of international 
recognition do not protect them from a variety of security challenges. The initial 
period of independence is beset by uncertainty principally within its domestic 
environment. 
Kazakstan and Uzbekistan are no longer part of a single powerful state, whose 
periphery had limited decision making requirements or ability. Its centre, Moscow 
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and the Politburo, had ultimate responsibility over a whole spectrum of issues, 
from foreign policy to language laws, environmental to inter-republican trade 
policy. It was apparent that the USSR was unable to deal with many of the 
problems confronting Central Asia, such as environmental degradation, inter- 
ethnic conflict or the penetration of Islamist ideology, for example. It was unable 
to protect the long-term survival of the state (the USSR), its regime, ideological 
foundation, or the well-being of the Central Asian economy, environment or 
population. The political and security environment of Central Asia has been 
dramatically transformed by the collapse of the USSR. The vulnerabilities of the 
Central Asian republics has been increased by the fragmentation of the region's 
decision-making process into five sovereign republics, each with their own 
"national" agendas, less experience in international diplomacy, limited economic 
resources and the restructuring of political and social relations. Kazakstan and 
Uzbekistans' physical existence, political legitimacy and structures are essentially 
external in origin, including the de facto and de jure independence which was 
provided by the collapse of the centre rather than a regional commitment to 
nationalism or independence. It is under these conditions, that the two republics 
are confronted by a series of individual and systematic threats; hostile or collapsed 
neighbouring states, ideological "infiltratioW', communal tensions and water- 
resource competition. 
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3. Ethnic Minorities and Security 
3.1. Introduction 
The objective of this chapter is to examine the relationship between the Russian 
and Tajik minorities with the respective governments of Kazakstan and 
Uzbekistan, with reference to potential intra-state instability. The hypothesis of 
this chapter, is that ethnic minorities can and need to be voluntarily incorporated 
into the political and civil society structures of the states for there to be stability. 
This can and should be achieved through a balance between acceptance by the 
central executive and the dominant population of the legitimate needs of minority 
group and the reciprocal acknowledgement by the minority that their demands and 
rights are related to obligations to and respect of the state and other citizens. The 
protection and in some instances the promotion of cultural, economic and political 
minority rights can ease social ffiction and centrifugal forces upon the state. 
The chapter will be divided into four sections. The first will discuss the 
conceptualisation of ethnic politics and conflict. The key area of interest is the 
politicisation and mobilisation of ethnicity. The two case-studies, will examine the 
respective government-minority relations over contested demographic, economic 
and political issues. These sources of tension are particularly acute in the period of 
state-building and transition that the two republics have undergone. The 
concluding section will assess the potential for inter-ethnic violence in the 
republics, including the influence of economic and political processes and trends. 
3.2. Theoretical Background 
Terminology concerning ethnicity, minority and nation is often ambiguous. A 
useful politically-oriented definition of the term minority is provided by the UN 
Sub-Comn-ýission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of 
Minorities. The Commission defines a minority as, 
"a group of citizens of a State, constituting a numerical minority and in a non- 
dominant position in that State, endowed with ethnic, religious or linguistic 
characteristics which differ from those of the majority of the population, 
having a sense of solidarity with one another, motivated, if only implicitly, by 
a collective will to survive and whose aim it is to achieve equality with the 
majority in fact and in law. " I 
This statement emphasises the political inequality of the minority. It is this issue 
and the attempt to rectify it by the minority that is a major source of 
confrontation. 
This political interpretation is applicable to both case-studies. The numerical size 
of Uzbekistan's Tajik population has been in itself a source of political dispute. 
Kazakstan's Slavic population does not immediately correlate with preconceived 
views of a minority. During the post-Soviet period, however, demographic and 
political trends coincided to lead to a major revision in the fortunes of ethnic 
Russians. 2 
The boundaries between ethnic and national identity are unclear. Kellas regards 
ethnicily as a narrow group identity, based upon a common ancestry, which is 
more exclusive than that of a nation. 3 Ethnicity in Soviet nationalities policy, 
although linked to language and territory, was ascriptive and inflexible. Kozlov, 
aware that such an interpretation of ethnic identity was impractical, stated that, 
"national affiliation is not a biological but rather a social category which is not 
determined by birth, but is formed in the process of the indiNidual's 
socialization. " 4 
Whilst language is a key distinction between the groups, bilingualism is common 
amongst the non-Russian groups. For many Kazaks and Tajiks their first language 
is Russian and Uzbek, respectively, rather than their titular language. Cultural 
assimilation has been a common feature in both cases and all four groups, 
especially the three non-Russian groups, share some common characteristics; 
partially the result of shared Soviet experiences. Seventy years of Sovietification 
have not, however, eradicated significant distinctions between them. 
Group identity is as much what distinguishes the group from others as any 
"intrinsic" characteristics of the group itself The fluidity of ethnic identity is 
evident in Pilkington's research on ethnic Russian imn-dgrants to the RF. One 
returnee from Bishkek highlighted this, stating that, "here [in Russia] we are not 
Russians (nisskie), we are Kirghizs, [but] in Kirghizia, we are Russians. "' What 
initially appear as a homogeneous group is often superficial, with internal 
divisions. Acceptance of these divisions may be beneficial, dismissing the myth of 
the nation-state and allowing for "debate on citizenship and nation, and avoid the 
politics of polarity. 116 
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Inter-ethnic conflict has increasingly become the focus of Security Studies 
interest. To some extent this is a result of the collapse of European Communism. 
Between 19904, there were fifteen secessionist conflicts, equal to the whole of 
the 1980S. 7 This resurgence in this form of violence was a result of structural 
change in the international system, indicating a relationship between inter-ethnic 
conflict and transition. ' State-societal and inter-ethnic relations in the FSU region 
have been in flux. States, and titular nations, have sought to establish their own 
hegemony within the NISs. Kazakstan and Uzbekistan were not immune from 
inter-ethnic violence. Since independence, although neither of the republics 
witnessed inter-ethnic conflict, the issue remained a major regional security 
concem. 
The upsurge in academic interest in ethnic conflict is also related to an intellectual 
shift in security thinking. Until the 1980s ethnic conflicts were neglected by 
Western political theorists. 9 The "existing anti-secessionist international normative 
edifice" has been seriously undermined by post-Cold War World events. 'O In 
response, greater interest has been devoted towards domestic security concerns, 
as their relative significance has increased. Inter-ethnic conflict has also 
encouraged a multi-disciplinary approach to studying security. This is because 
"ethno-cultural conflicts often centre on questions which political theorists have 
simply ignored, from the boundaries and powers of political cornmunities to 
language rights. "" 
3.21 Grout) Mobilisation and Sources of Tension: It was assumed that 
modernisation would replace ethnicity with other loyalties, such as the state. 12 The 
contemporary wave of ethnic conflicts has shown that modernity has failed to do 
so. Ethnic identity and conflict have in fact been a response to modernity. 
Discussion on ethnicity's revival has focused upon two explanations. The first, is 
that ethnicity is primordial, more persistent and fundamental than other forms of 
identification. 13 For primordialists, ethnic conflict is not the consequence of 
economic or geo-political competition but "exclusively a result of the ethnic 
principle. "14 The second approach, regards ethnicity as fluid and no more salient 
than other group identities. Ethnicity becomes significant when it is "involved by 
entrepreneurial political leaders in the instrumental pursuit of material and political 
benefits for a group. "" 
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This study will apply the latter, essentially an instrumentalist approach that 
recognises periods of transition can increase awareness of ethnic differences. 16 As 
Horowitz notes, ethnic conflict is a recurrent phenomenon, in which "shifting 
contexts make ethnicity now more, now less prominent. " 17 The instrumental and 
political value of ethnicity is emphasised by events in late-Soviet elite politics. The 
weakening and ultimate collapse of one trans-national ideological hegemony, 
Communism, saw the emergence of alternative social constructions. By 1989, 
republican elites were assuming the mantle of national nomenklatura to enhance 
their legitimacy whilst attempting to wrestle power from the centre without 
implementing major economic or political reforms. 
Ethnicity is not in itself a precursor for conflict, rather it is simply one means of 
advancing group interests and demands. One must look beyond ascription for 
causes of inter-ethnic conflict at the wider economic, political and social 
structures. Ethnic conflicts are linked to competition for material and non-material 
resources in which at least one group perceives itself to be aggrieved and unable 
to rectify these grievances through legal or political channels. "' "The greater the 
competition and inequalities between groups in heterogeneous societies, the 
greater the salience of ethnic identities and the greater likelihood of open 
conflict. "19 Ethnic conflicts are, therefore, not just struggles for resources and 
power but also for the recognition and protection of non-material issues. " 
3.2. i. a. Political Causes: Central to the minority issue are "the conflicting 
principles of territorial integrity of states and self-determination of peoples. ýM As 
Boutros Boutros Ghali, the former UN Secretary General, has commented, 
"If every ethnic ... group claimed statehood, there would be no limit to fragmentation, and peace, security and economic well being for all would 
become even more difficult to achieve. 
One requirement for solutions to these problems lies in the commitment to 
human rights %ith a special sensitivity to those of minorities ... 
The sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of the State ... and the 
principle of self-determination for peoples ... must not be permitted to work 
against each other. " 22 
Ghali's statement acknowledges the delicate balances between territorial integrity 
and self-determination; authority and human rights; and majority and minority. 
Feasibly these relationships are manageable. Legitimacy and order are 
prerequisites for effective and representative government. 
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Sel&determination is problematic, frequently linked to irredentism. Consequently, 
state elites, dominant societal groups and the international community are wary of 
claims for minority rights and self-determination. Managed properly self- 
determination is not necessarily the cause of extreme nationalism and secession 
but "the only realistic remedy for those conditions of power, subjection and fear 
from which nationalism are born. "23 Unfortunately, when "(Oaced with a stark 
choice between the territorial integrity of the state and democratisation, state 
elites will invariably opt for territorial integrity. iiN 
The demands of minorities within in a state are often contradictory, seeking both 
equal treatment before law and the preservation of their separate identity. The 
provision of collective rights acknowledges the presence of a distinct cultural 
group within its boundaries and is far more threatening to *the state's social, 
cultural and territorial integrity, than individual rights legislation. 25 Majority and 
state regime respect for distinct group rights and culture should be reciprocated 
by the minority's respect of the legitimate territorial integrity of the state. 26 
If peaceful political channels are blocked to minority groups and domestic 
autonomy is resisted, resort to force and outright independence may be advanced 
. 
27 rom instead Snyder, for example, argues that groups actively seek secession f 
the state when they perceive that the state is failing to provide them with political 
access and recognition . 
2' The longer these failures are perpetuated the greater the 
potential for conflict and the greater the intensity of the struggle is liable to be. 
There is the need to regard minority demands as a potential security issue and 
respond to them as early as possible and in a manner which will not be ultimately 
counter-productive. 
3.21b. Economic Causes: The Minorities at Risk Project research indicates that 
there is only a "negligible correlation" between "ethrionationalist grievances" and 
domestic economic problems . 
29 The Project concluded that active nationalist 
30 
groups are not necessarily the most economically disadvantaged within the state. 
Whilst these findings are not disputed by the author, economic dislocation and 
disparity are frequently cited as a cause of inter-ethnic tensions. 31 
In Soviet Central Asia, economic deterioration and political uncertainties of the 
late-Soviet period exasperated socio-political tensions. 32 Zaslavsky argues that the 
USSR's economic downturn undermined internal stability and the regime's 
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legitimaCy. 33 The previous social policies and welfare, and material growth, which 
had secured a level of consensus, could not be maintained. The inter-republican 
economic interdependency of the system, even when successful, was problematic 
for Central Asia. The disparity between economic realities and popular aspirations 
was particularly felt by the burgeoning and educated young population. Declining 
economic prospects in the region encouraged the coalescence of ethnic identity 
for resource competition. Economic and political advancement was frequently 
based upon patronage systems, itself linked to ethnicity. (See 3.4. ii. b., 3.4. ii. c. & 
3.4. iii. ) 
3.2. i. c. Demographic Causes: A final consideration, of great significance for 
Central Asia, is the impact of population change. Absolute population growth 
increases pressure on resource supplies, including access to land and water, 
accommodation and political representation. The relative growth or decline of a 
group's influence can also be detrimental to inter-ethnic relation. The latter issue 
is raised in Nevada's study of titular-Turkish minority relations in Bulgaria. The 
minority's more rapid growth, fuelled Bulgarian apprehensions over cultural, 
demographic and political relations between the groups including fears of 
Islamification, Turkification and irredentiSM. 34 The issue of different growth rates 
was a feature of late-Soviet politics. The Russo-phile attitudes of Moscow was 
evident in official concern over the four-times greater birth rate in the Muslim 
SSR than in the RSFSR. 35 
Migration, both internal and external pose serious concerns for the region's social 
stability. The UNHCR cites economic decline, environmental degradation and fear 
of conflict as the origins of population displacement and potential hostilities 
between incoming and settled communities in Central Asia, emphasising the close 
relationship between transition and conflict. 36 This problem is most evident in 
relation to rural over-population and underemployment, and resultant rural-urban 
migration. It is feared that immigrants to the cities, unable to find employment and 
housing or return to their original communities because their accommodation and 
jobs will be taken by other locals, will form an urban underclass. This underclass, 
"dissatisfied, alienated and angry", it is argued, is susceptible to extremist and 
31 violent rhetoric and action. Whilst the migrants' grievances may not be explicitly 
ethnic, manipulation and misinformation, as well as, the ethno-stratification of 
labour may result in such a perspective. '8 
Arý 
3.2. ii. Conclusion: The Minority at Risk Project concluded that a crucial 
influence on whether ethnopolitical agitation escalates to sustained violent 
confrontation is the government's behaviour in the initial period of debate. " It 
found an average gestation period of 13 years between the emergence of ethnic- 
oriented political movements and the first occurrence of violence . 
40 Ethno-politics 
is a long-term and gradual process. The sudden explosion of violence is in fact the 
visible culmination of long-term governmental inability, or unwillingness to 
address minority demands. 
The length of time that ethno-politics takes to become violent and the role of the 
authorities in this process are important points to emphasise. This work does not 
believe that ethnic conflict in the two republics is a short-term possibility. 
However negative trends; economic decline, increased wealth disparity, political 
malaise; population growth; and worsening environmental and social conditions 
offer the potential for ethnic polarisation in the long-term. 
The incorporation of minority issues into the security debate can be manipulated 
by a government. A government may portray the group as threats to "national" 
security, principally through accusations of irredentism, and act against it. 
Minorities have traditionally been perceived by state majorities and elites as a 
source of insecurity, who should prove their loyalty towards the state, beyond that 
expected from the titular nation. This is of utmost significance in a NIS where 
questions of state- and nation-building, citizenship, and territorial integrity are still 
weak. Ethnic groups are more able to co-exist if they are able to "share a common 
image of their mutual history, and of one another's current conduct and character 
whilst self-justifying historical myths or ... 
distorted pictures of the group's and 
other groups' past and present behaviour and characteristics can encourage 
intolerance and antagoniSM. ', 41 This negative security implication is recognised by 
Buzan, who declares that internal societal threats are a sign of a vulnerable state. 42 
Government denials, manipulation and portrayal of legitimate minority demands 
as negative and potentially threatening to state integrity, is often counter- 
productive, triggering minority discontent and demands for increased self- 
determination. Minority-oppressing behaviour can cause wars by either provoking 
violent secessionist ambitions from the minority, or by encouraging the 
"homeland" of a diaspora minority, to aid their co-nationals by force. 43 The latter 
point is most applicable to the Kazakstan case-study, but elements in Afghanistan 
and TaJikistan would be able to provide moral and physical support should 
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relations between the Uzbekistani goverriment and the Tajik minority become 
more confrontational. 
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The Case-Studies 
3.3 Inter-Ethnic Relations in the Soviet Period 
Prior to Soviet national delimitation policies, initiated in 1920, ethnicity had been 
amorphous and of little significance to those outside of the region's politics . 
44 
Tsarist conquest did not dramatically transform this situation. Although Kazak- 
Russian contacts were increasingly important and regular from the seventeenth 
century onwards a significant colonial presence on the Steppe did not take place 
until the late-nineteenth century. Tsarist expansion further south was completed 
more rapidly with the conquest of the Uzbek khanates in the 1860-70S. 
45 Here 
Russian cultural, demographic and political influences were more limited than it 
had been upon the Kazak Steppe. 
The imposition of Soviet rule transformed ethnic and territorial issues. Soviet 
policies dramatically accelerated if not instigated the subsequent ethno-national 
consolidation and established the Central Asian republics. Amorphous ethnic 
groups with ill-defined territories were transformed into titular nations with 
eponymous republics, official histories and distinct languages. The process has 
been referred to as "nation-building from above. "46 
A Kazak Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, (initially known as the Kirgiz 
ASSR) existed within the RSFSR between 1920-36.47 The Kazak SSR underwent 
a series of territorial configurations, with land transfers between it and the 
RSFSR, and the Turkmen and Uzbek SSRs. The Kazak SSR lost its southern 
Siberian lands to the RSFSR. The temporary acquisition of Karakalpakia and Syr 
Darya regions including the Tashkent environs from the Uzbek SSR were 
returned to the latter in 1963, although part of Syr Darya oblast was ceded to the 
Kazak SSR in 197 1.48 
The Uzbek SSR was created in 1925. Subordinate to it until 1929 was the Tajik 
Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. After this date, the latter received Union 
republic status, too. The Uzbek SSR received the bulk of the former Bukharan 
khanate, the Samarkand region, the Tashkent area, and most of the Fergana 
Valley and Khiva. 
The Soviet territorial division left latent tensions. The complex ethnic pattern of 
Central Asia did not correspond well to the restructuring of the region, creating 
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diasporas and territorial problems. This was acknowledged by Bartold in a 1924 
memorandum, which was only made public in 1992. The artificiality of the Tajik- 
Uzbek delimitation in particular was emphasised in this report . 
49As Subteiny 
recorded, 
"(i)n view of the difficulties involved, the 'solutions' arrived at could never 
have been entirely satisfactory and they eventually engendered a whole new set 
of problems which the era of glasnost'brought out in full relief. " 
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The most controversial aspects of the process, for Tajik-Uzbek relations, was the 
division of the multi-ethnic but integrally coherent Fergana Valley between 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Similar problems resulted from the 
allocation of the Tajik-dominated cities of Bukhara and Samarkand to the Uzbek 
SSR and the heavily Uzbekified Khojent region (known as the Leninabad oblast 
during the Soviet period) to Tajikistan. 51 
In Kazakstan, the key contested areas are the Kazakstan-Russian border and the 
northern Kazakstani oblasts, which nationalists from both communities have 
contested. (See 3.4. v. ) These problems and related cultural allocations have 
proved problematic for the NIS to build cohesive state loyalties and identities. 52 
As Akiner notes, because much of Central Asian heritage was universally shared 
throughout the region Soviet efforts to divided it resulted in "distorted and 
grossly anachronistic interpretations of history. "53 
During the Soviet period, the balance between the Kazaks and Russians 
underwent major transformations. Disease, economic dislocation and hostilities 
with Tsarist and Bolshevik governments between 1916-30s decimated the Kazak 
population. In 1959 the Kazak population was 900,000 less than it had been in 
1929.54 This decline was compounded by three waves of Slav migration, 
associated with the emancipation of the Serfs (1861) and the Stolypin reforms 
(1906-12), Stalinist deportations (1920s-40s) and the Virgin Land Schemes 
(1954-65) These factors resulted in the Kazaks becoming a minority in their own 
republic. (See Table 3.1. ) Demographic dominance reinforced the impact of 
Russian political supremacy. " 
The Soviet era saw increased Uzbek regional political dominance, within the 
limits that Moscow allowed. Despite criticism from Moscow about Tashkent's 
treatment of Tajik and Turkmen minorities, the Uzbek SSR acted as the provincial 
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agent for the centre. 56 This proved advantageous to both parties and helped 
legitimate its regional dominance, especially vis-d-vis Tajikistan and Tajiks. 57 
Moscow allowed a policy of native cadre control of the SSRs provided republican 
elites complied with the centre's core directives and strategic sectors of the 
economy and administration remained the preserve of Slavs. Titular groups 
controlled lower level administration, including oblasts and raions and traditional 
agriculture. Under the leaderships of First Secretaries Dinmukhamad Kunaev 
(1960-86) and Sharaf Rashidov (1959-83) the Kazak and Uzbek nomenklaturas 
consolidated their authority and personalised and nationalised the republics' 
power structures. This was a feature common throughout Central Asia in the 
Brezhnev era. The selection of and composition of republican administration was 
relatively autonomous. "The undemocratic pyramidal structure of power built 
with Moscow's consent and support, [and] a complete absence of civil society in 
Central Asia inevitably led to a situation in which the actual dispensation of power 
was connected to a network of personal trust, power and patronage. "58 
In both republics, the elites promoted the interests of the titular nations. In the 
Kazak SSR, Kunaev's reign saw the initiation of social and economic 
improvements and a Kazakification process in which the patronage networks were 
the main recipients. 59 In the Uzbek SSR, relations with the centre became more 
assertive. Widespread corruption and nepotism were investigated during the 
Andropov and Gorbachev periods, in what became known as the Cotton Affair. 60 
Many in the Uzbek SSR's political elite regarded the resultant trials, cadre 
changes and criticism of the republic by Moscow as directly anti-Uzbek in tone 
and intent. The Virgin Land Scheme, nuclear testing at Semipalatinsk and 
Gennadi Kolbin's appointment as First Secretary in the northern SSR, and the 
resultant Kazak affront bore considerable similarities. 
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3.4. The Russian Minority in Kazakstan 
3.4j. Introduction: Upon independence Kazakstan's Russian community made 
up approximately 43% of the republic's total population and was larger than the 
titular group. (See Table 3.1. ) In the nine northern oblasts of Kazakstan, over 
50% of the population is ethnic Russian .61A 
high concentration of Russians has 
also recorded in Almaty. (See Map 3.1) Many settlers are second or third 
generation inhabitants who regard Kazakstan as their home and have a distinct 
identity from Russians in the RF. 62 There are also three Cossack Hoste within 
Kazakstan: the Semirechie, located south of Almaty; the Siberian north-eastern 
Kazakstan and the Uralsk in the north west. 
Since independence, a constant theme of Kazakstani politics has been the 
maintenance of stable Kazak-Russian relations. The reasons for this are: 
- Historical Kazak grievances against Russian and Soviet colonisation, 
including 
the systematic cultural and physical destruction of the Kazak nation, and massive 
Slav immigration; 
- The recent reversal in demographic and political balance between the two 
groups; 
- The vocal and antagonistic nationalism of nationalists from both communities 
during the late-Soviet period; 
The territorial homogeneity of the Russian community; and 
Russia's regional influence and relationship with its diaspora. 
These influences will be explored in four key areas crucial in determining the 
republic's stability: politics; econornics; demography; and relations with Russia. 
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3.4. ii. Politics 
3.4. ii. a. National Politics: Independence was accompanied by a policy of 
harmonisation (garmonizalsia), which has attempted to assert a Kazak identity 
over previously Russified aspects and regions of Kazakstan. 63 The nativisation 
policy (korenizatsfia) has impacted upon all spheres of Kazakstani affairs. This 
has been an understandable reaction to the near-decimation of the Kazaks as a 
physical and cultural entity and the Russification that accompanied Tsarist and 
Soviet control of the Steppe. This Kazakification programme was regarded by 
Argingay Baltabaev, Vice-Director of International Affairs at the Kazakstan 
Institute for Strategic Studies, as a natural act of a sovereign Kazakstan. In his 
opinion, "Russification occurred intensely here from the 1960s to the 1980s. It is 
difficult to leave the past behind and it is natural that we must now move to 
redress the balance. 1164 
Such a process may have had a detrimental impact upon non-titular groups, 
concerned by the promotion of the titular culture, preferential treatment for the 
titular group in the administration and employment, and support for the return of 
the Kazak diaspora. This has been recognised by Konovalov and Evastafiev, who 
state that "historical problems and negative experiences cannot justify ethnic 
minority rights violations from either a moral or a realpolifik point of view. "6' 
This statement expects a far greater degree of rationalism than usually 
accompanies the euphoria that follows independence. 
Historically, Kazak over-representation in the republic's power structures was 
sanctioned by MOSCOW. 66 Under the Soviet system, Kazakstani Russian interests 
were channelled through the RSFSR and All-Union structures. These lines of 
communication were closed by independence. Since 1991, Almaty's moderate 
nationalist agenda has marginalised the interests of the Russian community at the 
national level. This was demonstrated in the debate on the 1993 Constitution. 
Article 2 defined the republic as "a democratic, secular and unitary state ... self- 
determined by the Kazakh nation [although it] guarantees equal rights to all. iiV 
The revised 1995 Constitution removed this statement but the new preamble 
declared that the state was founded "on primordial Kazak land .,, 
68Amerkulov, an 
ethnic Kazak academic, has criticised the implicate preference given to Kazaks by 
the Constitution. He believes that such discourse has categorised all other groups 
as second class citizens, and that "the principle of group privilege ... 
[has] won 
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out over democracy and human rights [and] principles of equality for everybody 
regardless of nationality. 110 
Elections to the lower and upper chambers of the revised Kazakstan Parliament 
the Maj1hi in March 1994 and the Senate in December 1995 were seen as further 
demonstrations of the pro-Kazak emphasis of politics. In 1994,60% of the 177 
lower house deputies were ethnic-Kazaks, and only 33% were Russian or 
Ukrainian. 70 Of the 47 Senate members in 1996,32 were Kazak and 13 
Russians. " Russian candidates found it difficult to register for both elections. 72 
The Semirechie Cossack Ataman, Nikolai Gunkin, and the Russian Centre 
movement's leader, Nina Sidorova were prevented from standing in the 1995 
election, accused of making unconstitutional remarks. 73 In both elections, 
CSCE/OSCE observers complained of numerous electoral abuses. 74 
Important central ministries, the Judiciary, law enforcement and most important 
spheres of public administration are don-dnated by Kazaks. 75 In the upper echelons 
of power, the near-domination is more evident. Titular consolidation of the 
political elite saw Kazaks in the offices of President, Vice-President, Prime 
Minister and First Deputy Prime Nfinister, by November 1994. At the same time, 
all five State Councillors, 6 of the 7 Vice Premiers and over 80% of the senior 
Presidential staff were Kazaks. " 
Russian and Cossack political and social organisations have faced government 
censure. After a Semýirechie Hoste demonstration in Almaty, December 1994, and 
accusations that its social organisation was pursing objectives not stated in its 
charter, the social organisation was outlawed by the Justice Nfinistry. 77 In 1994, 
Boris Suprunyuk, editor of a Petropavlovsk Russian-language paper, was charged 
with inciting discord. Although the conviction was overturned at appeal, 
demonstrating some judicial impartiality, the Court and Suprunyuk criticised the 
local officials' lack of accountability and the political nature of the charges, 
respectively. As Suprunyuk is a Russian citizen, the case against him contravened 
an inter-republican agreement. 79 
Government censure of Russian political groups was accompanied by similar 
actions against other movements including Kazak nationalist groups. In fact, 
Alash, the Islamist and pan-Turkic organisation, ceased to effectively exist due to 
considerable government hostility. (See 5.10. iii. ) Whilst Almaty has therefore not 
acted in an explicitly ethnic manner, Olcott argues that as a result Russian 
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nationalists, and other independent groups, have been left with limited 
constitutional channels to pursue their interests. '9 The government, essentially 
Nazarbaev appointees, have not regarded the incorporation of other groups into 
the political decision-making process as essential to retaining vAdespread 
legitimacy or addressing these groups' apprehensions over the lack of 
representation. 
3.4. ii. b. The Influence of Elites in Inter-Ethnic Relations: The role of political 
elites in the mobilisation of ethnicity must be emphasised. Elite rivalries during the 
1980s saw the politicisation of ethnicity. Ro'i believes that there is considerable 
evidence to suggest that the ethnic violence in late-Soviet Central Asia, was at 
least partially the result of top-down manipulation. 80 The rapid dissemination of 
rumours which fuelled the tension, the rioters' ability to locate their victims' 
homes, the political capital that the republican and central elites made from these 
incidents, and the similarity between the various incidents imply some central co- 
ordination. 81 The Soviet authorities used the fear of, 
"inherent hostility between ethnic groups ... particularly 
in the southern tier, in 
the hope that these nationalities would prefer the domination of Moscow ... to 
the anarchy that would necessarily result from their independence. " 82 
This "cult of stability" continued to be promoted by the post-Soviet republican 
leaderships. 
in Almaty December 1986, demonstrations took place against Gorbachev's 
replacement of Dinmukhamed Kunaev, the long-serving ethnic Kazak First 
Secretary of the CP of the Kazak SSR, with Gennadi Kolbin. Kolbin was a 
Russian with no connection to the republic. The leadership change was part of 
Moscow's anti-corruption and the restoration of "internationalism7' campaigns. 
Similar to the consequences of the investigations into the Cotton Affair, the 
indigenous republican elite were confronted by potentially great reversals. 
Moscow's policies struck "at the heart of the ... clan power structure that 
had 
infiltrated the Communist Party under Kunaev's rule. "" It was perceived as a re- 
Russification of political life. Kazak elite acquiescence to or encouragement of the 
protest cannot be discounted. The demonstrations ended in violence when KGB 
and Ministry of Interior (MVD) troops were used to end the protest, resulting in 
upto 258 deaths, and mass arrests. " 
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Athough the protests were not anti-Russian per se, the demonstrators were 
predominately Kazak. The demonstrations and subsequent repression "stimulated 
the development of Kazak nationalism. "" Official reaction and rhetoric to the 
events exasperated the problem. The escalation from demonstrations to riots has 
been linked to the overreaction of anti-Kunaev officials to peaceful and genuine 
protests. These officials attempted to portray the events as purely ethnic. " Such a 
portrayal was not, however, widely accepted. As Olcott notes, 
"[elverybody with any connection to Alma Ata knew that the government was 
lying, that regardless who was at fault, the protest over Kunaev's dismissal 
were far larger than reported and far more peaceful ... 
[The] Kazak sense of 
victimization by Moscow continued to deepen during Kolbin's time in 
office. " 
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The role of elites in managing contemporary Kazakstani inter-ethnic relations is 
equally disturbing. Considerable attention has been paid to Nazarbaev's self- 
professed role in maintaining social harmony. As a means of maintaining stability 
this is disconcerting for two reasons. 
Firstly, the arbitrary, centralised and highly personalised system of government 
inevitably results in the reliance upon the individual rather than office cannot be 
relied upon. The careful and pragmatic balance between the titular and non-titular 
interests, crucial in retaining Nazarbaev's authority, means that the government 
has been unable to offer major concessions or reassurances to either group 
without alienating the other. As a result inter-ethnic tensions have been managed 
in an ad hoc and temporary manner. A long-term strategy has not been 
developed. "' 
Nazarbaev's professed commitment to a multi-ethnic state may not necessarily be 
maintained by any future leadership. Succession, in itself an unstable process in 
quasi-democratic systems, may revive these concerns. Whilst noting Nazarbaev's 
relative youth and health, his departure, combined with the increased 
concentration of power in the office, and more significantly the person, of the 
president, may have serious implications for the state's political stability. Any 
future president, Olcott argues, wHI be perceived as either pro-Kazak or pro- 
Russian, unable to retain Nazarbaev's universal appeal. '9 Even this is contested by 
Critchlow who claims that by 1995 the two main ethnic communities were less 
willing to uncritically accept Nazarbaev as guarantor of civic peace. 90 Critchlow 
directly associates this decline in popular support for the government with poor 
economic performance. 9' Popular disquiet was, however, directed towards the 
77 
succession of Ministers rather than President Nazarbaev, who has sought to place 
blame for economic and political failings on his appointments. Nazarbaev, for 
example, accused the Tereshchenko government of political inertia which "not 
only discredited the last government but deprived it of credibility on the part of 
the president and society. "92 How long such a policy can be maintained is unclear. 
Secondly, the commitment of Nazarbaev, and the government in general, to a 
democratic and non-discriminatory polity has been ambiguous. Nazarbaev has 
demonstrated authoritarian tendencies. For example, in August 1995 Nazarbaev 
won the referendum on revising the Constitution which gave the executive 
increased authority, restricted the legislative creating ability of Parliament, and 
replaced the Constitutional Court with the weaker Constitutional Council. 9' The 
enhanced constitution powers of the President led to Warren Christopher, former 
US Secretary for State, to voice concerns over the republic's political direction. 94 
3.4. ii. c. Intra-Kazak Divisions and Inter-Ethnic Relations: Social stability is 
not solely based upon the Kazak-Russian fracture. It is the contention of this 
thesis that intra-ethnic factors also affect inter-ethnic stability. The indigenous 
community is not monolithic. Within the Kazak nation there are a series of 
potentially damaging fractures: north-south; rural-urban; and the Zhuz. 
The key historical division within the Kazak nation was the Zhuz. The Big, 
Middle and Little (Uu, Orta and Kichi respectively) Zhuzs emerged from the 
Kazak khanate in the early sixteenth century. 95 They were associated with 
"temporary military unions" and pastoral migration routes. Membership was not 
rigid. It was possible for clans to transfer from one Zhuz to another. 
Geographically the Big Zhuz was located in the South and East around Lake 
Balkhash, the Middle in central and northern Kazakstan and the Little north of the 
Aral and Caspian Sea. 96 The Zhuzs briefly held political significance after the 
disintegration of the khanate in the eighteenth century, with de facto sovereign 
rights. The combination of internal dissent, and Jungars and subsequent Chinese 
and Russian expansion destroyed their political relevance. 97 
There has been intense speculation concerning the Zhuzs' contemporary cultural 
and political significance. As Edmunds has noted the term has two overlapping 
applications. " The first is anthropological, related to actual and imagined clan 
heritage and its contemporary cultural role. The second is an appellation for 
political patronage networks within Kazakstani society. It is the latter this thesis is 
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principally interested. The blurring of the two applications, however, has 
complicated analysis of this sensitive issue. 
Patronage networks were endemic in Communist Kazakstan. In fact the deliberate 
courting of national cadres enhanced titular patronage structures. Kunaev's 26 
year reign as First Secretary was a particular significant era for this trend. These 
informal and predon-dnantly, although not exclusively Kazak, structures developed 
loosely along clan fines. 99 As the nuclei of the patronage structures are based upon 
close contacts and associates they consequently appear as clan or regionally 
exclusive. This characteristic is enhanced by the fact that the each of the Zhuz (as 
a social unit) is associated with a particular area of Kazakstan. 
These networks survived the collapse of the USSR far more successfully than the 
Slavic power structures. They subsequently gained considerable influence in key 
economic and political spheres. There are suggestions that these structures have 
had negative implications for intra-Kazak relations as well as been detrimental for 
non-titular groups. The former have been highlighted in interviews conducted by 
Edmunds. As one interviewee noted, 
"[djuring the Soviet times, if a Kazak became important in Moscow, then all 
Kazak people were proud of him. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
people started thinldng carefidly about which Zhuz you represented and who 
occupied the higher official positions. These subdivisions have become clearer 
and distinct since independence, especially at the top level of government. " 100 
It is apparent, however, that the selection of administrative and political personnel 
has not been solely determined by Zhuz membership (in the anthropological sense 
of the term. ) For example, to connect Nazarbaev's Big Horde background and the 
predominance of this Zhuz in post-independence politics with an explicit clan 
supremacy fails to recognise the subtle and flexibility of this form of personalised 
pofitics. Personal connections (whether through family and clan ties or ftiendship, 
shared educational, employment or military experience) and perhaps most 
significantly loyalty towards the centre have determined cadre selection. 10' As 
Edmunds records members of the networks were not even necessarily Kazak. 102 
Pragmatism understandably also affected appointments. Tazhkora Shardabayev's, 
of the Little Horde, appointment as Oil and Gas minister, in 1994, was perceived 
as expedient because the Tengiz reserves are located on territory associated with 
the Little Zhuz. 103 
79 
Even though these power structures are not explicitly clan-based, access to 
economic and political benefits and positions has been arbitrary and personalised. 
Individuals and groups including Kazaks therefore have felt excluded. 
Consequently the Zhuz may assume an instrumentalist political role that absent 
from its present social and political role, particularly once the allocation of 
appointments reaches an impasse. If this takes place it could develop in either of 
two directions. It may increase Kazak nationalism with intra-Kazak competitors 
attempting to use a Kazak national identity to either "out-Kazak" opponents, or 
provide a source of common solidarity to subsume Zhuz divisions. The adoption 
of a strong nationalist dimension in domestic and foreign policy may be used to 
divert attention from internal divisions towards a "common enemy", the Russian 
minority. '04 
To date, however, these intra-Kazak fractures have had a positive influence on 
inter-ethnic relations. The loose Kazak identity and Russified nature of the 
northern Kazak community and their sense of exclusion from national political 
power, shared with the Russian community, has meant that co-operation between 
the two ethnic groups has been witnessed. In spring 1993, Russian and Kazak 
inhabitants of Pavlodar protested together against the replacement of the ethnic 
Russian director of the regional television station with an Almaty loyalist from 
southern Kazakstan and perceived as an outsider and Big Zhuz candidate. 'O' 
Similarly, the Peoples' Congress of Kazakstan also sustained multi-ethnic political 
activism. Founded by Olzhas Sulemeinov, poet and former leader of Nevada 
Semipalatinsk, the Party's core support came from Russified Kazaks in the eastern 
and northern oblasts and Almaty, and the Russian intelligentsia. The Peoples' 
Congress Party established ties with moderate Russian nationalist movements, 
over common objectives including the protection of Russian language in 
education, and criticism of Big Zhuz political dominance due to cadre 
replacements with Nazarbaev loyalists. 106 Additionally, these sub-national 
affiliations may have restricted the consolidation of a Kazak identity. 107 Kazak- 
Russian political cooperation was symbolic of the limited mass appeal for Kazak 
nationalist movements such as Alash and Am. '" The key issue within the Zhuz 
debate has not been ethnic politics but rather the role of the arbitrary and 
patronage over openness and meritocracy in politics. 
An additional concern is the rural-urban division. The rural population is larger, 
more conservative and Kazak-speaking but has lacked the degree of political 
access that urban Kazaks have achieved. The urban Kazak community, Melvin 
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believes, has suffered an identity crisis because of the adoption of "what many of 
them see as an essentially peasant culture and use [ofl a language with which they 
are often extremely uncomfortable. "'09 Kazak nationalism has not provided a 
common bond for these two groups. As one interviewee, Murat Laumulin, 
confirmed to the author, that central government failed to respond to extreme 
rural hardship because of the lack of political communications and organisation 
outside of the urban areas. "O The immense economic and welfare crisis in the 
provinces whilst resulting in major localised demonstrations had minimal impact 
upon politics in Almaty. This unwillingness to represent the rural Kazak 
population in mainstream politics may lead to rural communities seeking more 
radical political representation. Kazak nationalist groups, in particular the 
extremist groups, have been vocal advocates of agrarian problems. What makes 
this feasible and alarming is that the strength of Islam and lack of Russian contact 
in the South, the principal area of agricultural decline, dovetails with the 
combined but varying anti-Russian, Islamic, and pro-Kazak economic emphasis of 
Alash, Azat and Zheltoqsans' manifestos. (Also see 3.4. iii. ) 
3.4. ii. d. Centre-Regional Relations: Previously the political preserve of the local 
Russian community, the top tier of northern Kazakstan's administration has been 
replaced by titular centre-loyalists. What has been initially portrayed as essentially 
an ethnic dispute is as much a centre-periphery power struggle. This assertion of 
Almaty's control over the northern and eastern oblasts, and the Russian reaction 
to it, may partially be explained by the fact that during the Soviet era these oblasts 
were politically and economically relatively distinct from Almaty, closely 
integrated to Moscow, the RSFSR border regions and All-Union structures. "' 
With the collapse of the USSR, these ties were curtailed. Almaty replaced 
Moscow as the centre of ultimate authority. This ambition was affirmed in the 
1995 Constitution which declared the state as unitary and increased presidential 
authority through the regional prefects (akims), directly responsible to the 
president. 112 
The sense of alienation was considerable in Bremmer's 1993 study of Oskemen's 
Russian population. 113 The article indicated a high level of discontent within the 
Russian community to their treatment by the new government. Central 
government was viewed as solely promoting the interests of Kazaks, at the 
expense of Russians. 
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Politics in Oskemen (previously known as Ust-Kamenogorsk), for example, has 
assumed an ethnic dimension. On a vote over whether the region should become 
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autonomous, the city's Soviet of Peoples' Deputies was split along ethnic lines. 
Whilst the lower level city and oblast officials in Oskemen remained Russian, the 
percentage of Kazaks in the city administration rose from 10% in 1989 to 18% in 
1993 and at the oblast level from 20% to 40%. 115 The Russian-led city authorities 
attempted to resist Kazakification, delaying the building of a mosque by a year, 
returning Kazak educational material to Almaty and preventing the sale of Kazak 
language material in street kiosks. 116 The continual replacement of regional 
leaders has weakened oblast political structures. In the Eastern Kazakstan oblast, 
for example, there were four akims between 1991-96.117 In 1994, Kazaks in 
northern urban centres reported regular physical harassment from the Russians. '18 
Similarly, Chechens and Cossacks complained about racially-motivated police 
harassment. "9 
Throughout the FSU, the proper location of authority has been under debate. 
What makes this debate more volatile in Kazakstan is that the new centre is Kazak 
whilst much of the periphery is Russian. Bremmer believes that the northern 
oblasts Russians clearly associated their apprehensions with central government, 
and not Kazaks per se and "claim that most Kazaks are themselves uneasy with 
the Kazak state policy; but are dissuaded from voicing their dissent from fear of 
retribution. " "0 As well as the obvious anger and disempowerment, centralisation 
weakened Russian identification with the state and removes channels to address 
their concerns. The local Russian and Kazak communities initially reacted with 
disquiet to these appointments. Somewhat ironically given the Russian discontent 
over this process, the Chairman of the Eastern Kazakstan oblast, Amangeldy 
Bektemisov, a career politician and Nazarbaev loyalist was given the mission of 
improving inter-ethnic relation in the oblast. 
Devolution could mitigate a crisis, equally it may be the embryonic stage of a 
secessionist movement. The opportunity for devolution does not exist, as the 
Constitution expressly forbids challenges to the unitary structure of the state, 
which would allow the Russian community to maintain its distinct identity. 
Although it is understandable that the new republic has been unwilling to foster 
potential separatist movements, a highly centralised system does not alleviate 
justified concerns from the new periphery. 
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3AW. Economic Grievances: Ethnic-stratification has dominated the region's 
economic structures. Euro-Caucasians were and remain the backbone of technical 
and scientific sectors, whilst the titular populations have been employed in service 
sectors, republican administration, law enforcement and unskilled sectors of 
industry and non-mechanised agriculture. 121 
The role of economic disparity in inter-ethnic violence was demonstrated in Novy 
Uzen, 1989. Caucasian migrant labourers were employed in the western 
Kazakstani oil fields, in preference to local workers, at the time when 18,000 
youths were unemployed in the SSR. 122 Demands for the replacement of the 
Caucasians with local workers resulted in riots. Five people were killed and 118 
injured, Caucasian-owned businesses were destroyed and 3500 Caucasian fled the 
republic. '2' The incident illustrates the problems of inter-ethnic competition for 
limited economic resources. 
It is difficult to determine whether the ethnic stratification of Kazakstan's labour 
force has had negative or positive implications for social stability. This Soviet 
legacy may have aided complementarity rather than competition, a view supported 
by Horowitz. 124 However, ethnic Russians have been markedly affected by 
reductions in state-subsidised employment. Increased titular competition has 
forced them unsuccessfully to seek employment in other sectors. Between 19914, 
a disproportionate percentage of Russians were unemployed in all of the Central 
Asian republics. 12' Their lack of transferable and language skills plus perceived 
and actual pro-titular selection may enhance fears of ethnic discrimination. (Also 
see 5.121. ) Kazakstan saw major internal migration from Chimkent and Almaty to 
the northern oblasts. 126 As Russians are involved in technically skilled and 
economically strategic sectors Kazakstan can ill-afford to allow the mass 
emigration of non-titular groups that has taken place. 
Numerous Kazakstani political commentators regard economics as crucial in 
determining the state's domestic stability and are pessimistic about the future. 127 
This was bome out by economic statistics: Kazakstan's GDP in 1994 was 
approximately 60% of its 1991 level. 128 There was only a minimal rise of 1.1% 
between 1995-6.129 
Kulchik argues that in Kazakstan the state or at least nomenklatura's control over 
the economy after 1991 increased since the final years of the USSR. 130 The Soviet 
economic system was transformed into sovereign nomenklatura capitalism. 131 
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Access to political and economic information has allowed well-connected 
individuals to prosper whilst the majority of the population has faced serious 
economic hardship. This is implicitly ethnically-oriented. Those who have 
benefitted, however, from this process are the new nomenklatura, primarily 
Kazak. With representatives of the settler population being steadily forced out, 
political and economic power has been concentrated in the hands of a single 
ethnic groUp. i7132 Corruption has also weakened the government's legitimacy, an 
issue which is frequently a central Islamist critique of Muslim governments. (5.4 
& 5.12. iii ) In 1994, approximately 1400 high ranking officials were arrested for 
abuse of office and accepting bribes. 133 As Kazakstanskaid pravda declared, 
"if people lost their faith in the representatives of presidential authority, and if 
people turned their back not only on the representatives but also on the 
authority itself, what kind of radical reform and rebirth of the republic can we 
speak about here? " 134 
Privatisation has raised inter-ethnic concerns, particularly over land privatisation. 
The concept of private ownership of land is an anathema to traditional Kazak 
ethics. The Virgin Lands Scheme was both at the expense of the Kazaks and also 
excluded them from the economic benefits. 135 This development insulted and 
alienated traditional Kazak society and aided the nexus between environmental 
and anti-Russian attitude in Kazak nationalism. Kazak nationalist groups such as 
Azat have expressed opposition to land privatisation arguing that the Kazaks 
would lose out to other groups. Azat's pro-Kazak manifesto argued that the 
titular nation should be the principle recipients of economic and pofitical reform. 
The Republican Party of Kazakstan, a successor to Azat, has also been a 
prominent advocate of the rural Kazak community's problems. These ethnic 
considerations led to the 1996 "Law on Land" which allowed private ownership 
of land, but avoided serious antagonism by ruling that privately owned 
agricultural land can only be used for a limýited number of purposes. 136 
The republic's economic difficulties have already resulted in embryonic 
demonstrations. Dissatisfaction with economic progress was expressed 
throughout 1996. Kazak nationalist movements such as Azat, Alash and Russian 
groups including LAD, Slava and Edinstvo all drew sustenance from the 
population's dissatisfaction with their economic plight. 137 The majority of the 
demonstrations were, however, non-ethnic in composition and objective. In 
Almaty and other major cities mass protest took place on 17 October 1996, 
organised by the Federation of Trade Unions of Kazakstan and the Confederation 
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of Independent Kazakstani Trade Unions. Government action over socio- 
economic problems, in particular the failure to pay salaries and wages, the 
excesses of privatisation and the decline in living conditions were cited as the 
reason for the demonstrations. The action also offered an insight into the 
republic's political culture. The organisers forbade political party leaders to 
address the demonstrators in order to disassociate the event from accusations of 
political bias, and posing a political challenge to the government. 138 Problems 
associated with the electricity, gas and telephone systems in southern Kazakstan 
resulted in similar large-scale public demonstrations in Shymkent. "9 However, 
whilst the situation was described as on the threshold of a social explosion in 
1994, economic hardship did not resulted in serious social instability. '40 As 
Laumulin commented that whilst "the economic situation may be endless, people 
will not protest, because there is a lack of political tradition, weak opposition, and 
it is difficult to mobilise opposition in such a sparsely populated country. 9A41 
Notwithstanding this, the impact of the economy on political stability will be 
noticeable during the period of succession after Nazarbaev, and that, 
"[ulnless economic prosperity by that time high enough and equal enough- so 
that the country's major ethnic groups perceive that they have an interest in 
preserving the status quo, then the outlook for long-term political stability in 
Kazakhstan is (Lim. " 142 
3.4. iv. Demographic Issues and Inter-Ethnic Relations: Population growth 
throughout Central Asia is seen as a key concern for regional stability. As 
discussed in 4.2. rapid growth increases pressures on economic, ecological, 
infrastructure and political resources. Given the incidents of resource-related 
conflict in the late-Soviet period this is a disturbing prospect. 
Absolute population growth has been negative since 1993. A 3.5% decline was 
recording between this date and 1996.143 This was a result of non-titular 
emigration and increased morbidity rates. 144Demographic tensions have remained, 
however, over the issues of the titular and minoritys' different rates of relative 
growth; Kazak immigration into the republic in general and specifically into the 
northern oblasts; and non-titular emigration. 
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Table 3.1. Kazakstan's Population by Nationality 1926-97 (as percentage) 
Kazak Russian/Slavic Others 
1926 57.6 21.7 20.7 
1959 30.0 52.1 17.9 
1970 32.6 51.1 16.3 
1979 36.0 48.1 15.9 
1989 40.0 43.3 (Russian & 
Ukrainian) 
16.7 
1993 43.2 41.6 (Russian & 
Ukrainian) 
15.2 
1997 50.6 37.7 (Russian & 
Ukrainian) 
11.7 
Sources: Bohr, A. Table 7.1 Ethnic Composition of Kazakstan, K)Mzstan, 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekista in Smith, G. et al. Nation-building in 771e Post- 
Soviet Borderlands: Ae Politics of National Identities, CUP, Cambridge, 1998; 
Kazakhstanskaia Pravda, 27/5/97; Bremmer, 1. & Taras, R. (eds. ) Nations and 
Politics in the Soviet Successor States, CUP, Cambridge, 1993, Appendix B, 
Figure 17, p 555; Clem, R. S. Table 5. Ethnic Composition of Kazakhstg& by 
Oblast in 1926,1959. and 1989. "Interethnic Relations at the Republic Level: The 
Example of Kazakhstan" Post-Soviet Geography, Vol. 34, No 4, p 23 1; 
Kazakstan State Committee for Statistics (SWB SU 1724 B6,25/6/93); & Olcott, 
M, The Kazakhs, Hoover Institute Press, Stanford, 1987, Appendix 1, p 258. 
The two nationalities' different rates of growth has caused anxiety for Kazakstani 
Russians. In 1994 the average age of the Kazak community was 23 years old, 
whilst that of the Russians was 46 years old. 145 This demographic disparity 
exemplifies the minority's sense of alienation and decline. In the future, this 
problem may be further worsened by the fact that the large young Kazak 
population, with little connection to the Russified Soviet past, may demand 
greater Kazakification within the republic. Although present communal relations 
remain relatively stable, there are disturbing signs for future relations. A 1993 
survey registered evidence of ethnic animosity. 55% of Russian interviewed had 
been subjected to nationality-based hostility on public transport, 40% on a daily 
basis and 30% of Kazaks blamed their difficulties on the presence of non-titular 
groups. The survey concluded that the "younger generations of Kazakhs had 
absorbed an atmosphere of hatred for Russians. "146 This latter point is of 
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significant interest. Post-Soviet societies are in the process of losing their shared 
(Russian) cultural experiences and nonns, as a generation grows up with limited 
positive identification with Russia. Given the rapid population growth amongst 
the Muslim nations, in a period of enhanced national awareness, this suggestion is 
foreboding for future communal stability in the region. 
Population transfers have been a major component of the gannonizatsia 
programme. Implicate in van Evera's suggestion that a government may find it 
more acceptable to allow secession by a homogenous and distinct region is the 
reason for the settlement of the Kazak diaspora. 147 The potential for secession 
from an ethnically-homogenous Russian territory, contagious VAth the RF., has 
been weakened by the programme. Almaty has diluted the cultural distinctiveness 
of the northern oblasts and attempted to incorporate them into a Kazakstani state. 
International and internal migrants have been provided writh limited government 
assistance to relocate. Almaty, via the "Resolution of the Qurultay" document 
recognises members of the Kazak diaspora as refugees and provides limited 
financial and social incentives to "return" to the republic. This encouraged, at 
least in the first years of independence, large-scale migration. 148 155,000 returned 
from the diaspora in China, Mongolia, and the FSU between 1991-6.149 30,000 
Kazaks were settled in northern Kazakstan in 1991 and 45,000 in 1993.150 In 
Oskemen, the housing of ethnic Germans who emigrated to Germany was 
reallocated to Mongolian Kazaks. "' 
The programme whilst reducing the ethnic homogeneity and distinctiveness of the 
oblasts has increased tensions within them. Cultural differences between the 
Russians and newly arrived Kazaks from the densely populated rural oblasts of 
Almatinsk, Zhambyl, Taldy-Kurgan and Southern Kazakstan, din-dnished the 
potential for social interaction and integration. The Kazaks' rural, conservative 
and Muslim background is liable to cause fliction with local Russians accustomed 
to bi-lingual Russified Kazaks. 152 The problems of integrating these two groups 
has been further complicated by the arrival of Kazakstani Russians from the 
southern oblasts and Russian refugees from Tajikistan. "' These Russian migrants 
have already left what they perceive to be a hostile traditional Muslim 
communities and an Islamic-inspired conflict, respectively. 154 
The disparity between population growth and employment opportunities is 
particularly acute in rural regions. In the Kazak SSR, the highest levels of 
economic backwardness and unemployment were recorded in the Kazak 
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dominated oblasts. 115 Agrarian problems are likely to increase in the near-future 
due to the decline in the carrying capacity of Kazakstan's agricultural lands, a 
consequence of desertification, erosion and salination. It has been predicted that 
by the year 2000,50% of all Kazakstan's pasture land will be affected by serious 
erosion. 156 Competition for increasingly scarce resources and rural-urban, south- 
north migration are likely. Disaffected rural Kazaks settling in the cites may be 
susceptible to political Islam and nationalism. 157 This author would accept that the 
detrimental impact upon stability will be felt in the long-term future, 10-20 years, 
rather than in the short-term that Shashenkov favours. "8 
Since 1991, out-mýigration particularly by Russians to Russia, has continually 
exceeded in-migration. Net out-migration from Central Asia is, however, not a 
new phenomena. The average annual net in-mýigration into Central Asia fell from 
63,818 pa during the 1959-70 period to a negative balance of 58,916 during the 
1979-87 period. 159 This suggests that the relaxation of employment and residency 
laws since independence rather than concerns over ethnic discrimination may have 
caused this increase (rather than a reversal) in rnigration trends. 
Table 3.2.: Net Out-migration from Kazakstan 1991-1996 
Year Net Out-Migration 
1991 49,000 
1992 179,000 
1993 222,000 
1994 411,000 
1995 238,000 
1996 175,538 
Source: "CIS Migration Report" IOM International Organization for Migration, 
1997, pp 56-60. In "Migration in Kazakstan" Eurasian File, No 96, April, 1998, 
p 7. 
It has been argued by some authors that continued out-migration of non-titular 
groups may alleviate ethnic tensions, and provide housing and employment for the 
titular population and reduce government social expenditure. '60 Although this may 
be the case the massive and continued haemorrhaging of the skilled sections of the 
settler community suggests non-titular groups feel that the state has failed them. 
Economic hardship, including, job insecurity, low wages and poor living 
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conditions, and educational and employment discrimination and psychological 
concerns, linked to the collapse of the USSR were cited as the main reasons for 
leaving by emigrants. 161 
Whilst there has been a decline in non-titular emigration and titular immigration, 
the process has the potential for self-perpetuation. 162 The greater number of 
Russian who leave Kazakstan, the greater the influx of ethnic Kazaks into 
formerly Russian-don-tinated areas, further increasing Slav fears of discrimination, 
encroachment and insecurity. It is difficult to regarded the combined 
psychological impact upon local Russians, who have seen their cultural, political 
and now demographic position eroded within a decade as positive. The 
immigration of white-collar Russians has removed the cadre of the community's 
social and political structures. 
The loss of their skills and education will have serious consequences for 
Kazakstan's economic development. This is an additional reason why it is vital 
that Almaty must seek to incorporate this community, rather than alienate them by 
over-emphasising the Kazakness of the republic. The only positive feature of this 
trend is that the minorities have not actively protested against actual and 
perceived discrimination, with implications for political and social stability, 
although avoidance and rnigration are not ideal solutions. 
There is considerable evidence to suggest that since the initial militancy of the 
1991-93 period when Russian community was discussing the status of northern 
Kazakstan and their citizenship, a situation common throughout the FSU, there 
has however been growing acceptance by the Russians that their future is linked 
to that of the republic. In a 1997 opinion poll, 57% of Kazakstani Russians 
interviewed regarded themselves as permanent residents of the republic, and only 
25% as potential emigrants. Only 3% of all respondents irrespective of their 
ethnicity considered themselves as citizens of Russia. 163 Similarly, two thirds of 
Kazakstan's 122,000 immigrants between 19914 were Slavs and only 19.8% 
Kazak. '6454,000 "non-native" citizens of Kazakstan who had previously left the 
state since independence have returned. 16' These statistics imply that non-titular 
immigrants perceived the economic and inter-ethnic situation in the republic as no 
worse than elsewhere in the FSU and that Kazakstani immigration policy has not 
been explicitly pro-Kazak. 
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3.4. v. The External Dimension: Russia's Role in Kazakstan: Without any 
doubt potentially the most dangerous and unpredictable influence on Kazakstani 
stability, and in particular inter-ethnic relations, throughout the period was Russia. 
Its effects upon Kazakstan's stability have been wide-ranging in their origins, 
although the emphasis of this section will be upon Russian foreign policy. 
Kazakstani politicians have been acutely aware of Russia's axiomatic role in 
Kazakstani affairs as Nazarbaev noted at the International Conference on 
Disarmament, Geneva in 1995, stating that "Russia ... [and] her choice will to a 
large extent determine the stability and changes in Eurasia. "'66AImaty has striven 
to maintain close economic, military and political relations with Russia. This has 
been a recognition of Kazakstan's interdependency with its northern neighbour, 
the need to reassure its own Russian community, and a means of seeking dialogue 
and cooperation over the diaspora and other sensitive issues, including military 
security. 
This has been achieved with difficulty because Moscow's Near Abroad policies 
and interventions have not aided confidence in its neighbours. The Federation's 
erratic views and actions towards the Russian minority has failed to satisfy any of 
Kazakstan's interested parties, whilst providing all groups with material for 
advancing their own critiques of Moscow. Initially, liberals such as Andrei 
Kozyrev, the former Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, were reticent to see 
Russia as a "guarantor of regional stability. " A subsequent change in Russian 
foreign policy resulted in a more assertive concept with a self-proclaimed right to 
intervened in the Near Abroad. By March 1993, Yeltsin argued that, 
"Russia continues to have a vital interest in the cessation of all armed conflicts 
on the territory of the former USSR. Moreover, the world cornmunity is 
increasingly coming to the realise our country's special responsibility in this 
difficult matter. I believe the times has come for authoritative international 
organisations, including the UN, to grant Russia special powers as a 
guarantor ofpeace and stability in this region. " 167 
Similar interventionist attitudes and policies were expressed in the Basic 
Provision of the Russian Federation's Foreign Policy Concept, for example. 168 
The diaspora has attained a central position in Russian foreign policy. Numerous 
official statements from Moscow have stated its willingness to protect the 
interests of Russians and Cossacks. Ambartsumov, for example, has argued that 
forcible methods as a means of solving problems, including the protection of the 
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Russian diaspora are legitimate. "9 The confused concepts of Russia and Russian 
have complicated post-Soviet Russian Foreign Policy. The Federation has sought 
to connect the diaspora to the Russian nation and by implication the Russian 
state, and via "[flhe emphasis on common ethnicity" ensure "that the diaspora is 
seen as an object of the Russian state" rather than as solely a domestic concern for 
Almaty and the other Near Abroad capitals. 170 
Elements within Russia, and not solely extremists, hold views that have not 
assisted stability in Kazakstan and good diplomatic relations between the two 
capitals. Vladimir Zhirinovski, the Liberal Democrat leader, exemplifies Russian 
nationalism at its most bellicose and has played a key role in promoting the 
diaspora in politics. '7' Similarly, Solzhenitsyn's ideas on a "Greater Russia7' which 
would include northern regions of Kazakstan heightened diplomatic tensions. 172 
Key RF decision-makers and policy advisers have also questioned the territorial 
integrity of Kazakstan. '7' One must note that the extremist Kazak nationalist 
movement, Zheltoqsan, demanded the incorporation of "historic" Kazak lands 
including the RF. regions of AstraUan, Kurgan, Omsk, Orenburg and Tomsk. 174 
The differences in Kazakstan and Russia's respective treatment of the Cossacks 
have affected the former's inter-ethnic relations. Cossack membership is subject to 
three core articles: 
- Acceptance of Russian Orthodox faith; 
-A strict code of discipline; and 
- The belief in the integrity of Russian lands. "' 
The Federation's recognition of the Cossacks as a distinct nation with the right to 
self-rule, including the formation of armed militias contrasts with Kazakstan's 
view that the Cossacks are a sub-section of the Russians, rather than a distinct 
ethic group. 176 This may be explained by the Cossacks' militaristic and territorial 
character. The Cossacks have presented Almaty with the greatest challenge to its 
territorial integrity. 177 Ataman Gunkin, was arrested and sentenced for three 
months for "agitating" for the unification of northern Kazakstan into the RF, in 
contrivance of the Kazakstani Constitution. Upon release, Gunkin unrepentantly 
declared that, 
"all [Kazakstanij Cossacks ... will take Russian citizenship ... In other words, the Semirechensk Cossack Horde should become the Russian Semirechensk 
Cossack Horde on Kazakhstan's territory. " 178 
The Kazakstani authorities have regarded the Cossacks as a fifth column for 
Russian interests. The paramilitary character of the Cossacks and alleged military 
contacts with Russian Armed Force Cossack units has increased such 
apprehensions. 179 The Siberian Hoste, cross-border in distribution with its 
headquarters in Omsk, has been more confrontational than the other two Hostes 
towards Almaty. 180 The political activism of this Hoste's Kazakstani members has, 
however, been limited. "' 
Armed Cossack troops have been deployed to patrol Russia's 5000 km border 
with Kazakstan, an arrangement which Almaty complained about. Kazakstani 
commentators have been critical of this close relationship, to the extent that one 
Presidential Apparat figure charged Moscow with supporting "criminal" ataman 
such as Gunkin. 182 
Difference of opinions and policies between the two states on the treatment of the 
Russian-speaking minority has also acted as a source of ffiction. Both capitals 
claimed that the other has failed to appreciate the real situation. Russian media 
sources have been highly critical of Almaty's unwillingness to discuss minority 
problems. When the Kazakstan ambassador to the Russian Federation, Tair 
Mansurov, spoke to the Duma Committee for CIS Affairs hearing on Russian- 
Kazakstani relations his denials of any ethnic related problems "were so equivocal 
that they could not satisfy anybody [present], "according to Pravda. 183 
Mirroring these views, Kazakstani charges have been levelled at Russian 
commentators and politicians that they "lack knowledge about Kazakstan ... 
know 
nothing about the real situation or even migration statistics. " 114 Throughout the 
period Kazakstani elites frequently complained, with some justification, that 
Russian journalists and politicians deliberately exaggerated the situation for their 
own objectives. Several figures interviewed by the author reported conversations 
with unspecified Russian Federation officials, who they regarded as having 
incredulous views on Kazakstan. 18' Abdigaliev argues that discrimination towards 
Russians and intra-Kazak divisions were primarily creations of Russian "conflict- 
provoking articles. " 186 Such statements contain echoes of previous Soviet denials 
of internal problems and display a lack of substantial change in the political culture 
of the post-Soviet decision-makers, which will hinder effective policy making, and 
conflict prevention. In such an environment any deterioration in inter-ethnic 
relations in Kazakstan could easily escalate to become a regional issue. 
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Moscow's erratic policies towards Kazakstan have been dangerous. Russian 
politicians alternatively encouraged and neglected the interests of Kazakstani 
Russians. In fact, relations between Moscow and the diaspora have been more 
strained than between the capitals. In interviews with Melvin, the Russian 
population expressed a sense of betrayal by Moscow, over the issues of dual 
citizenship; snubs by Russian Federation politicians to appeals and delegations; 
and a reduction in the purchasing of military equipment manufactured in the 
Kazakstan's northern oblasts. 197 This has led to the Kazakstani Russian 
community adopting a pragmatic view of Moscow's ability to act on its behalf and 
may account for the decline in irredentism and militancy. 
Kazakstan-Russian relations remain amicable. Russia has acknowledged 
Kazakstan's territorial integrity. Co-operation and dialogue have been the norm 
for inter-state relations. Given the customary sensitivity and independence of 
national military security, Kazakstan-Russian security cooperation including the 
stationing of Russian troops on Kazakstan's Caspian and Chinese borders is 
indicative of a relatively close and transparent level of inter-state relations . 
188 
Some Kazakstani security advisors suggest that co-operation between the two 
republics has improved because northern Kazakstan is no longer a source of 
contention. 189 
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3.5. The Ta*ik Minoritv in Uzbekistan 
3.51 Introduction: Beyond charges of ancient and intractable ethnic enmities, 
Uzbek chauvinism and Tajik irredentism, discussions on Tajik-Uzbek relations has 
been limited, unlike the situation of the Russian minority in Kazakstan. " This 
section aims to examine this neglected area of post-Soviet inter-ethnic relations. 
The case-study will be examined predominately through Tashkent's relationship 
with the Tajik social-political movement, Samarkand. Whilst the broader Tajik 
community will be discussed, the government-Samarkand relationship was 
selected because Samarkand is one of few areas of the minority's affairs that is 
sufficiently documented. 
In the Tajik-Uzbek scenario there are significant points of departure from the 
Kazakstani example. These include: 
- The close and long Tajik-Uzbek relationship; 
- The ill-defined cultural demarcation between them; 
- The fact that power relationships between Tajiks and Uzbeks have remained 
unaltered by independence; 
- The continued reliance of an authoritarian political culture; 
- The manipulation of national (state) security for explicit regime security 
requirements; and 
-A tense regional security environment in which the Tajik's eponymous republic 
was embroiled in conflict. 
Of the 4.6 million Tajiks recorded in the 1989 Soviet census, 3 million lived in 
their titular republic and 933,560 in Uzbekistan. '91 In the latter, Tajik-dominated 
regions include the cities of Bukhara and Samarkand, the Chorvok area, parts of 
the Fergana Valley; Jizzakh province, Surkhan Darya and Kasha Darya. 192 
Another 3 million Persian-speakers, identifying themselves as Tajiks, are in 
Afghanistan. 193 The number of ethnic Tajiks in Uzbekistan is contested. (See 
3.5. iv. ) The Tajiks dispersal between three republics, two of which have been 
beset by conflict, and an eponymous republic with a smaller Tajik population than 
in either Afghanistan and Uzbekistan has complicated questions of nation- 
diaspora relations and irredentism. 
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Table 3.3. Ethnic Composition of Uzbekistan 1996 
Ethnic Group Number Percentage 
Uzbek 17,925,750 77.5 
Russian 948,330 4.1 
Tajik* 1,179,630 5.1 
Others 3,076,290 13.3 
Total 23,130,000 100 
Source: Bohr, A. Table I Ethnic Composition of Uzbekistan Uzbekistan: Politics 
and Foreign Policy, RIIA, London, 1998, p 33 (ii); & The Government of the 
Republic of Uzbekistan/TACIS, Population Development 1990-98 (thousands) 
Uzbekistan Economic Trends 1997 (First Quarter), Tashkent, 1998p 43. (* This 
is the official Tajik figure which is contested. ) 
In 1996, the Uzbeks comprised 77.5 percent of Uzbekistan's population, itself the 
most populous state in Central Asia. They are the region's largest ethnic group 
with a diaspora in all of the other four republics. 194 Prior to the Tajik Civil War 
upto 25% of Tajikistan's population was ethnically Uzbek, located along the 
republican border and especially in the Khojent oblast, (known as the Leninabad 
oblast between 1929-91). 195 
3.5. ii. Politics: Tajik-Uzbek tensions were reported in 1987 in the Samarkand 
oblast. '96 As with Kyrgyz-Uzbek violence in the Osh region of Kyrgyzstan, in 
1989, these clashes were associated with land and water access. (See 4.10. ii. a. 3. ) 
The glasnost period saw debate on Tajik-Uzbek issues. 197 Interviews were 
published in which Tashkent acknowledged that there had been discrimination 
towards the minority in the past, accepted the group's fears of Uzbek assin-dlation 
and sought bilateral solutions with the Tajik SSR on these problems. '98 
The first signs of an organised revival in TaJik cultural and political action was the 
establishment of the Social-Cultural Association of TaJiks and TaJik-speaking 
people (SCA) in March 1989, under Uktum Bekmuhammadov. 199 The next year, 
saw the SCA augmented with the foundation of the National Cultural Centre 
(NCC). The joint movement is commonly referred to as Samarkand and was co- 
chaired by Bekmuhammadov and Jamol Mirsaidov. Although it is difficult to 
gauge the movement's popularity, according to one Samarkand leader, 60,000 
TaJiks signed an open letter presented to President Karimov in 1991.200 As with 
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other independent political movements throughout Central Asia, due to 
government hostility, general dissatisfaction with politics and economic hardship, 
it is probably that this support has been much reduced. 
Samarkand, although primarily concerned with promoting Tajik aspirations, in its 
platform and political methods was compatible with the numerous moderate 
reform-oriented movements that were emerging throughout the USSR in the late- 
1980s. As Samarkand's published material demonstrate its nationalist objectives 
were moderate, pluralist and principally focused upon four broad themes: national 
education; the use of Tajik language in politics and mass communication; culture 
and heritage; and political and legal rights . 
20' Taft-specific demands were 
accompanied by a wider desire for political reform. The movement sought to 
provide "constructive proposals about how to resolve ethnic problems and to 
meet the lawful demands of our ethnic group" and "facilitate the provision of real 
equality of all the citizens of the Republic of Uzbekistan, regardless of their 
nationality, social status, position, political views or faith. ýi= 
After an initial and brief period of government dialogue with the Tajik movement 
there was a dramatic reversal in their fortunes. 203 The early modest advances were 
lost in the restoration of authoritarianism in 1992 related to the Shukurulla 
Nfirsaidov-Karimov power struggle, demonstrations in Tashkent and Tajikistan's 
descent into Civil War. 204 Samarkand's cursory connection with Birlik, the main 
opposition movement in the early 1990s also complicated its relationship with the 
government. 205 
The, CSCE has reported routine harassment of the Samarkand Movement. 206 This 
harassment has ranged from bureaucratic obstinacy to kidnappings. By 1992, the 
authorities were accusing SCA-NCC of taking on political aspirations, essentially 
offer a political alternative. 207 The organisation fell foul of the 1993 law forcing all 
political movements to apply for re-registration. A government-sponsored Tajik 
association using the designation, the Tajik Cultural Association-Samarkand, was 
registered. The independent movement was thus prevented from registering, even 
after the Samarkand oblast court ruled against the Justice Department's 
decision. 209 
Bureaucratic harassment has been accompanied by frequent gross violations of 
Samarkand activists' rights. From June 1991, leading members of the movement 
have been arbitrarily arrested, beaten or forced to leave Samarkand city. 
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Bekmuhammadov was been subject to considerable government attention. In 
1991, he was initially jailed for four monthS. 209 In December of the same year, 
Uzbekistani security service agents kidnapped Bekmuhammadov, along with 
Abdumannob Polat, the founder of Birlik, and another Birlik member, Takhir 
Bakaev, who were attending a human fights conference in Bishkek, Kygyzstan. 
Although Polat's argument that Bekmuhammadov and Bakaev were arrested to 
prevent them from reporting Polat's abduction is probably correct, the case 
illustrates the extent to which the regime has been prepared to go in order to 
silence opposition figures . 
2'0 Bekmuhammadov, who received a 10 day jail 
sentence, has since been accused of being a Russian spy, and emigrated. 211 
Tajik activists have also been prevented from meeting with international 
organisations. Since 1992 the Uzbekistani authorise have been prevented Tajiks 
from attending the annual World Congress of Tajiks, in Dushanbe, even though 
the Constitution guarantees that (a)ny citizen ... shall 
have the right to ... free 
entry to and exit from [the republic] except in the events specified by laW. "212 
Similarly, an arranged meeting between an US State Department delegation and 
Samarkand members resulted in the detention of 36 individuals associated with 
the movement. The incident indicated the continued surveillance of dissent. 213 
Other reports suggest that ethnic Tajik candidates were prevented from standing 
in the December 1994,01i MajUs elections, although five Tajik candidates from 
approved and registered parties were elected . 
214 Ethnically-based parties are 
illegal, therefore independent Tajik candidates would have been prevented from 
standing. 
Numerous arbitrary and unconstitutional actions by the central government, 
viloyet, hokim and security service (SNB) and police figures have been directed to 
the Tajik movement. These include the prohibition of Tajik cultural centres in Syr 
Darya, Surkhondarya, Kashkadarya and Fergana viloyet. " 
Both Tajiks and government officials were keen to highlight the existence of a 
Tajik-media to the author, even though its was rather superficial in nature. 216 With 
censorship endemic in Uzbekistan discussion on the Tajik issue has been 
curtailed. 217 The publication of appeals for humanitarian aid to Tajikistan and 
historical tresises on good government have been labelled seditious. More direct 
forms of repression have also been evident, including the physical harassment of 
the editor of Ovozi Tadjik, who was subsequently forced to retire 2'8 This gap in 
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the service has been more pronounced because after the onset of the Tajik GO 
War, transmissions from the republic were jammed by Tashkent, depriving the 
minority of "its links with their national-state education. , 219 
Tajik cultural aspirations have been problematic for Tashkent which has sought to 
portray a strong unified and uniquely Uzbek identity. The community's demands 
for increased access to native-language education and media material ran counter 
to the government's attitudes towards free speech, and Uzbek history and national 
identity. Similarly, Tajik demands for the expansion of Tajik-language in 
education, and cultural links with the broader Perso-phone community would 
have allowed non-sanctioned information and influences to reach the minority. 
The TaJik minority scenario has been enacted in a wider political environment 
founded upon the preservation of "stability at all CoStS. "220 Authoritarianism and 
an homogenous identity have been justified as expident. As Karimov declared 
such conditions are necessary, 
"during historic periods when a country gains its own statehood, the more so, 
during a transition period from one system to another [in order I to prevent 
bloodshed and confrontation and the preserve ethnic and civil accord, peace 
and stability ... It is necessary for democracy's progress" 
221 
A pluralist political culture in which an assertive Tajik identity could be articulated 
would not have aided this. The Tajik Ci vil War was symbolic of the stability and 
security the Uzbekistani population would forsake should they engage in the 
"pseudo-revolutionary upheavals" for which neither Tajikistan and Uzbekistan 
were prepared for. 2n The Uzbekistani Foreign Nlinistry paper, Jahon, ststed that 
opposition groups should be "constructive and patriotic" and not compete for 
power, for such behaviour would result in a Tajikistani situation . 
223Groups that 
fail to meet with these criteria are regarded as unpatriotic and extremist. 22' 
Equally important in the call for stability have been objective considerations. 
Inter-ethnic violence in Osh, in Kyrgyzstan in 1989, the temporary breakdown of 
central authority in Namangan and the instability in Afghanistan and Tajikistan, all 
illustrate the regional political insecurities in which republic's government has had 
to formulate domestic and foreign policies. With the exception of the Namangan 
incident, discussed further in the Islamic chapter, ethnicity was politically divisive 
in these situation. 
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Tajikistan's disintegration has had a striking resonance for Uzbekistan. (See 
3.5. v. ) Sub- and supra-national loyalties from the mahalla to Islam are evident 
within the Uzbek nation. Regional rivalries remain a key source of division within 
the republic, both at the elite and popular level. 22' The Fergana Valley, has proved 
a particular challenge to Uzbekistan's integrity from the perspective of the 
government. The Valley's ethnic composition; division between three republics; 
deep-seated and conservative Islamic affiliation and proximity to Tajikistan's 
events pose unresolved problems for Tashkent. Carlisle claims that the state's 
territorial divisions are so acute that the possibility of an autonomous or even 
independent Bukhara in the near-future is feasible. 226 This author would dispute 
this conclusion. Regionalism within in Uzbeksitan has not developed irredentist 
ambitions. The presence of Tajik communities in the alternative centres, Bukhara- 
Samarkand and the Fergana Valley, however, has blurred the distinction between 
regional and ethnic political competition and heightened Tashkent's apprehension 
of insecurity. 
The construction of an Uzbekistani identity has attempted to subsume these 
alternative local and ethnic loyalties. This has been demonstrated in the historical 
manipulation of the republic's demographic figures and the re-defining of different 
nationalities as Uzbek. Writing specifically on post-Soviet Uzbekistan, 
Schoeberlein-Engel declares that the creation of an homogenous nation can be 
achieved through the creation of a government-sponsored identity, 
"compelling both to its own population and the world at large ... 
The most 
common way of establishing a state's identity is through asserting that the 
identity of the state represents the identity of its population. ... 
[Mew states are 
keen [to] promote themselves as having a deep history and important presence 
in the world. " 
227 
A strong unitary Uzbekistani identity has been perceived as vital to maintaining 
territorial and civil stability, according to the present regime's philosophy. A 
constant theme of Uzbekistan's state-building programme has been the centrality 
of authority, stability and strength. The centre's revival of Timur, the fifteenth 
century empire-builder and Rashidov have focused upon the benefits of 
authoritarianism. Timur's rehabilitation "is no accident [for] he unified the peoples 
of the region [and] instilled a sense of order during a time of chaos. "2n The re- 
interpretation of Uzbekistan's historical significance has been central to this 
elevation in which "the Timurids are inextricably linked with the [Uzbek] nation, 
making Uzbeks feel they share a tradition of statehood that, though interrupted, 
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has no parallel in the region ... and shapes 
Uzbeks attitudes towards surrounding 
powers. 11229 
Tajik cultural demands have challenged the ideological foundation of post-Soviet 
Uzbekistan, as established by the Karimov regime. Uzbek ctaims to a dominant 
role in the region's history have been undermined by their understandable desire 
to reaffirm their historical origins and the relationship with the territory and 
culture of what is now Uzbekistan. 
It is uncertain whether Tashkent's assertive nation-building is expedient. The 
failure to establish effective cohesive nation and state identities may lead to the 
fragmentation of the state. Tajikistan has been perceived as, or at least portrayed 
by Karimov amongst other post-Soviet leaders, the result of the failure to 
construct such loyalties and used to "justify the nastier aspects of nation-building" 
including discrimination, and the suppression of diversity. 2'0 There are serious 
doubts, however, as to the effectiveness of an unitary Uzbek identity. As 
Schoerberlein-Engel concludes, 
"[i]n Uzbekistan, there is such tremendous cultural diversity that any attempts 
to promote a clear cut homogenous national identity would inievitably make 
outsiders of a substantial part of the population unless they suppress their own 
culture in favour of the national one. I would like to challenge this notion of 
nation-building imperative and suggest that with all its rich diversity, Central 
Asia would do better to seek its models of pluralism. " 231 
The assertiveness of contemporary Uzbek identity may alienate non-titular groups 
either because of fears of exclusion and discrimination or conversely fears of 
assimilation and encroachment. Both of these concerns have been felt by the 
Tajiks. Their culture and history have been assimilated into an Uzbek 
construction, whilst their political aspirations portrayed as subversive and disloyal. 
The fact that the group has not held any irredentist ambitions makes these attacks 
even more perverse. If alternative identities are radicafised and strengthen, 
Uzbekistan's political structures and environment will find these difficult to 
accommodate. 
The paucity of reliable information, however, makes it difficult to determine the 
level of oppression although the author has anecdotal evidence of individual 
discrimination and harassment of ethnic Tajiks by government official, and 
security officers. 232 The difficulty is in gauging the level of such harassment and 
determining whether these were officially sanctioned or the actions of rogue 
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individuals. Mrsaidov's address to the President concerning the arbitrary and 
unconstitutional behaviour of the hokim, police officers and other officials in 
Samarkand oblast indicated regular harassment of the Tajik community, and also 
the government's failure to control its own personnel. 233 No matter its origins 
such actions do not endear citizens from minorities to the agents of the state and 
by implication the state itself. Considerable evidence suggests, however, that there 
has been no significant communal enmity between the republic's Tajik and Uzbek 
communities. Novak and Wixmans' individual research support the assertion of 
relatively harmonious interaction between the two communities. 234 
This is concurrent with this work's hypothesis that the treatment of the Tajik 
minority by the government has been politically motivated rather than a 
consequence of intractable and ancient hostilities, the result of an ongoing 
"Uzbek-Tajik conflict which is the [partial] ... product of the millennium-long 
relationship between Turkic and Iranian peoples. "23' The primary focus, has 
therefore been centred upon the more obvious "elite7' level of political 
discrimination and abuse towards Samarkand and its activists. The government's 
repression of the Tajik opposition was arguably more a result of the ex- 
Communist elite's attempts to retain personal power than concern over a militant 
minority. Regime security supplanted state security. Haghayeghi argues that the 
evidence supports such an analysis "when one considers the methods by which the 
present leaders have secured their power, their reaction to the coup of 1991, and 
11236 the manner in which the opposition has been treated . Underneath the this 
behaviour is the legacy of Soviet political culture and mentality. The failure to 
achieve a wholesale transfer in political ideology and personnel and structures has 
allowed for this continuation. Arbitrary actions, combined with a culture of 
deference and a lack of official recourse have stifled political initiative and 
independent thought in Uzbekistan. Ethnicity does not appear to be the principle 
cause of harassment and discrimination that the state's Tajiks face. The Tajik 
movement and community has been subject to the same level and methods of 
oppression as have ethnic Uzbek opponents of the regime, whether secular, 
Muslims, nationalist, or democratic. The Tajik example has simply been a 
microcosm of the systematic abuse of power practised in the republic. 237 
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3.5jii. Economic Grievances: Ethnic stratification of labour was essentially 
tripartite; indigenous, European, and Caucasian. Employment demarcation 
between Tajiks and Uzbeks has been therefore less emphatic than that between 
Kazaks and Russians. Tajiks are on the whole bilingual and urban with a tradition 
as artisans and small traders. Consequently, they may find it possible to thrive in 
the republic's economy with little explicit discrimination. 23' There are, however, 
four key econon-&-oriented spheres which have had serious implications for 
Tajik-Uzbek relations. These are: 
Historical examples of inter-ethnic resource competition; 
The general economic situation related to transition and population growth; 
The state's coercive use of employment; and 
Intra-republican trade; 
As noted previously, Uzbeks were involved in a series of economic-related 
conflicts with other nations during the late-Soviet period. The Fergana Valley 
witnessed Uzbek violence against Meskhetian Turks, deported by Stalin in 1944. 
The violence, between 23 May and 25 June 1989, claimed 100 lives and required 
9000 MVD troops to restore order. 239 The incident demonstrated a network of 
factors which generated and maintained the violence including: a lack of reliable 
news sources in which rumour created an environment of insecurity; ethno- 
economic inequality and stratification, and the involvement of party figures in the 
disturbances; and the authority's failure to respond to early signs of tensions and 
the victims' requests for protection. Meskhetian leaders regarded Tashkent's 
inaction as a sign that the group was deemed as a unwanted immigrant group. 2" 
Economic disparity contributed to the pogrom. With upto 30,000 Uzbeks 
unemployed in the Fergana Valley, in 1989, the relative economic prosperity of 
the Meskhetians was regarded by the Uzbeks as an acute aff-ront. 241 The brutality 
and intensity of the pogrom towards the Meskhetians, in Haghayegni's opinion, 
can "only be rationalised if one took into account the centuries-old Uzbek sense 
of supremacy that had been profoundly frustrated by the presence of the 
Meskhetian Turks who enjoyed a relatively higher economic status in Fergana. iý242 
This nationalistic chauvinism, Haghayegni believes, is even more pronounced 
towards the TaJiks. 243 It is difficult to ascertain the potential for similar violence 
between these two groups as the cultural and economic demarcation between 
them is less pronounced than between the Uzbeks and Meskhetians. 
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In 1990 Osh oblast, Kyrgyz SSF, "[u]nder conditions of low living standards, 
socio-economic crisis and political destablization, inter-ethnic tensions erupted7 
244 between Kyrgyzs and Uzbeks. Increased group competition for land, 
accommodation and political positions, rural-urban divisions (i. e. Kyrgyz-Uzbek), 
and high unemployment all contributed to the outbreak of violence. Political 
inequalities were stark. Although the Uzbeks; comprised 26% of the oblast's 
population, only 5.8% of Osh town administration was staffed by Uzbeks, who 
dominated the "less prestigious but materially rewarding positions in trade and 
services. "24' Tishkov, citing other authors, emphasises the role of a weak oblast 
administration, unable to cope with nationalist groups, as a major contribution to 
the violence. 246 
The general economic situation, linked to rapid growing population and 
transitional problems, is a serious source of concern for future stability. Over 60% 
of Uzbekistan's population is under 25 years old, and between 1990-7 grew by 
15% 
. 
247 There are already underlying economic tensions. By the late-1980s, 20% 
of all those entering the employment market in the Fergana oblast were unable to 
find a job. 249 Whilst the economy has proved relatively resilient to the detrimental 
effects of transition due to major state involvement, the lack of economic reform 
and population growth are liable to disturb this calm. GDP revived in 1996, 
having previously dropped to 50% of its 1990 figure. 249 Privatisation and reforms 
have been cautious. Land privatisation, in particular, has been constrained by 
concerns over communal competition and problems of water access and 
pricing. 250 
The Fergana Valley is perhaps the most likely location for these confrontations. 
The Uzbek section of the Valley saw a 13.1 % rise is population between 1991-6 
and an average population density of 338 people/km2 in 1997 . 
25 ' This burgeoning 
multi-ethnic population has resulted in competition for increasingly scarce 
resources. A much debated concern has been the question of rural-urban 
n-dgration. It is feared that arrivals from traditional rural communities, with lower 
education and employment skills, enter the urban underclass and are susceptible to 
alienation and political radicalisation. (This issue is discussed further in 4.2; 4.12; 
5.4; & 5.12. ) Should this process take place, the prognosis for Uzbekistan is far 
worse than that for Kazakstan. In the latter out-migration and population decline 
have acted as a release to competition and tensions. Whilst many of the southern 
rural Kazaks migrating to northern and urban areas are devout Muslims, Islam is 
stronger amongst the Uzbekistani rural community and potential migrants. The 
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arrival of rural Uzbeks including refugees from Tajikistan, whose poor economic 
and social status may lead to resentment and violence towards the already 
established Tajik inhabitantS. 252 (An estimated 300,000 ethnic Uzbek refugees fled 
Tajikistan. ) Competition for accommodation and employment, as well as, possible 
animosity towards Tajiks in general may heighten communal tensions. 253 
Under-represented in state-run employment Tajiks have called for a fairer quota 
system. 254 These demands have not been met. As state employment is a key 
employer, (30% of total workforce), the government has used appointments as a 
weapon against opponents including Tajik activists. 2" The threat or use of 
dismissal from employment has been a highly effective method of stifling dissent, 
given the present hardships and the deference and patronage of republic socio- 
economic life. Several Samarkand figures, mostly academics, have been removed 
from their positionS. 256 Members of Samarkand State University (SamGU), that 
the author spoke to, were unwilling to discuss these cases and the wider issue of 
257 discrimination. This may have resulted from their concerns over employment 
security. The double standard between the titular and non-titular groups has seen 
the removal of non-Uzbeks first when redundancies are required. (Inequality has 
also been recorded in the legal system where titular group defendants have 
received more lenient sentences than non-titular co-defendants for the same 
crimes. 258) 
The economic tensions between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan have been problematic, 
partly as a consequence of the artificial nature of Soviet border policy, and the 
republican governments' inability to consistently enforce their law agencies and 
legislation. There has been a failure in codifing and normalising inter-republican 
trade "between Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, [as] customs wars have 
acquired ethnic coloration . 
"259 Tajikistani Tajiks have been excluded from 
entering Uzbekistan for trade purposes, by Uzbekistani border guards, and ethnic 
21 Uzbeks given exclusive export rights. 
3.5. iv. Demographic Issues and Inter-Ethnic Relations: Tajik-Uzbek 
demographic disputes have been more ambiguous and complex than that found in 
Kazakstan. Questions of absolute population growth and migratory pressures and 
the resultant group competition for resources have influenced the republic's social 
stability, as witnessed in the 1987 tensions in Samarkand oblast. Another issue, 
government-orchestrated, indicates the sensitivity of ethnicity in the republic. 
Unlike Kazakstan, where the physical relocation of Kazak migrants has used as a 
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means of enhancing state cohesion, Tashkent has used a more subtle assimilation 
practice; the manipulation of statistics and national identity. Uzbekistani state- 
building programme including the construction of a foundation myth and an 
Uzbekistani identity has sought a narrow and strict, rather than pluralist 
conceptualisation. "The Government of Uzbekistan seems to partake of the notion 
that Uzbekistan can achieve the stature of a great nation if the number of Uzbeks 
is large and if they have a strong sense of their identity. 77261 
Throughout the Soviet period, the figure was artificially low because of official 
assimilatory practices and Tajiks perceiving it advantageous to assume a public 
Uzbek identity. 262 During the 1920-30s, the republic's Tajiks complained about 
increased pressure on them to identify themselves as Uzbeks. Tajiks at the time of 
the creation of the Tajik SSR, 1929, were given a stark choice, either to remain in 
the Uzbek SSR and accept an Uzbek identity or move. 263 "It was thus apparent 
that the Tajiks [in Uzbekistan would] not be accommodated in maintaining their 
cultural independence, a dire fact that most Tajiks resentfully accepted. 11264 It was 
highly probably that the 1926 census was falsified. 265 Between 1872 and 1926, the 
official number of Tajiks in Samarkand dropped from 95% of the city's 
inhabitants to 10%, whilst the Uzbek population rose from below 1% to 41%. 266 
The introduction of internal passports in 1932, further eroded the Tajik's status, 
as by the end of the 1930s, the holder's nationality was non-transferable and had 
to correspond with that of ones' parents. 267 
There appears to have been no re-assessment of the Tajik population in 
independent Uzbekistan. Consequently, the number of citizens who regard 
themselves as Tajiks remains difficult to determine. Tajiks within and outside of 
the republic, SamGU academics and international commentators suggest that 
there may be between 6-7 million Tajiks in Uzbekistan, approximately 30 percent 
of the republic's, rather than the official figure of 5.1 percent. 268 
A legitimate reason for the discrepancies between the official statistics and the 
actual number of Tajiks in the republic has been the weak ethnic consciousness of 
the Tajik community, in relation to that of other ethnic groups, most notably the 
titular nation. It is suggested, including by Tajik activists, that this has helped to 
account for the group's under-representation in official records . 
26' Tajik acquiesce 
of referring to themselves as Uzbeks has not been wholly benign, however. 
Although Articles Four and Eighteen of Uzbekistan's Constitution guarantees 
respect of and equal right to all citizens irrespective of nationality, there are claims 
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that TaJiks, have been forcibly dissuaded ftom identifying themselves as such since 
1991, for fear of incurring official displeasure and possibly discrimination. 270 
Foltz's work illustrates the continuation of a climate in which Tajiks are unsure 
whether to disclose their identity. 271 "Just as in the early Soviet period, many 
Tajik-speakers sense advantages in claiming Uzbek identity and perhaps fear anti- 
Tajik prejudice if they don't. qSic] 272 Equally, the weakness of the Tajik 
consciousness in Uzbekistan has been at least partially the result of government 
attempts to assimilate the minority into the Uzbek nation and official 
discouragement at members of the minority from taking an interest in their distinct 
Persian background. Mesbahi has called Uzbekistan's policy towards its Tajik 
minority an attempt at "cultural cleansing. "27' Nissman suggests that 
discrimination towards the Tajik population has been a consciously designed 
policy to foster greater Uzbek cohesion . 
274 This under-representation has enabled 
the authorities to promote nation-state linkage whilst demoting the historic role 
and influence of the Tajik community. 
3.5. iv. a. The Weakness of Tajik Identity: The paucity of the Tajik national 
consciousness has its roots in the blurred Tajik-Uzbek historical interaction and 
the Soviet construction of a Tajik identity for a disparate group of Persian- 
speakers with limited historical cohesion. (See Figure 3.1. ) 
The Uzbekistani Tajik community has had a vague notion of its nationality, to the 
extent that many have assumed a "superficial Uzbek identity. "275 Tajik activists 
have complained about their co-national's lack of knowledge towards their own 
heritage and the broader Persian culture. 276 
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Fizure 3.1. Confusion Over The Taiik Identitv 
J7 
rA IT-L 
Two individuals in Tajikistan are considering their choice of ethnic identity 77he one on 
the left has darkened his face, but is infon-ned by the other that "From your fair skin and 
black eyes, you belong to the Tajik nationality. Why be an Uzbek? " 
Source: Mushtum, No. 17,28/10/24. Allworth, E. Figure 12.1. E. The Modern Uzbeks; 
From the fiourteenth Cenlwýy to the Present, Hoover Institute Press, Stanford, 1990. 
Equally important for this weakness and the contemporary TaJik-government 
scenario has been TaJikistan's recent history. The republic was perhaps the most 
artificial of all the Soviet territorial constructions in the region. Cultural, political 
and territorial cohesion within TaJikistan are weak. The Pamirs of Gorno- 
Badaskhshan, which makes up half of the republic, are Ismaili eastern Farsi- 
speakers whilst the majority of the TaJik nation is Sunni Muslim and western 
Farsi-speaking. Clan networks reinforced intra-TaJik divisions and inequalities, 
assisting the Khojent clan's political and economic control from 1929-92. The 
Kulyab clan dominated the security structures, whilst the democratic-Islarnic 
movements which emerged in the late-Soviet period, obtained the majority of 
their support from the economically and politically underrepresented Gann and 
Pamirs regions. Regional affiliations have consequently been established to the 
detriment of any cohesive state and national identities. This lack of national 
identity further aggravated by the war has had negative implications for the TaJik 
diaspora. One NCC member declared that "the conflict in TaJikistan [was] the 
main cause of the cultural problems for Uzbekistan's Tajiks. )1277 
3.5. v. The ImImet of the Conflict in Taiikistan: The internal and external 
security of Uzbekistan have been closely connected, a fact that Tashkent has 
emphasised if not manipulated for its political advantage. The security 
implications of the Tajik minority cannot be examined without reference to 
regional instability. 
After independence, in September 1991, political competition, in Tajikistan, 
between democratic, nationalist and Islamic groups, including the Democratic 
Party, Rastokhez and the Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP), on the one hand and 
the ruling former-communist on the other, led to the region's first contested 
Presidential elections, in November 1991. The victor, Rahmon Nabiev, the former 
Communist Party First Secretary, promptly sought to restore the dominance of his 
clan, the Khojent. Popular protests in the capital, Dushanbe, in the spring of 1992 
lead to concessions, and the establishment of the National Reconciliation 
coalition, which included the aforementioned secular democrats and moderate 
Muslims. The reformist ousted the President and for a brief period in the autumn 
of 1992 assumed governmental responsibility. 
Politics became increasingly factional and violent. Conflict in the 1992-3 winter 
led to the restoration of the conservative Kulyabi and Khojent clans to power, 
with Russian and Uzbekistani assistance . 
278 At least 50,000 people were killed and 
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10% of the republic's population became refugees in this period. 279 Sporadic 
fighting continued between 1993-6. With Imomali Rahmonov's appointment as 
President, the Kulyab clan has dominated government and attempted to erode the 
political position of their former allies, the Khojent and ethnic-Uzbeks. 
In early 1996, former loyal ethnic Uzbek Popular Front forces invaded from 
Uzbekistan into the Khojent and rose in the Kurgan-Tiube, under the command of 
Ibudollo Boitmatov and Makmud Mudaberdiyev, respectively. 280 The United 
Tajik Opposition (UTO) took advantage of these rebellions and by mid-1996 
central Tajikistan was engulfed in conflict. After a series of failed cease-fires, a 
successful agreement was concluded in December 1996 between Rahmonov and 
Said Abdulto Nuri, leader of the UTO, which acted as the basis for further 
agreements between the parties. Low level violence has remained endemic and 
local militia leaders relatively autonomous. 281 
Although Uzbekistani officials have stressed a security policy based upon non- 
interference and neutrality towards Tajikistan, its involvement in the war suggest 
that its professed concern about an escalation in regional instability and communal 
tensions did not deter it from becoming involved in a partisan manner. 282 
After an initial period of neutrality, the possibility of a democratic-Islarnic 
government and increased violence in Tajikistan led to Uzbekistani involvment in 
the conflict. While discussions on the formation of the CIS peacekeeping force 
were being conducted, in November 1992, Uzbekistan trained a pro-Nabiev MVD 
force crucial in removing the Islamic-democratic forces from Dushanbe, in 
December 1992. Since this action, Uzbekistan's involvement was regularly 
reported including air strikes on opposition camps in Afghanistan. 283 Similar 
accusations of Uzbekistani interference in Afghanistan, has also discredited 
Uzbekistan's self-publicised role of guarantor of stability, and concern about the 
spread of inter-ethnic enmities. 284 
The neighbouring wars have had serious implications for Uzbekistan's security 
and inter-ethnic relations. Tashkent's manipulation of these situations for 
domestic objectives has, however, been noted by several commentators, who 
question Uzbekistan's perceived fear of nationalism and political Islam emanating 
285 from the TaJik conflict . Interviews conducted by the author and Petersen 
demonstrate that Uzbekistan's political elite regarded the strengthening and 
maintenance of regional stability as the paramount objective of the republic's 
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security policy. 
286 The same group, however, did not feet that their position was 
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militarily threatened . 
The fact that Uzbekistan flouted its own arms embargo 
proposals questions its own alleged concerns about the regional proliferation of 
conflict. 
The possibility of a fragmentation of Uzbekistan similar to that found in Tajikistan 
has been an understandable concern for Tashkent. Limited identification with the 
state due to regional, clan and ethnic divisions and the establishment of Islamist 
local government in the Fergana Valley, 1991-2, have endorsed these fears. 288 
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Irredentism within the republic has, however, received negligible support ." 
Tashkent's centralist policies towards regional sources of opposition and attempts 
to strengthen the centre's power vis-d-vis local elites may, in the long-term, prove 
to be counter-productive and lead to greater alienation and radicalisation. 
Brown closely links the removal of Nabiev, in May 1992, with the onset of 
political oppression in Uzbekistan. 290 Uzbekistan sought to portray Tajikistan's 
democratic and Islamic movements as radical, inherently unstable and ill-suited for 
contemporary Central Asia. By associating the threat of regional instability with 
the events in Tajikistan, Tashkent created a discourse of stability in which 
Uzbekistani pluralism, including Tajik demands, were been marginalised. 
Domestic groups were to be associated with external enemies attempting to 
destabilise Uzbekistan. The ability to associate Uzbekistan's Tajik community 
with instability in the neighbouring republic was beneficial to the regime. 
A key and oft-repeated accusation by Tashkent has been the minority's challenge 
to the republic's territorial integrity. In the late-1980s, a Tajik Liberation Front 
was based in Samarkand, and, according to Rotar, the city was at the time 
renowned for irredentism. 291 A Greater Khorasan was advanced by the "Greater 
Ariana" society, in the Tajik SSR. 292By late 1992, possibly because of the Civil 
War and Tashkent's limited concessions and isolation of radical figures, including 
Bekmuhammadov and Mirsaidov these irredentist, pan-Tajik ambitions ceased to 
be promoted. 293 Even before the war, however, such ambitions lacked mass 
support. The conflict with an associated rise in regionalism destroyed such 
objectives. 
Since the 1980s there has been little to indicate that the minority has any such 
ambitions. Samarkand has regularly affirmed its respect for Uzbekistan's 
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territorial integrity. In a letter to Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Mirsaidov emphasised 
the non-territorial nature of their goals and stated that, 
"the national-cultural development of this ancient ethnic group ... 
[does not 
require any] revision of the TaJikistan-Uzbekistan current border or the 
formation of a Tajik national-territorial autonomy for the age-old Tajik 
communities in Uzbekistan, even though all the pre-conditions for this am 
Present .,, 
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Obviously, irredentism. would not be raised lightly or necessarily openly in 
Uzbekistan's restricted political climate. The Uzbekistani Constitution, for 
example, declares that the frontiers and the territory of the Republic "are 
inviolable and indivisible . 
"295 This in itself does not suggest that the movement has 
not advocated a hidden territorial agenda. In the brief period of open debate 
between 1988-91, other groups proposed territorial challenges to the status quo. 
The People's Party of Turkestan, for example, advocated a single political entity 
incorporating all of the Central Asian stateS. 296 It is important to illustrate that 
when there was open discussion of radical objectives in this period Samarkand did 
not promote these. This should be recognised when analysing the official response 
towards the minority's demands. Implicit in much Uzbekistan official and some 
secondary source material is the charge of Tajik secessionist ambitions. During 
1992, the authorities began to accuse Samarkand of political aspirations and 
irredentiSM. 297 The ability to associate Uzbekistan's TaJik community with 
instability in the neighbouring republic was emphasised by the regime. One report 
claimed Tajikistani Islamic agents had attempted to ferment TaJik-Uzbek enmities 
in Surkhan Darya and Kasha Darya provinces. 298 "Conventional wisdom has it 
that the government of Uzbekistan sees TaJik nationalism as a threat interwoven 
with that of Islamic fundamentalism. "299 The Tajik community became a security 
threat per se, because it was an autonomous body, outside of the Uzbek 
mainstream, and by implication of its alleged association with external opponents 
of Tashkent. 
There is, however, no evidence to suggest that Uzbekistan's Tajik community has 
given any assistance to either of the belligerent parties in Tajikistan, beyond 
humanitarian assistance. '00 The level of militant Tajik nationalism in Uzbekistan 
and its relationship with political Islam is difficult to determine and is probably 
exaggerated . 
30' Authors who have had direct experience of Uzbekistan's Tajik 
community, believe that these accusations have not been borne out by experience 
and that irredentism. or aggressive nationalism have not been part of the Tajik 
cultural and political identity. 302 Numerous domestic and international 
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commentators have criticised Tashkent for exaggerating the regional threat of 
Islamic fundamentalism and Tajik nationalism, emanating from the Tajik 
conflict. "' Akiner notes, that even if there were calls from within Tajikistan for 
the integration of Tajik populated territory in Uzbekistan, the former does not 
have "the human or material resources to maintain a successful challenge to its 
larger neighbour" and dismisses Karimov's fears of overspill from the Tajik 
ConfliCt. 304 
This has not prevented the regime attempting to gain political benefits by 
upgrading the issue of Uzbekistan's TaJiks from a mildly disaffected but peaceful 
minority to an internal subversive group linked by ethnicity to neighbouring 
violence. 305 In advancing and support this line of argument, the government's 
justification for repression have been endorsed, although such claims lack 
substance. 306 
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3.6. Conclusion: The Potential for Inter-Ethnic Conflict 
in Kazakstan and Uzbekistan 
Based on the evidence above it is unclear whether inter-ethnic violence is a 
likelihood in the two republics. 
Both republics witnessed a series of inter-ethnic conflicts and bellicose nationalist 
rhetoric in the 1985-92 period, in which cultural and territorial counter claims 
were made and communal violence enacted. As numerous studies, including this 
author's own research, indicate that throughout the 1991-6 period there was a 
high level of antagonistic political discourse from all the parties involved. The 
chairman of the Society of Slavic Culture, stated that, 
"[11f we are forced to leave, then we will take everything, %ith us, and we will 
tear this place to pieces. In the future if there will be blood let there be 
blood. " 307 
In Kazakstan between 1991-93, inter-ethnic conflict and secession may have been 
feasible, as Azat Perushov, Deputy for Staff for Co-ordination of Political and 
National Processes Presidential Apparatus, acknowledged when interviewed by 
the author. He stated that "we had a mini-crisis in 1992-3 with the rise of 
nationalist political parties. "N' Russian militancy and irredentism was 
accompanied by assertive Kazak nationalism. Many observers at the time 
understandably regarded Kazakstan as volatile. Similarly, late-Soviet Ta ik 
nationalists inside and outside of Uzbekistan were advancing cultural and 
territorial claims. One Tajik nationalist, Mirobobo Mirrakhamov (latter known as 
Abdullah Said Nuri), is reported to have spoke out against Uzbeks in the Tajik 
SSR, who were next on his list for expulsion after the Russians. '09 These 
xenophobic arguments were matched by Uzbek chauvinism. 
During the 1994-6 period inter-ethnic relations appear to have improved. 
Ethnicity failed to translate into a mass pofitical force. Its failure to do so is all the 
more significant given the major political and economic upheavalS. 3 10 This has 
been the consequence of several factors. 
The "cult of stability" promoted by both presidents has been widely and 
understandably accepted by the populationS. 31 1 Events in Tajikistan, Afghanistan 
and the memories of the sporadic violence between 1985-90 made the republics' 
inhabitants acutely aware of the dangers of the new political envirom-nent. 
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In Kazakstan, nationalist groups on both sides have moderated their views. Lad, 
for instance, has urged ethnic Russian to reconsider plans to emigrate, encouraged 
them to allow their children to study Kazak and respect Kazak culture, and 
emphasised the traditional good nature of Russian-Kazak relations. "2When anti- 
government protests have taken place the two communities have worked 
together. Lad, Alash and Azat were involved in the Civil Committee of Social 
313 Salvation, established in late 1994. It is also questionable whether the high level 
of nationalism activism, in early independent period, was as serious as many 
commentators suggested. Similarly, inter-ethnic tensions within Uzbekistan did 
not result in physical confrontation. The alleged association between the domestic 
minority's irredentism and militant Islamists in Tajikistan has not materialised. 
A key factor has been the restricted nature of independent political activism in 
both republics. There are two major factors which have caused this; deliberate 
government action, and the absence of a tradition of popular political activism. 
The governments have hampered the establishment and continued existence of 
nationalist movements. In Kazakstan, during the late-1980's titular nationalism, 
channelled through Alash and Azat rather than republican structures, was strictly 
314 controlled . As a result Russian nationalism 
has been tempered, and unable to 
coalesce in opposition to a "nationalistic" government. Its direction and strength 
were weakened as a consequence. Nationalist parties, both Kazak and Russian 
have had limited success. Russian political mobilisation has been hampered by the 
collapse of their Soviet-era Moscow-oriented institutions and the rise of the clan- 
based patronage system . 
3" All independent political organisations have found it 
difficult to mobilise support in such a large and sparsely populated state. The 
post-independent decline in the fortunes of the Socialist Party (the Communist 
Party's successor) which was dominated by the Slavs, and the co-option of the 
settler economic elite into the presidential networks via the People's Union of 
Kazakstan have served to further isolate the settler population. 316 
In Uzbekistan, the political fate of the TaJik minority has been symbolic of wider 
authoritarian trends. All ethnic and religious based parties were banned in 1993 
because, the government argues, their objectives are divisive and destabilising. 317 
Registration for other parties has been difficult or impossible. Birlik and Erk, the 
two main movements of the independence period, were unable to re-register, in 
1993, because they lacked headquarters .3 
18 A relative "thaw" in the government's 
human rights related behaviour from late-1994 onwards, especially in terms of 
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dialogue with outside human rights organisations, has not resulted in "tangible 
improvements in abusive practises ... used to maintain strict control on all 
citizens. v73 19 As one commentator has noted that after this date the authorities 
were able to easy the level of repression, because there no longer existed any 
effective political opposition at least in the open, that could benefit from the 
modestly improved situation. 320 
In both cases, the ethnic consciousness of the minority remains ill-defined. The 
Russian settler community is an uncohesive community, subject to continued 
waves of immigration. This and post-Soviet emigration have deterred the 
consolidation of lasting social and political networks within the community. 321 
North-South ethnic Russian divisions have been reported. Those remaining in the 
south and central oblasts it is suggested are less favourable to autonomy or 
secessionist moves. 322 An inability to consolidate a Russian political consciousness 
within Kazakstan, and throughout the FSU may prevent any effective militant 
nationalist action. (The Cossacks are the exception to this. As already suggested 
they pose a more serious and distinct threat to Kazakstan's integrity, having a 
more developed and well-organised sense of collective identity than the other 
Russian settler communities . 
323) 
The Tajik identity is weak because of their close, long and at times ambiguous 
relationship with the Uzbeks, and the failure to subsume regional affiliations in 
Tajikistan. Thus whilst Uzbek-centric state-building has marginalised alternative 
identities it is unclear whether there a deep-seated and distinct national 
identification within the minority has been established and whether the community 
perceives the discrimination it faces as a consequence of ethnicity. Communal 
relations appear to be stable, the potential end of the Tajik Civil War and the 
possibility of compromise between the two sides may lessen the extreme security 
environment Uzbekistan has had to operate in and may lead to a reappraisal of its 
domestic and foreign policies, including its attitudes towards the Tajik 
community. 
Lewer and Ramsbothams' explanation of group conflict which requires distinct 
identity groups, who pursue what they perceive as mutually incompatible goals 
has yet to materialise in either of the republics. Exclusive identities and objectives 
are lacking, explicit political mobilisation shunned and there is not indication that 
alternative violent methods are regarded as any more effective than the limited 
legitimate political channels. 
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To focus primarily upon the present stability of communal relations is, however, 
unwise and fails to recognise the real sources of competition and confrontation. 
Arrayed against the limited and superficial safeguards are deep-seated economic 
and political structural trends, with long-term negative implications. 
The arbitrary, authoritarian and stagnation nature of Central Asia's politics, 
combination vAth the economic hardships and psychological dislocation involved 
in the period of transition, this author believes, are detrimental to future inter- 
ethnic relations. 
The governments' behaviour in relation to this case-study, and in the wider 
political context, is perhaps the most important and potentially destabilising 
factor. In both cases, government rhetoric and behaviour indicates a closed 
political system, which has alienated and may radicalise opposition. Domestic 
challenges to the regimes, whether ethnic, regional, religious or secular, have been 
stifled. The absence of discussion on the subject and the lack of mass participation 
in the political process offers pessin-fistic outlook. In parallel with the Minority at 
Risk Project research this author regards the governments' failure to develop 
inclusive and open political structures will have a long-term negative impact upon 
inter-ethnic relations. 
Legal and structural safeguards in situ are inadequate. it is these areas that need 
further examination, recognition and redress. Nazarbaev has destroyed an 
independent Judiciary and centralised power through the appointment of loyalists, 
reducing the authority and autonomy of the regions, in the case of the northern 
oblasts the key political conduit for ethnic Russians. Admittedly, a Presidential 
Committee for Human Rights was established, in 1994. Part of its remit was to 
manage inter-ethnic tensions, through the protection of citizen's rights and 
promotion of co-operation and understanding between communities. 324 
In Uzbekistan, a Human Rights Conunissioner was appointed in February 1995, 
and established a Commission on the Observance of the Constitutional Rights and 
Liberties of the Citizens . 
325 This action should be treated with scepticism given the 
arbitrary character of politics in the republic. A Presidential commission was 
established after Samarkand campaigning. The objectives of the institution was to 
monitor Tajik minority-related problems, counter ethnic discrin-tination, provide 
the President with information on their situation and grievances, help establish 
dialogue and confidence between the minority and the authorities and resolve 
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Tajik minority-Government questions in a mutually beneficial manner. The 
Commission was criticised strongly by Samarkand who claimed that it failed to 
investigate the minority's concerns and was only established for appearance. 326 
Although throughout the period the Tajik-Uzbek situation was more benign than 
the Russian-Kazak scenario this is deceptive and unrepresentative. 327 The 
governments differed in their control of opposition, Almaty principally through 
constitutional and political methods, and Tashkent via confrontational and at 
times illegal means. This divergence leads the author to suggest that conflict in 
Uzbekistan is a far greater long-term probability and liable to be more intense. 
There is little evidence to suggest the Uzbekistani Tajik community is a security 
threat Per se. The govemment-Tajik relationship demonstrates a regime 
attempting to use national security and the threat of irredentism as means of 
securing its own position. Tashkent has used ethnicity to further its political 
objectives. The contemporary state-sponsored Uzbek identity is a key component 
in the political culture of the Karimov regime. Unlike Kazakstan, where the 
government has expediently sought a moderate multi-cultural citizenship, 
Tashkent has pursued an Uzbek-centric policy which has alienated non-titular 
groups. It is this authoritarian response to cultural and political demands that is 
liable to increase political and social tensions within the republic. Moderate 
domestic opposition has been eliminated. The proscription of ethnic and religious 
parties is difficult to justify on democratic and pragmatic grounds, as ethnicity and 
especially Islam are immediate sources of identity for the mass of Uzbekistan's 
population. The extemally-imposed politicisation and radicalisation of the TaJik 
identity in Uzbekistan may ultimately be counter-productive. Constitutional 
methods have failed to provide benefits for the Tajiks. The lack of political 
alternatives, a consequence of government actions, may lessen the possibility for 
future compron-dse between the incumbent and its rivals. HRW/H's former 
representative in Uzbekistan, Jonathan MacLeod has endorsed the view that 
stability and development are most likely in an environment where of open debate, 
328 freedom of expression and human rights are guaranteed. 
The Kazakstani situation has been more open and this in itself may be a positive 
factor. Emigration and political accommodation or apathy have been the standard 
response to the economic and political problems that the Russian community has 
faced in Kazakstan. '29 This has therefore allowed for a relatively stable and 
tolerant social milieu. Equally the Russian question has had far greater input into 
regional/international affairs, because of the involvement of a global actor, Russia. 
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Thus the consequences of any irredentism in northern Kazakstan are immediately 
accessible to the outside world, as is the language of debate, Russian and public. 
This accessibility and familiarity may aided resolution. 
In both republics economic differentiation has increased. Wealth accumulated 
through connections and corruption will weaken social cohesion and respect for 
the existing structures. These problems offer a catalyst for nationalist but also 
Islamist activism which may indirectly affect inter-ethnic relations. Economic 
hardships in Kazakstan has already resulted in popular protest throughout the 
republic and criticism of the government. The impact upon government policy, 
particularly economic and social, has, however, been minimal. Whilst 
Uzbekistan's economy has not undergone the same level of dislocation, the 
implementation of necessary wholesale reforms will prove more difficult in the 
future as the population continues to increase and vital economic activities, most 
noticeably irrigation agriculture deteriorate in efficiency. 
"Inter-ethnic relations ... are complex, contextual and highly situational. People 
who get along well under certain conditions may be virtual enemies under 
others. 11330 Central Asian ethnic groups are not inherently hostile towards each 
other but "like any people who have been lied to, manipulated, cheated and 
abused long enough, any of these peoples could be provoked to seek quick and 
easy answers to the host of complex problems that beset them. 7v331 
I UN Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, 
E/CN. 4/Sub. 2/1985/31, para. 181. Quoted in Gyurcsik, 1. "New Legal Ramifications of the 
Question of National Minorities" in Cuthbertson, I. M. & Leibowitz, J. (eds. ) Minorities: 7he 
New Europe's Old Issue, Institute for East-West Studies/Westview, Boulder, 1993, p 22. 
*2 The term ethnic Russians will refer to the combined Belarus, Cossack, Russian, and Ukrainian 
population in the republic except when there are explicit differences in opinions, intentions or 
characteristics in this grouping. 
3 Kellas, J. The Politics ofNation and Ethnicity, MacMillan, Basingstoke, 199 1, p 4. 
4 Kozlov, V. I. Narsionalnosti &SSR Ethnodemographeskii obzor, Statisikia, Moscow 1975, p 
256. Quoted in Zaslavsky, V. "Success and collapse: Traditional Soviet nationality policy" in 
Bremmer, 1. & Taras, R. (eds. ) Nations and Politics in the Soviet Successor States, CUP, 
Cambridge, 1993, p 34. 
5 Quoted in Pillrington, H. A. "Going home? the implications of forced migration for national 
identity formation in post-Soviet RussW'BASEESAnnual Conference, Cambridge, 30/3-2/4/96, 
p 13. 
6 Ibid. 
' Heraclides, A. "Secessionist Conflagration: What Is To Be Done" Security Dialogue, vol. 25, 
No. 3, p 283. 
8 Ibid, pp. 2834. 
9 Kymlicka, M. (ed. ) Yhe Rights ofMinority Cultures, OUP, Oxford, 1995, p 2. 
"D Heraclides, A. op cit., p 283. 
" Ibid. 
118 
12 Guff, T. R "Peoples Against States: Ethnopolitical Conflict and the Changing World System" 
International Studies Quarterly, No. 38,1994, pp 347-8. 
13 After Gurr. Ibid, p 348. 
14 ljgyarto, 1. "The Codification of Minority Rights" in Cuthbertson, I. M. & Leibowitz, J. (eds. ) 
op cit., p 273. 
's Gurr, T. op cit., p 348. 
16 Ibid, p 350. 
17 Horowitz, D. Ethnic Groups in Conflict, University of California, Berkeley, 1985, pp. 34. 
"' DeNevers, I, "Democratization and Ethnic ConflicV Survival, Vol. 32, No. 2, p 32. 
19 Gurr, T. op cit., p 348. 
20 Kellas, J. op cit. p 72. 
21 Ghebali, V. Y & Sauerwein, B. European Security in the 1990s: Challenges and Perspectives, 
UNIDER, New York, 1995, p 60. 
22 Ghali, B. B. An Agendafor Peace: Preventative Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping, 
UN New York, 1992, paras. 17-19. 
23 Bibo, I. "The Paralysis of International Institutions7' Quoted in Gyurcsik, 1. op cit., p 38. 
24 Ayoob, M. The Third World Security Predicament. ý State Making, Regional Conflict, and the 
International System, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, 1995, p 182. 
25 For the debate on collective and individual rights see Freeman, M. "Are There Collective 
Human Fights? " Political Studies, Vol. 43, Special Issue Politics and Human Rights, 1995, pp. 
2540. 
26 See for example Heraclides, A. op cit., p 288; Nevada, I. "Democracy Building in Ethnically 
Diverse Societies: The Case of Bulgaria and Rumania", in Cuthbertson, LM & Leibowitz, J. 
(eds. ) op cit., p 144. Bibo, Konovalev & Evstafiev, and Held argue for a similar interaction. See 
Bibo, I. Quoted in Gyurcsik, 1. op cit., p 40; Konovalev, A. A. & Evstafiev, D. "The Problems of 
Ethnic Minority Rights Protection in the Newly Independent States" in Cuthbcrtson, I. M & 
Leibowitz, J. (eds. ) ibid, 161, & Held, D. (ed. ) Political Theory Today, California State 
University Press, Stanford, 199 1, p 220. 
27 Bibo, I. Quoted in Gyurcsik, 1. op cit., p 39. 
2g Snyder, J. N. "Nationalism and the Crisis of the Post-Soviet State" Survival Vol. 35, No. 1, 
1993, p 26. Also see Konovalov', A. A. & Evstafiev, D. op cit., p 157; & Gyurcsik, I. op cit., p 
19. 
29 Minorities at Risk Project. Quoted in Gurr, T. op cit., p 358. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Fridman, L. "Economic Crisis as a Factor of Building up Socio-Politcal and Ethnonationalist 
Tensions in the Countries of Central Asia and Transcaucasia, " Naumkin, V. V. (ed. ) Central 
Asia and Transcaucasia: Ethnicity and Conflict, Greenwood Press, Westport, 1994. p31. 
33 Zaslavsky, V. op cit., p 29. 
34 Nevada, 1. op cit. 
3-5 Lubin, N. Labor and Nationality in Soviet Central Asia: An Uneasy Compromise, MacMillan 
Princeton, 1984, p 50. 
36 Jalali, A. "Central Asia: Migratioif' Voice ofAmerica, 7/2/96. 
3' Khazanov, A. "Underdevelopment and Ethnic Relations in Central Asia" in Manz, B. F. (ed. ) 
Central Asia in Historical Perspective, Westview Press, Boulder, 1994 p 146. (iii) 
313 See Galiev, A. V "Bezrabotitsa v Srednei Azii i Kazakhstane na sovremennometape" 
Vsesoiuznaia nauchnaia sessiia po itogam polevykh ethnograybeskikh i antropologicheskikh 
issledovanii v 1988-89 gg, Alma Ata 1990, pp. 127-8. 
39 Guff, T. op cit., p 365. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Bunn, B. People, States and Fear, Wheatsheafer Harvester, Hemel Hempstead, 199 1, p 123. 
43 Van Evera, S. "Hypotheses on Nationalism and War" in Lynn-Jones, S. & Miller, S. (eds. ) 
Global Dangers: Changing Dimensions ofinternational Security, NUT Press, Cambridge, Mass, 
1995, p 260. 
44 Manz, B. F. "Historical Background7 in Manz, B. F. (ed. ) op cit., p 48. 
119 
45 Kokand was annexed in 1877 whilst Bukhara and Khiva became Russian protectorates. 
46 Carlisle, D. "Geopolitics and Ethnic Problems of Uzbckistaxf' in Ro'i, Y. (ed. ) Muslim 
Eurasia: Conflicting Legacies, Frank Cass, London, 1995, p 73. (ii) 
47 Throughout their history several ethnonyms have been applied to the Kazaks: initially the 
Uzbek Kazaks, indicating their origins within the Uzbek khanate; then the Kazaks; Kirgiz- 
Kazaks, the Russians called them the Kirgizs and finally their chosen ethnonym was restored to 
them by the Bolsheviks. Porkhomovsky, V. "Historical Origins of Intcrethnic Conflicts in 
Central Asia and Transcuasasia" in Naumkin, V. V. (ed. ) op cit., p 15. Akincr, S. The Formation 
ofKazakh Identity From Tribe to Nation-State, RIIA, London, 1995, pp 35-6. (ii) 
48 Ibid, p 36; & Schwartz, L. "The Political Geography of Soviet Central Asia: Integrating the 
Central Asian Frontier" in Lewis, R. A. (ed. ) Geographical Perspectives on CentralAsia, 
Routledge, London 1992, p 62. 
49 Bartold. V. V "V. V. Bartold o natsionalnorn razinezhevanii v Srednei azii" Vostok-oriens, 
Moscow, No. 5,199 1. Quoted in Porkhomovsky, V. op cit., p 20. 
50 SubteIny, M. E. op cit., p51. 
5' See Carlisle, D. Map 5.4 Disl)uted Areas, op cit., p 97. (ii) 
52 Zaslavinsky, V. op cit. p 34. 
. 53 Akiner, S. "Uzbekistan and the Uzbel&' in Smith, G. (ed. ) The Nationalities Question in 
Post-Soviet States, Longman, London, 1996, p 336. (iii) 
54 Akiner, S. op cit., p 45. (ii) 
-55 Melvin, N. Russians Beyond Russia: The Politics offational Identity, RIIA/Pinter, London 
1995, p 103. (ii) 
-56 See Carlisle, D. "Soviet Uzbekistan: State and Nation in Historical Perspective" in Manz, B. F. 
op cit. p 120. (i) 
57 See Gretsky, S. "Civil War in Tajikistan: Causes, Development and Prospects for Peace" in 
Sagdeev, R. & Eisenhower, S. (eds. ) Central Asia, Conflict, Resolution, and Change CPSS, 
Chevy Chase, 1995, pp. 222-223. 
58 Khazanov, A. op cit., p 149. 
59 See Edmunds, T. "Power and Powerlessness in Kazakstani Society: Ethnicity Problems in 
Perspective 7hirdManchester Conference on Central Asia and Caucasus, University of 
Manchester, 34/3/97. (i) 
60 The Cotton Affair centred around the manipulation of Cotton harvest figures, highlighted 
enden-dc political corruption, nepotism, and financial gains in Uzbekistan described by Carlisle 
as "oriental despotism. " Carlisle, D. op cit., p 81. (ii) For an overview of the Cotton Affair see 
Gleason, G. "Uzbekistan: from statehood to nationhood" in Breminer, 1. & Tam, R. (eds. ) op 
cit., pp. 33940. 
61 Olcott, M. B. Central Asia's New States: Independence, Foreign Policy, and Regional 
Security, US Institute for Peace, Washington, 1996, p 60. (vi) 
62 See Pilkington, H. A. op cit p 8. 
63 Clem, R. S. "Inter-ethnic Relations at Republican Level: The Example of Kazakstan" Post- 
Soviet Geography, Vol. 34, No. 4, April 1993, p 229. Harmonisation is also known as 
Kazakificaion (Kazkhisatiya). 
6' Interview with Bremmer, I. Quoted in Bremmer, 1. "Nazarbaev and the North: Statebuilding 
and ethnic relations in Kazakstan" Ethnic and Religious Studies, Vol. 17, No. 4,1994, p 623. 
65 Konovalov, A. A. & Evastaficv, D. op cit., p 160. 
66 Melvin, N. op cit., p 109. (ii) 
67 Ibid. 
'58 Constitution of the Republic ofKazakstan, Almaty, 1995. Quoted in Bohr, A. "The Central 
Asian States As Nationalizing Regimes" in Smith. G. et al. Nation-building in The Post-Soviet 
Borderlands: 7he Politics ofNational Identities, CUP, Cambridge, 1998, p 14. 
69 Amerkulov, N. "Inter-Ethnic Conflict and Resolution in Kazaklistan" in Sagdeev, R_ & 
Eisenhower, S. (eds. ) op cit., p 159. 
70 The Economist, 12/3/94, p 77; & Kulchik, Y. "Central Asia after the Empire: Ethnic Groups, 
Communities, and Problems" in Sagdeev, I- & Eisenhower, S. (eds. ) op cit., p 110. 
71 Bohr, A. in Snidth, G. et al op cit., p 72. 
72 See Akiner, S. op cit., p71. (ii) 
120 
73 OMRI, Daily Digest, No. 30, Pt 1,12/2/96. 
74 OSCE Parliamentary Assembly Press Release On Kazak Elections, 11/12/95. 
'-5 Galenko, V. "0 nekotorykh protivorechiiakh v Konstitutsii Kazakhstar&' Birlesu, No. 14, 
1993. Quoted in Melvin, N. op cit. p 164. (ii) 
76 Ibid. 
77 SWB, SU 2173, G 1,8/12/94. 
7" Kozlov, S. Nezavisimaya gazeta, 8/9/94, p 3. CDPSP, Vol. XLVI, No. 36. 
79 OlCott, M. B. op cit., p 68. (vi) 
"0 Ro'i, Y. "Central Asian Disturbances and Riots 1989-90: Causes and Context" Central Asian 
Survey, Vol. 10, No. 3,1991, p 21. (iii) 
'31 Ibid. 
82 Ibid, p 22. 
193 Melvin, N. op cit., p 107. (ii) 
84 OICOM M. B. "Kazakhstan: a republic of minorities " in Bremmer, 1. & Taras, R. (eds. ) op cit., 
p 317. (iii) 
85 Ibid, pp. 318-9. 
86 OlCott, M. B. "Ethnic Violence in Central Asia: Perceptoins and Misperccptio&' in Sagdeev, 
Rý & Eisenhower, S. (eds. ) op cit. p 118. (iv) 
87 Olcott, M. B. op cit., p 319. (iii) 
88 For a discussion of Nazarbaev's political strengths and weaknesses see Akiner, S. op cit., pp. 
73-5. (ii) 
" Olcott, M. B. op cit., p 85. (vi) 
90 Critchlow, J. Quoted in "Kazak Elections" Voice OfAmerica, 7/12/95. 
91 Ibid. 
92 SU 2129 G1 18/10/94; also see Nazarbaev interview with Kazakh TV 1500 glut 11/10/94 
SWB SU 2125 G1 13/10/94; & RFE/RL Newsline Vol. 1, No. 48, Pt 1,29/10/97 on Nazarbaev's 
criticisms of Akezhan Kazhegeldin after his resignation as Prime Minister. 
93 Opposition groups claimed that only 34% of the electorate participated in the referendum 
rather than the required 50%. The election officials claimed a 90% turn out. "Kazak Elections" 
Voice OfAmerica, 7/12/95. 
"4 Ibid. 
95 The khanate, which spread from Lake Balkhash, to the Syr Darya and north west of the Aral 
Sea, was a loose confederation of Turkic-speaking nomads. Olcott, M. B. The Kazakhs, Hoover 
Institution Press, Stanford, 1987. p 9. (i) See Akiner, S. Map I Approximate Territorial Limits 
of Kazakh Hordes c 1750 ne Formation ofKazakh Identity. ý From Tribe to Nation-State, 
RHA, London, 1995, p 6. (ii) 
96 Olcott notes that the term Horde implies consanguinity and common ancestry, whilst the term 
Zhuz does not. As these Zhuz were not based on common ancestry but simply ad hoc and 
temporal unions of tribes it seems appropriate to use this term. Ibid, p 11. 
97 Akiner, S. op cit., p 21. (ii) 
98 Edmunds, T. Nation-building in a Multi-ethnic Kazakstan: Identity, Power and Politics PhD 
Thesis, University of Sheffield, 1998, p 128. (ii) 
99 Edmunds, T. op cit. (i) 
100 Senior Presidential Apparat member, interview with Edmunds, T. Summer 1996. Quoted in 
Edmunds, T. op cit. (i) 
101 See Edmunds, T. op cit. (i) 
102 Edmunds, T. op cit., pp 129 & 164. (ii) 
103 "Nazarbaev's Solutions to the Zhuz question: A new capital" Labyrinth, Vol. 1, No. 4, p3. 
10' Kellas, J. op cit., p 149. 
105 Ibid. (i) 
106 Melvin, N. op cit., p 119. (ii) 
107 Janabel, J. op cit. p 15. 
108 Melvin, N. "Russia and the ethno-politics of Kazakh=W' Vie World Today, p2 10. (i) 
109 Melvin, N. op cit., p 209. (i) 
110 Laumulin, M. Kazakstan Institute of Strategic Studies, Author's interview, Almaty, 1/10/96. 
121 
111 Melvin, N. "Patterns of Centre-Regional Relations in Central Asia: The Cases of Kazakstan, 
Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan" 491h Annual PSA Conference, 8-10 April 1997, p 25. (iii) 
112 Ibid, p 29. (iii) 
113 See Bremmer, I. op cit., pp. 614-35. 
114 Ibid, p 623. 
115 Ibid. 
116 Ibid, p 627. 
117 Dave, B. "More than a Cadre Reshuffle: Nazarbayev Appoints New Heads in East 
KazakhMW' 011RI Analytical Briefing, 19/4/96. Vol. 1, No. 74, pp. 1-2. Quoted in Melvin, N. 
op cit., p 46. (iii) 
"" Bremmer, 1. "Minority Rules" Yhe New Republic, Vol. 2 10, No. 15,04/11/94. 
119 OMRJ, Daily Digest, No. 60, Pt 1,25/3/96. 
120 Brenuner, L. op cit. p 630. 
121 See Khazanov, A. op cit. (i) 
122 Zhambulov, D. A, "Problemy sotsialnogo razvitiia v Kazakhstane" lvfezhnatsional'nye 
problenty i Konflikty poiskiputei ikh resheniis, Bishkek, 199 1, p 98. Quoted in ibid, p 15. 
123 Khan, M "Russians in Kazakhstan" Minority at Risks, University of Maryland, 06/5/95. 
124 Horowitz, D. op cit., p 113. 
125 Tishkov, op cit., p 124. 
126 Ibid. 
127 See Khazanov, A. op cit. (iii); Kuvanbykov, A. "Etlmo-sotsial'naia Situatsiia v Kazakstane 
Tendentsii i problemy" Kazzakstan i ýIfirovoe Soobshchestbo, No. 1,1994 pp. 100- 105; & 
Laumulin, M. Chief Researcher for the Department of Foreign Policy and Asian Security, 
Kazakstan Institute of Strategic Studies. Author's interview, Almaty, 1/10/96. 
128 Olcott, M. B. op cit., p 66 (vi); & The Government of the Republic of Kazakstan Centre for 
Economic Reforms Table 3.1 GDP, EmpIpMent and Productivi! y Kazakstan Economic Trends, 
Berlin, 1997, p 74. 
129 Ibid. 
13" Kulchik, Y. op cit. p 102. 
131 Ibid. p 103. 
132 Melvin, N. op cit. p 110. (ii) 
133 ITAR-TASS, 1032 gint, 5/4/95, Moscow, & Kazakstan TV 1400 gmt, 1/3//95, Almaty. SWB 
SU 2272 G1 7/4/95. 
134 Kazakstanskaia pravda, 7/12/94, p 1. SWB SU 2179 G 1,15/12/94. 
13'Khazanov, A. op cit., p 145. (i) 
136 Agricultural land can only be privatised when designated for private subsidiary farming, 
horticulture or the building of dachas. Izvestia, 4/1/96, CDPSP, Vol. 48, No. 2,1996, p 2. 
137 "Demonstrations in Kazakhstan: Political or non-political" Labyrinth Vol. 3, No. 4, p 3. 
138 Ibid. 
139 OMR1 Daily Digest, No. 230, Pt 1,27/11196. 
140 RFE/RL, Daily Report No. 208,2/11/94. 
141 Laamulin, M. Kazakstan Institute of Strategic Studies, Author's interview, Almaty, 1/10/96. 
142 OlCott, M. B. op cit., p 85. (vi) 
143 The Government of the Republic of Kazakstan Table 2 Population, EmpIpMent, GDP and 
GNP & Table 4.1 Selected Time Series of Employment op cit., pp. 20 & 84. 
144 Ibid. 
145 Amrckulov, N. op cit., in Sagdeev, R_ & Eisenhower, S. (eds. ) op cit. p 165. 
'46 Khan, M. op cit., p 3. 
147 Van Evera, S. op cit., p 260. 
148 Janabel, J. op cit., pp 7-8. 
149 , CIS Migration Report" IOM International Organization for Migration, 1997, pp. 56-60. In 
"Migration in KazakstaY Eurasian File, No. 96, April, 1998, p 7. 
'-'0 Janabel, J. op cit., p 8. 
15' Bremmer, 1. op cit., p 622. 
1.52 See WLxman, R. "Ethnic Attitudes and Relations in Modem Uzbek Cities" in Fierman, W. 
(ed. ) Soviet Central Asia: 7he Failed Transfonnation, Westview Press, Boulder, 1991. 
122 
153 Konovalev, A. A. & Evstafiev, D. op cit., p 162. 
1-54 Brerruner, I. op cit., p 632. 
1-55 Kazakstanskaia pravda, 21/4/89. Quoted in Khazanov, A. op cit., p 249. (iv) 
1 -'ý6 Masonov, N. "Kazakhi v XX stolett: ethnicheskoe razvite i iistoricheskie sud' by" Rasyi 
narody, 22, pI 10. Quoted ibid, p 25 1. (iv) 
157 Panarin, S. A. "Political Dynamics of the 'New' East (1985-1993)" in Natunkin, V. V. (ed. ) 
op cit., p 86. 
158 Shashenekov, M. "Security Issues of the Ex-So-, iet Central Asian Republics" London 
Defence Studies, No. 14, Brassey's/Centre for Defence Studies, London, 1992, p 11. 
159 Rowland, R. H. "Union republic migration trends in the USSR during the 1980s" Soviet 
Geography, Vol. 29, No. 9,1988, pp 812. Quoted in Patnaik, A. "Agrarian and Rural Out- 
migration in Central Asia, 1960-91" Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 47, No. 1,1995, p 157. 
160 See Clem, R_ S. op cit., p 229; & Masonov, N. "Russians in Kazakstan " Network on 
Ethnological Monitoring and Early Warning of Conflict, 20/4/96. 
161 Abdigaliev, B. "Russians in Kazakstan: Problems. Myths and Realities" in Sagdeev, R_ & 
Eisenhower, S. (eds. ) op cit., p 147; Sadovskaya, E. "PreNention of Conflict in Kazakhstan" 
OSCE ODIHR Bulletin, Vol. 3, No. 1, p 32; & Von der Stoel, M. OSCE High Commissioner on 
National Minorities. Quoted in OMRI, Daily Digest, No. 44, Pt 1,1/3/96. 
162 OlCott, M. B. op cit., p 62. (iv) 
163 Although 39% and 22% saw themselves as citizens of the CIS or the USSR- Kazakstanskaia 
pravda, 29/1/97. OMRI, Daily Digest, No 37, Pt 1,30/1/97. 
164 Panorama, Alma-Ata, 5/11/94, p 3, SWB SU 2154 G/2,16/11/94; & Interfax, Moscow 1722 
gmt. 23/1/95, Interfax, Moscow, 1427 gmt, 30/12/94 & ITAR-TASS, Moscow, 1242 gmt, 
25/6/94, SWB SU 2218, G 3,3/2/95. 
165 Ibid. 
'66 "Kazakhstan Suggests New Eurasian Security Grouping7 Reuters, 8/6/95. 
167 Yeltsin, B. 1/3/93. Quoted in Crow, S. "Russia Seeks Leadership in Regional Peacekeeping" 
RFEIRL, Vol. 2, No. 15,9/4/93, p 28. Italics added. 
168 Ibid. 
169 Yegenii Ambartsmov, former Chairman of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet 
Committee on International Affairs and Economic Relations in Kozyrev, A. et al, "What 
Foreign Policy Russia Should Pursue" International Affairs, No. 2, February 1993, pp 7-8. 
170 Pilkington, H. A. op cit. p3 
"' McIvin, N. op cit. pp. 121-2. (ii) See Chernomyrdin, V. V. Interview with Kazak Radio, 
25/12/93 on the moderate line of Russian cooperation with Kazakstan and a rebuttal of Russian 
nationalist provocations of ethnic conflict in Kazakstan. SWB SU 1882, GI, 30/12/93. 
172 See Izvestia 4/5/94, Quoted in Olcott, M. B. op cit., p 60. (vi); & Komsomolskaya joravda 
23/4/96, OMR1 Daily Digest, No 143, Pt 1,25n196. 
173 For discussion of Russian neo-imperialism see for example Noviov, E. "Central Asia's 
Search for Security" Prism, Vol. I No. 23. 
174 Edmunds, T. Interview 08/06/96, Quoted in op cit., (ii) 
175 See Wilson, A. & Bachkator, N. "T'he Cossack Revival" The JVorld Today, Vol. 49, No. 1, p 
2. 
176 Olcott, M. B. op cit., p 69. (vi) 
177 SWB SU 2173 G 1,8/12/94. 
178 Gunkin, N. Russia TV, 2000 gmt, 7/12/94. SWB SU 2179 G 1,15/12/94. 
179 Kaztag Newsagency, Almaty, 1600 gint, 30/11/94, SWI3 SU 2173, G 18/12/94. 
11ý0 Melvin, N. op cit., p 115. (ii) 
'81 Ibid. 
182 Azat Perushov, Presidential Apparat Deputy for Staff for Coordination of Political and 
National Processes. Author's interview, Almaty, 7/10/96. 
183 Pravda, 20/4/95. SWB SU 2285, G 2,24/4/95. 
184 Sadit Zhisipov, Kazakstan Institute of Strategic Studies, Author's interview, Almaty, 
1/10/96. 
185 Author's interviews, Almaty, October 1996. 
186 Abdigaliev, B. op cit., p 147. 
123 
187 Melvin, N. op cit. p 122. (ii) 
"' The stationing of Russian border troops was initiated by the 1992 Cooperation and 
Assistance Agreement and a Kazakstani Liaison Office has been established in Moscow. Woolf, 
R. The Armed Forces ofthe Former Soviet Union: Evolution, Structure and Personalities, Vol. 
2, Pt 1, Brasseys', London, 1996, D2 - 16. 
189 Melvin, N. "Russia and the ethno-politics of Kazaklistan" The TVorld Today, Vol. 49, No. 1, 
p 209. (i) 
190 The chief exceptions to this trend are Foltz, R- "The Tajiks of Uzbekistan" Central Asian 
Survey, Vol. 15, No. 2,1996, pp. 213 -6; Haghayeghi M. Islam and Politics in Central Asia, 
MacMillan, Basingstoke, 1995; & Schocberlein-Engel, J. "The prospects for Uzbek National 
Identity" Central Asian Afonitor, No. 2,1996, pp. 12-20. 
191 Pravda Vostaka, 15 June 1990, p 3. Quoted in Gleason, G. op cit., Table 14.1, p3 88. 
192 Foltz R. op cit., p, 213. 
193 Weekes, R- (ed. ) Aluslim Peoples: A World Ethnographic Survey, Greenwood, Westpoint, 
1984, p 739. 
194 1989 Soviet Census figures. Quoted in Bremmer, I. & Taras, R. (eds. ) op cit. Appendix B, 
pp. 555-59. 
195 The Civil War in Tajikistan has led to an exodus of approximately 300,000 ethnic Uzbeks, 
who are now refugees in Uzbekistan. Huttcnbach, H. R- Analysis of Current Events, September 
1996, ASN, NeNv York, Vol. 8, No. 1, p 4. 
196 Ro'i, Y. op cit., p 24. (iii) 
197 Timur Pulatov warned Samarkand oblast officials about Tajik-Uzbek confrontation over land, 
in 1989. Quoted ibid, pp. 24-5. (iii) 
19ý See Artemenko, V. & Latifi, 0. "To Seek A Solution Togethee' Pravda, 25 June 1988, pp. I- 
2, in CDSP, Vol. XL No. 25,1988, pp 9-10. 
'99 Haghayeghi, M. op cit., p 196. 
200 Nfirsaidov, J. Perechen'Faktov Politicheskoi Diskriminatsii Demokraticheskikh Organizatsii 
Ta&-hikov i ikh Aktivistov, 26/3/94. p 8. (ii) 
201 See for example "Otkrytoe Pis'mo Prezidentu Uzbekskoi Sovetskoi Sotsialisticheskoi 
respubliki Karimovu, I. A. ot obshchestvenno-kul'tumogo ob"edincniia (OKO) i natsional'nogo 
kul'turnogo tsentra tadzhikov i tadzhikoiazychnych narodov (NKTsT) Samarkand" Ovozi 
Tadzhik, No. 4,18/3/9 1, p. 4. 
202 Mirsaidov 
, 
J. Letter To Boutros Ghali, 2/10/93, pl. (i) 
203 Haghayeghi, M. op cit. p 196, 
204 For greater discussion on political events during this period see Carlisle, D. op cit., p. 8 1. (ii) 
205 Haghayeghi, M. op cit. p 197. 
206 Nissman, D. "The Ethnic Factor in Central Asia" Prism, Part C, nnI95. 
207 Haghayeghi, M. op cit. pp. 196-7. 
208 For a full account of this incident see Nfirsaidov, J. op cit., p 1. (ii). 
209 Polat, A. "Political Prisoners in Uzbekistan: Five Pardoned Eight on Trail" Central Asian 
Afonitor, No. 6,1994, p 36. 
210 [bid, pp. 2024 for a personal account of this incident. 
211 Nfirsaidov, J. op cit., p 4. (ii) 
212 Republic of Uzbekistan, Article 28, Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan, Uzbekiston, 
Tashkent, 1993. 
213 Nfirsaidov, J. Interview with 14RW/H, Tashkent, 21/11/95. Quoted in HRW/H, Uzbekistan: 
Persistent Human Rights Holations and Prospects for Improvements, Vol. 8, No. 5D, 1996, p 
18. (i) 
214 Gibova, 1. "One Party Parliament in Uzbekistan" Sevodnya, II/l/95; 4. CDPSP, Vol. XLVII, 
No. 2,29; Usmonov, L. Radio Liberty 14 January, Quoted in Khalq Suzi, 2/2/95, p 2. SWB SU 
2225 G 6-7,11/2/95; & Jorabayev, A. Editor of Khalq Suzi, Ibid; & Yalcin, R- Email posted on 
Cenasia Discussion Group, 10/5/97. 
215 Nfirsaidov, J. op cit. (ii) 
216 Author's interviews with Ikromov. T. Tajik Cultural Centre, Tashkent 6/11/96, Razzok, P. 
Director of the Tajik language Department SamGu, 12/11/96; Khurrashova, B. SamGu, 
124 
Samarkand 15/11/96; Ulosh, A. candidate of pedagogical science, SamGu Samarkand 12/11/96; 
& Mirsaidov, J. Tashkent, 18/11/96; & Foltz, R- op cit. p 215. 
217 Mirsaidov, J. op cit., p8 (ii); & Mirsaidov, J. Author's Interview, Tashkent, 18/11/96. 
218 Ibid. 
219 Ibid; & Mirsaidov, J. op cit., p 8. (ii) 
220 See for example Karimov, 1. IntcrviewAith Komsomolskaya pravda. Quoted in ITAR-TASS, 
World Service 1131 gmt, 12/2/93, SWB SU 1616, B4 18/2/93. 
221 [bid. Italics added. 
222 Karimov, 1. Interview with Trud, 26/5/93. SWB SU 1713, B 8,12/6/93. 
223 Hidoyator, G. "Sovereignty and Democracy arc Inseparable" Jahon, October 1996, p 2. 
224 Ibid. 
225 See Melvin N. (iii) 
226 Carlisle, D. op cit., p91. 
227 Schoeberlein-Engel, J. op cit., p 12. 
228 Kangas, R- "Imposing Order on Uzbekistarf' Transitions, Vol. 2 No. 18,6/10/96 p 26. (iv) 
229 Starr, F. "Making Eurasia Stable" Foreign Affairs, Vol. 75, No. 1,1996, p 83. 
230 Schoeberlein-Engcl, J. op cit., p 12. 
231 Ibid, p 13. 
232 Personal conversations with the author, November 1996. 
233 Mirsaidov, J. op cit. (ii) 
234 Novak Y. "Mezhetnicheskie Otnosheniia v Uzbekistane" Sotsiologicheskie Issledovaniia, 
No. 4,1994 pp. 49-5 1; & Wixman, R. op cit. 
235 Subtelny, M. E. op cit., p 45. 
2m Haghayeghi, M. op cit., p 134. 
237 See HRW/H for the widespread nature of repression and pp. 7-12 for the particular 
victimisation of independent Muslims. HRW/H, op cit., (i) 
23" Private correspondence with author. 
239 Haghayeghi, M. op cit., p 193. 
240 Ibid. 
241 CDSP, Vol. XLII, No. 31,1990, p 29; & Haghayeghi, M. op cit., p 193. 
242 Ibid, p 193. 
243 Ibid, p 195. 
244 Tishkov, V. op cit., p 137. 
245 Ibid. 
246 Ibid. See Asankanov, A. "Ethnic Conflict in Osh Region in Summer 1990: Reasons and 
Lessons" in Rupesinghe, K. & Tishkov, V. (eds. ) Ethnicity and Power in the Contemporary 
fVorld, Tokyo, UN University Press, 1996; Brusina, 0. Onekotorykh prichinah 
meznetnicheskogo konflikia v Oshshoi oblasti, Doc 10 IEA, Moscow 1990; Elbaeva, 1. 
Dzhuisurbekov, A- & Omuralicv, N. Oshski me, -hnatsional'ni konlikt i solsiologichskii analiz 
ANKirgizii, Bishkek, 1991. 
24' The Government of the Republic of Uzbekistan/TACIS, Uzbekistan Economic Trends 199 7 
(First Quarter), Tashkent, 1998, p 40. 
248 Bekker, A. "Chomyi rynok Chorsu" Moskovskie novosti, 3/10/89. Quoted in Tishkov, V. op 
cit., p 137. 
249 The Government of the Republic of Uzbekistan/TACIS, op cit., p 6. 
250 Private land cannot be resold or purchased. Ibid, p31. 
251 [bid, p 46. 
252 Much of the everyday discrimination may be explained by the sense of grievance that rural 
and poorer titular individuals feel towards the urban and more successful members of the Tajik 
community. Author's private correspondence. 
253 Huttenbach, H. R. Analysis of Current Events, September 1996, ASN, New York, Vol. 8, No. 
1, p 4. 
254 HRW/H, op cit. pp. 25-6. (i) 
255 Ibid; & The Government of the Republic of Uzbekistan/TACIS, op cit., p 50. 
256 Mirsaidov, J. op cit., p 2, (i); & HRW/H op cit., p 25-6. (i) 
257 Author's Interviews, November 1996. 
125 
25" In one murder case, the two Tajik defendants, Bahodir Sharipov and Sukhrob Sobirov, found 
guilt were executed whist their Uzbek co-defendants received lighter sentences. There were 
strong suspicions that ethnicity "not the level of guilt. " determined the verdict. Author's 
personal correspondence. 
259 Olimov, M. A. Regionalism in Tajikistan: Its Impact on the Fergana Valley, CPSS, Chevy 
Chase, 1996, pp. 2-3. 
260 
Ibid. 
261 Schocbericin-Engel, J. op cit., p 12. 
262 Carlisle, D. op cit., p 88 (ii); & Foltz R op cit., pp. 213 & 215. 
263 Ha ghayeghi, M. op Cit., P 195. 
264 Ibid, pp. 195-6. 
265 See ibid; & Schoeberlcin-Engel, J. op cit., p18. 
266 Zarubin, I. I. Naselenie Samarkandskoi oblasti, Leningrad 1926, pp 23 & 33 and 
Vsesoiuznaia perepis'naseleniia 1926 goda, vol. 15, Uzbekskaia SSIý, Moskva, 1928. Quoted in 
Schoeberlein-Engel, J. op cit., p 18. 
267 Kozlov, V. I. The Peoples of the Soviet Union, Hutchinson, London, 1988, p 36. 
268 See Bohr, A. Table I Ethnic ComRqsition of Uzbeldstan op cit., p 33 (ii); Foltz R. op cit., p 
213; Carlisle, D. in Ro'i, Y (ed. ) op cit., p 88; Fierman, W. "Independence and the Declining 
Priority of Language Law Implementation in Uzbekistan", in Ro'i, Y. op cit., note 8p 228; & 
Rurner, B. "The Potential for Political Instability and Regional Conflict" in Banuazizi, A. & 
Weiner, M. (eds. ) The New Geopolitics of Central Asia and Its Borderlands, I. B. Tauris, 
London, 1994, p 75. 
269 Foltz, R_ op cit., p 215. 
2,70 The Goveriument of the Republic of Uzbekistan, op cit. 
271 Foltz R. op cit., p 214. 
272 Ibid, p 215. 
273 MeSbahi, M. "Tajikistan, Iran, and the international politics of the 'Islamic factor"' Central 
Asian Survey, Vol. 16, No. 2,1997, p 145. 
274 Nissman, D. op cit. p 2. 
275 Schoeberlein-Engcl, J. op cit., p 19. 
276 Mirsaidov, J. Author's Interview, Tashkent, 18/11/96; & Foltz, R. op cit., p 215. 
277 Author's Interview, Tashkent, 6/11/96. 
278 See Orr, M. 'Me Russian Army and the War in Tajikistan" Conflict Studies Research 
Centre Paper K2 1, February 1996. 
279 HRW/K Tajikistan: Tajik Refugees in Northern Afghanistan, Vol. 8, No. 6D, May 1996, p 5. 
00 
280 OMRI Daily Digest No. 20, Pt. 1,2911/96. Khudaberdiyev claims that his actions were not 
co-ordinated with those of Boimatov; Pannier, B. "Defining the 'Third Force... Transitions, Vol. 
2 No. 5,21/3/97, p 44. (ii) 
281 Pannier, B "A Year of Violence" Transitions, Vol. 3, No. 2,7/2/97, p 97. (i) 
282 Alimov, K. "Uzbekistan's Foreign Policy: In Search of A Strategy" in Sagdeev, R. & 
Eisenhower, S. (eds. ) op cit. p 187; and Author's Interviews, Tashkent, November 1996. The 
Collective Security Programme in Central Asia allows for intervention when regional stability is 
at stake. Quoted in Kangas, R. "Taking the Lead in Central Asian Security" Transitions, Vol. 2, 
No. 9,3/5/96 p 53. (ii) 
293 Nezvis-maya gazeta, 23/2/93, p 3. Quoted in Olcott, M. B. op cit., p 73 (vi); & Martin, K. 
"Tajikistan: Civil War Without End" RFEIRL, Vol. 2, No. 33, p 22. 
284 Bourke, G. "Enemy forces unite for final attack on Afghan leader" The Guardian, 11/3/94, p 
15. 
285 Akiner, S. "Conflict, Stability and Development in Central Asia" in Dick, C. J. (ed. ) 
Instabilities in Post-Communist Europe, Carmicheal and Sweet, Portsmouth, 1996, p 13 (iv); & 
Clark, S. L. The Central Asian States: Defining Security Priorities and Developing Military 
Forces, Institute for Defense Analyses, Alexandra, 1993, p 22. 
286 Jurayev, S. Member of the Progress of the Homeland Party Author's interview, Tashkent, 
16/11/96. Also see author's Interviews, Tashkent, November 1996; & Petersen, "Security in 
Post-Sovict Central Asia" European Security, Vol. 4, No. 1,1995, p 134 
126 
2S7 Ibid. 
288 For the regional divisions of Uzbekistan and their political implications see Carlisle, D. op 
cit. (ii) 
289 See Horsman, S. "The Tajiks in the Contemporary Politics of Uzbeldstan" in Cordell, K. 
(ed. ) Ethnicity and Democratisation in the New Europe Routledge, (forthcoming); & Nfirsaidov, 
J. op cit. (i) 
290 Brown, B. "Tajik Civil War Prompts Crackdown in Uzbekistan" RFEIRL, Vol. 2, No. 11, 
1213/93, p 3. (i) 
291 Rotar, 1. "A Mine Laid By The Kremlin Mapmakcrsý'Nezavisimaya gazeta, 25/12/92, pI& 
3. CDPSP Vol. XLV, No. 1, p 7. 
292 Komsomolskaya pravda, 25/4/92, p 5. Quoted in Shashenkov, M. op cit. p 56. 
293 Rotar, 1. op cit., p 7. 
294 Mirsaidov, J. op cit, p 1. (i) 
295 The Government of the Republic of Uzbekistan, Article 3, op cit. 
296 Bichel, A. "Political Parties in Turkestan Republics" BITIG, No. 12,1997, pp. 7-8. 
297 Haghayeghi, M. op cit., pp. 196-7. 
298 Usmanov, L. "'Will the Islamic Factor' determine the Country's Future" Nezavisimaya 
gazeta, 6/l/94. CDPSP, Vol. XLV, No. 1, p 17. 
299 Foltz, R. op cit. p 215. 
300 For further refution by Samarkand of territorial ambitions see Mirsaidov, J. op cit., p1 (i); & 
Rotar, I. op cit. 
301 Foltz, R. op cit., p 215. 
30'2 See for example, Foltz, R. op cit., & Schoeberlein-Engel, J, op cit., p 19. 
303 See Clark, S. op cit., p 22; & Polat, A. op cit., p 36. 
304 Akiner, S. ', Conflict, Stability and Development in Central Asia7' In Dicks C. J. (ed. ) 
Instabilities in Post-Communist Europe, Cannicheal and Sweet, Portsmouth, 1996, p 13. (iv) 
305 See Brown, B. op cit., (i) & Horsman, S. "Constructing an External Role for Domestic 
Consumption: Uzbekistan's Involvement in Tajikistan" MacArthur Regional Security in A 
Global Context Conference, Wilton Park, 21-25/4/97. 
306 For example, "Karimov has been concerned that overt Tajik nationalism could spread to the 
Tajik population inside Uzbekistan. " Treacher, A. "Political Evolution in post-Soviet Central 
Asia" Democratization Vol. 3, No. 3, Autumn 1996, p 319. 
30' Pegushin in Bremmer, I. op cit., p 629. 
-'('8 Azat Perushov, Deputy for Staff for Coordination of Political and National Processes 
Presidential Apparat, Author's Interview, Almaty, 7/10/96. 
309 Kommunist Tadjikistana 16110/89. Quoted in Ro'i, Y. op cit., p 62 & footnote 80, p 62. (ii) 
310 OlCott, M. B. op cit., p 115. (iv) 
311 See for example Olcott, M. B. op cit., p 118. (iv) The surveys were conducted in Kazakstan 
and Uzbekistan. 
312 "Slav party urges halt to emigration" LabyTinth Vol. 1, No. 4, p 4. 
313 Ibid. 
314 Azat has since split into the more moderate: the Peoples' Congress, founded with Olzhas 
Suleimenov, (the poet and founder of Nevada-Semipalatinsk) a centralist and environmental- 
concerned party-, and the Republican Party of Kazakstan a pro-Kazak but avowed constitutional 
party. Edmunds, T. op cit., (ii) 
315 Melvin, N. op cit. p 110. (ii) 
316 Ibid. 
317 OMRI Daily Digest, No. 5, Pt. 1,8/1/97. 
3"' Bichel, A. op cit., p 6. 
319 Human Rights Watch/Helsinki, (HRWAH) Uzbekistan: Persistent Ifuman Rights Violations 
and Prospectsfor Improvements Vol. 8, No. 5(D), p 2. (i) 
320 Author's Interview, Tashkent November 1996. 
321 Melvin, N. op cit., pp. 110- 111. (ii) 
32'2 Russian Press Digest 06/3/94. 
323 Melvin, N. op cit., p 115. (ii) 
324 ITAR_TASS, 1404 gmt, 17/2/94. SWB SU 1928 G 2/3,22/2/94. 
127 
325 Nissman, D. "The Sad Fate of Opposition in Central Asia" Prism, Pt 2,15/7/95. 
326 NfirSaidoV, j. op cit., p 8. (ii) 
327 See Rotar I. Op Cit. 
328 
. 
MacLeod, I Quoted in Bakshian, D. "Uzbekistart Rights7' VOA, 1242 pm 12/9/96. 
329 Ibid. 
330 Wixman, P, op cit., p 160. 
331 Olcott, M. B. op cit., p 125. (vi) 
128 
4. Environmental Security in Central Asia 
4.1. Introduction 
This chapter will examine the linkage between environmental change and security. 
The specific focus, in both the theoretical section and case-studies will be upon 
water resources and intra- and inter-state conflict. After discussing the debate on 
environmental security, the main focus of the chapter will be upon the use of the 
trans-boundary Amu Darya and Syr Darya rivers. These rivers are essential to the 
region's economic and social development and stability. Other regional 
environmental issues, particularly nuclear testing at Semipalatinsk (now known as 
Semey), will be examined to illustrate the relationsl-ýp between environmental 
issues and the broader understanding of environmental security. 
Environmental activism is widely perceived in the West as indicative of a 
progressive and vibrant civil society. Evidence from late- and post-Soviet Central 
Asia highlights an antagonistic dimension, in which an environmental-nationalist 
nexus was facilitated by their shared characteristics and the context of Soviet 
polity. Individually and combined, they provided effective critiques of Moscow's 
legitimacy. The linkage was also evident in the communal violence witnessed in 
Central Asia, notably in the Fergana Valley, during the declining years of the 
USSR. These conflicts were frequently associated with resource allocation and 
notional concepts of group ownership. Independence and statehood divorced the 
two agendas and weakened the political significance of environmental issues. The 
author would suggest that this trend is temporary and does not indicate the 
successful management of regional environmental crises or their social-political 
consequences. In fact, aggressive environmental-nationalist activism, particularly 
at the sub-state level is liable to re-emerge with greater saliency and volatility than 
has previously been the case. 
4.2. Environmental Security: The Intellectual Debate 
Discussion about the environment's incorporation into IR. and Security Studies 
can be seen as part of the wider re-evaluation of these disciplines that has taken 
place in the last two decades. 
Traditional Realist thinking can to some extent explain inter-state resource wars, 
and the role of resource on the balance of power between states. ' These 
explanations, however, fail to explore the wider implications which fundamentally 
challenge the Realist approach. The distinction between domestic and 
international, for example, cannot be maintained if one examines the loci of 
environmental problems and their security implications. 
The incorporation of the environment into IR. has been encouraged by three key 
events: the 1973 Oil Crisis in which the strategic leverage of a resource was 
demonstrated; evidence of ozone depletion and associated global climate 
implications; and the collapse of the bi-polar rivalry of the Cold War. 2 At the 
forefront of the broadening of security was the Brandt Commission and the 
Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues (Palme Report). 
3 The Palme Report advanced the idea of common security. Subsequently, The 
World Commission on Environment and Development emphatically linked peace, 
security, development and the environment and a common approach to 
international security. 4 Superpower policy from the late-1980s began to accept a 
role for environmental issues in international affairs. Gorbachev's "New Foreign 
Policy" acknowledged the role of non-military issues including environmental 
degradation within the sphere of international security. The USA has sought to 
incorporate the environment "into the mainstream of foreign policy" with the 
establishment of the Environmental Initiative in April 1996. ' 
The incorporation of the environment has not, however, been universally 
accepted. Whilst environmental security is essentially a creation of the Pluralist 
school, critics of the concept are from both ends of the Realist-Idealist spectrum. 
The holism of the environment as a concept, the interdependency of interrelated 
eco-systems and the lack of distinct boundaries makes the establishment of an 
environment security problematic. This is compounded by the absence of 
universally adhered to terminology which has confused the debate. For Buzan, 
environmental security is concerned with "the maintenance of local and planetary 
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biosphere as the essential support system. )16 This author would argue that this is a 
definition of environmental protection, rather than an acknowledgement of the 
influence of environmental issues on security. Sarty, aware of the difficulties 
intrinsic in a broad definition of environmental security, believes that the term 
should cover "the probable linkage between environmental degradation and the 
outbreak of violent civil or interstate ConfliCt. i57 It is this narrow interpretation that 
shall guide this study. 
There are valid reasons for upholding a division between security and the 
environment. A central argument of both groups is the differences in character 
and values of military and environmental threats and required responses. Dyer is 
critical of attempts to include environmental security within existing national 
security thinking as they "are alternative values [based upon]... alternative world- 
views. "' Deudney, from a Realist perspective, argues that traditional national 
security issues are predominately source and target specific, short-term and zero- 
sum situations, whilst environmental problems are unintentional, non-specific, 
regional or global, long-term, pervasive and incremental. 9 
These divisions exist but create a false exclusivity between the two spheres. This 
is especially the case with the distinction between the assumption that all military 
scenarios are zero-sum and the environmental ones win-win. Perceptions of the 
actors and the context of the situation can lead to autonomous or collective, co- 
operative or conflictual approaches in either case. Dyer cites the example of a 
downstream state's dependency on an upstream state for its water supply. The 
downstream state may not be able to reciprocate the environmental threat to the 
upstream state but may use military response as a substitute, bringing traditional 
security concerns back in. 'O 
Others are wary of the association between the environment and security because 
of the implications of militarising the environment. The assimilation of military 
values including non-democratic decision-making and zero-sum assumptions, and 
the unsuitability of military solutions, it is argued, deter an association. There is 
considerable merit in these concerns. Clearly, military solutions will not be 
suitable for economic and social problems. Military action, as Realists would 
acknowledge, is, however, only part of an effective security policy. The recent 
broadening of the security concept can only be strengthened and legitimised by 
the involvement of other practitioners in relevant disciplines. 
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A related concern over the value of environmental security, with relevance for the 
post-Soviet region, has been voiced by Sarty. In common with concerns raised 
about the increasing Security Studies interest in non-military issues, one must be 
sceptical of the motives and mindsets of these converts. Sarty argues that the "'us 
versus them' mentality", which helped propel Cold War thinking, has been 
perpetuated by the former- Sovietologists. Their objective is to re-invent 
themselves and their scholarly field, and maintain funding and intellectual 
distinctiveness by perpetuating a threat to the West emanating from the FSU. " 
The intellectual linkage between the environment and security are not invalidated 
by these hidden agendas. 12 
The lack of analytical rigour evident in a considerable section of pro- 
environmental- security writing has also aided its critics. Levy correctly criticises 
the "existential" connection between the environment and (national) security. " 
Advocates of this existential approach, including Mathews and Myers, attempt to 
establish a moral relationship between environmental degradation and security. 14 
Mathews discusses the widest interpretation of environmental security; economic 
development and quality of life, but fails to establish any relationship between 
environmental problems and conflict, either at an empirical or a theoretical level. " 
As Levy notes, it is "probably not a coincidence that advocates of the existential 
link between security and environment provide the loosest definitions of 
security. " 16 In fact, Mathews fails to either define or redefine the term security. 
The weakness of such environmental-sympathetic authors arguments does not, 
however, mean that the concept is redundant, rather that it needs greater 
coherence and rigour. 
Deudney and Levys' critiques of environmental security remain fundamentally 
rooted in the Realist paradigm. Levy, for example, defines security as that which 
"emphasizes protection of national values against foreign threats" in which "the 
actions of foreigners are involved. " 17 Such a definition enables the disengagement 
of the two concepts with relative ease. 
Deudney and Levy both maintain that there is nothing particularly "national" 
about environmental degradation, because it is often unintentional and non- 
specific in its target. The environment therefore cannot be incorporated into the 
"national" security agenda. This negates the fact that environmental degradation is 
a threat which affects a state's economic, military and social capabilities. The 
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assumption that environmental threats are unintentional negates them a position in 
security discourse whilst correct for some environmental threats, denies human 
intervention and responsibility in numerous situation as well as the impact it has 
upon specific states. Central Asia's environmental predicament is man-made and 
has led to the politicisation of the environment. 
Levy's argument is that because numerous factors intervene between the 
environment and violent conflict there is no direct link between the two. It is 
therefore argued that the environment per se should not be regards as a cause of 
conflict. 18 This seems rather circumspect. Other sources of antagonism, religion or 
ethnicity, for example, are not in themselves inevitably conflictual. Rather it is the 
"intervening" social and political factors that determine the eventual outcome of a 
situation. Water shortages faced by the Palestinians, a consequence of Israel's 
capture of aquifers and upstream supplies, are intrinsic to the parties' relationship, 
although they are not the primary cause of tension between them. Perversely, the 
acute environmental situation in Karakalpakstan is unlikely to lead to conflict. 
Only by placing the environmental issue within the broader political situation can 
these differences be understood as either a routine political or security concern. 
Authors including Buzan and Deudney, unconvinced by comprehensive security 
arguments, do, however, acknowledge the inability of Realist theory to cope with 
trans-national environmental problems. '9 Buzan accepts that collective action is 
required to deal with macro-scale ecological threats, including water resource 
competition. 20 IR. theory needs to accept and expand from its traditional narrow 
focus of interest, if it is to be capable of dealing with recently recognised and 
increasingly salient cross-border environmental concerns. Axiomatic to 
environmental security literature is an awareness of interdependence. If vecurity is 
to cope with potential threats to core values and the establishment of conditions 
conducive to the promotion of these values, as Stern argues, it must be capable of 
dealing with all potential threatS. 21 
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4.3. The Scope of Environment Security 
The environment security debate usually revolves around three direct issues and 
one indirect concern: 
1) The environment as a cause and/or objective of conflict; 
2) As an instrument of war; 
3) Environmental degradation as a result of military action; and 
4) The indirect influence upon security via development and welfare issues. 
The third is the weakest link in establishing an environment-security relationship. 
Military actions, including acquisition of strategic resources, military-industrial 
production, military tests, and the disposal of military waste, for example, all have 
had environmentally harmful results. 22 This author would argue, that these 
problems are essentially consequences of an entire economic system, of which the 
above military actions are an integral part. "[M]ost of the causes and most of the 
cures of degradation must be found outside of the traditional national security 
system related violence. ))23 
This chapter will principally focus upon the first concern and, to a lesser extent, 
the fourth. 
The Project on Environmental Change and Acute Conflict, led by Homer-Dixon 
has been seminal in examining the relationship between the environment and 
conflict . 
2' The Project's objective was to establish a theoretical framework for 
environmental security. Through empirical studies, the Project tested a series of 
hypothesis on environmental-inspired conflicts and sought to establish a 
theoretical foundation for environmental security. By examining environmental 
change, the objective of the Project was to answer two questions: 
Does environmental scarcity cause violent conflict? and 
If so, in what manner? 
The Project initially selected six environmental changes but revised this to focus 
more specifically upon four because the impact of these on political and social 
affairs was more evident and immediate to analysiS. 2' These were: 
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a) Degradation and loss of good agricultural land; 
b) Degradation and removal of forests; 
c) Depletion and pollution of fresh water supplies; and 
d) Depletion of fisheries. 
These were analysed as potential conflict-"instigators" under three conflict 
scenarios: 
1) Simple Scarcity Conflicts; 
2) Group Identity Conflicts; and 
3) Relative Deprivation Conflicts. 26 
The Project's case-studies found these, and specifically the degradation and loss 
of good agricultural land, had the greatest potential for leading to conflict. For the 
purpose of this chapter, the emphasis will be upon a and c; degradation and loss 
of good agricultural land, and the depletion and pollution of fresh water supplies, 
respectively. 
Environmental scarcity was defined as the combined affects of environmental 
change, population growth and material expectations, and unequal social 
distribution of resources . 
27 This tripartite model, Homer-Dixon argues, sought to 
integrate the frequent examination of resource depletion, population growth and 
political and economic resource allocation, as "(e)mpirical evidence suggests ... 
that the first two sources are most pernicious when interacting with unequal 
resource distribution. ))28 
Homer-Dixon argues that the creation of an environment-security relationship 
must be "highly detailed" and situation specific. Political, social, and demographic 
structures and trends and determine the potential for environmental conflict. As 
Homer-Dixon states, 
"(w)ithout a full understanding of these intervening factors we cannot begin to 
grasp the true nature of the relationships between human activity, 
environmental change, social disruption and conflict. ... Recognition of the 
role of these factors distinguishes simplistic environmental determinism from 
sophisticated accounts of the nature of environmental threats posed to 
humankind. " 29 
This latter point is an effective counterpoise to Levy's view that intervening 
factors prevent the base environmental problem from being regarded as a security 
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concern. Resource scarcity is context specific and subjective. Rather than solely 
determined by physical constraints, social perceptions of distributive justice and 
the quality of life influence the notion of resource scarcity and the manner in 
which the environment is articulated in politics. 
Homer-Dixon sees two common environmental scarcity interactions resulting 
from resource scarcity. In the first, resource capture, a decline in the quantity and 
quality of a renewable resource combined with population growth, can encourage 
a dominant group to attempt to direct resource distribution to their benefit. The 
second situation, ecological marginalisation, is a result of unequal resource access 
and population growth. The consequence is migration and increased human 
pressure on an already fragile ecosystem of the receiving region. The result is 
severe environmental damage and chronic economic decline. " 
A modified version of these interactions, with particular emphasis on ecological 
marginalisation, is perhaps suitable for Central Asia, although population 
movement is a factor in Kazakstan and Uzbekistan. In the latter, however, 
population pressure is principally domestic, a consequence of increased 
indigenous birth rates rather than migration. 
The Project's findings suggest the importance of group relations and political 
power in instigating environmental conflict. In the case of resource capture on the 
Senegal River, a large-scale development project in 1989 which included the 
construction of dams for irrigation, Hydro Electric Power (HEP) and river flow 
regulation had major economic and political consequences. This included the 
manipulation of environmental development programmes for sectarian interests, 
population movement and communal violence. " 
4.3. i. Simple Scarcitv Conflicts: Simple scarcity conflicts, according to Homer- 
Dixon, are explained and predicted by structural theories, in which actors 
rationally calculate their interests in zero-sum or negative-sum situations. 32 As 
Homer-Dixon notes "they are easily understood within the Realist paradigm of 
international relations theory. 03 "While the threat of resource wars is not new to 
international relations, this line of analysis points up the clear and growing 
connections between contemporary mismanagement of the environment and the 
security challenges of tomorrow. 7734 
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According to Homer-Dixon's findings, there is little empirical evidence to support 
the contention of inter-state conflict over renewable resources, although there is 
greater evidence for non-renewable resource interstate conflict, in particular over 
mineral and oil deposits. " Of greater significance for this thesis, however, is the 
Project's findings that the most feasible source of intra- and inter-state conflicts 
concerning a renewable resource is the issue of river water . 
36 "Conflict is most 
probable when a downstream riparian is highly dependent on river water and is 
strong in comparison to the upstream riparians. ... This 
is particularly dangerous if 
the downstream country also believes it has the military power to rectify the 
situation 1737 This description is analogous for the TaJikistan-Uzbekistan and, to a 
lesser extent, Kazakstan-Kyrgyzstan situations. 
Homer-Dixon cites the examples of South Africa and Lesotho, and Egypt and 
Ethiopia. In the former, South Africa unsuccessful negotiated for the allocation of 
Lesotho's water for agriculture in the Transvaal for 30 years. Homer-Dixon 
argues that South Africa's support for the 1986 military coup in Lesotho as well 
as being a means of denying the African National Congress guerrilla bases, was 
also motivated by water. Within a year, the two states had agreed upon the 
31 Highlands Water Project, to supply water to South Affica. 
The Project concluded that riverine water competition is more liable to cause 
intra- rather than inter-state conflict. Water projects such as HEP and irrigation 
systems, cause major social disruption including population movements. This has 
the potential for conflict between local and resettled peoples, competition over 
economic or political control of irrigable and irrigated lands, and land price 
changes. 39 
4.3ji. Population Movement and Group Identity Conflicts: According to 
Homer-Dixon, there is considerable empirical evidence to suggest that 
environmental scarcity causes large-scale population movement and group- 
identity confliCt. 40 Group identity conflict is not specifically due to the allocation 
of resources but questions of cultural encroachment and assimilation for example. 
The potential for group identity conflict is increased if there is a direct association 
between a region and an ethnic group. The recent arrivals are, therefore, alienated 
from and perceived as a threat to the existing community. 
This debate is, however, unresolved. The recent examples of Islamic 
fundamentalist sympathies developing in the deprived sections of Egypt's 
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conurbation's and communal violence in Indian cities, indicate a linkage between 
urban poverty and increased political violence. 41 
The frequently assumed correlation between rapid urbanisation, with its 
associated underclass, and radicalisation, social conflict and revolution, has been 
questioned. Tilly and Ullman argue that the urban underclass has not provided the 
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genesis or critical mass for revolution this century. The ability of this group to 
politically and physically challenge the existing political structures is, therefore, 
debatable. Migrants are frequently the marginalised and weak in their original 
location. Their poor status remains, if not further eroded in the receiving society. 43 
"This limits their ability to organize and make demands. )A4 Ullman argues that this 
is because they are more. concerned with maintaining and enhancing their 
45 economic situation in the new environment. Political and social organisations 
should also be examined when assessing the weakness of political consciousness 
of migrant group. Migration is less likely to "produce violence than silent misery 
and death, which rarely destabilizes states. ))46 
The Project, however, concludes that there is an association between land 
scarcity, a consequence primarily of population growth, and communal violence 
between environmental migrants and host communitieS. 47 
4.3. W. Relative Deprivation Conflicts: According to the Project's research, 
environmental scarcity is liable to increase economic deprivation and weaken 
social institutions . 
48Hurrell similarly believes that the most important dimensions 
of environmental security is the risk of environmental degradation, undermining 
the social fabric of weak states, and provoking internal social disruption and 
violence . 
49Relative deprivation perspectives suggest that conflict is most feasible 
under certain conditions. These are: 
1) Clearly defined and well-organised social groups; 
2) At least one of these groups believes that its economic and political position is 
unjust; and 
3) The aggrieved group feels that peaceful methods for change are unavailable 
and that non-peaceful means are feasible. " 
Political activism will be more effective if articulated through well organised, 
financed and autonomous movements, possibly based around social cleavages 
such as ethnicity, religion or class. " 
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The Project believes that key contextual factors determine whether economic 
decline, weakening state institutions will result in "deprivation conflict. " There is, 
however, no clear correlation between actual economic inequality and social 
conflict. 52 The catalyst, according to Homer-Dixon, for deprivation conflict is the 
social perception of economic justice. For civil conflict to emerge, recent research 
has indicated that there has to be a "severe, persistent and pervasive" economic 
crisis which erodes "the legitimacy of the dominant social order and system of 
government. "53 The absence of legitimate, peaceful channels to express demands 
makes the potential for conflict greater. "[A] state debilitated by corruption, by 
failing revenues and rising demands, for services, or by factional conflicts within 
elites will be more vulnerable to violent challenges by political and military 
opponents, also vital to state strength is the cohesiveness of its forces and its 
loyalty to civil leadership. )754 The Project suggested that the state's legitimacy and 
capabilities are brought into question by the impact of environmental security. To 
rectify an environmental crisis a state will have to divert financial resources from 
other activities. Those involved in resource exploitation will seek state 
compensation if state environmental policy restricts their business. The economic 
and political implications of state intervention can result in increased economic 
inequalities. 55 
4.3. iv. Combined Model: 56 Homer-Dixon believes that there are important links 
between population movement-group identity conflicts and environmental scarcity 
inspired deprivation conflicts. Population movement can be a direct consequence 
of resource scarcity, but more frequently it is a result of poverty which results 
from this scarcity. Equally, Homer-Dixon suggests that the weakening of the state 
not only offers opportunities for deprivation conflict but also group-identity 
conflict. He therefore argues it is useful to create a combined model of 
environmental conflict. 
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4.4. Water as a Security Issue 
Fresh water has been predicted as the renewable resource most likely to become a 
source of conflict in the near future, "due to population pressure, environmental 
degradation and unequal distribution of resources. "57 In the mid-1980s, US 
intelligence services catalogued ten potential water-related conflict zones. 58 Since 
the collapse of the USSR, Central Asia has been cited as a prime region 
vulnerable to fresh water competition. 59 This is a departure from history. 
Traditionally the majority of water-related conflicts have been concerned with 
navigation access rather than potable supplies. 
There are several attributes which make water a contested and "strategic 
resource. "" It is required for all human activities, is a limited resource, is without 
substitute, "used in vast quantities and at prices which normally do not reflect 
replacement costs" and is frequently trans-border, or extra-border in source. " 
For Gleick, a contributor to the Project on Environmental Change and Acute 
Conflict, the factors that make fresh water a strategic issue are: 
1) Its degree of scarcity; 
2) The extent to which water is shared by more than one party; 
3) The relative power of the riparian parties; and 
4) The potential for access to alternative fresh water SUpply. 
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Gleick established four indices of water resource vulnerability. These are: 
1) Annual water demand; 
2) Annual per capita water availability; 
3) Source of water supply; and 
4) Dependency upon HER 
These demonstrate a state's water demands, availability of supply and economic 
reliance upon a water source. States with high indices are expected to be those 
most vulnerable to water-related conflict, and where regional co-operation and/or 
international assistance would be most valuable. 63 
The ratio between annual water demand (withdrawals) and annual renewable 
water availability (supply), as a percentage, demonstrates the sustainability of an 
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individual state's water supply. Gleick lists seventeen states which withdraw at 
least 50% of their annual renewable supply, including nine states with an indices 
above 100%. 64 The latter supplement their renewable resource, with imported 
water, ground water supplies beyond annual replenishment rates, or expensive 
desalination programmes. 65 
Annual per capita water availability indicates a state's capability for economic and 
social development. The UN recommends that 1000 cubic metres per person per 
annum (p. a. ) is the minimum per-capita water requirement for an effective 
industrialised state. 66 Water availability levels in Israel and the Palestinian 
Occupied Territories, for example, are 375 and 180 m3/person/p. a., 
67 respectively. Water scarcity places serious constraints on many state's economic 
development with consequences for population growth, industrial expansion and 
social stability. 
A further indices of vulnerability is the percentage of the required water supply 
originating from external sources. Potentially, this can lead to tensions between 
upstream and downstream state. 68 
The final measure of vulnerability is the dependency upon HEP, as a percentage of 
total electricity supply. The greater the reliance on this form of power, the more 
significant the possibility of coercion or the threat of coercion by opponents of the 
said state. Such actions include the threat to destroy dams or restrict water 
supply. HEP only indicates one aspect of the economic value of water. (For 
Central Asia this index will be enlarged to include the direct economic value of 
water-related activities. ) 
Although these quantitative indices are suitable as a basis for examination of 
water-security in Central Asia, they lack detail and fail to illustrate the 
complexities of water use and security. Neither do they indicate the subjective 
nature of (environmental) security. The possibility of water-related conflict is 
dependent upon political considerations, as well as, simply scarcity. Naff and 
Matsons' study of Middle Eastern water-related conflict noted the significance of 
three subjective influences: 
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1) Perceived interests and issues of riparian states; 
2) Relative location to other riparian states; and 
3) "External and internal power considerations. )369 
In the Jordan river basin, whilst Arab-Israeli negotiations on technical aspects of 
water allocation have been relatively successful, "[b]oth sides, but especially the 
Arabs, have been reluctant to enter into binding agreements, even on technical 
matters, in the absence of a political settlement on the core issue of dispute: the 
future status of the territories occupied by Israel . 7770 The resolution of water 
disputes is closely related to the political relationships between the parties. A 
fraught and distrustful regional political environment will not be conducive to the 
settlement of water issues. 71 
As well as being a cause or objective of conflict, it can also be used as an 
instrument of war. 72 As a military weapon, water has some key advantages, for 
example, it is essential to life and easy to pollute. 73 
The security challenges posed by what are essentially non-military water projects 
was illustrated by North Korea's proposed construction of the Kumgansan HEP 
dam on a tributary of the Han river, upstream of the South Korean capital, 
74 Seoul. South Korea feared that the dam could be used to disrupt its agriculture, 
or even used as an offensive weapon. The sudden release of the whole dam's 
capacity would have flooded Seoul to a depth of 50 metres, according to South 
Korean claims. South Korea formally opposed the project and built a series of 
levees and dams as safeguards. The development was latter abandoned. Whatever 
the feasibility or intention of the dam, it was perceived by as a "national" security 
concern. 
A similar but more explicit case is the Turkish construction of the Ataturk Dam, 
part of the Grand Anatolia Project on the River Euphrates. In 1990, Turkey 
threatened to restrict water supply to Syria, if the latter did not end its assistance 
to Kurdish guerrillas in southern Turkey. 75 
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4.5. Solutions for Water-Resource Conflict 
Gleick regards International Law (IL. ) as a core means of managing water 
allocation. 76 Glieck notes that although most water disputes are resolved through 
negotiations, in regions including Central Asia, where scarcity and competition are 
acute, water has become part of "high politics" and "the probability of water- 
related violence is increasing. 1777 
In the last 20-30 years, IL. has sought to create a body of principles for fresh 
water resources. Gleick believes that the International Law Association's Helsinki 
Rules (1966) and the International Commission of United Nation (1991) have 
been crucial in the establishment of general principles including: 
- Equitable utilisation; 
- Prevention of harm to other users; 
- Obligation to notify and inform; 
- Obligation to exchange hydrological and other relevant data and information on 
a regular basis; and 
- Co-operative management of international rivers. 
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4.5. i. Eguitable Utilisation: This is a difficult concept to define, and in practice 
to quantify. According to this principle, expressed in the Helsinki Rules on the 
Use of Waters of International Rivers, and the International Law Association, 
riparians are entitled to a reasonable and equitable share of inter-state water 
resources. This is dependent upon population, geography, alternative resources 
and other factors. 79 It does not imply equal allocation. Equitable utilisation is 
contrary to the Harman Doctrine under which a state is entitled to use the water 
within its boundary without consideration of other states' requirements. In the last 
100 years, almost all river treatise have rejected the doctrine and restricted the 
freedom of upstream state in favour of equitable use. 'O 
4.5. ii. Prevention of Significant Harm to Other States: The Law of Non- 
Navigational Uses of International Water Resources (1991), for example, obliges 
states not to harm other states through their use of international waterways. 
Harmful action can, however, be permitted if compensation is provided. A major 
problem with this principle is determ=ining the acceptable level of downstream 
harm that can be inflicted, ascertaining the upstream state's responsibility, and the 
level of compensation for these actions. 
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4.5. iii. Obli2ation to Notify and Inform: The Helsinki Rules and International 
Law Association, both cite that states should notify and inform other states of 
actions that will affect their use of shared water. Such notification does not 
necessarily imply that a state's actions will be open to change or even 
consultation, nor necessarily mitigate tensions. 
4.5. iv. Obligation to Share Data: Effective water management practices are 
dependent upon access to relevant information. Gleick believes that sharing this 
data is a necessary part of the confidence building process, as well as, essential to 
the establishment of a viable water management programme. " Although this 
principle is gaining greater acceptance, in some regions water-resource 
information is not easily accessible. India and Israel, for example, regard much of 
their water data as classified. " In Middle Eastern water negotiations, adequate 
reliable data, data sharing, and mutual confidence in the information provided are 
frequently absent. 83 Similar issues are evident in Central Asia. 
4.5. v. Co-operative Management of International Rivers: The International 
Law Commission has proposed the "principle of participation", in which all basin 
state have a duty to be involved "in the development, use and protection of shared 
water resources" via "joint basin commission empowered to negotiate disputes 
and resolve questions of resource allocation. ))84 Treaty based water-management 
structures, with bi- or multi-lateral signatories, have been "more effective, albeit 
on a far more limited regional basis, than the broader principles described 
above. "85 
The political and economic weakness of the state are major obstacles to effective 
environmental management. Weak states are frequently those that require an 
environmental security concept the most, as limited resource and fiscal 
alternatives make the fragility of their ecological situation more vulnerable to 
conflict. Environmental scarcity conflict is liable to result in either state 
fragmentation or authoritarianiSM. 16 
Homer-Dixon believes that a society is best able to avoid environmental scarcity- 
inspired conflict by two strategies. The first is a more sustainable use of 
indigenous resources and the provision of alternative employment for those 
involved with the scarce resource. Economic measures including pollution taxes, 
incentives for more efficient use, as well as, social programmes such as family 
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planning and literacy campaigns may also ease pressure on the resource. He also 
cites the use of labour-intensive rural industries, as a means of alleviating pressure 
on agricultural land. The second is for a state to lessen its dependency upon the 
depleted resource. 87 "If either strategy is to succeed, a society must be able to 
supply enough [social and technical) ingenuity at the right time and place. "" 
4.6. Conclusion to Theorv Section 
Environmental issues, because of their regional or global location, challenge the 
effectiveness of independent state action and the theoretical values that underpin 
these. Realisation of environmental constraints to growth, material expectations, 
and environmental degradation have also led to a reappraisal of the 
environmental- security correlation. Gleick is convinced of the relevance of this 
relationship, to the extent that he argues security analysts should now examine 
"when and ivhere resource-related conflicts are most likely to arise, not iMether 
environmental concerns can contribute to instability and conflict. "'9 
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The Case Study 
4.7. Introduction 
Numerous authors cite the high probability of water-related conflict in Central 
Asia. 90 Most however fail to elaborate the mechanism involved in regional 
environmental conflict. For example, Petersen states that "(c)ompetition for finite 
resources-such as water irrigation in Central Asia ... will 
be keen. 
[E]nvironmental-caused conflict potential has drastically escalated. "91 Petersen, 
like others sympathetic to an environmental security relationship, does not detail 
the manner in which this relationship develops, beyond stating that economic 
competition and a "rise in international stress overall" are influential. 92 
The key environmental issues to be examined are: 
1) Water access and competition, and the related issues of irrigation, cotton 
agriculture and associated economic and social consequences; 
and the security implications of other regionally significant topics; 
2) The Aral Sea; 
3) Nuclear testing; and 
4) The Caspian Sea and related oil reserves. 
The latter two have particular relevance for Kazakstan and the discussion of these 
will focus upon the northern republic, as at the state level, water security has 
limited applicability to Kazakstan. 
The environmental security dimension of these issues will be analysed in two 
manners. Firstly, and most significantly, the narrow environmental security 
understanding will be applied to analyse whether a particular environmental 
concern may directly contribute to violent conflict. Secondly, the broader 
conceptualisation will be used to examine the manner in which environmental 
crises affect development, economic and health spheres and whether such 
problems ultimately impact upon the narrower conceptualisation. 
The twofold approach will demonstrate the differing saliency of the issues in 
relation to the two states, and the relevance of different management approaches 
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as the capitals differing conceptualisation of environmental security. Also it will 
illustrate that whilst the broader conceptualisation of the term environmental 
security is ill-defined, it deals with issues that indirectly contribute to the more 
specific interpretation. An example of this is the health implications of "Cotton 
Optimal" regional agricultural directives. This policy limited and polluted water 
supplies, directly damaging the health of cotton workers and reducing indigenous 
food production and calorific intake. The poor medical condition of Central Asian 
military draftees has been directly associated to such non-security problems. (See 
4.11. ) 
4.7. i. Geographical and Hydrological Background: The Aral Sea basin 
encompasses the majority of Central Asia. This 1.3 million km 2 ecosystem, 
incorporates all of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan plus the 
two southern Kazakstani oblasts of Qyzlorda and Shymkent and parts of northern 
Afghanistan and north-west Iran. The basin supports a population in excess of 32 
million people and contains 90% of Central Asia's surface water. 93 (See Map 4.1. ) 
Northern Kazkastan contains the Ural, Ishin and Tobol and Irtysh rivers in the 
west, centre and east of the republic. 
Two rivers dominate the region, the Amu Darya and Syr Darya, both of which 
drain into the Aral Sea. The former rises in the Pamir mountains. It flows through 
Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan before entering the Sea. The Syr 
Darya's source is the Naryn in Kyrgyzstan. Its subsequent route to the Aral Sea 
travels through Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakstan. 
The Zeravshan river which rises in the Pamirs ends in Qyzlqum desert, west of 
Bukhara, due to evaporation and heavy consumption. The Kashkadarya also 
terminates before reaching the Amu Darya. 
The drainage basins of the Amu Darya (including the Kara Kum Canal, 
Kashkadarya and Zeravshan) and Syr Darya have a combined annual flow of 
109.5 km3, although the flow may vary from in excess of 141 km 3 to less than 81 
kM3 , both of which have a one in twenty year probability. 
94 The 1989 inflow into 
the Aral Sea, however was less than one tenth of the figure recorded in 1959.95 
The prime reason for this has been water use for irrigation. " 
Between 1950 and 1985, there was a 60% increase in irrigated lands. 97 50% of 
the region's irrigated lands was located in the Uzbek SSR. 9' Between 1965 and 
146 
1990 its irrigated land expanded from 2.7 million hectares to 4.2 million ha., three 
times the size of the second largest irrigator, Turkmenistan. " The latter's 
irrigation has been chiefly provided by the Soviet constructed Kara Kum Canal, 
stretching westward from the Amu Darya for 1200 km. (See Map 4.1. ) This is a 
major drain on the river's flow. 15 km 3 of the Amu Darya is diverted to this canal. 
Poor construction, maintenance and management account for approximately a 
third of capacity lost to leakage. 100 
The principle recipient of this water has been cotton. Cotton production in Soviet 
Central Asia expanded from 2.6 million tons in 1955, to approximately 7.5 million 
in 1986. '01 Of the 8.2 million tonnes of raw cotton planted in the USSR in 1986; 
61% in the Uzbek S SR, 14% in Turkmen S SR, Taj ik S SR II% and Kazak S SR 
4% and Kyrgyz SSR 1%. 102 There was a decline in land under cotton in the 
1980S. 103 
Domestic and industrial water use expanded in the post-1945 period, although 
overshadowed by agricultural withdrawals. (See Table 4.4. ) Between 1959-89, 
the population of the four Aral Sea basin states rose from 13.6 million to 32.8 
million, an increase of 140%. During the same period agricultural production rose 
by lo()%. 104 Output by "industrial enterprises involving mibstantial abstraction or 
diversion of ivater" expanded by 200% for steel, 470% for cement and electric 
generation twelve fold. 'O' 
Consequently withdrawals from the river system have reached full utilisation of 
riverine supplies, and the near-cessation of inflow into the Aral Sea. Total Central 
Asian water withdrawals, including Kazakstan, in 1980 were I 18% of average 
annual flow. The figure for the Aral Sea basin was 130%. 106 Micklin suggests that 
water withdrawal figures are misleading, as total withdrawals can exceed total 
supply because returned waters can be used repeatedly. 107 He suggests 
consumptive use plus evaporation from reservoirs is a better means of indicating 
the sustainability of water use. 10" Consumptive use and reservoir evaporation in 
Central Asia were 91 km 3) 74% of average annual flow and for the Aral Sea basin 
81%. With the addition of pan-basin evapo-transpiration loses rose to 93%. 10) 
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4.8. The Historical Background to 
Environmental Politics and Conflict in Central Asia 
The allure of sedentary communities, agriculturally rich, with prosperous crafts, 
enticed nomadic conquest. After the Uzbek conquest, Transoxania's territorial 
integrity, however, remained relatively intact until the late-nineteenth century. It 
was in fact the resource-poor Kazak khanate which suffered the greatest 
reversals. Extensive lands were required to compensate for nomadic agricultural 
and environmental fluctuations. Unequal military competition against Jungars and 
Russian expansion pushed the Kazaks into smaller and more frequently grazed 
lands further weakening their economic and political well-being and social 
structures. Overgrazing within these confined lands further weakened political 
resistance to Russian expansion. 
Traditionally, the Uzbek khanates' political culture, including deferential 
collectivism, was a consequence of water scarcity and the organisational 
requirements of the construction and maintenance of irrigation systems. 110 
Irrigation required considerable human and financial resources, organised by the 
state. This collective effort transcended family and clan authority. Irrigated land 
"belonged quite naturally to the state. ""' Land was given to individuals to 
cultivate, who were expected to take part in canal maintenance. "Thus in Bukhara 
[and Khiva), as often in the Orient, irrigation appears as one of the principle 
functions of state power, its function in a sense. "' 12 In the khanates water 
management systems were localised, corresponding to particular rivers and 
oases. 113 Until the 1950s, most of the water required for irrigation was drawn 
from small tributaries of the Amu Darya and Syr Darya. 
The political and security significance of irrigated land can also be realised in the 
fact that popular revolts in nineteenth century Bukhara were focused around land 
and harvests' taxation. 114 This trend was replicated in Tsarist and Bolshevik 
Central Asia. In the former, a report declared that "the fundamental cause of 
banditry is in all probability, the growth of a landless proletariat. " 115 The 
concentration of land ownership and the arrival of Russian farmers had caused 
landless peasants to seek a living through banditry. As part of an attempt to 
politically placate, as well as, pacify the Basmachi opposition in the Fergana 
Valley, the Soviets introduced a series of land and water reforms. Land and water 
rights belonging to the bays (the feudal elite) were confiscated and redistributed 
to the dekhane (peasants). The project, initiated in 1921, although it never 
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reached its full potential received popular support. The collectivisation 
programme of 1929 onwards brought this period of economic stabilisation to an 
end. 116 
Environmental issues had a significant role in late-Soviet politics, establishing 
numerous links between environmental degradation, resource allocation and 
political mobilisation. Centre-periphery relations, and the evolution and toleration 
of nationalism were deeply influenced by environmental critiques of the Soviet 
system. Environmentalism was frequently used as a substitute for nationalist/anti- 
Moscow activism, as well as, a source of friction between non-Russian groups. 
The politicisation of environmental issues, made possible by glasnost reforms, was 
engendered by the Chernobyl incident, 1986. Glasnost saw the relaxation on non- 
state organisations. The transition can be illustrated well by noting Nikita 
Khrushchev and Mikhail Gorbachevs' differing opinions on environmentalism. 
Khrushchev described an ecologist as, 
"a healthy guy in boots who lies behind a knoll; through binoculars watches a 
squirrel eat nuts. We can mange quite well without these bums. " 
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Whilst the latter stated that, 
"growing ecological environmental awareness is one of the manifestations of 
the democratisation of society and a key factor of perstroik-a ... We must 
welcome this in every way possible. " 118 
The two statements emphasise elite attitudes towards the relationship between 
politics and environmentalism. The latter clearly recognised participation in 
environmental issues as symptomatic of a wider nascent civil society. 
Environmentalism was tolerated as it was not perceived as a challenge to the 
power base of the Communist Party. Official tolerance of environmentalism was 
also an acknowledgement that "the degradation of national areas which people 
identify with their national dignity, aggravates relations between ethnic groups. "' 19 
As with other aspects of gla. 5nost, the Centre found, however, it was unable to 
control the development and direction of environmentalism. It proved an effective 
critique of the system, as "[t]he destruction of nature ... epitomised everything 
that was wrong with Soviet development, Soviet economics, and the Soviet state 
itself, and these great injustices against nature were obvious and ease focuses for 
action. " IN Environmental and nationalist movements in Central Asia draw upon 
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the exploitative nature of centre-periphery relations. 12 ' This sense of outrage was 
reinforced by what was perceived as Moscow's pro-Russian stance, chiefly 
centred upon the status of the RSFSR and Russians within the USSR, and the 
"continuation" of Tsarist colonisation of Central Asia under the Soviet aegis. 
Environmental and economic policy decisions endorsed this perception. The core 
incidents were the degradation of Central Asia's water courses, and related cotton 
agriculture and desiccation of the Aral Sea, and nuclear weapons testing at 
Semipalatinsk. The Cotton Affair investigations, the cancellation of the Sibaral 
water diversion project in 1986, and the different government policies over 
development and conservation around the Aral Sea and Lake Baikal further 
engendered this view. 122 The Sibaral Project was a proposal to re-direct Siberian 
waters to replenish Central Asia's rivers. For over two decades, Moscow had 
promised that the region's water deficit, a result of centrally planned cotton 
production, would be rectified by diverted Siberian waters. 123 This was never 
fulfilled. The plan was shelved primarily for economic reasons, although Russian 
nationalist-environmental objections were also acknowledged. 124 Cancellation was 
regarded by Central Asia's nationalists and republican elites as an attempt by 
Moscow to placate Russian interests, whilst pressing economic, environmental 
and health problems in Central Asia remained unresolved and an affront to 
supposed equality in the USSR. 
Whilst Moscow had benefited economically from the distorted and destructive 
development of Central Asia, the region and its inhabitants bore the brunt of its 
costs: environmental degradation; water shortages and pollution; unskilled menial 
labour; and related health problems including high rates of infant mortality, 
respiratory illnesses, and typhoid, for example, without receiving any significant 
material benefits. 125 
The sense of nationalist affront was further enhanced by Moscow's accusation 
that the region's elites and traditions were solely to blame for the environmental 
and economic crisis. 126 The local nomenklatura were accused of "fulfilling the 
cotton plan at all CoStS. ))127 During Gorbachev's visit to the Uzbek SSF, the First 
Secretary informed his audience that their sacrifice was compensated by inter- 
republican trade, but the SSR's inability to feed its own residents was purely its 
own "fault" without acknowledging the fact that the mono-culture was directed 
by MOSCOW. 128 The survival (perczhitki) of traditional (i. e. Islamic and feudal) 
customs and practices, including large families were also cited as reasons for 
Central Asia's poor economic development and environmental conditions. "9 One 
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of the customs criticised was the size of Central Asian families. It was 
recommended that Central Asian women prone to illness should "refrain from 
pregnancies for 3 to 4 years so their systems could recover and their future 
children can be healthier. " 130 Given the late-Soviet centre's concern over the 
change in the population balance in favour of the Muslim component, such 
statements were not perceived as wholly altruistic. 
In the Uzbek SSF, cotton became a useful nationalist-political weapon against the 
MOSCOW. 13 1 As well as the negative ecological, economic and health 
consequences of the cotton agriculture, the Uzbek leadership perceived the 
investigations into the manipulation of harvest figures as an attempt to re-assert 
the centre's authority over the industry and SSR. In the Kazak SSF, the Virgin 
Lands scheme and nuclear testing were symbolic of the destruction of the nomads 
pastoral lands. 
Social-political movements were able to draw sustenance from these and other 
environmental-economic issues. Two of the most influential political movements 
of the period, Nevada- Semipalatinsk (now known as Nevada-Semey) and Birlik, 
in the Kazak and Uzbek SSR, respectively, were closely associated with 
environmentalism. The Nevada- Semipalatinsk movement was founded in 1989 as 
a pressure group, by the poet Olzhas Suleimenov, against nuclear testing at the 
Polygon proving ground near Semipalatinsk. It also campaigned over other issues 
including industrial pollution and agricultural land degradation. (Also see 
4.1 Lii. a) Birlik's platfon-n was more explicitly nationalist. It campaigned for 
Uzbek to become the republic's official language, sovereignty, as well as 
opposing environmentally destructive economic developments in the SSR. 
The understandable and legitimate environmental and nationalist criticism of the 
Soviet system, were highly compatible. The former was instrumental in advancing 
the latter. As a nationalist instrument, environmental activism had considerable 
value and provided a front for nationalist ambitions. "In several cases it was clear 
from the very beginning that environmental concerns [were] never ... essential. 
" 132 
During the 1980s, the two were frequently indistinguishable and mutually 
reinforcing. 133 
Both provided a nuclei for popular mobilisation but were often exclusive and 
hostile in character and objective. The environment was used in a distinctly 
exclusive manner in order to promote nationalist objectives. Although this was 
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particularly directed against the centre, it was also targeted against other 
indigenous and settler groups. Demonstrations were organised in the Uzbekistani 
section of the Fergana Valley by the titular group against pollution from the 
aluminium smelting plant in Isfara, Tajikistan. The issue was articulated along 
ethnic lines, with the activists accusing Dushanbe and the plant managers of 
polluting Uzbek villages. 134 According to KGB sources, Mirobobo Mirrakhamov, 
a TaJik nationalist, blamed non-TaJiks for all the republic's ills including 
environmental destruction. 13' As Ziegler notes, "[g]reen politics, frequently 
praised as direct democracy unmediated through hierarchical organisations, 
dovetails easily with the populist politics of nationalism. " 136 The two objectives 
share common traits, both are emotionally charged and related to questions of 
identity and territoriality. Rather than provided the basis for civil society, 
environmental activism reinforced the centrifugal tendencies in late-Soviet 
Politics. 137 
These characteristics were clearly demonstrated in group resource-competition 
during the 1980s. These events can be viewed in the broader context of the ethno- 
stratification of resources and the ongoing struggle for control of these including 
land and water. Sporadic conflict between Kyrgyzs of Batken and Tajiks of Isfara, 
between 1982 and 1991, was associated with "shortages of land and [a] deficit of 
water, " strong group-territory affiliation and the forced settlement of the 
Kyrgyzs. 138 Inter-ethnic violence in Osh oblast in 1989 had some similar features 
to that of the Kyrgyz-Tajik case. Conflict between Tajiks and Uzbeks in 
Samarkand oblast in 1987, was also linked to land disputes. 
13' The individual 
incidents of late-Soviet resource conflict in the region are discussed in detail 
below as part of the assessment of the present situation. (See 4.1 O. H. ) 
A common theme in the communal violence in Central Asia was the influence of 
Soviet modernisation policies including sedenatarisation and collectivisation. 
Tishkov argues that these created and institutionalised rivalries. 140 Already settled 
groups, were now forced to share resources with "recently" settled groups. 
Competition became acute as both parties now required the same resources for 
the same use, sedentary agriculture. 
By the collapse of the USSR, environmental activism had functioned effectively 
on several levels: (nationalist and non-nationalist) grassroots opposition to 
environmental degradation and exploitation; inter-ethnic competition for land, 
153 
water and other economic resources; and as a conduit for nationalist and 
republican elite challenges to Moscow's authority. 
4.9. Assessing the Potential for Environmental-Related 
Conflict in Contemporarv Central Asia 
With the exception of "the kolkhozes war" between the Kulyabis and deported 
Garmis clans in the Kurgan Teppa, in Tajikistan 1992, which was linked to land 
competition, open resource conflict has been absent since independence, and the 
aggressive nexus between environmentalism and nationalism has declined in 
political saliency. 141 Sources of potential environmental conflict have not, 
however, been resolved. In fact, the post-Soviet scenario is probably more 
precarious due to a complex of environmental, political, economic and social 
factors. The environmental-nationalist linkage has only been superficially and 
temporarily suspended. AM indicators suggest that water scarcity is increasing, 
environmental degradation continuing, sustainable development programmes 
inadequate and the economic and political milieu are not conducive to 
environmental reforms. Political debate, particularly in Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan, has been curtailed, without. the fundamental problems being 
addressed. This has case serious implications for regional water management and 
relations between the two republics. 
The following discussion on water security will examine the 1991-6 situation 
through a combination of statistical evidence and the subjective factors of 
economics and politics, for both inter- and intra-state disputes. 
154 
Xd x x 
' A 
w 
0 00 
00 
CN I'D 4 't In 
M 
-r_ 
00 Cf) 
= m ci C, - = 
= M Cý rllý Oý, Clt C'ý r- 00 
CN Cl) 
el 
C4 
, ý tn CN ýr 'IT \0 t- r- r- tf) m 
ý cl C14 
Is 1-1 0 
cl 
- 
0 
m % 
. 14 :7 j 
q- 
old td ft - 
I I I 
- 
I i 
kr) 
k4r) 
x x x x >0 x x Y, X 
x >1 >0 x x x x 
4 
c, CD m 
rn 
(14 
W) 
W) 
m 
CIA 
-t 
-T 
CD 
0 00 ON 
CD 
0 , 00 
C-A 
00 
c7N 
cs , 
(c) ON 
00 
C'4 
CD 
m 
--ý 
t- 
eq 
m 
00 CD 
00 
00 
as 
C) C14 
cn 
C> 
r- 
CD 
110 r4 - t- m 
00 
ON 
C) 
W) 
-tl 
O'ý 
C4 
00 
11' 
12ý 
C, 
cn 
C4 
clý ON 
\0 C) 
"'ý 00 
CN 
Ir 
17ý \0 
N 
0 
"ý 
W-1 
00 
Gl% 
V) 
C) 
00 
00 Cl) r" 00 Ile - C14 W) 00 (:, ý (-4 m C-ý C'n 
10 
cl 
ý 
1. 
CN 
00 C) C'4 0 C14 C14 r- C14 
t- 
cs 
q1t 
- 
m 
m 
\0 
ý10 
t- 
clq 
ýt 00 \0 m 
04 
t Cý t- 
C7% 
- 00 
- 
- 
ýr 
Cl) 
00 
") 
t- 
m 
r- 
N 
ýr 
M 
IC 
C14 
(c) 
M 
00 
- 
ýr 
C, 4 
") 
-T 
ýn 
- 
ýr 
- 
= 
V\ 
0\ 
14 
%D 
cli 
-, T 
C\ 
W') 
C'4 
- 
C\ 
t- 
ON 
C\ 
C-4 
00 m 
C% 
t- 
00 
til 
V) 
\10 
C-4 
cq 
Ci 
ýo 
m 
\0 
C\ 
a\ 
cq 00 
W) 
00 
Q\ 
t- 
00 
W) 
\0 
Wý 1; 
ed 
iX4 ý F.., M 
\O 
x X, 
x X, 
tn 
- 00 00 - C-4 ON CN CN 
J 
en 
ON en CN CN ON ON CN 
C'4 C14 
r- 
i C, VI til 00 
0*1 
W 
r- = 
00 
.o 
Cn M 
wl 
Tt, %0 00 
CD 
C-ý 
0 
m ýo cq \0 m ým tf) 00 00 -t ýo 0 \., D - - 
ci 
t- 
m 
W) 
00 
ý.: 
%I,, m 0% 0 C14 
"It 
tf) 
00 
ý \0 -t tl- r- \D 00 m 00 (0 t- 
ft 
= 
= 
r- 
IýD 
00 
\D - m 
00 
m 
\0 
00 
t- 
W 
r- 
X 
0 
0 
0 
CD 
0 
0 C14 ttl C7, C, (ON te) r- 
0 CD 0 1- 
00 oc 't 0 C\ C) eq in 
ý6 cpý C4 06 u 1 00 
j 
CN 
00 00 CD C\ \0 C14 
til - Til C) 
Cl) C4) en 
CS 00 
r- (:: ) co) C14 tn I- tr) 
,am ft C\ ft 
00 
Cý , cli 
Cl! 
(ON 
C14 
cq 
tn 
00 
olý 
CN 
75 
m 
5, 
42 
(12 
C. ) 
ul 
0. 
iz 
ý- 0 
bý 
r oý 1 u 
1 
c2 = . O\ N- ý- 
< 
;.: Z ý- 
r d r_ Z _ - 00 < "2 
": Z e 
cz 
cu 
-r- 
vi 
CD ": t: ' 
ýcý 
ci < U c> ö\ c, , 
"C 
= 
r_ 
-2 
0 
Z 
cN 
- \ZD 
- Iti .2 Z Z vý U cz c5 cl. C 
vi 
im 
b. 
u > u e Z cl m 0 
i3 
cu 
<L, 
.5 < vi 1- < 
cu ce 
M = 
ect 
-0 < Z 
rz 
?Z r- 1. (L) 
m 2 tn - t4 e i-ý, r- 
.0 2 
cn eu 2ý :k . %-, IM - . 5 te 
N 
-ci e: ' CD. 
t) L- '4ý 
Z 
Z) 
- 
U M < j 
EI = - ce CA 
cý 
tA -y . 
Z 
r. ý 0 CZ 2 
t) . (1) > 
U2 J-- 
kn CZ :: Z 
ký 
Q) 
"0 
r= 
LZ 
cu ri 
0 u 
0 
Ici 2 u En E, U V 3 
cu 0 
,= u Z 
" M vý 
ý-4 
, - < 2 c 0 
0 
0 
ul 
C' 
A cursory initial review of water statistics for Central Asia based upon Smith's 
research gives an initially benign outlook for regional water security. (See Table 
4.1. ) Smith's work, drawing upon Glieck's water scarcity indices, is useful as a 
starting point to indicate whether the region is facing a serious water crisis and 
provide a comparison between Central Asia and other water vulnerable regions, 
such as the Nile and Jordan basins. It attempts to construct a comprehensive 
oblast level breakdown of water vulnerability in the Aral Sea Basin. 
This is, however, problematic. It is unclear how the water figures were 
constructed and fails to indicate whether the figures used for individual provinces 
are based upon the whole river, or specific to the individual province. Returned 
and re-used waters make it difficult to establish accurate figures at the intra-basin 
level, thus weakening any assessment solely based upon statistics. The use of 
returned water has both positive and negative consequences. It allows for multiple 
withdrawals and therefore increased efficiency but returned waters are frequently 
contaminated, thus providing a depleted resource for downstream users. Intra- 
basin figures must therefore be used with caution, although those for the Aral Sea 
basin and complete drainage systems can be employed with greater certainty. 
They do, however, provide an initial foundation for assessing water conflict which 
is as dependent upon subjective factors as much as resource scarcity or 
inequitable distribution. The incorporation of the political context, as studied by 
Naff and Matson, will enhance the examination beyond the "simplistic 
environmental determinism" that Homer-Dixon is concerned about. An approach 
which recognises and records the different uses of water, domestic, irrigation, 
industry, as well as, the excessive use and wastage prevalent in Central Asian 
water allocation, is required. With greater detail on the indices and the 
incorporation of subjective considerations the prognosis becomes more 
pessimistic. 
4.9. i. Degree of Scarcity: 
' 
The degree of scarcity has to be seen as relative rather 
than absolute. Annual average water supply would initially suggest that at the 
region, and at a state level, none of the Central Asian states hav been subject to 
immediate water crisis. Water availability is above the UN minimum 
recommended for development. Table 4.1. indicates that the regional average per 
capita figure in the period was three times above the 1000 m3 per person UN 
recommendation for development, at 3170.3 m3 /person/p. a. Uzbekistan had the 
3 lowest state average, at of 5,215 m /per person/p. a. This was still five time above 
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the recommended UN minimum. Similarly the only province to had a total water 
supply below 1000 m3 /per person/p. a. is Jizzak, in Uzbekistan. 
Smith's simple population-supply equation has resulted in his conclusion that the 
republics "at present appear to have sufficient total water supplies per person. " 142 
In the case of Central Asia, blanket water availability per capita figures has failed 
to recognise intra-state sector distribution, wastage and contamination of what is 
essentially an adequate supply. 83% of water is allocated to irrigation agriculture, 
whilst domestic consumption is only 13% of total water used in Uzbekistan. 143 
(See Table 4.2. ) Irrigation has seriously depleted the quantity and quality of what 
is essentially an adequate and sustainable water supply, for other users. The 
problem is not that there has not enough water but rather the manner it has been 
allocated and managed. Turkmenistan, for example, in fact has enough water but 
these figures failed to recognise water lost to seepage and contamination, and the 
poor quality of available water quality. 144 Cotton production per tonne in 
Turkmenistan required a supply three times that used by Israel's cotton 
production. 14' Domestic consumption was 1% of total water used in the republic. 
This highlights the problem of attempting to quantify security threats. By 2025, 
estimated population growth will reduce water availability in the Aral Sea Basin 
to approximately 1900 in 3 /person/p. a. 146 
Scarcity does become apparent when water availability is examined through the 
Annual Water Demand: Annual Renewable Water Availability ratio. In Glieck's 
global survey, prior to the collapse of the USSR, 17 states had withdrawal rates 
above 50%, nine above 100%. Whilst it is not possible to provide complete data 
for individual Central Asian republics, water uses as a percentage and the ratios 
for the Aral Sea basin and Central Asia river inflows and withdraw information is 
available. Surface water diversion: Inflow for the river basins are recorded in Table 
4.2. 
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Table 4.2. Water Use By River Basins 
Supply Demand p. a. Demand as % of 
Available Water 
Total Water Water (a) (b) 
Water withdraw consumed 
Available n (km3) (km3) 
p. a. (a) (b) 
(km3) 
Amu Darya 81.80 61.61 36.25 75.3 44.3 
(including 
Zeravshan) 
a Kara Kum 0.55 13.86 6.69 2520 1216 
12 13.86 6.69 115 55.8 
Syr Darya 44.10 56.51 35.16 127.2 70.7 
Aral Sea Basin 126.45 131.98 78.10 104 61.7 
Central Asia bc 1 139.75 134.3 1 79.2 96.1 57 
'The first figure does not include water withdrawn from the Amu Darya. 
b Including ground water. 
'Central Asian Drainage Basin total of Amu Darya, Syr Darya Kara-Kum Canal, 
Lake Issyk-Kul and Caspian Sea east coast. 
ze 
Basin Characteristics & Sources: Micklin, P. Table 2. Central Asia: Drainag 
Table 3. Central Asia: Water Use by Sector in 1980 op cit., pp. 99,100- 1. 
Table 4.2. indicates that as a region the Aral Sea Basin is water vulnerable. On 
both rivers demand has been above 44%, in terms of withdrawals and more 
significantly consumptive rates. The Syr Darya and Kara Kum have been 
particularly vulnerable. Additional surface water withdrawals are highly probable, 
given population growth and industrial expansion. These place further pressure on 
the resource and the situation is predicted to become worse in the near future. 147 
4.9. H. Source and Distribution of Water: The external sourcing of water is the 
key to whether water scarcity is liable to result in conflict. Whilst regionally, the 
sense of competition and crisis is not explicitly demonstrated by the above indices, 
this is not the case with this index. All the river systems are shared between at 
least two states. Amu Darya and Syr Darya both cross four states. 
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With the exception of Tajikistan at least 50% of the water supplies for the Aral 
Sea basin states and southern Kazakstani oblasts was extra-republican in source. 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan had nearly total dependency upon external-sourced 
water. 
Sub-state water requirements was even more acute. Whilst all the provinces with 
the exception of Jizzak, had total available water supplies above I 000M 3 /per 
person/p. a. Table 4.1. indicates the precarious nature of this supply. Of the 30 
Central Asian provinces, 18 (60%) had indigenous supplies below the 1000m 3 
mark, and ten provinces (33%) had an indigenous available supply below 200rr?. 
22 of the provinces derived at least 50% of their supply from external sources. 
None of Turkmenistan's provinces had indigenous water supplies and with the 
exception of Jizzak viloyet, all of Uzbekistan's provinces water supplies were 
externally sourced, to levels of between 71% to 100% of total supply. JiZzak 
indigenous- dominated water supply was only total 385mý person/p. a. Although 
some of the region's oblasts were supplied from within the same republic, given 
the evidence of past intra-state competition and conflict this in itself does not 
suggest water competition will be easily managed domestically. "' 
The perception of being held hostage by upstream parties, or inequitable 
distribution of these shared supplies, transfers water competition from simple 
scarcity to political disputes. 
4.9. iii. Reliance on HEP[Direct Economic Value of Riverine Water: In "many 
and regions ... 
irrigation agriculture is an economic mainstay, with water, 
therefore, being an essential ingredient for economic stability. "149 As a measure of 
vulnerability, reliance upon on HEP production (as a percentage of total 
electricity supply) is ambivalent in Central Asia. In Central Asia, this index should 
be broadened to include other economic activities directly based upon fresh water 
supplies and acknowledge the political context of regional BEP production. 
Over 50% of both Kyrgystan and Tajikistans' electricity production has been 
generated by HEP. 150 They have not been confronted by water shortages but by 
political pressure from downstream states. Their use of HEP would be 
considerably larger if it were not for the continuation of cotton-driven water 
policies, instigated by Moscow, which favour downstream irrigation demands. 
Existing Central Asian HEP figures, therefore, fail to acknowledge these states' 
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unequal relations with downstream neighbours, and the significance of the latter's 
irrigation-based agricultural economies. Attempts by the two republics to increase 
HEP production alarmed Kazakstan and Uzbekistan. The latter threatened to 
destroy Kyrgyz dams, although this was not converted into action. 
Table 4.3. Electricity Production by HEP as 
a Percentage of Total Electricity Produced 
Republic Total 
Kazakstan <25% 
Kyrgyzstan >50% 
Tajikistan >75% 
Turkmenistan 0% 
Uzbekistan <50% 
Central Asia c35% 
Source: Klbtzli, S. Table 3. Importance of Hydropower in Aral Sea Basin 
(number of t)ower Diants for differina catep-ories of electricitv vroduction t)er 
yeaE) "The Water and Soil Crisis in Central Asia -A Source for Future 
Conflicts? " ENCOP Occasional Paper, No 11, Center for Security Policy and 
Conflict Research/Swiss Peace Foundation, Zurich/Berne, May 1994. 
The nexus between nationalism, development and water management is well 
illustrated by the issue of HER Post-independence Slav emigration saw the 
temporary closure of half of Uzbekistan's Syr Darya HEP plants because of the 
exodus of trained staff. "' Individual perceptions of personal security must be 
incorporated into state development and security. This incident also adds a ffirther 
and subjective dimension to Glieck and Smiths' more quantative-based 
approaches. 152 
As Table 4.4. indicates, irrigation has remained the largest water consumer. 
Further demands from actual and proposed industrial developments, irrigation 
plans and demographic growth, will affect the ratio of withdrawals as well as 
absolute withdrawals. 
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Table 4.4. Water Used by Sector 1990 M 
Irrigation Industry Domestic 
Kazakstan N/A N/A N/A 
Kyrgyzstan 90 7 3 
Tajikistan 90 5 4 
Turkmenistan 88 11 1 
Uzbekistan 83 13 4 
Aral Sea Basin 88 191 3 
Source: Smith, DR. Table 2 Water Use by Central Asian Republics 1990 (million 
m) op cit., p 357. Informatsentr Goskomstata SSSR, Okhrana oknizhaytishchey 
sredy i ratsional'noye ispol'zovaniye priodnykh resursov, Goskomstata SSSR, 
Moscow, 199 1, pp. 80-86; Gleason, G. Water and Land Conflict among the Neiv 
States of Central Asia, Analytical Brief of a Project Report for the National 
Council on Soviet and East European Research, Contract No 806-13,1992; 
World Bank, Tajikistan: A World Bank Country Study, International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development, Washington D. C. 1994, p 104. 
This broader analysis of water indicates that it is not the HEP states that have 
been most dependent upon water for economic survival, or vulnerable to water 
scarcity. Rather this is the situation the cotton producers, Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan, have been confronted by. 
Although it is difficult to quantify the broader economic value of water accurately, 
90% of the region's crop production has come from irrigated land. "' Cotton has 
been the leading GDP and employment provider for Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan. Cotton production employed 44% of Turkmenistan's workforce in 
1991 and was responsible for 76% of Uzbekistan's hard currency revenue. "4 
Even Levy's strict definition of a security threat that it must be directly 
detrimental to a "vital national interesf', allows water to be regarded as such for 
these two republics. "' 
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4.9. iv. Relative Power of Riparian Parties: In terms of economic, military and 
political strength, the riparian states can be divided into three groups: Kazakstan 
and Uzbekistan; Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan; and Turkmenistan. Ajthough both 
Kazakstan and Uzbekistan are powerful downstream states, the strategic 
importance of water to the two republics has been very different. In most "crude" 
analyses of water politics, upstream Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan would be regarded 
as relatively powerful due to their upstream positions. This, however, ignores the 
more significant non-water issues. 
Turkmenistan's position has been highly constrained. 98% of its water supply has 
been exterally sourced from the Amu Darya, the Kara Kum Canal, Atrek and 
Murgab which rise in Afghanistan, and the Tedjen from Iran. Economically, 
cotton production, a copious user of water, has dominated GDP earnings and 
employment. Turkmenistan' upstream neighbour, Uzbekistan, has dwarfed it 
demographically, economically, militarily and as international actor. The latter is 
partially a consequence of Ashgabat's neutral if not isolationist stance. External 
control of both its principal water supplies may fuel Ashgabat's sense of 
insecurity. The uncertainties of the Afghanistan war also poses problems for 
Turkmenistan in the near-future. 156 
The question of relative strength of the parties can also be directed to sub-state 
competition, Centre-periphery relations and ethno-politics influence this situation. 
Kazakstan's irrigated regions of Shymkent and Qyzlorda, and Karakalpakstan 
Autonomous Republic (AR) in Uzbekistan have depended totally upon extra- 
oblast waters and lacked political influence in their relations with the centre. (See 
below 4.1 O. H. c. for Karakalpakstan) 
4.10. Water and the Potential for Conflict 
4.10j. The Potential for Interstate Conflict: Interstate relations between the 
republics have beeen infused, but not solely determined by, the issue of water. 
Power relations between Kazakstan and Uzbekistan on the one hand, and 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, on other, were unequal. In reality, the upstream states 
have been in a far weaker position than an initial examination would suggest. 
Whilst only 1% of Kyrgyzstan's water originated from outside of the republic, like 
Tajikistan, it was unable to use its water in the most economically beneficial 
manner due to the continued cotton optimum policy. Uzbekistan's economic and 
military involvement in Ta ikistan strengthened its already strong position. i 
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Conflict along the Syr Darya is far less likely to emerge than between the Amu 
Darya riparians. This is because the Syr Darya has been a more marginal 
economic resource for its littoral. states when compared to the larger, southern 
river and its riparian. 
In terms of water vulnerability, the situation of Kazakstan and Uzbekistan were 
distinctly different. Consequently, their political responses to water issues have 
been different as is the likelihood of their future involvement in inter-state water 
conflict. At the state level, Kazakstan has not been vulnerable to water-related 
problems. Geographically and strategically, northern Kazakstan has been excluded 
from the water-conflict debate. Whilst Kazakstan has had its own "domestic" 
environmental and water problems, and the southern oblasts relied upon externally 
sourced water, nationally water has not been regarded as a scarce strategic 
resource, as it has been for Uzbekistan. Although Shymkent and Qyzlorda have 
relied upon extra-republican water, the majority of Kazakstan's total available 
water has been sourced indigenously or from Siberian rivers. In contrast, the 
percentage of extra-republican derived water for Uzbekistan was 91% of total 
water available. During the period of study Almaty regarded water distribution as 
an internal problem. Intra-republican re-distribution was seen as the prime means 
of resolving the southern oblasts' water requirements. "Water resources should be 
available for the whole republic. If somewhere in the republic water is lacking, we 
should have the right to allocate water to where it is needed. " 157 Only 17.5% of 
Kazakstan's exports, by profit, were cotton related. 118 (See 4.1 I. H. for 
Kazakstan's environmental security concerns. ) 
Uzbekistan's water requirements, and political and economic significance, have 
been and will continue to be central to the entire region's stability. For Uzbekistan 
water has been a strategic resource and cotton a vital economic activity. The 
republic has been confronted by water-related inter-state tensions with both its 
upstream and downstream neighbours, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, and 
. Turkmenistan, respectively. 
Competition between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan on the one hand, and Kazakstan 
and Uzbekistan on the other has resulted primarily from their different 
requirements and capabilities. The upstream states, whose mountain reservoirs 
store and regulate water flow, require large quantities of water, primarily in 
winter, for HEP, and have relatively small irrigated lands. During the Soviet 
period this integrated agricultural, industrial and power policy, was to some 
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extent mutually beneficial. The power needs of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan were 
compensated by Kazak SSR and Uzbek SSR produced electricity. The upstream 
states' economic development was, and remains, subservient to the needs of their 
more powerful neighbours, enshrined in Soviet-instigated water allocation quotas. 
The present water management body, the Interstate Co-ordinating Water 
Commission (ICCW), has allocated supplies based upon these historical patterns. 
(See 4.12. i.. for discussion of the institutional framework. ) 
Relations between Uzbekistan and its upstream neighbours have remained tense, 
however. In 1995, after Kyrgyzstan used water allocated for cotton for domestic 
energy production, an agreement was reached between Bishkek and Tashkent. 
Under this, Kyrgyzstan was to maintain a "cotton optimal" policy, even though its 
winter water reserves were low and Uzbekistan was to provide electricity to its 
neighbour. Kyrgyzstan stated it would have preferred hard currency transactions 
for the reciprocal trade of water and electricity but had to accept a barter 
arrangement. '" Kyrgyzstan plans to terminate the existing Soviet water use 
principle of 1981 in 201 0.160 Kyrgyzstan which spends $4 billion p. a. to maintain 
its reservoirs, does not believe that it has received equitable economic benefits 
from this framework. 161 
Attempts by the upstream states to re-allocate the existing water quotas and 
increase their own irrigation agriculture were countered by Kazakstan and 
Uzbekistan. One report claims that Uzbekistan threatened to use military force to 
seize the Toktogul dam on the Kyrgyzstani section of the Syr Darya, if the latter 
attempted to alter the existing distribution policy. 162 Previously, elements in 
Tajikistan discussed the idea of using the Syr Darya as "an offensive weapon in 
any territorial dispute with Uzbekistan. " 163 It is unlikely that these threats would 
have been enacted as the collateral damage would have been non-specific, even 
counter-productive. It does, however, illustrate the political milieu in which 
confidence and mutual guarantees are absent. 
During talks on water allocation in January 1996, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan 
proposed to expand their irrigated lands. Uzbekistan was able to force the former 
to retract its proposal, but not Tajikistan's plan for a 200,000 ha. expansion. 
Previously, Tajikistan had also expressed an interest in withdrawing an additional 
600 million nO p. a. from the upper reaches of the Zeravshan. 164 It has been 
suggested by a Tajik RFE correspondent, that water tensions hampered good 
Tajikistan-Uzbekistani relations, specifically citing an agreement between 
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Mghanistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, which excluded Uzbekistan. 165 
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan have not as yet established a bilateral agreement over 
shared water resources. 166 
Smith argues that the potential for Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan conflict "seems to be 
high. " 167 This has not taken place to date and the author would argue that near- 
term conflict is unlikely because of non-water factors. Whilst the present situation 
is not ideal nor liable to maintain long-term stability, it is unlikely that either 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan would be able to use the threat or implementation of 
military action in their disputes with Uzbekistan over water. The constraints on 
the upstream states has been apparent to Kyrgyzstan's politicians. The opposition 
figure, Doonbek Sadyrbayev recognised the limited choices the republic has had 
when bargaining with Uzbekistan. He has stated that, "if the Uzbeks want to play 
rough there are a hundred ways they can make sure life is difficult including the 
cutting of winter electricity supplies or raising export tariffs. ""' However, 
Kyrgyzstan's Deputy Prime Nfinister, Karimsher Abdimunov, believes that "the 
matter [water pricing] will be resolved in a civilized way. " 169 
Kazakstan has criticised Kyrgyzstan for withholding water for HEP use and 
water-pricing suggestions. 170 Although beyond the time span of this study, Almaty 
has also criticised Uzbekistan's reduction by 70% the flow of the Druzhba Canal, 
which supplies 100,000 hectares in the southern Kazakstan. "" This saw localised 
Kazak protests, showing the potential for communal tension along the borders. 
Negotiations resulted in a limited increase from this new quota. Kazakstan, 
however, is not solely dependent upon these supplies and it is unlikely that 
Kazakstan would seek to escalate these disputes. 172 
At present it appears unlikely that the status quo will be seriously challenged. The 
water demands of the more powerful downstream states have been met at the 
expense of the upstream riparians' demands. The downstream states, as yet, do 
not have to pay for water, whilst the upstream states are responsible for the 
financial burden of maintaining the reservoirs and dams. 
The second zone of potential conflict is the lower Amu Darya, between 
Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. Water distribution has been central to 
Turkmenistan-Uzbekistan relations. The republics are the two largest cotton 
producers in the FSU, the industry being the major employer in both. The 
establishment of international borders divided water resources on the lower Amu 
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Darya between Dashhowuz viloyet in Turkmenistan, and Khorazm viloyet and the 
Karakalpakstan AR in Uzbekistan. Inter-state hostilities are more likely in this 
region and Smith claims this "may be the single most serious regional resource- 
related dispute. " 173 The reasons for this prognosis are: the more equitable balance 
between the two states; the taut personal relationship between presidents Karimov 
and Niyazov; the economic significance of irrigation agriculture; and the near total 
dependency upon the Amu Darya to supply both states. 
Since independence Turkmenistan and Uzbekistans' political relations have been 
tense. Water has been elevated from a political dispute to a potential cause of 
conflict, re-emphasising Gleick's and Marawi's views that the political context in 
which water disputes are discussed, determines whether it can be settled in a 
negotiated manner or via force. Border and water disputes between the two 
capitals have heightened the stress levels between the capitals. 17' The political 
rivalry between two leaders, both of whom have promoted authoritarian 
leadership styles and their states as self-reliant regionally-significant actors, have 
restricted the potential for compromise. Unlike Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan has 
followed a neutral, isolationist approach. This stance in which multilateral 
organisations "shall not infringe upon our [Turkmenistan's] sovereignty" seems 
rather naive. 17' Turkmenistan's ability to independent action has not resolved its 
water difficulties. The two presidents did not met each other until 16 January 
1996, in response to border tensions of the previous year. 176 This was five years 
after the collapse of the USSR. At this meeting water management was discussed, 
and a border-protection agreement signed. 177 Niyazov's antipathy to Karimov's 
appointment as head of the International Aral Sea Salvation Fund hindered the 
organisation's Almaty summit, in February 1997.178 
Military tensions along the Bukhara-Lebap border were recorded during late- 
1995, and water may have been the source of this situation. 179 A Russian 
newspaper reported that there are Uzbekistani contingency plans for the 
occupation of north-eastern Turkmenistan. "0 The alleged plan does little to 
establish confidence between the two states. 
Smith argues that if Turkmenistan continues to extend the Tuyamauvun Canal, 
westward of Dashhowuz, this increased water diversion could "further heighten 
[regional] tensions. ""' The political and environmental disputes between these 
states are intertwined and suggest that co-operation between them will be difficult 
to achieve. Without mutual trust and cooperation, however, water disputes will 
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not be resolved. Kangas has stated that peaceful relations with Turkmenistan 
would allow Uzbekistan to "concentrate on the more pressing problems in 
Tajikistan. 1)182 The resolution of Turkmenistan-Uzbekistan water disputes would 
ease Tashkent's regional commitments. It is debatable whether this can be 
achieved, and to what extent Tashkent wishes to see a stable Tajikistan, as the 
war is to some extent fuelled by Uzbekistan. 
A final variable for the Amu-Darya system is the eventual outcome of the wars in 
Afghanistan and TaJikistan. The political attitudes, economic development and 
foreign policies of the post-settlement governments are presently unclear. 
According to 1985 figures, Afghanistan withdrew only 1.5 km 
3 p. a. from the Amu 
Darya, 2.2% of the river's annual flow. 18' As the republic covers 23 % of the Amu 
Darya basin, and also is the location of the Murgab headstream, potential post- 
conflict expansion in withdrawals will have inevitable consequences for 
downstream states. Given that total expenditure of the river already outstrips 
inflow by 3.16 km3/p. a., any resumption in normal economic activity in northern 
Afghanistan would place further pressure on the system. 184 In 1978, the World 
Bank reported that the Amu Darya could provide Afghanistan with half of the 
republic's HEP potential, but only through joint projects with other riparians. 
During the occupation, Soviet authorities restricted Afghanistan's HEP and 
irrigation schemes in order to favour downstream Soviet users. Projects 
established in this period were integrated into the Soviet Central Asian 
infrastructure. '85 Afghanistan has not been party to any regional water sharing 
agreements, although unconfirmed reports indicate that negotiations between 
Afghanistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan have been held. 186 The World Bank has 
voiced concern over the exclusion of Kabul form international water 
agreements. 187 Similarly, peace and economic stabilisation of Ta ikistan will see 
increased water withdrawals and implications for regional allocations. 
4.10ji. The Potential for Sub- and Trans-State Conflict: Water competition 
has greater security significance at the trans- and sub-state levels. Smith used 
population growth, population density, per capita water availability and ratio of 
water externally sourced to rank the Aral Sea Basin provinces for potential water- 
related conflict. In addition, this thesis recognises the need to incorporate the 
direct economic reliance on water and ethnic composition of the provinces into 
this assessment. 
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According to Smith's indices there has been a wide variation in provincial water 
vulnerability. The ten provinces with the most acute water problems were 
Andijon, Bukhara, Karakalpakstan, Khorazm, Namangan, Samarkand, 
Sukhandarya and Sirdarya, (all in Uzbekistan), Khatlon (the merged Kurgan- 
Tiube and Kulyab provinces, Tajikistan) and Ahal (Turkmenistan). The regions of 
acute inter-state water-tension are also those most liable to sub-/trans-state 
disputes. 
The identification between ethnicity and territory has been most accentuated in 
Uzbekistan. The republic has lacked significant indigenous control of its water 
supply, whilst containing Kyrgyz and Tajik minorities, whose eponymous 
republics control Uzbekistan's water sources. Eight of the ten regions, which 
Smith cited as those with the highest water vulnerability, were in Uzbekistan, and 
two of the four most vulnerable were in the Fergana Valley. 188 
4.10. ii. a. The Fergana Valley: The Fergana Valley has already VAtnessed inter- 
ethnic conflict for resources. The aggregate of a burgeoning, dense and 
heterogeneous population, important but ailing industries, and the region's 
contested division between three newly sovereign states could make water a near- 
term political problem. It is interesting to note that three of the four disputed 
areas of irredentism and/or the subject of territorial claim in the Valley, discussed 
in a 1992 Nezavisimaya gazeta article have also been subject to environmental 
resource competition. "9 The three are Isfara-Batken border, the Zeravshan river 
basin and Osh oblast. (See Map 4.2) 
Unequal resource access and population growth, Homer-Dixon suggests, leads to 
migration which due to the influx of migrants, increases environmental pressure in 
the host region. This author suggests that non-migratory growth can create similar 
problems. The components for group-identity conflict were present in Fergana 
Valley: heterogeneous, high density and growing population, well-defined ethnic 
groups with political and cultural structures and resource scarcity. A third of 
Uzbekistan's population resided within the Valley. Between 1979-89, population 
growth in the Valley's provinces was considerable: 27% in the case of Andijon 
and 34% in Namangan. 9' 
Tishkov sees inter-ethnic water conflict as symptomatic of the difficulties that 
Central Asia encountered during its integration into the USSR. Modernisation and 
collectivisation, he argues, eroded traditional modes of production and social 
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networks. '9' The Soviet national delimitations, sedentarisation and collectivisation 
processes "could not reflect the complex local systems of land and water use" nor 
the historical norms of co-existence. 192 This inflexibility created and 
institutionalised rivalries. Competition for water escalated with the already settled 
groups forced to share the resource with more recent settlers. With both groups 
now requiring the resource for the same purpose, sedentary agriculture, demand 
and therefore competition was increased. 
4.10. ii. a. i. Isfara-Batken: Violence between Kyrgyzs of Batken (Osh oblast) and 
Tajiks of Isfara (Khojent oblast) was recorded in 1982,1988,1989 and 1991.193 
"Shortages of land ... 
[a] deficit of water, " and the Tajik SSR's closure of the 
Bokent Canal which supplied the Kyrgyz oblast were cited as reasons for the 
conflict. 194 
Tishkov argues that the Tajik-Kyrgyz dispute arose from the ending of 
"economic-complementafism. "195 The waters of the Isfara river were traditionally 
viewed by the local Tajik population as their "property" because they cultivated 
the immediate vicinity and constructed the irrigation systems in the Isfara Valley. 
In winter, the Kyrgyzs traditionally used the fallow land to pasture their animals. 
The sedentarisation of the Kyrgyzs, which began in the nineteenth century, led to 
increased competition for irrigation and land. The Tajik community has found it 
difficult to reconcile this "encroachment" with their view "that all cultivated land 
and potentially arable land, as well as, the waters of the Isfara, are historically 
their territory and most importantly their water. " 196 
Competition in the Isfara-Batken was affected by massive demographic growth 
and different rates of population growth between the Kyrgyzs and Tajiks. The 
Isfara raion, with a 75% Tajik population, saw a 4.7 fold growth in population 
between 1970 and 1990, whilst Kyrgyz-dominated Batken's population rose by 
2.5 fold, between 1964 and 1990.197 
The two republics have not resolved the Batken-Isfara. border issue, suggesting 
that a communal resource situation could potentially lead to an international 
dispute. '9' 
173 
LU 
OW70 
at 
1 
1: 
IL 
, ýl. ib 
i i%ýC* ZIMZ e 
6i6w, 
i 
Alb 
ANY* 
r. *) 
H 
5! 
4*lw 
P4 1 
lvod 
At 
tv 1004t 
F- 
d 
z 
0 
Clf CN 
C14 
t4r) 
C14 
cd 
4.10. ii. a. 2. The Lower Zeravshan: Since communal violence in 1987 over 
irrigated lands further Tajiks-Uzbek conflict on the issue is unlikely to take place. 
Whilst this source of tension was latent between 1991-96, a series of other 
conflict-instigating factors remained. These included: Tashkent's discriminatory 
policies towards Tajik minority cultural and political claims; harassment by local 
officials and security agents, particularly in the Samarkand oblast; and the 
existence of arms and experienced combatants in neighbouring Tajikistan. '99 Post- 
conflict economic re-development in Tajikistan, including expansion in irrigated 
agriculture, already mooted, could also re-invigorate downstream communal 
competition. Tajikistan's plans to increase withdrawals from the Zeravshan would 
mean reductions for other downstream consumers. The ulitisation of the river has 
3 200 already been reached. Inflow to the Zeravshan is 5.2 km . 
Surface diversions in 
Uzbekistan alone, 10.76 kra 
3 /p. a., exceed thiS. 201 Should the Tajikistani proposal 
to expand irrigation be implemented then the Tajik-Uzbek conflict in Samarkand 
oblast may resurface. 202 With increased water scarcity in Uzbekistan it is not 
unfeasible that the titular group will seek to retaliate against members of the 
group that has caused this scarcity. 
That said, the Tajik-Uzbek situation has proved particularly resilient to a wide- 
range of conflict-inducing catalysts and academic predications. Unless 
government repression is increased, resulting in the minority becoming radicalised, 
this will remain the case. A peaceful and united Tajikistan, in which Islamist are 
active within government, may lead the diaspora to re-appraise its identity and 
interest in Tajik nationalism, and closer co-operation with it homeland. Dushanbe 
is, however, unlikely to promote any activity that would aggravate its relations 
with Tashkent. Similarly, during the Soviet period the Tajik SSR was the poorest 
of the SSRs, and after four years of war it is unlikely to be able to construct the 
HEP and irrigation infrastructure its plans require. 
4.10. ii. a. 3. Osh: During 1990, the Osh oblast administration granted Uzbek 
irrigated land for Kyrgyz settlement. Land and housing pressures in the oblast 
were acute. The local Uzbek community responded with a plethora of political 
demands including regional autonomy. The failure to withdraw the land grant, or 
offer concessions to the Uzbeks, and the local official encouragement of Kyrgyz 
211 nationalism, resulted in a week of rioting. 
Inter-ethnic relations in the oblast have remained sensitive since independence. 
Counter accusations between Bishkek and Tashkent about the treatment of the 
Uzbek minority in Osh, and the presence of Islamist movements in the oblast, 
originally Uzbek-dominated, have not aided stability. (See 5.12. ii. a. 2. ) 
4.10. H. b. The Lower Amu Darya: The lower Amu-Darya scenario as well as 
being a situation of interstate tensions has implications for cross-border inter- 
ethnic relations. The dichotomies between domestic and international, and 
economic development and international security can be demonstrated by the 
situation. 
The republics share a 200 km border. 121,578 Turkmen live in Uzbekistan, 
principally in the Khorazm region, and 300,000 Uzbeks reside in the 
Turkmenistani province of Dashhowuz, neighbouring Karakalpakstan and along 
the south-eastern reaches of the Amu Darya . 
20' Karakalpakstan and Khorazrn in 
Uzbekistan, and the Turkmenistani province of Dashhowuz, compete for water 
within the lower stretches of the river. Cross-border water poaching, diversions of 
irrigation systems, resultant vigilante actions and destruction of pumping stations 
and canals have been reported along the Turkmenistan-Uzbekistan border. 205 
Although to date there has been no evidence of these incidents escalating to state 
level, relations between the two capitals have been tense and the region is possibly 
the prime site for such a scenario. 206 
Since independence, Turkmenistan has not addressed severe crises in the 
republic's agricultural and water sectors. Lack of basic maintenance of the Kara 
Kum Canal since independence, combined with poor construction, has led to 
silting, leakage and structural failures. In 1993,50% of agricultural soils were 
classified as unsatisfactory due to water logging and/or salination. 207 In fact, 
President Niyazov's Teti Years of Prosperity programme has been essentially the 
continuation of Soviet style policies, to increase agricultural production without 
improving irrigation practices. 208 O'Hara concludes that with predicted population 
growth, and declining crop yields and water supplies "Turkmenistan could be 
faced with a future of severe food shortages which will undermine development 
,, 209 and could ultimately result in increased social and political tension. Should this 
prediction prove correct it poses serious regional implications for both Turkmen- 
Uzbek inter-ethnic and Turkmenistan-Uzbekistan state relations. 
4.10. H. c. Karakalpakstan: The link between environmental degradation and 
inter-ethnic conflict is not, however, inevitable or unequivocal as the 
environmental situation in Karakalpakstan illustrates. 
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Karakalpakstan's status as an AR was preserved in Uzbekistan's 1993 
Constitution . 
210 The AR has been confronted by one of the worst environmental 
situations in Central Asia. The reduced and frequently absent flow into the Aral 
Sea, and the resultant decline in water availability, desertification and destruction 
of habitat and fisheries have devastated the AR . 
21 1 The supply was further 
diminished by the high concentration of agricultural, domestic and industrial 
pollution and toxins. At a time when the Soviet average life expectancy was 69 
years of age, the figure in the ASSR was less than 42.212 (See 4.11. ) 
Massive environmental stress and related economic and social problems are not, 
however, expected to lead to inter-ethnic conflict. Environmental degradation and 
its economic and social consequences have not become divisive. Contrary to 
predications of group and periphery-centre conflict models, which propose that 
the lack of political access frequently drives groups to seek other alternative 
means of advancing their grievances, Karakalpakstan has so far remained calm. 
Politicisation and conflict has not arisen in this case because the conditions 
required are not evident. These are: 
- Clearly defined and well-organised social groups; 
- The belief by at least one of these groups that they are economically or 
politically disadvantaged; and that 
- Peaceful means are unavailable to the group and non-peaceful methods are 
feasible. 
For the Karakalpak case, demarcation between inter-ethnic groups has been 
difficult. The three main ethnic groups relatively are evenly balanced: 32% 
Karakalpaks, 33% Uzbeks and 26% Kazaks, and share common cultural roots. 213 
The Karakalpaks and Kazaks are linguistically close, both are from the Kipchak 
group, and Uzbek linguistic assimilation of the Karakalpaks has been a noticeable 
trend. Where as other inhabitants of Karakalpakstan have emigrated to 
"homelands", Karakalpaks leaving the region have no defined recipient 
community. 214 Assimilation of Karakalpak migrants has been common, reducing 
inter-ethnic tensions in host regions too. 
The multi-ethnic population of the region does not necessarily predispose 
harmonious relations, given the "acute shortage" of potable water and other 
resources, including employment, in the AR. Inter-ethnic violence between other 
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Central Asian groups, frequently linguistically, religiously and culturally close, 
does not suggest that such commonalties will prevent future conflict. Neither does 
the numerical balance between the three groups provide a permanent deterrence. 
The greater cultural affinity between the Kazaks and Karakalpaks may aid an 
alliance against local Uzbeks and the centre, if these were perceived as the cause 
of the AR's problems. 
The political weakness of Karakalpakstan and the alienation of the titular group 
has been striking, but ambivalent in its consequences. Political decision-making 
has remained Tashkent's prerogative. Well-organised political communities have 
not emerged in the AR, and the province's relationship with Tashkent has been 
asymmetrical, preventing Karakalpakstan from establishing a political identity or 
agenda. The AR's economic status has also been poor. Only Jizzak and Sirdarya 
viloyets contributed less to Uzbekistan's post-independence industrial output. 
215 
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Karakalpakstan was the only region not to witness industrial growth after 1994 . 
This sense of disempowerment may account for the lack of militancy amongst the 
Karakalpaks. As Tishkov argues, conflict has not emerged in the AR because it is 
not the groups that have been most discriminated against who normally initiate 
violence. Rather it is dominant and well-defined groups, "to be precise, their elite 
elements" that instigates "the suppression of 'others. ,, 
217 This is borne out by the 
Novy Uzen, Osh and anti-Meskhetian incidents. 
The Aral Sea-Karakalpakstan situation developed in a radically different manner 
to water allocation issues in the Fergana Valley and between Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan. The latter two cases were ultimately inter-group competition for the 
utilisation of a resource. The protagonists and the subject of their interest have 
been immediate and obvious. The situation in Karakalpakstan has been essentially 
a question of "survival. " It has been engaged in an unequal competition with 
upstream, "over the horizon" parties. It has also been affected by a series of 
external competition between upstream parties, without the ability to influence 
these situations. The potential for conflict is less likely, as opponents are less 
obvious. It has been difficult for Karakalpakstani inhabitants, of whatever 
nationality, to find an adversary or articulate any definitive solution. As one 
Karakalpakstani author concluded, 
"(a)ll the efforts of our [Karakalpak] nation are focused on one thing now, and 
that is physical survival. We are not capable of anything more: not anger, not 
the search for culprits. We think only of one thing: to survive and save 
ourselves. " 218 
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4.11. The Broader Concept of Environmental Securill 
And Its Implications For Central Asia 
The analysis of this wider definition of environmental security, directed to quality 
of life, health, social welfare and development will focus principally upon 
Kazakstan. The aim of this examination of the broader concept is two-fold. 
Firstly, to highlight the difference between the two republics' situation and 
therefore emphasise the saliency of water in Uzbekistan's environmental security 
agenda. Secondly, to demonstrate the implicit influence of other environmental 
issues on the region's, and in particular Kazakstan's, security agendas. The key 
environmental problems, in this respect are: 
- The Aral Sea; 
- Irrigation agriculture; 
- The legacy of nuclear testing; 
- Caspian Sea, and oil resources. 
Before examining these topics it is valuable to return to the Project On 
Environmental Change and Acute Conflict's research. Smil, a member of the 
Project, has produced an environmental audit of the environmental situation in 
China. The study provides a quantifiable assessment of environmental degradation 
upon China's economic and political activities. Smil has calculated that at least 
15% of China's GNP is lost to environmental problems. The principal causes of 
this deficit are: air, land and water pollution; loss of agricultural land, from 
nutrient loss, flooding, erosion and conversion to other land uses; the resultant 
crop yield reductions; and increased human morbidity. 219 Placing financial figures 
upon environmental degradation makes incorporation of the environment into 
economic and political and ultimately security thinking more tangible, removing 
Levy's criticism of existentialism in environmental security literature. 
Economic inequalities between China's regions, the failure of the one-child policy 
and the increasing influence of free-market economics, indicate further pressure 
upon China's environmental and political infrastructure. The state "may have 
already crossed key thresholds of unsustainability. ))220 Smil argues that the 
greatest pressure from environmental degradation will be experienced in north- 
west China, including Xinjiang. 221 Goldstone believes that the already evident 
political violence in Xinjiang is liable to escalate. This is because of the association 
of ethnicity, in this case between the indigenous Muslim Turkic Uighurs and Han 
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Chinese central government and settlers; Bejing's unwillingness to democratise 
power (which he regards as the best means of long-term stability in China) and the 
environmental situation . 
222 It is difficult to see how environmental degradation- 
related insecurity in Xinjiang, with its existing ethno-political tensions and shared 
border and diasporas with Kazakstan will not have a detrimental impact upon the 
latter's stability. 223 
In a similar economic vein, the World Bank has calculated the economic costs of 
short life expectancy, workdays lost to ill-health, and the degradation of 
agricultural lands for the whole of the former Communist bloc. It estimated that 
30,000 people die and over 65 million working days are lost p. a. as a direct result 
of industrial pollution in the region. 224 
Smil and the World Banks' research have considerable parallels with and 
relevance for Kazakstan and Uzbekistan. These are the influence of a centrally 
planned economic system, closed to political debate, and in the case of China, 
contiguity with Central Asia. China's environmental-related economic and social 
dislocation is liable to have negative impact upon Central Asia in general, and 
Kazakstan in particular. 
A plethora of demographic, health and economic problems created by the "cotton 
first" policies suggests future political and social discontent, if not instability. 
These issues are clearly situated in the wider environmental security context, 
associated with development, social and political tensions. The economic loss 
from degradation of the Aral Sea was estimated in the 1980s at 100 million 
Roubles p. a. 225 
Health problems have resulted from the effects of a pro-irrigation economy. Half 
of Central Asia's rural population use contaminated water. 226 In Karakalpakstan, 
infant mortality rose from 35 per 1000 in 1935, to 180 per 1000 in 1994.227 The 
AR's average age of death declined from 64, in 1987, to 57 in 1991.228 
Cotton-dependent national economies have reduced indigenous production of 
food crops and the calorific intake. During 1958-75, the Aral Sea basin oblasts' 
calorific intake was 81-85% of the Soviet average. It has since declined further. 229 
Consumption of fish, meat, and eggs and milk products in the Uzbek SSR were 
21,6 and 12 times below the Soviet averages. 2'0 Per capita consumption of 
foodstuffs was even lower in rural areas. Central Asian Kolkhoz consumption of 
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milk and meat was as low as 14% of the Soviet average. 2" Given that the oasis 
agriculture system historically provided a wealth of produce, the over-emphasis of 
cotton production clearly bears a responsibility for this. 
These welfare issues have had implicit security implications. The most obvious of 
these is the health of Central Asian conscripts: 40% of the Uzbek SSR's male 
youths were considered too unfit to be drafted into the Red Army. 
232 The author 
met individuals with serious medical conditions who still passed examinations for 
233 the independent Kazakstani Armed Forces. To date, the military leaderships in 
the republics have not publicly voiced concern about the health of their troops. 
This, however, does not detract from the military implications of what are 
234 essentially welfare issues . 
The rural population has been the principal victim of environmental degradation. 
This has implications for inter-ethnic, and inter-state stability. Rural population 
growth increased in the Aral Sea basin by 13.7 million (149%) between 1951-89, 
whilst the total Soviet rural population declined by 9.8% . 
235 Since independence, 
population growth in Uzbekistan remained steady at 17% whilst rural population 
increased its percentage of the total population from 60 to 62%. 23' Whilst this 
increase was taking place, 107,000 agricultural jobs were lost between 1994-7, a 
1% decrease p. a . 
237 It is estimated that 20% of agricultural posts in the republic 
are superfluous . 
238 This under-employment may translate into major rural 
population movement. Ecological deterioration led to the internal migration of 
70,000 Kazakstanis in 1996.239 Thus, population growth and environmental 
decline have increased pressures upon the agricultural sector. Although rural 
emigration increased in Central Asia throughout the post- 1945 period, it has been 
low and insignificant compared to rural population growth. This low level of 
emigration is a consequence of insufficient urban employment opportunities and 
housing, preference for traditional life and the migrant's lack of industrial skills. It 
suggests that irrigation agriculture will be difficult to replace as a core source of 
employment by less-water-intensive activities. 
4.11. i. The Aral Sea: Environmental Conservation or SecuritV Concern? The 
level of the Aral Sea fluctuated throughout history. As late as the 1960s the Sea 
received a regular annual input of 45 km 
3 from the Amu Darya and Syr Darya and 
sustained a thriving and diverse ecology. 
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Rapid expansion in irrigation which began in the 1950s, reduced this inflow to 
approximately 7 krn 3 /p. a. by the 1990S. 240 The Sea's volume declined by 73.4% 
and its area by 49.5%. 241 The implications of these changes include massive 
destruction of habitat and species. The region's large fishing industry based at 
Aralsk and Muynaq was devastated with 60,000 jobs lost between the 1950s and 
1991.242 Airborne particles picked up from the expansive dried seabed containing 
pollutants and salts, and highly saline and contaminated water have been blamed 
for the high incidents of respiratory illnesses, typhoid, short life expectancy, high 
infant mortality rates and other diseases. 243 
Whilst riverine waters has been politically-sensitive to the extent that conflict may 
arise from this issue, the Aral crisis falls within the broader environmental security 
category. The commitment and ability of the states to resolve the problem has 
been questionable. The republics agreed a programme of action to redress the 
economic, environmental and social problems of the Sea, at Qyzlorda, on 26 
March 1993. Initial financial pledges by the republics to the International Save the 
Aral Fund have not been honoured. Kazakstan only provided 30% of its 
commitment, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan 2%, whilst Tajikistan and Turkmenistan 
failed to pay anything. 244 
Whilst financial assistance, and political co-operation and have been lacking, this 
does not suggest that violent conflict over the Aral Sea is probable. There has 
been little to incite the littoral states to conflict. Cynically, one could ask that 
beyond Karakalpakstan, which other regions or politicians has been directly 
affected or concerned about the situation? The immediate costs of even 
maintaining the Sea at its present level dramatically overshadow any potential 
benefits from such an action. Suggested solutions including a three year 
moratorium on irrigation, or reduction of irrigated land by 50%, plus improved 
irrigation techniques capable of reducing the consumption of water by a third. 241 
The magnitude of the problem and the drastic nature of solutions required, 
including the restructuring of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistans' economies with 
minimal economic or social benefits, make redress unlikely and unpopular. 
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4.11. ii. Kazakstan's Indi2enous Environmental Securitv Concerns: 
"Ecological problems cannot be solved without economic and political issues being addressed 
too. " 
Vasily Vasilenko, Kazakstan Institute of Strategic Studies. 246 
The narrow, conflict related, definition of environmental security, especially in 
terms of water has limited application for Kazakstan with the exception of the 
southern oblasts. Although Almaty voiced concern over Kyrgyzstan's water 
pricing proposals, and Kyrgystan and Uzbekistan withholding of water to 
Qyzlorda and Shymkent oblasts, it has not perceived these problems in the stark 
confrontational manner that similar disputes have been by other Central Asia 
states. Water, therefore, at the state level, has not been a strategic problem for 
Kazakstan. Interstate conflict over water resources is therefore unlikely to involve 
Kazakstan. There are, however, issues within Kazakstan that have had and 
continue to have indirect security implications, as this section will demonstrate. 
The fact that Kazakstan has a far less acute environmental milieu has not 
prevented its political elite embracing environmental security in the national 
security debate to a far greater extent than has been the case in Uzbekistan. 247 The 
Conception of the Environmental Safety of the Republic of Kazakhstan states 
that, 
11 environmental protection is one of the strategically basic components of national 
security ... [and the] refusal to undertake measures 
[to redress the environmental 
problems] may cause ... a threat to social stability. 
" 248 
The same document recognised the interdependency of economics, the 
environment and security. 249 Kazakstani interpretations of environmental security 
have been concerned with environmental protection or conservation rather than 
explicitly conflict-related. This was demonstrated by the former head of the Arms 
Control Division of Kazakstan's Internal Affairs Ministry, Leonid Bakaev, 
description of the Chinese nuclear tests at Lop Nor as an environmental rather 
than security threat for Kazakstan. 250 
4.1 Lii. a. The Consequences of Nuclear Testing: Semipalatinsk was the seminal 
environmental issue in Kazak SSR, comparable to the political catalyst that cotton 
provided in the Uzbek SSR- It has had major international political and security 
repercussions. 
It is estimated that approximately 40% of Kazakstan's territory was used by the 
USSR Ministry of Defence. 251 Olcott argues that massive "military colonisatioif' 
of Kazak land helps explain the political significance of Nevada- Semipalatinsk, 
which was established in as pressure group to end nuclear testing on Kazak SSR 
territory. 252 Semipalatinsk was one of the USSR's two main military nuclear test 
sites. Between 1949-89,470 nuclear tests were conducted at the range. 253 
The health implication of these tests and related atmospheric, ground and water 
pollution has been immense. 254 The local population were rarely warned or 
evacuated before tests took place. Consequently, 800 settlements and 
approximately 1.5 million people have been affected. 255 Cancer deaths in the 
Semipalatinsk oblast rose sevenfold between 1975-85, and still births and serious 
mental defects commonly recorded. 256 
These events acted as a catalyst for the glasnost-era foundation of Nevada- 
Semipalatinsk. The movement's political significance cannot be overestimated. 
Throughout 1989 it organised a series of demonstrations and was influential in 
halting II of the 18 tests planned for that year. 257 In 1989 the movement obtained 
I million signatures demanding the closure of the base. By 1991, Nevada- 
Semipalatinsk was the largest and most influential public organisation in the 
Kazak S SR. The Polygon was closed on 21 August 199 1. 
The issue of nuclear testing in the Kazak SSR, between 1989-92, fits within the 
parameters of the broader environmental security concept. It was an example of 
the detrimental influence of military action upon the region's environmental and 
social well-being. This led to the politicisation of an environmental issue, which 
had international implications. Soviet and independent Kazakstani defence policies 
have been, to some extent, constrained by popular protest. The anti-nuclear 
campaign nurtured late-Soviet Kazak nationalism. Independence was 
accompanied by disarmament. Mmaty saw political advantages in its anti-nuclear 
stance; domestic legitimacy, international recognition and economic assistance. 
The continued nationalist-political dimension of environmental protest was 
witnessed in Attan, Nevada-Semey and Lop Nors' (the Kyrgystan anti-nuclear 
movement) campaigns against Chinese nuclear testing. These tests took place at 
Lop Nor in Xinjiang, 1000 km east of the Kazakstani border . 
25' As well as the 
effects on the Kazakstani population and environment their campaigns also 
emphasised transborder sympathies . 
259 Kazaks, Kyrgyzs and Uighurs communities 
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are located on either side of the border. Sievers stated that the Uighur diaspora in 
Kazakstan used the issue in a similar nationalist manner that the Kazaks had done 
with Semipalatinsk . 
260 Cross-border relations soured during 1993, because the 
newly elected president of Nevada-Semey was an ethnic Uighur and the grandson 
of the last president of Eastern Turkestan. Beijing was fearful of the potential 
cross-fertilisation of Muslim-nationalist irredentism in Xinjiang, and externally- 
located environmental protest may provide the catalyst for thi S. 26 ' As Olcott 
notes, China's leadership are clearly aware how the direction of political activism 
in Central Asia "has potential consequences for their own country's security. "262 
Relations improved with the ending of the tests in 1996 and Beijing successfully 
lobbied Almaty to restrain Uighur groups in Kazakstan. 263 In April 1996, 
Kazakstan's Foreign Mnister, Daulet Sembaev, declared he was totally opposed 
to "certain forces pushing for the right of people of northwest China to self- 
determination. 17264 
As with the case of cotton in Uzbekistan, protest against Soviet and Chinese 
nuclear testing demonstrates the manner in which politically tolerated 
environmental activism can easily contain a nationalist dimension and implicit 
political criticism (of another state). 
4.11. ii. b. The Caspian Sea, Oil and Geopolitics: The Caspian Sea and 
associated oil reserves are internationally contested issues. "' This situation is, 
however, a traditional resource rather than environmental security concern. It has 
been included, however, to demonstrate the diversity of thought on the concept of 
environmental security and the relationship between political and economic 
competition within a state. 
The scramble for hydrocarbons has seen fierce inter-state competition, with "geo- 
political" overtones. US-Russian tensions have been heightened by the former's 
concern to exclude Iranian participation in multi-state extraction agreements, and 
Russian involvement in ousting the Azerbaijani president, ElbaJay Elchibey. Under 
the rule of his successor, the former Soviet Politburo member, Gaidar Aliyev, 
10% of the Azerbaijan International Operating Company (AIOC) consortium was 
granted to the Russian oil company, Lukoil. 266 Whilst Kazakstan was on the 
periphery of these diplomatic tensions, its political and geographic proximity to 
Russia may draw it into any conflict. Bellicose Russian diplomacy has been 
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matched by US statements. Senator Robert Dole for example has commented 
that, 
"the security of the world's oil and gas supplies remain a vital interest of the 
US ... areas under US 
interest include the Caucasus, Siberia and Kazakhstan. 
Our fon%, ard-military presence and diplomacy need adjustments. 9267 
Within Kazakstan, oil also raised questions about the distribution of economic and 
political resources. The oil-rich western region containing the Tenghiz and 
offshore reserves is also the home of the Little Zhuz. Almaty has voiced concern 
about this linkage . 
26' Although beyond the time span of this research, the 
appointment of Nurlan Balgimbayev to prime minister in 1997, was perceived as 
an attempt to placate growing western Kazakstani disquiet over their "economic 
exploitation" and lack of political representation at the centre. 269 (Balgimbayev, 
from the Caspian town of Atyrau, was formerly the oil minister. ) This example 
endorses the argument advanced in 3.4. ii. c that arbitrary, closed and personalised 
resource allocation, both economic and political, has created a sense of inequality. 
The combination of patronage and regional rivalries combined to suggest that 
such problems are clan-based disputes. 
4.12. Managing Central Asia's Environment Crises: 
Co-operation or Conflict? 
Central Asia's poor environmental milieu has significantly affected the region's 
economic, political and social affairs. It is essential, therefore, that problems in the 
former are addressed. The historical precedent is not encouraging. Previous 
mismanagement, inefficient practices, wastage, population growth and 
dependency upon irrigation agriculture are the underlying causes of the present 
predicament. Future developments are dependent upon the political and technical 
responses to water allocation. Contemporary political attitudes, policies and 
management and technical capabilities, indicate that co-operation and effective 
management although feasible, may be difficult to achieve. Elite rivalries, between 
Niyazov and Karimov in particular, have hampered inter-republic dialogue and co- 
operation on this vital issue. 
The continued use of Soviet political traditions has been compounded by 
problems related to the break-up of the USSR: the division of the region into 
independent states, with implications for divergence in political consensus and 
economic development; and economic transition for example. The key (political) 
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problem for water management has been the division of the region into the five 
republics. This has not aided regional co-operation over water distribution. In 
other regions where water is either scarce or in dispute the issue gradually 
evolved with the development of relations between the riparians. This has not 
been the case in Central Asia. "All of a sudden, a very complex water 
management problem became a very complex transboundary water management 
problem. )1270 
4.12. i. Rezional Institutions and Water Management: Previously the region's 
water management was regulated via numerous, and often competing, ministries. 
There was, however, a central agency, the Ministry of Land Reclamation and 
Water Resources, based in Moscow. It was renamed as the Ministry of Water 
Management Construction (MinVodKhoz) and then restructured as a scientific 
research institute, in 1990.271 In the Uzbek SSR five ministries plus other 
organisations, including the Uzbek Supreme Soviet Water Resources Commission 
and the Department of Agriculture were involved in the decision-making 
procesS. 272 The other Central Asia SSRs had similar structures. 
With independence a network of interstate organisations, based upon Soviet 
institutions, with responsibilities for Aral Sea basin water issues was established. 
(See figure 4.1. ) These bodies and their related policies and interactions, however, 
imperfect, have been a bulwark against inter-state conflict. 
The Interstate Council for Addressing the Aral Sea Crisis (ICAS): 
Membership of the ICAS has been drawn from the five republics, plus Russia 
holding observer status. 273 The ICAS's role has been to "avoid disputes before 
they arise. 1)274 In terms of institutional structure, under the ICAS's Executive 
Committee, based in Tashkent, are two committees, the Interstate Coordinating 
Commission for Water Resources (ICCW), and the Interstate Commission of 
Socio-Economic Development and Technical and Ecological Co-operation. 
Subordinate to the ICCW are the two river basin agencies (BVOs) one each for 
the Amu Darya and the Syr Darya. 
The ICCW consists of the republics' water ministers and meets four times per 
year, or at a time of interstate crisis. Its role is to act as a conduit for the riparians 
to notify other parties of intentions to act. The BVOs' role is to allocate riverine 
water amongst the states. The quotas allocated by the BVOs remain based upon 
Soviet plans, although the Aral Sea was granted a defined minimum infloW. 275 
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The International Fund for the Aral Sea (IFAS): This organisation was 
established to finance joint actions to improve the situation in the basin, in 
particular the immediate coastal regions. 
The Fund has a board of governors with a rotating chair, selected from Central 
Asian heads of state. The WAS is supposed to rely upon member-state 
contributions. Initially, the recommended level was 1% of GNP, with additional 
276 international donations 
.A 
1% levy is unlikely to resolve the crisis. Previously 
Goskompriroda suggested that 1.3% of GNP would be required simply to 
maintain the then present condition in the Aral Sea basin, and 7-9% of GNP 
would be required to decisively reverse the situation . 
277 "To date, [its] 
accomplishments have been limited, as significant variations in inherited fiscal 
resources and physical infrastructures in the basin republics make equitable 
apportionment extremely difficult. 77278 
Equitable Use: The ICCW and BVO allocate water quotas. A key question, 
which Gleick and Smith both fail to address in their conceptualisation of water- 
related security, is how equitable water use can be achieved between upstream 
HEP requirements and downstream irrigation needs, or how externally and non- 
consentual. imposed quotas can be re-structured. For example, only 12,000 m3 of 
the 50 million rn 3 of water collected in Kyrgyzstan's reservoirs and lakes is used 
within the republic. Kyrgyzstan has been able only to irrigate one million hectares 
whilst downstream the water has supplied four million hectares in Uzbekistan. 
279 
Without economic compensation, it is difficult to perceive this as equitable. 
Kyrgyzstan has a legitimate claim for readjustment of the existing water quotas. 
Prevention of Significant Harm to Other States: Soviet environmental policies 
failed to protect downstream users from the affects of water withdrawals 
including the contamination of returned waters. The environmental, health and 
social consequences of these actions in the Aral Sea basin demonstrates the need 
for these mechanism to be implemented in Central Asia. 
More disturbingly have been the ominous though unfulfilled Tajikistani and 
Uzbekistani threats to use water in future conflicts and to destroy the former's 
dams, respectively. The poisoning of wells was rumoured to have been carried out 
by Soviet forces in Afghanistan. 
MISSING 
PAG S 
NOT 
AVAILA L 
Obligation to notify and inform: This principle was accepted by the members of 
the ICCW. Notification does not necessarily led to compromise or resolution. 
Tajikistan's notification, in 1994, of planned increased withdrawals from the 
Zeravshan, upstream of Bukhara and Samarkand, did not alleviate Uzbekistan's 
concerns. 280 Similar notification by Kyrgystan and Tajikistan of water pricing and 
increased extraction proposals were met with Kazakstan and Uzbekistans' 
disapproval. 
Obligation to share data: This has been a major problem. Access to scarce and 
frequently unreliable information has been treated with scepticism if not hostility. 
Political culture has played a significant role in water management and co- 
operation. Agricultural and hydrological information has been "jealously guarded 
as a privileged commodity. "281 
Shared management of water supply: Co-operative management and the 
International Law Commission's "principle of participation" have been poorly 
adhered to in Central Asia. The region's record on multi-lateral co-operation has 
been poor, water politics being no exception. Turkmenistan did not sign the 
international accord nor participate in the follow-up Nukus Conference in August 
1993, because it is unwilling to make any financial contributions. 
Alarmingly, the allocation agreements lack legally enforcement. The World Bank 
and the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development have criticised these 
agreements for failing to acknowledge the water interests of Afghanistan, China 
and Iran. 282 The absence of Afghanistan from the Amu Darya BVO and the ICCW 
seriously weakens any long-term and regional institutional solution. 
Obligation to the peaceful resolution of disputes: The principles of sustainable 
and co-operative water management have had mixed results in the region. 
Although institutional frameworks have been established, their effectiveness, 
technical capabilities, and monitoring and management skills have been 
questionable. Over 300 agreements have been signed concerning the Aral Sea 
region with minimal positive reSUItS. 283 These agreements need to be accorded IL. 
status, as is the norm for other treaty-based river basin commissions. The BVOs 
need to be transformed from inter-republican to treaty based international 
organisations, and complemented with the establishment of further BVOs, for all 
the region's other international rivers. The BVOs' management policies should 
also integrate attempts to rehabilitate the Aral Sea. 284 
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4.12ji. The Political Context: Politics, not absolute water scarcity, is the 
determining factor for future water-related conflict management. The weakness of 
the institutional structures can be traced to endemic political problems. Without 
political reforms, the necessary precursor measures to alleviate environmental 
scarcity inspired conflict, either through more sustainable use of indigenous 
reserves or provision of alternative employment, cannot be effectively 
implemented. 285 
Regional leaderships have been unwilling to provide more than token political or 
financial support to environment issues. "[W]hilst this is ostensibly because of the 
need to tackle more 'urgent' priorities, it seems to reflect a short-sighted view 
that does not take account of the far greater costs that will be paid later. ))286 The 
reasons for this failure include: 
The lack of political change; 
Lack of sense of responsibility; 
Ineffective relevant political and technological acumen; and 
Economic reliance upon environmental damaging activities. 
Key decision-makers and institutions were involved in previous environmental 
mismanagement. Consequently they often have had a vested interest in minimising 
independent criticism of previous and contemporary practices. As Critchlow 
comments, 
"despite Uzbekistan's responsibility for the Aral problem and the fact that the 
brunt of the consequences are being bome by its population ... 
President 
Karimov has effectively distanced his goverrunent ftorn primary responsibility 
for a solution. " 
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288 This culture of denial is a vestige of the Soviet period . 
The issue is further complicated by the fact that any effective regional 
management needs to be an integrative system incorporating "autonomous local 
irrigation system administration to inter-republican directive organisations for 
strategic water distribution. "M This would re-introduction local responsibility for 
monitoring and control of water, promoting greater social understanding of water 
management problems and respect for "the precious resource. 7)290 Pre-Soviet 
water-management functioned -in this manner. 291 As Gleason notes, however, the 
successes of this system were possible because irrigation was localised, and relied 
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upon communal respect for mirabs (water masters) and Islamic tenets on water 
use. The mirabs were independent from state institutions and had the authority to 
allocate water and settle disputes. 292 
Based on this historical evidence, subsidiarity may be advantageous, establishing a 
complex of localised and inter-state institutions. 293 Zolotarev and K16tzli 
emphasises the role of the informal, moral and popular norms in engendering a 
more responsible attitude to water-use. 294 Unfortunately, traditional social respect 
for water and other users established through customs, norms and laws were 
eroded during the Soviet period. Since independence neither of the governments 
have indicated that subsidiarity in resource management, or popular participation 
in the decision-making process, would be welcome. Civil society and NGOs have 
295 been viewed with suspicion and frequently coopted by regional governments. 
Discussion on environmental issues has been restricted. Republican elites, since 
independence the authors of cotton, irrigation, health and environmental policies 
and the recipients of cotton profits have been sensitive to criticism. It is therefore 
unlikely that the integrated system will by implemented, for it would challenge the 
political leaderships' authority. 
The collapse of the integrated Soviet space further nationalised environmental 
issues. The republics enacted property laws in which water and land became state 
assets. 296 Kazakstan's post-independence water law has been criticised as a 
continuation of Soviet legislation. Water has remained the property of the state 
and cannot by bought or sold. 297 Kygyzstan's parliament initially established a 
land law in which land and natural resources became the property of the titular 
population. President Akaev vetoed the relevant article, mindful of the tensions 
between Kyrgyzs and Uzbeks in Osh oblast. An alternative article was 
successfully passed though Parliament, which declared that land is the property of 
all of the people of Kyrgyzstan. 298 
After independence, environmental issues declined in political status. The causes 
of this have been threefold. Firstly, the external exploitation of the region's 
natural assets has been removed. Moscow no longer provided an easily 
identifiable focus for common action by ambitious republican elites, nationalists 
and environmentalists. Political events made the symbolic anti-Russian character 
of Soviet-era environmentalism irrelevant. The removal of this central and 
299 populist tenet weakened popular identification with the cause. Secondly, 
transitional economic and social hardships have superseded less immediate issues. 
195 
In one survey, although approximately 50% and 33% of Kazakstan and 
Uzbekistan citizens, respectively, agreed that the environment in which they lived 
was dangerous for habitation, economic and political problems were cited as more 
pressing issues. 300 Only 4.5% of all Uzbekistani respondents placed environmental 
problems as the most significant concern they were faced by, including those 
surveyed in Karakalpakstan. Only 3.6% of Uzbek SSR respondents regarded the 
environment as the first priority. 30 ' The economic and political constraints of post- 
glasnost Central Asia have also curtailed political activism. Thirdly, the successor 
regimes have discouraged criticism of their previous and present roles in the 
region's economic and environmental mismanagement. 
Environmental platforms have disappeared as other political issues have become 
more salient. Some green organisations transmuted into more comprehensive 
political parties and all have faced the problems common with other independent 
movements. Birlik, like other independent political movement in Uzbekistan was 
banned in 1993. Where independent social-political environmental movements 
survivied their popular and fiscal support has been limited. Environmental politics 
in Kazakstan has been able to develop more freely than in Uzbekistan. Green 
Salvation, Nevada-Semey and Ecofund have maintained political discussion on the 
subject. Nevada-Semey formed a political party, the People's Congress. Its 
fortunes have declined, especially since its founder, Olzhas Suleimenov, was 
appointed Ambassador to Italy; a move which many saw as a form of political 
exile, preventing him and his party from challenging the president. 302 Charges of 
303 financial impropriety within Nevada-Semey also weakened its popular mandate. 
There has also been a growing sense that the previous pro-environment actions 
did not provided tangible results. In Kazakstan, compensation for the effects of 
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nuclear testing have been negligible and misappropriated . Equally, Kazakstan's 
non-nuclear stance has not provided the republic with a significant international 
profile, a particularly sensitive issue given the continued nuclear status of 
neighbouring China and Russia. 
Republican elites must accept that they are now the key actors responsible for 
rectifying the situation. It is debatable, however, whether the present elites and 
technical staff have either the political will or technical acumen to resolve water 
problems. 
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The Soviet legacy has had a major influence upon contemporary water 
management. As well as the infrastructures of irrigation and agriculture, the 
region has seen the persistence of Soviet scientific and technological knowledge 
and planning, and institutional frameworks. These and the level of environmental 
awareness proved inadequate when confronted by the enormities of the problem. 
One western environmental activist has stated that in the FSU awareness of 
environmental science, and its capabilities to resolve problems, have been rather 
sketchy and unrealistically optiMiStiC. 305 Similarly, Critchlow criticises the evasive, 
non-committal and "ill-informed" attitudes towards the region's environmental 
crisis. 'O' This author has had personal experience of these attitudes among some 
elements of the region's academia and politicians. Solutions to the region's 
environmental crises, it was suggested, would be found in the innate 
environmental acumen of the indigenous population, the resurrection of the 
Sibaral scheme, or continued faith in similar ill-planned large-scale projects. 
307 
As the critique of the statistical indices indicates, environmental competition and 
potential conflict have not been primarily rooted in the physical plane. Political 
calculations, ambitions and rivalries influence sub-state disputes, as well as, inter- 
state relations. Cultural perceptions on distributive justice influence the notion of 
whether a resource is scarce, or being unfairly allocated. Such beliefs in 
contemporary Central Asia are difficult to determine, because in the transitional 
period the region's population has been confronted with a range of competing 
cultural and political norms. Soviet values never entirely accepted in the region, 
have been openly challenged by those rooted in Muslim and capitalist traditions. 
Environmental reforms, such as land privatisation and water-pricing, run counter 
to Muslim and Soviet values. 
4.12. iii. Economics and Environmental Security: The direction of reforming 
water use in post-Soviet Central Asia has been ambiguous. Political continuity has 
been accompanied by the continuation of Soviet-style environmental and 
economic practices. 
From the 1980s onwards, there was a deliberate attempt to reduce water-hungry 
economic activities. Diversification and economic restructuring saw a decline in 
the area under cotton during the Soviet period. Within the Syr Darya, cotton 
acreage declined by 25% . 
3" Rice production in southern Kazakstan, since 1989, 
was reduced and similar trends were recorded in Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and 
319 Uzbekistan. Such restructuring, however, was limited and negated by failures to 
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implement fundamental improvements in irrigation practices, and subsequent 
increases in irrigation acreage in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan's area 
under cotton production increased between 1996-7 by 24,600 hectareS. 310 
After independence, Turkmenistan's severe agricultural and water crises have not 
been addressed, whilst the Teti Years o Prosperity plan in fact attempted to 
increase agricultural output. "' The plan was, however, ambitious if not 
unrealistic, demonstrating the poor environmental awareness of post-Soviet 
planners. State and collective farms were abolished, but private farmers have had 
to sell their produce to the state at (below free market) regulated prices and are 
unable to sell their land. Agricultural output according to Ten Years of Prosperity 
should have risen by 11% p. a. ' 12 Poor irrigation practices and the use of marginal 
lands in fact resulted in declining yields and further degradation of these marginal 
SoilS. 313 Rather than radically and efficiently restructuring its agricultural sector 
and water management, Turkmenistan has compounded Soviet-instigated 
economic and environmental problems. In the face of existing and escalating 
water demands throughout the Aral Sea Basin it is difficult to perceive that 
Ashgabat's action will do anything but heighten regional tensions. 
The present level of cotton production is not environmentally sustainable, but any 
attempt to diversify will cause massive socio-economic disruption. "Irrigation as a 
means of meeting Central Asia's growing employment and food needs has much 
to recommend it.,, 314 Irrigated agriculture provides large-scale intensive unskilled 
labour. Nor would diversification necessary lead to an improved environment 
regionally. Major industries in Kazakstan, fertiliser and uranium production are 
also major polluters. 315 
As the states' Soviet-based economic ties diminish and their economies diverge, 
co-operative action may be relegated as national interests are promoted. The 
states' respective economic development and priorities may lead to mutually 
incompatible water demands. The precursors to such a scenario have already been 
witnessed with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistans' plans for water-related industrial 
expansion. ' 16 
The continued economic reliance upon exploitative industries eroded the previous 
environmental-nationalist critique of Soviet regional development policies, 
encouraged by the region's elites. What was once a valuable political weapon 
against external exploitation cannot be discussed, as it has become a domestic 
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problem and major contributor to the national economy. In Uzbekistan, debate 
concerning student labour in the cotton harvests has been suppressed? 17 
Uzbekistan and Turkmenistans' financial profits from cotton production are the 
prime examples of this trend. The capitals' unease has been filrther enhanced 
because the leaderships lack remedies to the present predicament. The main 
reasons for this are political inertia, and the absence of economic and technical 
capabilities. The detrimental impact of cotton on the region's water availability, 
ecology and health are indisputable, but motivation to reduce its economic 
dominance would be difficult, if not unwanted, as it provides both a source of 
hard currency and employment. 
A contentious point is whether market competition and increased links with 
international markets will make resource prices more responsive to costs, 
including environmental costs or increase social friction. Market mechanisms, it is 
argued, would make former-Soviet producers improve efficiency in use of 
resources and quality of output. Structural adjustments, it is argued, would 
provide incentives for re-investment and increase efficiency in the agricultural 
sector. This argument is supported by the relative efficiency of Kyrgyzstan's 
privatised agricultural sector, when contrasted to the less-liberalised agricultures 
of Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. 
Reforms such as land privatisation, polluter-pays taxes, and water-pricing are 
politically sensitive. Privatisation of land is problematic: questions of access to 
water, agricultural machinery, quality of land allocated, access to markets (free or 
state controlled) and social perceptions of the process must all be considered. 
"Traditionally, water in Central Asia has been 'free' ... Accordingly, water 
in 
Central Asia will continue to be wasted until its value is fixed in the pricing 
structures . 
018 Experimental water-pricing in Kyrgyzstan, saw a 1.5 time 
reduction in withdrawals without any affect on yields . 
319 Similar small-scale 
pricing schemes were implemented in Kazakstan and Uzbekistan. In these cases 
water use was more efficient and responsible. 320 Privatisation of water rights is 
problematic, however. It is dependent upon the instillation of expensive metering 
systems, and effective policing, to deter the likelihood of water poaching and 
competition . 
321 Water pricing may in fact increase communal tensions. Small-scale 
acts of violence between individual water users, including armed and unarmed 
confrontations and water-poaching, indicate community tensions. 322 Inefficient 
farmers may be forced off the land, increasing social tensions, migration or acting 
as an impetus for industrial development. Land privatisation and water pricing 
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may cause serious sub-state problems. '23Water pricing will also be difficult to 
achieve, because there is grassroots opposition to pricing and the costs incurred 
by the instillation of metering equipment. 324 
200 
4.13. Conclusion 
This chapter has demonstrated that whilst environmental security is a nebulous 
concept, and that whilst environmental issues frequently appear as minor 
contributory factors in the security debate, they can also act as major catalysts in 
exasperating already existing divisions. 
Simple resource scarcity (quantitative) approaches to environmental security and 
water-related conflict in Central Asia are unable to acknowledge the complex 
origins of such crises and also more significant for Central Asia, indicate the full 
extent of the seriousness of the present and future situation. Political and cultural 
factors heavily influence the physical situation. 
Ka. zakstan has been affected by all of the major environmental crises present in 
Central Asia; water scarcity and the desiccation of the Aral Sea in southern and 
western Kazakstan; and on the northern steppe, subject to erosion and 
overgrazing; industrial and nuclear contamination has polluted the region's cities. 
These problems have not perceived as security challenges. They remain essentially 
and principally related to environmental management and economic development. 
Their consequences remain within the economic and social spheres. This has been 
reflected in the republic's less confrontational approach to southern Kazakstan's 
water problems, than that of its southern neighbour. 
Environmental activism played a significant and positive role in late-Soviet polity. 
Popular political participation expanded beyond the bounds that Gorbachev had 
envisioned, and the development of political environmentalism and nationalism 
were mutually assisted by their ideological and functional proximity. Both 
provided valid and effective critiques of the Soviet system but also saw inter- 
ethnic violence. Whilst this relationship diminished in the post-Soviet period, this 
can be accounted for by political changes which have temporarily undercut the 
linkage. In reality, however, expedient and wholesale reform of the ecological and 
political situations have not been attempted. Independence and associated nation- 
building processes have provided sufficient physical and political concerns for the 
linkage to find a renewed salience. Foreign economic intervention in Central Asia 
may also provide new external targets for environmental-nationalist agitation, 
particularly if environmental safeguards are not implemented and these 
developments are associated with unequal wealth distribution (either actual or 
perceived). 325 
201 
There is some acknowledgement in the region of the need for a comprehensive 
approach to environmental problems, and the relationship between environmental 
stress and economic and social disruption. Alarmingly, however, political inertia 
and financial constraints suggest that decisions and structures will not be in place, 
or effectively implemented in the near future, whilst the causes of environmental 
conflict, rising demand and declining availability are set to continue. 
Effective water management emphasises the need for co-operative political action 
and an integrated management system, 
"based upon ... local governance at the micro level ... larger 
institutions, also 
independent, that severe entire drainage basins not republics [and] institutions at inter- 
republican level (that would address coordination of sectoral priorities, such as the 
balance between agricultural and industrial development and crop diversification. )" 326 
These are clearly politically dependent options, with wider implications to which 
the present regimes may be averse to implementation. It is uncertain whether a 
future incident of competing state claims reaching regional crisis point will result 
in conflict or the implementation of effective interstate co-operation and 
agreements. Clearly, the establishment of institutional structures prior to this 
"crisis point" would enhance a peaceful resolution of such an incident. 
International evidence, particularly from the Middle East where inter-state 
relations are more strained and water supply more acute, suggests that water- 
based conflict is the exception. Co-operation on water issues is attainable as long 
as other more deep-seated political differences can be managed. Inter-state 
relations in Central Asia have been, to date, far less tense than those in the Middle 
East, suggesting co-operation and negotiated settlements of water disputes are 
possible. Future inter-state conflict over water in the region is unlikely. The 
resolution of economic and demographic problems K16tzli believes are essential 
for inter-republican water disputes to remain within the realm of politics rather 
than security. 327 Whilst it appears that these and water-use pressures are unlikely 
to be resolved in the near-future, the probability of interstate conflict over water is 
limited because of the comparable evidence from the Middle East, and the existing 
institutional framework and shared political norms at the elite level in Central 
Asia. Whilst there has been considerable political tensions between all the 
republics, the transition to sovereignty has not been marred by physical 
confrontation over water access. With the possible exception of the lower Amu 
Darya interstate water conflict is unlikely. 
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The sub-state situation is more disturbing and has greater potential for the revival 
of late-Soviet resource conflict because of several water-related and more 
significantly non-water-related issues. The non-water issues explain why acute- 
environmental stress in Karakalpakstan is unlikely to result in conflict, but likely 
to in the Fergana Valley and Zeravshan regions. Whether these sub-state rivalries 
will lead to inter-state conflict is difficult to determine, though historical evidence 
suggest that this is unlikely. The reasons for greater likelihood of sub-state water 
conflict are: 
- The historical precedent of environmental activism, as a form of political protest 
and as a source of group resource competition; 
- Proximity of sub-state actors and resource; and 
- Ineffective sub-state institutions and regulations. 
As described above, Central Asia witnessed a series of water and land related 
inter-ethnic struggles of during the last years of the USSR, and environmentalism 
was used to articulate essentially nationalist political critiques and demands. 
Whilst the antagonistic nationalist dimension of environmentalism has declined 
since the establishment of the independent states, this nexus has not been 
permanently broken, nor the environmental issues resolved. With major 
population growth predicted throughout the region, a continuation of water- 
intensive activities and the possibility of peace in Afghanistan and Tajikistan, 
increased water demands may be liable to lead to the re-emergence of communal 
tensions. 
The immediacy of the actors and resources is to be found on two levels. The first 
is the proximity of the actors to the contested resource. The absence, 
contamination or withdraw of water, by other groups at the communal level is 
immediately and acutely felt, to an extent that is not directly noticeable at the state 
level. At the communal level, the access to alternative resource supplies or 
economic activities are limited. 
The second level is the proximity of the protagonist to each other. Individual 
provinces have witnessed phenomenal population growth rates, for example, 
Jizzak-43%; and Dushanbe-113%, between 1979-89.32' 50% of the region's 
population lives in 20% of its area: the Fergana Valley; the Tashkent-Khojent 
corridor; and along the Zeravshan river between Bukhara and Samarkand. 329 
Water demands will therefore rise but without additional supplies being available. 
203 
Due to the region's heterogeneous and dense demography, particularly in 
Fergana, inter-ethnic communication, and at times competition, is already a 
regular occurrence. "To date, there have been no mass violent manifestations, but 
in a situation of political instability and growing social deprivation, the Fergana 
Valley area with its high population density (308.2 people/km2) could will 
experience open conflict. iMO Communal fissures and competition for scarce 
resources may reinforce each other. 
Existing interstate mechanism may not be able to manage these future local, cross- 
border, water-based conflicts . 
331 Sub-state water disputes have not been provided 
with the same level of institutional regulation as inter-state problems have. Local 
participation in water-management, seen by Klbtzli as essential, has been absent. 
Centre-periphery and inter-ethnic relations are liable to become tense as resource 
scarcity, environmental degradation, burgeoning populations, and lack of 
substantive economic and political reforms combine to increase social tensions 
and provide a source for identification with radical and aggressive political 
activism. The lack of local participation in water-management is symptomatic of 
the limits of regional politics and suggests that communal water-disputes are liable 
to transform into violent conflict, because channels for dialogue and compromise 
are absent. 
Regime legitimacy and capabilities are undermined by environmental degradation 
and attempts to address such troubles, according to findings by the Project on 
Environmental Change and Acute ConfliCt. 332 If a government attempts to deal 
with the situation, resources will have to be diverted from other state activities. 
Should the government fail to act or find itself incapable of resolving such crises, 
its authority and legitimacy may be challenged. Moscow's unwillingness and/or 
inability to act undermined its legitimacy and aided the political elevation of the 
present regimes. Continued lack of political intervention and debate on pressing 
environmental concerns may erode popular support for the new leaderships. 
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5. Islam and Securitv in Central Asia 
5.1. Introduction 
"Power belongs to God, His Apostle and the believers. " 
This chapter aims to explore the relationship between Islam and stability in the 
two republics. The focus will be upon Islam's political application, principally the 
nature and objectives of its political mobilisation, and ideological role in both 
supporting and challenging regime legitimacy. Within the case-study, the focus 
will be upon the government-Islamist relationship and competition for political 
authority and power, both on the physical and ideological planes. The core 
subjects of debate are regime security and the "idea of the state". Whilst the 
theory chapter emphasised the distinction between regime and state, the former is 
the guardian and promoter of the "idea of th6 state. " It is these, the seat of power 
and its ideological foundation, that government and Islamists contest. The latter 
pursue this through political activism, electoral or force, or for neo- 
fundamentalism via a more wholesale social transformation and thus undermining 
"the secular hegemony 'fforn below' ,2 
5.2. Islam, Politics and Securitv: 
The Historical and Theoretical Backeround 
5.2. i. The Historical Ori2ins: When examining this topic, reference to the 
ideological basis of the state and its security implications, discussed in 2.2. ii. d, will 
be of relevance. 
Islam's roots as an organisational ideology can be traced to Mohammed's rule in 
Yathrib (renamed Medina), which began in 622. The Prophet's political authority 
and legitimacy were "based upon his prophetic calling and Koranic mandate. "' 
Islam is an all embracing religion, containing temporal codes of conduct, as well 
as, spiritual guidance. Human existence independent of the religion is denied and 
itpresumes political duties for the believers. ))4 Neither the Koran nor Hadith 
(traditions and sayings of the Prophet) however, provide explicit guidance for 
political authority within the umma (community of believers) and "[flhere is no 
concrete political ... model 
inherent in Islam. "5 Consequently there is considerable 
debate over the political application and implications of Islam. 
The essential tenets of classical Sunni political theory, are: 
- God is the absolute sovereign; 
- The Sharia is the sole source of law and personal morality; 
- Temporal authority serves as God's vice-regent, defends Islam and the Sharia, 
and enable its population to live as good Muslims; and 
- The state in itself has no intrinsic authority or significance. 
However, although not supported by any Islamic political theory a de facto 
6 
autonomous political space has always existed in Muslim history. Abid A] Raziq, 
an Egyptian Muslim secularist, argued that whilst Islamic rules relating to spiritual 
affairs were constant, those relating to temporal affairs are subject to re- 
interpretation in accordance with society's needs. 777 Similarly, Ayubi and 
Vatikiotris individually argue that Islam is not a particularly political religion. 8 
Between the eleventh and twentieth century, with the exception of Ismaili Fatimid 
Egypt, religion and state politics remained autonomous. 9 In opposition, many 
authors argue that the linkage between religion and state are indivisible. 'O 
The nexus between politics and religion is more evident in Shi'ism. 11 Although 
historically an Arab phenomena, Shi'ism was adopted by the Safavid dynasty, in 
sixteenth century Persia. This was a politically motivated action, the establishment 
of an independent and stable state. 12 Shi'ism. has an organised clergy, the ulama 
(mullahs in Persian) influential in the Safavid state, in opposition to the Qajar and 
Pahlavi dynasties and since 1979, involved in government. 13 
Hstorically, strong executive powers have been present in Islamic society, 
originating in Mohammed's leadership followed by that of the caliphs. Some 
critics have argued that there is an intrinsic autocratic character to Islam. The 
religion has frequently been used to legitimising absolute rule by attempting to 
associate political subservience with religious devotion. LevAs has argued that, 
"this sort of justification is also responsible for the prevaifing authoritarianism of 
the 20th (sic] century. " 14 The use of Islam in legitimising a regime is, however, 
frequently problematic. In parallel to the numerous theological interpretations of 
Islam there is also "more than one political language of Islam. "15 Leaderships of 
Muslim states do not have a monopoly over the use of Islam. 16 It also provides a 
critique of Muslim regimes and an ideological focal point for opponents to 
coalesce around. 17 I-Estorically, revolts and successions were frequently regarded 
as religious as well as political events. The constraints and compromises 
necessitated by government diminish the purity of Islamic economic and political 
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maxims. These expedient deviations allow for fundamentalist critiques of the 
administrations. The Muslim-based state may find itself regarded as failing both its 
secular and religious constituent. Should the government be perceived as 
favouring either party this can alienate the other. Central Asia's former 
Communist elites, for example, are still regarded by their Islamic opponents as 
atheists even though the leaderships have symbolically, albeit superficially, 
embraced Islam. 
5.2ji. The Position of Non-Muslim Minorities: In Islamic law, non-Muslim 
(kafir) minorities are regarded as second-class separate communities. Provided 
they are loyal to the state and pay a poll tax they are free to practice their own 
faith and customs. In reality, most Muslim states, however, grant equal citizenship 
irrespective of faith. 
Non-Muslim and members of Muslim sectarian minorities are usually 
apprehensive of Islamist movements. Given the highly specific and frequently 
unorthodox doctrine of political Islam movements, this is understandable. 
Tensions between Muslims and non-Muslims have increased in locations where 
Islamist movements have been expanding and after the establishment of Islamic 
states. 18 Non-Muslim minorities are often perceived as having co-operated and 
benefited from the previous non-Islamic regime. 
Islamic activists also question whether these minorities should be entitled to hold 
influential public positions. This is contrary to the professed non-domination 
selection in most modem Muslim states. Even in these states, in practice, non- 
Muslims are frequently absent ftom. top posts. "This is caused not only by their 
limited numbers but also by government recognition and acceptance of widely 
held traditional attitudes toward the place of non-Muslims in an Islamic-oriented 
state. "'9 In Kazakstan and to a lesser extent Uzbekistan, the previous high 
employment status of non-Muslims has been eroded by preferential treatment of 
the titular population in the post-Soviet employment market. 
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5.3. Contemporarv Islamism 
In this chapter Islamism will be used as a generic term to refer to both political 
Islam and neo-fundamentalism. A distinction should be made between political 
Islam and neo-fundamentalism. The term political Islam indicates its temporal 
and political orientation. Neo-fundamentalism refers to de-politicised social 
activism interested in enhancing popular Islamic consciousness, linked to the 
observance of Islamic practices and benevolent societies, rather than mainstream 
political activism. Beinin and Stork argue that the term findamentalism is 
intellectually located within the Christian Protestant tradition. To apply the term 
fundamentalism to contemporary Islamic thinking they argue is incorrect because 
the Koran is literal. The divine origin of the text is not a subject of debate, only 
interpretations of its application. Fundamentalism also implies a restoration of the 
authentic and original. Contemporary Islamic activists frequently refer to this 
return. This is spurious as their conceptualisation of an Islamic society is novel . 
20 
Islamic movements are difficult to place in a left-fight political dichotomy. 
Revolutionary, democratic, conservative, free-market and centre-led economics 
ideas, for example, have all been incorporated into various Islamic political 
thought and activism. In the twentieth century, the majority of Muslim political 
parties have been moderate, successfully participating within the confines of the 
mainstream political process. 
Political Islam is a product of and reaction to the modernisation of Muslim 
societies . 
2' The intellectual origins of contemporary politicised Islam can be found 
in the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and Pakistani Jamaat-i Islami. These two 
movements and post-1979 Iran have provided the foundation for the ideas, 
structures and themes for most twentieth century Islamic movements. Jarnaat-i 
Islam has been a key influence for the more conservative groups. 
Political Islam is a novel and radical departure ftom mainstream and traditional 
Muslim political thinking. "[The] fundamentalists who base their political ideology 
upon the Sharia have removed this jurisprudence from its historical and political 
context and infused it with "essentialist and everlasting qualitieS. 1122 Political 
Islamist doctrines are based upon a "very selective choice and rather unorthodox 
interpretation of older texts. "23 Where as traditional Muslim jurists "forged a link 
between politics and religion by giving religious legitimacy to political power, " 
contemporary political Islam is seeking to politicise particular interpretations of 
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the religion. 24 It is also a radical departure because it proposes rule by clergy or 
jurists, a concept eschewed by most Muslim states throughout history. The 
Islamic state has traditionally been a nomocracy - the rule of law, in this case the 
Koranic and shariat, rather than a theocracy.. Thus despite claims to authenticity, 
political Islam and in particular the conservative neo-fundamentalism are modern 
constructions and can be traced back to the end of the Ottoman empire, and the 
Indian Islamist thinker and founder of Jamaat-i Islami, Abu al-'Ala Mawdudi and 
Hasan at-Banna, founder of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, both of whom 
were active in the first half of the twentieth century. 25 
The objective of political Islam is the attempt to (re-)introduce the Sharia. 
Islamist opinions diverge on what this means and how this should be achieved. 
The core arguments are, however, relatively coherent and represent a "general 
ideological framework of contemporary Islamic revivalism. 7726 These are: 
1) Din wa Dawla: Religion (din) and state (dawla) are inseparable. The Koran 
provides the law and the state implements it; 
2) Qur'an wa Sunna: Muslims need to return to the early roots of Islam, for 
authenticity and renewal, by the application of the Koran and Sunna (traditions of 
the Prophet and his initial followers); 
3) Puritanism and Social Justice: Divergence between political Islam and neo- 
fundamentalism is most noticeable on this issue; 
4) Allah's Sovereignty and Sharia Rule: The ultimate objective is the 
establishment of God's sovereignty upon earth, through the creation of Islamic 
society; and 
5) Jihad. In order to achieve an Islan-dc society Muslims are allowed to commit 
themselves to action. This requires the destruction of the existing jahiliyya, the 
pre-Islamic society of ignorance and impiety and removal of the authority of 
worldly leaders through thefihad (holy war). 
Dekmejian identifies four Islamist categories. These are: the Gradualist- 
Adaptationist; revolutionary Sunnism; revolutionary Shi'ism; and Messianic- 
Primitivism. The majority of Sunni movements including the Muslim Brotherhood 
are gradualists. These groups are mainly involved in legally recognised political 
activities. Revolutionary Sunnism has a long historical tradition which can be 
traced back to the ninth century. Al-Banna, and Mawdudi can be included in this 
tradition. Shi'ism is more susceptible to radicalism for a number of factors. These 
are: its "sense of history, millenarianism, idea of social justice, the devaluation of 
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temporal power and martyrdom, and its organised clergy's wider read of non- 
Muslim philosophy and politics. 27 Messianic-Primitivism is puritanical and neo- 
fundamentalist in approach and objectives. 28 
Islamist activist have adopted three strategies: 
1) Entry into official mainstream politics; 
2) Re-investment in the social sphere; and, 
3) Formation of small groups, either ultra-orthodox religious movements or 
terrorist groupS. 29 
The ideology and methodology of the movements are also affected by their social 
context and nature of the crisis. The three cover the political Islam - neo- 
fundamentalism continuum. Consensus amongst Islamists is confined to the five 
central tenets. The differences can be seen in the spectrum of groups' 
hermeneutics of the Koran, the Sunna and early Islamic history. There is no clear 
distinction between the two approaches rather a differences of emphasise. Their 
attitudes towards women, the Sharia and politics are the key criteria in 
distinguishing political Islam, such as Khomeini-era Iran, from the conservative 
fundamentalism of Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, for example. Briefly, political 
Islamists see a political role for the faith, women in public life, and the 
implementation of the Sharia following the population's complete adherence to 
the faith. Fundamentalists regard religion's role as principally cultural, restrict 
women's roles in public life and are more insistent upon the immediate application 
of the Sharia . 
30 Neo-fundamentalism places personal piety over politics. 
Roy argues that the political activist of the 1970s has transmuted into neo- 
fundamentalism. He believes that the quest for power has been abandoned by 
most Islamic activists. Existing political and economic values are being challenged 
only in rhetoric and the discourse on the state has been replaced by a discourse on 
society. 3 ' This shift has weakened the faith's political vitality. Neo- 
fundamentalism, which Roy regards as a regression from radical Islam, is more 
reminiscent of a sect "than a society confident about its identity. 02 It is obsessed 
with internal enemies and homogeneity of the community. 33 
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The reasons for neo-fundamentalism's ascendancy and the decline in involvement 
in the body politic, Roy believes, are: 
1) The subordination of politics to morality, within Islam; 
2) The loss of revolutionary direction, a result of Iran's economic difficulties and 
internecine fighting in Afghanistan; and 
3) Cooption of Islamic symbols and movements by Muslim governments. 34 
5.4. Islamism Activist and Crisis 
If Islam is essentially no more political than other religions and its guidance upon 
politics ambiguous, when and why does a politicised form emerge? A common 
feature of Islamist activism and challenges - to Muslim rulers have emerged in 
periods of economic, political and social crises. " Islam has proved to be able to 
resist and react to these problems. During the twentieth century, these common 
themes accompanied by identity-conflicts, legitimacy crises, military impotency 
and cultural uncertainty and state collapse, have influenced the growth of Islamist 
consciousness. 
The Muslim world has confronted issues such as the creation of "nation-states" 
and secular political culture in a far shorter timespan than western Europe. From a 
neo-fundamentalist perspective 
"modernity ... appears to 
be the polite name for an authority that protects an 
alien project on native soil, where as the [Islamist] call for authenticity appears 
to be a means to negate such an authority and deprive it of legitimacy., 
36 
Political Islam and more significantly neo-fundamentalism provide a reassuring 
identity, a response "to the confusion and aniciety of modernity and a challenge to 
repressive and corrupt regimes. 3)37 The failure of Muslim states' 
modernisation/state-building projects and contemporary Western (secular) 
dominance over the triumphs of classical Islamic cultural and political history, 
have created a sense of dislocation. Islamism calls to reclaim a lost identity and 
moral purpose and provides a substitute to kinship, security and "cultural 
authenticity. 08 This is particularly acute amongst the neo-fundamentalist 
approach. These attributes have applied to disposed groups affected by modernity 
and transition, including rural-urban migrants. 
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As well as indicating the secularism's failure to become the accepted ideology of 
Muslim society, Islamism responds to the Muslim governments' difficulties in 
implementing the modernist and secular objectives. " Initially, states such as 
Algeria and Egypt were relatively successful in providing both material and 
subjective benefits to their populations, whilst countering dependency on external 
states and ideologies through modernisation and nationalist policies. Reversals in 
these projects enabled political Islam to offer a viable alternative. This implies 
Islamism is a long-term problem in Central Asia, once the initial "successes" of 
Kazakstan and Uzbekistan secular policies and state-building falter. 
Modernisation in the Muslim world has been rapid and uneven. Economic 
inequalities have provided a receptive audience for Islamism's politicised form of 
Islamic social justice. Economic disparity has been influential in gamering support 
for political Islam in Algeria, Egypt and Morocco, for example. The rise of the 
Islamic Salvation Front is associated with Algeria's serious economic crisis -a 
20% inflation rate, 25% unemployment rate, and 70% of its population below the 
age of 25 . 
40 As with the case of environmental security, the issue of relative 
deprivation has been perceived as a cause of political instability in Muslim 
societies, particularly enhanced by the low levels of social mobility. 
41 In fact, 
Dekmejian links social-economic injustice, official corruption and the lack of 
cohesive state identities as the prime (combined) cause of the crisis of legitimation 
in Muslim stateS. 42 The rise in Islamic activities has been closely associated with 
urbanisation. At the time of the 1979 Revolution, 50% of Iran's total population 
was urban. The growth of Islamic politics accompanied similar demographic 
trends in late- I 980s Algeria, Egypt and Morocco. 43 
The rapid social-economic transformation which has provided Islamic activism 
with a cause also helps explain the social composition of its support. The urban 
supporters of political Islam differ from the traditional urban community. In 
Muslim urban areas social structures have been weakened as old and influential 
families and communities have moved to the suburbs, being replaced by the new 
rootless migrants. The lack of traditional soci*al structures and the state's failure to 
organise the cultural and political space and infrastructure of these new 
communities has allowed for Islamist organisations to develop. Unions and left- 
wing political movements, regarded as bourgeois in orientation, have not been 
able to penetrate these communities, whose employment is unreliable, short-term 
and menial. A social and political niche has been filled by the Islamist movements. 
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The movements' memberships are predominantly the recently urbanised, 
educated, middle-strata, and youthful. With the exception of Iran, Islamist 
movements are lead by young educated men rather than the clergy. They are rivals 
to the ulamas who have compromised themselves by their association with 
temporal authorities. This is bome out by Ansairi's work on the Egyptian Jihad 
44 movement. Jihad's members were recent arrivals to the peripheral regions of 
Cairo and inhabitants of Upper Egypt, the pre-migration home of the majority of 
its Cairene members. (See Table 5.1. and 51) 
Table 5.1. Distribution of Jihad Members bv Occuu)ation. (by Percenta2e) 
Occupation Percentage 
Students 43.9 
Workers 14.6 
Professionals 12.5 
Unemployed 10.7 
Shopkeepers 5.7 
Government officials 5.4 
Police and Military 5.0 
Farmers 2.2 
Total 199NAM I 
Source: Ansairi, H. "The Islamic Militants in Egyptian Politics" International 
Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 16, No 1, March 1984, p 133. Quoted 
Piscatori, J. P. Islam in the Political Process, RHA/CUP, Cambridge, 1983, p 
163. (The figures are based upon arrests after the assassination of Sadat. ) 
Table 5.2. Distribution of Mad Members by Aze. (bv Percentaj! e) 
Age Percentage 
<20 17.5 
21-30 70.0 
31-40 10.7 
>40 1.8. 
Total 100% (28QI 
Source: Ansairi, H. op cit. 
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This new "middle class" provides the majority of political Islam's adherents. This 
is because of their relative expansion in size in comparison to the newly 
industrialised-urban proletariat, who would normally be expected to be a major 
political constituent. The former group have been susceptible to radicalisation 
even though they are essentially conservative because of their middle-class 
aspirations for upward mobility and fears of downward mobility. 45 Raised and 
then dashed expectations for education, employment and social advancement have 
encouraged support for political Islam. Because of their social aspirations and 
previously modestly successful lives, they have been highly sensitive to such 
negative trends. Roy calls this social concern a fear of "reproletarization., )46 The 
lower middle class merchants, conservative by nature, are attracted to the 
ideology because of poor or arbitrary ec9nomic policies and their frequent 
exclusion from profitable sectors controlle *d 
by members of the ruling clique. 
Unemployment, overpopulation, poor conditions, alienation and social "descent" 
have affected these newly urbanised, ambitious groups, as have archaic power 
structures which restrict the social mobility of the aspirant educated. This issue 
has relevance for the Soviet-educated population (both Russian and indigenous) 
who have lost prestigious employment and stable living standards in the post- 
Soviet states. 
Islamic movements have not been successful in attracting the industrial proletariat 
nor agrarian workers. The least educated and most traditional sections of society 
are least involved in political Islam. 47 Political Islam has little attraction in rural 
area, where forms of neo-fundamentalism and populist Islamic practices such as 
Sufism are more significant. 
The transformation from political Islam. to neo-fundamentalism has been 
associated with a deterioration in the intellectual qualities of ideology and 
leadership. Since the 1970s, activists have had a less intellectual background, 
because of declining education standards, overcrowded universities and the 
replacement of academic linguaftanca (i. e. colonial) with titular languages in 
many universities . 
48 The new activists are mix of graduates, especially from 
technical colleges, and secondary school educated individuals. Members of this 
generation are more likely to be neo-fundamentalists than political radicals, 
partially because they are less Westernised than the previous activistS. 
49 
"Intellectual research ... already 
deficient in the Islamist movement, is absent from 
neo-fundamentalism and has been replaced by fideism, a reliance on faith. "50 The 
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activis& greater involvement in preaching than politics has also diminished the 
intellectual vigour of the moment. 
Training of activists takes place in independent madrasas (Islamic schools), 
separate from state-sponsored institutes. Private organisations funded these 
madrasas, frequently with external support from Saudi Arabia through 
intermediary groups such as the World Muslim League, Muslim Brotherhood and 
Tablighi Jamaat. During the Afghan Civil War, for example, new mullahs were 
recruited from refugee camps in Pakistan, sometimes trained in Saudi Arabia. 
Returned to the camps they supplanted the older generation of Islamist militants 
such as Ahmad Shah Massoud. 51 The rise of these new activists highlights 
government concerns about the threat from exterrially-supported groups and 
inter-generation conflict over restricted social mobility. 
Although neo-fundamentalism is not explicitly involved in politics, compromise or 
accommodation between it and secular government is more difficult to achieve, if 
not impossible, than between government and political Islam. This suggests that 
states confronted by neo-fundamentalist opposition, which is more susceptible to 
grassroots support and populist sentiments than political Islam, may find that any 
political confrontation will be less resolvable. In defence of the strength of neo- 
fundamentalism, Roy states that its degradation of political Islam has enabled it to 
appeal to communities that are less receptive to an explicit political approach. 
5.5. The Islamist Challenge And The State's Response 
The government-Islamist debate is influenced by three factors, according to 
Dekmejian: government policies, external stimuli and the n-fflitant's own objectives 
and capabilities. 52 In the struggle between the Muslim government and Islamist 
opposition, the latter has several advantages. As a political challenge, the 
nebulous nature of the Islamist ideology is useful, a self-sufficient discourse which 
"ignores political issues in favour of advancing a politicised religious manifesto. "" 
Islamist opposition is able to use a particular interpretation of the religion and the 
Sharia as a means of evaluating the Muslim government's legitimacy. 54 This 
enables it to attack the regime on its own ideological ground, forcing the 
government to engage in debate according to the Islamist discourse. It is, 
ideologically and spiritually, an asymmetrical struggle with the government tainted 
by the expedient compromises of temporal power, including accusations of 
corruption and apostasy. The Islamist opposition is unburdened by the legacy of 
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governance and as yet the potential failures or compromises of political 
participation. Unlike its opponent, the "moderrC' secular nationalist Muslim state, 
political Islam and neo-fundamentalism do not (necessarily) offer a social- 
economic manifesto. Rather it can remain concerned with non-material issues - 
the protection of Islamic norms. 
Islamist movements because of this nebulous political basis draw together 
disparate groups with different social attitudes and political objectives, who share 
"a sense of alienation, a quest for authenticity, and demand for the enforcement of 
public morals. "" The lack of intellectual coherence and the different political 
assumptions and objectives of the Islamist supporters becomes more apparent as 
the movement becomes more deeply immersed in politics and expected to 
produce policy decisions and solutions rather than simply critique the existing 
system. 
As the conflict is essentially an ideological one, the dissemination of information is 
an important factor. The material is often produced by internationally active 
groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood, Jamaat-i Islam and World Muslim 
League. Its audience is large but usually poorly educated, a factor which Roy 
believes enables the blurring of the distinction between political Islam and neo- 
fundamentalism. 56 Muslim Brotherhood literature, translated into Russian, 
distributed through the Afghanistan mujaheddin bases in Peshawar, found its way 
into Soviet Central Asia. 57 
In response to the Islamist challenge, governments vvith large Muslim populations 
have adopted different strategies. These include: 
- The integration of moderate Islamist parties into the political process, without 
granting them any particular concessions, forcing the Islamist parties to become 
involved in the temporal and compromise-oriented nature of politics; 
- Ideological concession towards the re-Islamisation of society, without allowing 
Islamist parties a role in politics, attempting to undercut their raison dWre; and 
- No concessions at all because the state ideology and Islamism are 
incompatible. " 
Moderate groups and the official-sponsored clergy have been employed to divide 
the Muslim community and remove support from independent and radical 
elements. The official clergy have been used as a means of regulating and utilising 
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the religion. State sponsored Islamic universities, madrasas and appointments to 
muftiates have all been part of this process. Governments can use the mainstream 
religious body to demonstrate that radical Islamic opponents are beyond the 
consensus Qjma ) of the Sunni community. " 
Incorporation of political Islamist parties into the country's political process has 
demonstrated they are as susceptible "to the vagaries of electoral preference" as 
are other partieS. 60 Involvement and acceptance of electoral process has shown 
that "Islamic ideology can be tempered by realpolifik. ,6' Their integration into 
mainstream politics is not therefore necessarily altruistic. It forces Islamist 
movements to compete in the "marketplace of ideas" and promise and provide, if 
politically successful, political and material goods. When Islamists achieve 
political power they are then confronted with economic and political issues, which 
their rigid dogmatic approach, wielded effectively in opposition, have frequently 
avoided. Provision of economic and social goods will ultimately determine their 
success and survival. If political Islam is to be successful in the body politic it has 
to ultimately replace its populist rhetoric with pragmatic policies. 62 
Wider political reforms including the creation of secular and moderate Muslim 
parties can also be used to channel support from Islamist groups. Such policies 
were temporarily implemented in Egypt after Sadat's assassination. President 
Mubarak weakened support for the Islamic opposition through a combination of 
security measures, lenient treatment of moderate Islamic opponents, and limited 
relaxation on press restrictions. Moderate sedular groups were also encouraged to 
63 expand, in order to split the opposition camp. In Central Asia it is debatable 
whether such a policy will be effective as secular parties have limited appeal. 
Tal argues that governments should also acknowledge the positive role Islamists 
can have in political and social affairs. They can provide educational and medical 
functions that the state is unable or unwilling to offer. The apolitical neo- 
fundamentalists are highly suitable for such roles. 64 A key issue in this debate is 
whether the state is willing to accept these non-state actors and able to coopt 
them. 
Political, economic and social reform, is also advanced by Dekmejian, as key 
response to the Islamist challenge, as it is the crisis in these spheres that has 
provided the environment for its emergence and saliency. Many governments are 
unwilling or unable to implement such comprehensive reforms. 
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"When all outlets for political expression are closed, extren-tism is only a step 
away. By forcing Islamist to operate outside the system instead of addressing 
the legitimate grievances they raise - poverty, corruption, lack of political 
accountability - rulers ... only build support 
for their adversaries. As the 
Jordanian experience illustrate, bringing Islamist into government is the best 
way of eroding the mystique of opposition. " 
65 
The Jordanian case indicates that cooption and inclusion are far more effective 
means of managing political Islam than repression. 66 The case provides lessons for 
other governments. Regimes should recognise the heterogeneity of Islamism and 
adopt a range of approaches to different movements: cooption, assimilation and 
legal status for moderate and popular movements for example; and repression and 
counter-insurgency measure against avowed terrorist organisations, rather than 
label all groups as a fundamentalist threats and implement wholesale repression. 
As Hadar notes "[tlhe crusade against political Islam is in danger of becoming a 
self-fulfilling prophecy. )767 
5.6. Conclusion: The viability of the threat 
Dekmejian and Roy are sceptical about political Islam's ability to accumulate 
popular support and ultimate success due to its intellectual exclusivity, extremism 
and intellectual paucity. 68 Islamism has serious deficiencies as an effective 
challenge to existing Muslim governments. These are: 
- Nebulous and impractical objectives; Its intellectual incoherence attracts 
diverse 
support but is only a temporary advantage. 
- Its frequent extremism in both method and objectives; Militancy and the 
objective of a sharia-based society have alienated mass Muslim support. Many 
Muslims in principle favour some form of enhanced social role for the religion but 
are apprehensive of n-fflitant behaviour and the complete implementation of the 
Sharia. The violence and chaos of Afghanistan and TaJikistan, combined with the 
biased nature of information in Central Asia about Muslim movements in these 
states may also dissuade support from political Islam in the region. 
- The failure of the revolutionary path; The vigour and inspiration of the Iranian 
revolution has foundered upon economic difficulties; Sunni extremists have 
marginalised themselves; and Shi'a radicals groups become the instruments of 
state interests, Iran and Syria. 
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- Islamism de-politicisation; Neo-fundamentalism's populist and conservative 
moral and social agenda lacks the cursory ideological underpinning of political 
Islam. 
- Its failure to establish unified pan-faith political activism; It has not provide an 
ideological trans-national movement. Instead it has worked on two levels, as a 
domestic form of protest against individual governments and as an agent of 
external sponsors, notably Iran, Pakistan and Syria. 
This pan-national character is central but ambiguous in understanding the security 
implications of the ideology. Its trans-national nature, characterised by the umma 
enhances the domestic-intemational nexus and increases regime's perception of 
acute insecurity because of link between international and domestic opponents. 
Islamists frequently regard nationalism as un-Islamic and claim to seek the 
termination of nation-state system. Where as states and governments are 
legitimated by sovereignty and self-determination, political Islam does not 
necessarily acknowledge this and the state has no intrinsic value other than 
advance and protect the believers. Neo-traditionalists, such as Mawdudi, and 
modemisers, including Iqbal, perceived nationalism as an instrument of 
colonialism and means of dividing Muslim unity. '9 Modem nationalism is opposed 
because of its western secular origins rather than its organisational division of the 
umma, which had always existed . 
70 Islam's trans-nationalism is circumspect, 
however. Although independent Islamism movements and governments support 
organisations throughout the umma, e. g. Iranian involvement in Afghanistan, 
Saudi Arabian support for Sunni fundamentalism, this does not presuppose a 
trans-national political identity or solidarity. Islamic and Muslim states have 
attempted to establish pan-Islamic co-operation, when it serves their own state 
interests, whilst retaining their own state identities, rather than strive for political 
unity. Indigenous Kazakstani and especially Uzbekistani interest in the religion 
and foreign religious assistance poses intriguing questions. The alleged 
associations between Afghan and Tajik Islamists with the Islamic opposition in 
Uzbekistan has allowed Karimov to link outside conflicts with domestic political 
dissent. Domestic opposition groups have been marginalised by this relationship. 
However, although nationalism is ideologically incompatible with Islam, most, and 
all successful, political Islam movements have been confined to the territorial 
boundaries of individual sovereign states. 71 Roy believes it is more appropriate to 
examine the present manifestation of political Islam as a series of Islamo- 
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nationalist movements with common traits than a unified pan-Muslim 
72 
movement. Ethnic, sectarian, regional and national divisions within the umma 
appear to be resistant to calls for Islamic solidarity and are recognised, by 
Muslims, as political and sociological features. "This imaginary solidarity still has 
the power to mobilise popular support ... 
[although] it cannot provide the basis 
,, 73 for an international Islamic union. 
The Islamic revolution and state may be politically ineffective, but as an 
instrument for mobilisation and opposition political Islam has continued 
significance. 74 Whilst Roy professes that political Islam is not a coherent or 
effective political force or threat and that any Islamist victory will be superficial 
and short-term, he concludes that the "illusions it creates will not be without 
effects . 'M These he, however, suggests are related to the neo-flandamentalist 
ambitions in the social sphere rather than political consequences. 76 
Ultimately, the political success of political Islam in attaining positions of 
governance is dependent upon the existing governments ability to manage major 
economic crises, made worse by burgeoning and youthful populations and the 
political acumen of the Islamists rather than religious piety. 77 To be politically 
successful Islamists have had to accept compromise with the state and win 
popular support. Neo-fundamentalism's preoccupation with social and individual 
piety would suggest that success will be the exception. It is impossible to isolate 
political Islam's political salience from the social and economic conditions as it is 
a response to and functions within. States have proved on the whole, resilient to 
the Islamic challenge, mixing compromise and selective repression in order to 
counter this opponent. 
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The Case-Studies 
5.7. Introduction 
Islam has been crucial in Central Asian affairs because of its universalist character. 
The Muslim tradition of large families, for example, has had implications for 
resource competition and was previously a source of contention between the 
Soviet centre and the Muslim peripheries. 
After discussing the historical context of Islam in Central Asia, the case-study will 
examine the political and security implications of the Islamic "revival" through 
three key arenas. These are: 
- The popular and cultural revival in Islarn in Central Asia since the 1980s; 
- The manner in which the two governments have approached the religion for 
their own purposes, including regime legitimacy and state-building, the role of the 
officially sanctioned clergy and their response to independent Islamist trends; and 
- The development of independent Islamism in the region. This will include the 
political methods and objectives adopted, popular support, the implications of the 
wars in Afghanistan and Tajikistan, and the influence and contacts that extra- 
regional Islamist actors have established. 
The previous review of contemporary research on Islamic politics in the Middle 
East has relevant parallels which can be drawn upon for this case-study. Common 
features include political modernisation afid secularisation, the post-colonial 
situation, economic modernisation and inequalities, high birth-rates and the 
weakness of civil society. 
5.7. i. Religious adherence in Kazakstan and Uzbekistan: The majority of 
Central Asia's Muslims are Hanafi Sunnis. The regional dominance of this 
doctrinal school may have considerable implications for local acceptance of 
political Islam and neo-fundamentalism. Hanafi theology is regarded as a liberal, 
"tolerant belief system. , 78 It views "'[d]ifference of opinion in the community as a 
token of divine mercy' ... 
[a principle which] unequivocally places the Hanafi. 
school farthest away from the conservative or dogmatic understanding of 
Islam. "79 Hanafi theology may in fact preclude neo-fundamentalism's call:, for-a 
"return to orthodoxy" because it accepts that the transitions in socio-econorme, 
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conditions. In Central Asia, it has allowed for the incorporation of pre-Islamic 
customs. 
Sufi brotherhoods have had considerable political, social and spiritual role in the 
region. Sufi membership is selective, frequently based upon clan lineage. The 
Naqshbandi is the most widespread brotherhood. Its present core areas are 
Bukhara and Samarkand, the Fergana Valley, (as well as eastern and southern 
Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan). It has proved adept at accommodating changing 
social and political situations. The Qadiryya retains a greater presence in the 
Fergana Valley. There is a small but growing Wahhabi community in the Fergana 
Valley. " 
Shi'ism has a small presence in the region. There are Shi'ite communities in 
Bukhara, Samarkand and Tashkent and 300,000-400,000 Ismailis in Gorno- 
Badakhshan. According to Roy, the Ismailis are highly secularised and have little 
interest in religious practice. 81 
Muslim proclivity in Kazakstan follows a north-south division. This characteristic 
is influenced by the South's historical association with sedentary Muslim Uzbeks, 
and the latter abandonment of nomadic life in the north, complemented by the 
influx of Slav, Christian settlers. Shyrnkent and Qyzlorda oblasts, bordering 
Uzbekistan, and containing large Uzbek minorities, are the most religiously 
devout of Kazakstan's provinces. 75% of Shymkent's 2 million inhabitants and 
80% of Qyzlorda's 0.25 million population claim to be practising MUSliM. 12 
Even in Uzbekistan, where Islam has had the most developed and widespread 
impact, regional variations in adherence exist. The Fergana Valley, most notably 
the cities of Andijon and Namangan are "considered the bastion of Islamic 
activism in the whole of Central Asia. "" Andijon viloyet has recorded a 75% 
figure for practising Muslims, Namangan 47%, and Fergana 41%. This compares 
to a 25% figure for Tashkent and 13-20% in western Uzbekistan. 
Karakalpakistan, with a strong Sufi tradition, and Bukhara and Samarkand, with 
their considerable Islamic heritage, are also noticeable for their strong religiosity. 
Approximately 40% of the latter two and Syr Darya viloyets' population claim to 
be practising MUSliMS. 84 Atheism is far more prevalent in urban regions of both 
republics. 
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5.8. The Historical Role of Islam in Central Asian Politics and Security 
5.8. i. The Arrival of Islam in Central Asia: Muslim Arabs first crossed the 
Amu Darya in 651, laying siege to Merv. Their defeat of the Chinese at the battle 
of Talas, 75 1, saw the Arab-Islamic hegemony secured. Between the eighth and 
fourteenth centuries, the faith spread throughout the region. Its adoption was 
more rapidly and comprehensively accepted in the settled Transoxanian 
communities than amongst the nomads. From the ninth to the sixteenth centuries, 
Transoxania was the third most important region of Muslim culture and leaming. 
Islamic art, culture and sciences flourished under the region's succession of 
dynasties. 
Later geographic and political isolation, particularly after the eclipse of the Silk 
Road by maritime routes, led to Islam in the khanates becoming conservative and 
authoritarian in character. Islam was entrenched in the khanates' political and 
social affairs. In Bukhara, Islam was both the ideological basis of the regime, and 
the only social force autonomous of the emirate's authority and thus a potential 
balance to it. 85 
Buddhism, Shamanism and Zoroastrism retained cultural and spiritual value for 
the nomads even after their nominal conversion. Orthodox practices and rituals 
including the role of the imam and mosque could not be easily incorporated into 
the nomadic lifestyle. By the tenth century, what is now central and southern 
Kazakstan were nominally Islamic. Proximity to Transoxania and the existence of 
Khoja Ahmet Yasavi's tomb (the founder of a Sufi sect successful in converting 
the Kazaks) at Turkestan, meant that Islam was adopted more wholesale in this 
region than in northern Kazakstan. The superficial adherence to the religion, its 
combination with older religious practices, and the north-south division are still 
noticeable and significant in the republic. 
5.8ji. Islam in the Tsarist and Soviet Periods: Tsarist expansion in the region 
did not dramatically alter its religious life. Russian imperialist policies, in fact, 
sought to increase the Kazaks' affiliation witfi Islam. Tatar missionaries were used 
to proselyte the faith and civilise the Kazaks, in order to incorporate the nomads 
into the empire more effectively. The policy had limited success, only a small 
member of the Kazak elite were converted and Russified. 86 
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After the nineteenth century annexation of the khanates, Tsarist policy did not 
attempt to disrupt traditional religious structures. This was a lesson from previous 
anti-Muslim policies by St Petersburg which had strengthened Islam 
consciousness and resistance in the empire. 87 
The political and economic crises of late-Tsarist Russia produced Muslim 
reformist groups in the region, influenced 
by Tatar pan-Islamic and pan-Turkic 
activists. A distinct character which emerged amongst Turkestan's reformist 
circles was the promotion of a common and unified Turkestani identity. A major 
movement in the region was Jadidism (usul-i jadid - Arabic for new education) 
founded by Tatar intellectuals. This secular Muslim movement sought wholesale 
political and social reform. Its objectives and organisational weakness bear close 
resemblance to contemporary political Islamic movements. Politically, the Jadidist 
sought to elevate the position of the most deprived and least integrated members 
of Turkestan's society. However, their aims and political success were 
constrained by the capricious nature of its supporters and the privileged and 
conservative background of its leadership. Also active in nineteenth century 
Central Asia were a small number of Turkish-trained Shiites. Their contact with 
88 Turkey imbued them with an avowed anti-Russian stance. 
Traditionally, Shi'a and Sunni communities in the region had co-existed. Relations 
between them soured in the late-nineteenth century for political reasons. Emir 
Abd at-Ahad of Bukhara sought to undermine the Uzbek chieftains' position by 
appointing Farsi-speaking Shi'ites. The ruling Uzbek Sunni elites grew fearful of 
losing their political power whilst madrasa students saw their employment 
opportunities decline. In 1910, tensions led to anti-Shi'ite pogroms. Russian 
troops had to be used to restore order. 
The balance that Muslim leaders have to master between secularism and 
modernism, and placating traditional Muslim expectations was demonstrated 
during this period with the Sufi-led revolt against Khan Isfendiyar of Khiva. The 
khan's reformist policies, influenced by his Russian protectors, administrative 
corruption and personal immoral behaviours (mild - consisting of the introduction 
of alien objects such as a cinema) were declaimed as violations of the Sharia. '9 
Medieval Islamic jurisprudence was drawn upon in an attempt to incite his Muslim 
subjects overthrow the khanate. 90 The political and material connections between 
the Khivan government and kafir Moscow, may prove a salutary lesson for the 
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present regional elites, attempting to placate international duties with the interests 
of their Muslim citizens. 
In the aftermath of the 1905 revolt, nationalist Muslim groups were formed. With 
the 1916 rebellion which swept throughout Central Asia, these groups became 
engaged in anti-Russian activities. The rebellion was the coalescence and 
culmination of several issues: mobilisation of Muslims for second-line units; 
unequal legal status; the loss of agricultural lands - emancipated serf colonisation 
of the northern pastoral areas resulted in environmental degradation of the 
remaining lands, and absentee Russian landlords in the south; and peasant 
hardship. The revolt only lasted a few weeks in Transoxania, although it 
continued on the Steppe until the February 1917 Revolution. 
After the February 1917 Revolution, an alliance between some Muslim 
nationalists, conservative ulema groups and the elites of the khanates, especially 
in Kokand, was forged in the Basmachi revolt. 91 (Liberal Muslim groups 
cooperated with the Provincial and Bolshevik governments to varying degrees and 
often for purely tactical purposes. ) It has been estimated that upto 18,000 rebels 
were involved in Basmachi activities, particularly concentrated in the Fergana 
Valley, Lokay, Bukhara and around Khiva. 92 A jihad was proclaimed by some 
combatants. The Sufi brotherhoods were influential within the Basmachi 
movements. They had provided similar organisational and leadership functions for 
previous fihads. 9' The Basmachi were, however, localised and disunited. The 
causes of the rebellion were similar to the 1916 revolt: economic hardships; 
Soviet food-requisitions; and the continued mobilisation of Muslim conscripts. As 
famine increased in the region, so did support for the Basmachi. The objectives of 
those involved were broad. These ranged *from limited autonomy to complete 
independence and the creation of an Islamic Turkestan. This is understandably as 
the participants ranged from the En-ýr of Bukhara, to Enver Pasha and landless 
dektanes. 
From 1922 Moscow responded with political, as well as, military initiatives to 
undermine the rebels support. The kazi (religious courts) were temporarily re- 
established, waqf lands returned and taxes reduced by 50%. A series of land and 
94 
water rights reforms were also implemented . 
The Bolsheviks were concerned 
about the ideological challenge that pan-Islam and pan-Turkism posed in the 
region. The combination, an united Muslim opposition from within and without, it 
was feared would prevent the consolidation process of the USSR. 
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Accommodation with Islam, expedient in* the Civil War, was reversed with 
Stalin's elevation to First Secretary in 1924. In 1927, Sharia courts and madrasas 
were phased out and waqf lands confiscated. Soviet secular schools began to 
replace Islamic educational establishments. Religion was restricted to the 
performance of religious rites and rituals. Repression escalated throughout the 
1930's. 
A modest liberalisation took place during the Great Patriotic War, chiefly as a 
means of bolstering popular support for the war. Four Muslim Spiritual 
Directorates were established. Tashkent was the location for the Muslim Spiritual 
Directorate for Central Asia and Kazakstan (DUMSAK). Its Mufti was the de 
facto head of all Soviet Muslims. 95 The establishment of four directorates may 
indicate Moscow's concern over a united Soviet Muslim community with a sole 
institutional representing their interests, a potential rival to its authority. The 
Directorate's roles as an officially sanctibned organ and supporter of the 
Communist regime resulted in Islamist criticisms. The principle criticism was its 
dependency upon a militant atheist regime. Nepotism also enhanced criticism of 
the organisation. 
Anti-religious drives were more piecemeal after 1953. Khrushchev re-instigated a 
short-term offensive between 1960-4. Anti-Muslim policies were increased again 
in 1979 after the Iranian revolution and the invasion of Afghanistan. Moscow was 
concerned about their implications on its Muslim republics. A key concern of 
Moscow was the infiltration of external and proscribed ideas. To some extent 
these apprehensions were justified. Under the example of the Iranian revolution, 
Central Asian Muslim demanded greater religious freedoms and undertook a 
series of anti-Soviet demonstrations, with Islamic characteristics, in Alma-ata, 
Dushanbe, and other cities in 1979-80.96 Consequently, Moscow sought to isolate 
its Muslim community from the wider umma and responded with three policies: 
political support, on the international stage, for Iran's anti-imperialist victory; 
enhanced security in the southern republics and along their borders with 
Afghanistan and Iran; and increased anti-Muslim propaganda in Central Asia. 97 
These measures failed to significantly reduce the regional influence of 
domestically and externally sourced Islam. 9' Islamic propaganda and material 
infiltrated Soviet Central Asia principally from Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan. 
Atkin is, however, unsure to what extent there was a direct correlation between 
the proximity to Islamic information and states, and the religious revival in Central 
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Asia. Soviet media and political interest in the religious revival in the Tajik SSR 
did not focus particularly upon the border regions. '9 
Under Gorbachev's leadership, initially a. strongly anti-religious agenda was 
pursued. A speech the First Secretary made in Tashkent, 1986, was so 
inflammatory it was not published in full. 100 In the reshuffle of regional 
nomenklatura numerous officials were removed for tolerating religious activities, 
as well as, allegations of corruption, and nationalist attitudes. In a six months 
period, 53 members of the Uzbek CP members were expelled for "organizing 
religious rituals and taking part in them. "'01 
By 1989, however, Islam was afforded a more positive official status. Its ethical 
stance on social justice, crime, drugs, alcoholism and corruption were recognised 
as "Useful Points of Collaborationý' as the title of a Kommunist Uzbekislana 
article recorded. 102 There was also a volte face in republican elites' attitudes 
towards Islam. They realised its intellectual and political challenge but also the 
opportunities it offered, in replacement of the crumbling ideological foundation of 
the USSR. Opposition had to be accommodated and coopted if the leaderships 
were to retain their position and legitimacy. . 
With the deepening of glasnost, however, independent Muslim criticism of the 
secular state and coopted official clergy grew. State-sponsored Islamic institutions 
and individuals became the targets of increasingly confident Islamist movements. 
Genuinely spontaneous demonstrations in Tashkent, December 1988, forced the 
removal of the Chief Mufti of the DUMSAK, Shamsuddin Babakhanov, in 
February 1989, accused of licentiousness. This was "possibly the first and only 
direct public attack on the legitimacy of the official clerical establishment in 
Central Asia. " 103 Olcott sees the appointment of his replacement, Muhammad 
Sadiq Muhammad Yusuf, as nothing less than a "rebellion by believers" organised 
by an independent and informal movement, Islam and Democracy. 104 The popular 
strength of Islam was duly noted by Karimov. 
Tashkent initially thought Yusuf would prove a complaint ally. He was brought in 
to give the government credibility. He was a member of a delegation led by the 
First Secretary which visited the Fergana Valley after the anti-Meskhetian 
violence of May-June 1989. It became apparent, however, that he was more 
independent than Tashkent had expected, speaking on behalf of further reform. 
Elected to the Uzbek Supreme Soviet he declared, at its second session, June 
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1990, that the region's ethnic groups were a single Muslim people, a view not 
endorsed by Karimov's increasingly nationalist objectives. 105 Yusuf was latter 
forced to resign due to loss of government and popular support. (See 5.10. ii. ) 
Despite seventy years of government suppression, including the physical attack on 
the personnel and material of Islam, it was never eliminated from the daily life of 
Central Asia. This was acknowledged by -a 1989 CPSU Central Committee 
Institute of Scientific Atheism of the Academy of Social Sciences survey which 
stated that, 
'ta comparatively extensive practice of traditions, festival and rites among all 
socio-demographic groups of the population [continues], ... which indicates ... 
a mass basis for Islam's continued existence in the USSR. " 
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These activities were most evident in rural areas. Regional Communist elites 
tolerated and even participated in these. In 1963, whilst there was only 33 
officially registered Muslim prayer houses in Kyrgyz SSR, there were an 
estimated 200 unregistered prayer groups in existence. 107 This independent 
religious activity has been referred to as parallel Islam. One source claims that by 
1989,10,000 people directly involved in parallel Islam, and their influence was 
probably far greater than their numbers suggested. "' The survival of parallel 
Islam in Soviet Central Asia indicates the difficulty if not impossibility of 
government attempts to control this arena of *society, autonomy, through the most 
repressive measures. 
5.9. The Contemporary Revival 
5.9. i. Introduction: The revival in regional interest in Islam has been 
multifaceted. The events surrounding the fall of Mufti Babakhanov, mirrored in 
Kazakstan, exemplified this range of issues: increased government attempts in 
coopting and regulating the religion; attempts by the state-sanctioned clergy to 
increase their own autonomy and authority; and the presence and influence of 
independent interest in the religion. 
5.9. H. The Popular Revival: A considerable element of the revival has been 
benign, a genuine and popular return to Muslim cultural and spiritual traditions. 
This has been encouraged by the governments as a means of national 
consolidation. Official support has not been ihe principle force behind this trend. 
The revival in Islam can be illustrated through the fortunes of the region's 
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mosques. In 1912 there were in excess of 26,000 mosques. This was reduced to a 
nadir of only approximately 450 official mosques in 1976. The resurgence in the 
late 1980s and 1990s saw approximately 10,000 mosques being recorded in 1995, 
half of which were in Uzbekistan. '09 During 1991,10 mosques were opened per 
day in Central Asia. "0 
The real political and spiritual adherence of those professing Islamic beliefs is 
unclear. Ambiguity towards faith is evident in many social surveys. Lubin's work 
shows that within the titular groups there are substantial number of people who 
claim to be believers. (See Table 5.3) In terms of numbers, Derluguan and 
Tabyshalieva claim that the number of pýactising believers did not increase 
between 1986-96.1" Others have even suggested there was a decline in religious 
adherence. One argument for this has been that the novelty and fashionablity of 
faith may have dissipated. If this interpretation is correct, it indicates a 
superficiality to religious belief and probably its political and social implications. 
Another more politically oriented explanation, for Uzbekistan specifically, is that 
the faithful have become jaded and disillusioned with the corruption and state- 
apologist dimensions of the official clergy, which includes blessings for President 
Karimov in the Friday prayers. 112 This implies a degree of political and religious 
autonomy and the potential for increased popular support for the independent 
sector. 
The depth of religious knowledge among many believers has been circumspect. A 
third of "practising" Muslims in Uzbekistan and two thirds in Kazakstan were 
unable to correctly translate "there is no God other but Allah, and Mohammad is 
his prophet" from Arabic. A fifth of the Kaz? tkstani Muslims respondents did not 
even agree with this fundamental tenet. 113 
- 
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-(by 
Per entagej Table 5.3. Religious Belief in Kazakstan and Uzbekistan 
Islam 
(0/0) 
Russian 
Orthodox 
(%) 
Other 
(0/0) 
Non- 
believer 
N 
No answer 
/Don't know 
Kazakstan 
Kazak/Central 
Asian 
48 0 1 45 7 
Slav <1 10 25 58 7 
Other 15 3 29 44 11 
Average 21 4 18 49 8 
Uzbekistan 
Uzbek/Central 
Asian 
54 0 1 44 2 
Slav 0 14 29 50 17 
Other 39 1 io 45 7 
Average 31 5 13 46 5 
Source: Lubin, N. Table 2. Religious Belief By Nationality, & Table 3 Professed 
Religious Belief by Nationalily and Religion Central Asians Take Stock: Reform, 
Corruption and Identity, United States Institute of Peace, WasHngton, 1995, pp. 
16-7. 
It is unclear whether popular misconceptions and poor understanding of theology 
amongst Central Asia's population has negated Islam from holding a political role. 
One survey indicated some grassroots sympathy for the political application of 
Islam. In Uzbekistan, 50% of the titular population agreed with the statement that 
"in Islam, one can find the solution to many of Uzbekistan's problems. " 114 Only 
27% of Uzbeks disagreed. Interest in an Islamic state has been confused. In 1991, 
a survey in Uzbekistan, 88% of the respondents favoured the implementation of 
sharia laws. 115 However, in Lubin's survey, only 2% of Kazakstani respondents 
and 10% of Uzbekistanis favoured such a state. "' Similarly interviewees were 
unsure about the concept of the Islamic state. A majority of Uzbekistanis 
surveyed supported Karimov as the head of a potential Islamic state, despite his 
avowed anti-Islamic position. ' 17 Correspondents felt that Islamic figures had little 
influence or power. 118 
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In common with other Muslim states where the clergy have been used in official 
capacities, parallel Islam has continued to be a feature Central Asia's religious life. 
It enabled popular piety to be practised and also acted as a conduit for more 
explicit political activities. Thus although at present Central Asian Islamism 
remains interested in increasing personal piety, the structures for politicisation 
exist. However the divisions within parallel Islam between piety and 
fundamentalism, and political activism is often exclusive. Equally, the gulf 
between the nominal and poor religious education of Central Asian Muslims and 
the minority of committed fundamentalism may prove irresolvable. 
The fact that after independence Central Asians were able to travel abroad and 
receive foreign broadcasts with greater ease may aid their Islamic education and 
recognition of the numerous political and social variants of the faith. This could 
weaken Tashkent's, and to a lesser extent Almaty's, portrayal of political Islam as 
intrinsically divisive and radical. It may, however, remove support for radical 
Muslim groups as awareness of events in Afghanistan, Iran and Tajikistan 
becomes more widespread. As an example of the poor popular awareness of 
Islam, one western educated Uzbekistani women, the author spoke to, who 
claimed to be Muslim was unaware of the segregation of the genders in the 
mosque. 119 
5.10. The Governments and The Islamic Revival 
Both Almaty and Tashkent have attempted to incorporate Muslim traditions into 
their avowed secular political systems. The intellectual collapse of Communism 
has meant that the former Communist leaderships have sought new foundation 
myths to bolster support for their regimes and place them in an historical 
continuum. Government sponsorship has also aided control of the faith and 
undercut autonomous and more radical religious movements. 
To date, this policy has only been moderately successful in both republics. The 
use of religion in legitimising the regimes has been a double-edged sword. Both 
leaderships retained a strong legacy of the Soviet mindset which has influenced 
their opinion of Islamist activists. Equally their previous atheism and opportunistic 
and highly publicised conversion to Islam has antagonised more devout critics. 
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5.10j. Islam's Role in Nation- and State-building: Karimov has attempted to 
enhance his Muslim credentials. He has made the hajj, sworen the presidential 
oath on the Koran and made public displays of his Muslim practices. Uzbekistan 
has been active in its rehabilitation of its Islamic heritage. The Kurban bairam and 
Uruza bairam celebrations have been legally enshrined. 120 The 675th anniversary 
of Khoja Bahoutdin Naqshband's birth was celebrated in 1994. He was claimed as 
"our countryman [and] great ancestor" although his religious activities were 
practised in fourteenth century Bukhara, prior to the Uzbeks arrival. 121 
Whilst Karimov has declared that Islam is a. cornerstone of contemporary Uzbek 
national identity, Nazarbaev has been more cautious. It was the only republic not 
to grant official recognition to Muslim celebrations. Nazarbaev with a far smaller 
and less vociferous Muslim constituency and a large secular Kazak, as well as 
Russian, community has been far less inclined to emphasise deep-rooted affinity 
with Islam. The goal of these policies was the maintainence of inter-ethnic 
harmony and an inclusive Kazakstani identity. As Nazarbaev has stated, "one must 
take into account that in our republic there are various faiths ... But none of them 
can be become [a] state [religion]. " 122 To date, Almaty has successfully sought to 
create a moderate government controlled indigenous Islamic culture. Kazak 
separation from the "dogmatic and radical" Islam of the Uzbeks and Tajiks is 
emphasised. The more superficial adherence of Kazaks traditionally to the faith 
has aided this. 
Almaty has pursued a pro-active but moderate revivalist policy to undercut 
independent Islamism. The popular Muslim revival has been directed by the 
government seeking to maintain a monopoly over Muslim affiliation and prevent 
independent mobilisations, to the extent that Dave regards it as "far from 
spontaneous. "'23 This has included state-sponsoring of mosque building, and a 
controlled number of Islamic programmes on radio and television. The 
government has also successfully been able to outflank radical Islamic groups 
such as Alash and Attan, although it must be acknowledged these groups had 
minor popular support anyway. 
Both republics have attempted to regulate mosque building. Non-state mosques 
are associated with independent thinking and conduits of foreign penetration 
because of external funding. The Uzbekistani Committee for Religious Affairs, 
linked to the Cabinet of Mnisters, has controlled the country's religious 
institutions and Ministry of Justice permission required prior to a religious 
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organisation training students. Despite this official control of religious education 
and activities, independent religious activities have continued. It is estimated that 
there were 5000 unofficial religious schools in the republic in 1993.124 
The differences in the presidents' public display of their beliefs has been indicative 
of the relative concern that the two governments have felt that the religion poses 
to their ideological foundation. In Uzbekistan, the government has attempted to 
monopolise of the religion as political and social force, whilst in Kazakstan a 
second goal has been not to overemphasise the role of Islam, in order not to 
alienate the Russian community. 
5.10. H. The Role of Official Clerzy: The official clergy have continued to be 
used as an instrument for state policies, although this has not been wholly 
successful. 
Almaty established a separate Spiritual Board for Muslims of Kazakstan (DUMK) 
in January 1990. The old Tashkent Directorate, responsible for the entire Central 
Asian region, was regarded as an Uzbek institution. No Kazak cleric had ever held 
the position of Chief Mufti. The independent DUMK provided an impetus for 
enhancing Kazak national consciousness, nation-building and isolating the 
republic's Muslims from a pan-Central Asian identity which Almaty feared could 
radicalise its Muslims. 125 The Mufti appointed, Ratbek Nysanbai Uli, owed his 
position entirely to Nazarbaev and has enjoyed limited support from the Muslim 
community. 126 
The balance of faiths and ethnic groups in Kazakstan emphasised by the 
President's statement that "Islam and Christianity are the two flanks of 
Kazakhstan's spiritual legacy" has also manifested itself in political structures. 127 
As with Islam, the Russian Orthodox Church has also seen a revival. Nazarbaev 
has endorsed the Kazakstani Orthodox Archbishop, Aleksei, as well as, Mufti 
Ratbek. Both institutions have pursued pro-govemment agendas. The Archbishop 
a strong advocate of Christian and Muslim friendship, has stated that there are "no 
preconditions for conflict on religious or ethnic grounds. "12' He has also denied 
Church premises to Cossack movements for their Easter and Christmas "holy 
marches. " 129 Almaty has sought to create and regulate a moderate and compliant 
form of Christianity as it has a Muslim faith. For international consumption at 
least, Tashkent has sought to portray itself as a multi-faith society. 130 
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The Uzbekistani Mufti, Shaykh Mukhtar Abdulayev, between April 1993 and 
April 1997, was apolitical and had littte personal authority. "' Until his 
appointment as ambassador to Egypt, in 1994, the real power in the Directorate 
resided with Abdulayev's deputy, Babakhan, the Soviet-era MUfti. 132 
Consequently, he was an experienced advocate of the government's agenda and 
indicates the retrenchment of the status quo ante since 1992. Abdulayev's lack of 
spiritual and temporal authority led to his replacement with Abdurashid qori 
Bakhromov, who has not managed to increase popular respect for the Muftiate. 133 
The political benefits for the governments of an official clergy have been 
ambiguous and even detrimental. The officially sanctioned clergy have not always 
remained compliant. Their criticism has been particularly directed against 
government interference in religion. The synthesis between formal and informal 
Islam has worried the authorities as it demonstrates the popular and political 
influence of the Muslim clergy and their desire to retain autonomy from temporary 
leaders. 134 
The example of Mufti Yusuf s dual relationship with President Karimov and 
independent groups was symbolic of this. Yusuf s position was a delicately 
balance between grassroots expectations and the goodwill of the government. 
Muslim opponents accused him of proximity with the authorities, KGB ties and 
profane behaviour. His public opposition to the IRP, which in turned increased its 
hostility towards him, forced Yusuf to increase his reliance upon Karimov's 
support. 135 Initially, fearful of allowing the ascendancy of radical independent 
Islamic figures, Tashkent provided him with political support. This was 
problematic for the Mufti. To remain credible he had to demonstrate his 
autonomy and in turn alienated himself from Karimov, his political master. 
Yusuf s increasingly independent opinions over issues including a greater political 
role for religious leaders and support for the Tajikistani opposition leader and 
Qazi (Chief Mufti) of Tajikistan 1988-92, Hojiakbar Turajonzade, became a 
source of embarrassment for Tashkent and his position became untenable. 136 
Olcott argues that the Mufti was an electoial asset and therefore was placated 
until the December 1991 election. Two attempts to unseat him failed before he 
resigned, partly as a consequence of a physical assault on him, which was 
probably state-instigated. 137 He was finally replaced by Abdulayev, a less 
independent figure, in April 1993 and went into exile. 131 
243 
At the behest of the governments, the Chief Muftis of both republics have been 
used by the governments to seek accommodation with the Islamic opposition. 
Mufti Ratbek attempted dialogue with IRP-sympathetic clergy from Zhambyl and 
Shymkent, and Mufti Yusuf met representatives of the Islamic opposition. 139 Both 
approaches were unsuccessful. At one meeting in Uzbekistan, 26 February 1992, 
the IRP turned down the deputy mufti posts offered and complained of 
government interference in religion. 
The machinations surrounding the removal of Babakhan and Yusuf demonstrated 
to Karimov the potency of religion in the republic's social affairs. It also 
illustrated the balance the state and establishment clergy have had to maintain 
between government policy and independent religious belief if popular Muslim 
criticism is not be brought forth. 
Soviet-era official Islam was unable to eliminate parallel Islam. In the post- 
independence era, official Islam's close proximity to the authorities may erode its 
standing and encourage further growth in parallel Islam. This may be particularly 
significant if official Islam retains its appearance as a political tool of the 
government. Olcott argues that the synthesis between the formal and informal 
branches of Islam has provoked anxiety in Tashkent. 140 The fear is that this 
association will result in sanctioned religion becoming autonomous and 
radicalised. Such a trend is a rare occurrence, perhaps the Iranian example being 
the only major example. The reverse has been the norm, with the incorporation of 
Islamists into the political mainstream and their political moderation. What is not 
clear, perhaps with the exception of TaJikistan, is whether this synthesis has been 
political significance. 
5.10. iii. Attitudes Towards Independent Islam: Accompanying the 
governments' assimilatory policies and attempts to coopt Islam into the state- 
building projects more repressive measures have been pursued in order to control 
Islam. 
Freedom of conscience has been guaranteed by statute in both republics. The 
Uzbekistani "Law On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organisations" 
(1991) and Articles 31 and 61 of the Constitution guarantee the right to practice 
religious beliefs free from harassment or coercion and equal treatment of religious 
organisations. 
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These rights have not applied to religion when it has been politicised or 
autonomous. The Uzbekistani Law on Freedom of Conscience has since been 
enhanced by proscription on religious organisations funding political parties and 
the banning of all religious parties. 14' Religious figures have been prescribed from 
holding office, irrespective of their party affiliation. 142 Unsanctioned madrasas 
have been closed and non-state religious education prohibited. 143 The thinking 
behind this heavy censure, Brown believes, is a result of the secular and 
Communist origins and beliefs of Uzbekistan's ruling elite. 144 However secular 
parties were suppressed prior to the religious-based movements. There appears to 
have been a conscious decision by Tashkent to systematically repress and remove 
independent Muslim figures once secular opposition had been removed. 145 The 
focus of state repression has increasingly been transferred from the emasculated 
secular opposition to Islamists. Independent Islamic activities and groups have 
become such target because they offer one of the few unregulated arenas of social 
and intellectual (political) thought and activity, and because of the government's 
accusation of financial and political connections with foreign Islamic actors. The 
informal alliances between secular and Islamists parties in glasnost-era Uzbekistan 
aided subsequent government opposition to all independent groups, without 
providing either secular or Islamic movements with any significant gains. Birlik 
supported the right for the IRP to exist but not its Islamic state goal. 146 
Since the period of study, Uzbekistan has stepped up its control of independent 
religious activities, by forcing all religious communities, mosques, and churches 
for example, to register with the Ministry of Justice. There is no guarantee that 
communities will be granted legal status. Only state sanctioned organisations can 
provide religious education or publish related material. All private attempts to do 
so are proscribed even though a considerable proportion of the new law and many 
of the legal penalties violate Uzbekistan's commitments to international human 
rights agreements. 147 
During the early post-Soviet period the lack of trained and approved clergy 
necessitated the use of previously unofficial clergy to serve the growing popular 
interest in religion. It is clear that by 1994, Tashkent was concerned for either 
purely regime security or more general state security motives about the presence 
and influence of the independent clergy. Since then, non-establishment religious 
figures have been the chief victims of government repression. The crackdown has 
been particularly acute in the Fergana Valley cities of Kokand and Namangan. 
HRW/H cites systematic detentions, and harassment of Muslim individuals and the 
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closure of mosques. 148 Informatsionn'i biulleten' lists six imam removed from 
their posts in Tashkent and Samarkand between October-December 1995 
alone. 149 The majority of the clergy arrested in the Valley were associated with the 
Adolat movement. "o 
Three factors may have influenced the latter implementation of suppression of 
Islamists than secular opponents. Firstly, the strength and growth of the Islamic 
revival may have taken Tashkent by surprise. Secondly, the initial courting of 
Muslim opinion in the early period of independence was more vital to Karimov, 
than the smaller democratic secular constituency. With his position secured and 
having displayed his Muslim credentials, repression could begin. Thirdly, the Tajik 
Civil War, whether as a pretext or real concern was an important external factor 
in determining Uzbekistan's domestic policies. 
Whilst Kazakstan has been faced by a less immediate "Islamic threat" and has 
pursued a more selective and less physical policy against opposition groups in 
general, it has been decisive in its actions against radical Islamist groups. The 
suppression of the Alash movement has been symbolic of the government's 
regulated approach to faith. Alash members were involved in protest against the 
election of Mufti Ratbek to the head of the DUMK. The Mufti was criticised for 
his un-Muslim conduct and possible KGB-links. Alash proposed an ethnic-Uzbek 
from Shymkent as a replacement. Ratbek was elected and scuffles between the 
militia and protesters broke out. Forty one Alash members were arrested, and 
warrants for the Alash leadership were issued. Dave argues that few Kazaks were 
interested in the events and even less supported the Alash's cause. "' The incident 
demonstrated, as have similar events in Uzbekistan, the tensions between state- 
sponsored clergy and independent Muslim activists. 
Alash has not been allowed to register and it newspaper, Khak, banned. Although 
the party dropped its Sharia and Russian repatriation objectives, it has remained 
outlawed. Its leadership, fearful of further governmental repression, is now in 
exile in Moscow. By 1996, Alash was no longer able to function as a political 
movement, except secretly and on a small scale. 152 Dave asks why such a poorly 
organised, supported and intellectually incoherent movement has faced such 
government hostility. The answer she arrives at is that Mash questioned the 
legitimacy of the post-Soviet elite and proposed an alternative, offering an 
ideological challenge to the foundation of the present state. Mash's explicit 
opposition to the Nazarbaev government was illustrated in articles in Khak, which 
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described the President as a traitor and "collaborator in Kolbin's crimes. " 153 "The 
vilification of Alash confirms the government's own paranoia about the dangers of 
an "Islamic movement. " 154 
Government harassment was directed towards Zheltoqsan too. Its registration 
application was lost by the Ministry of Justice prior to the local and Afajli. v 
elections of March 1994.155 
5.11. Independent Islamist Movements 
Islamism has seen a relatively small growth in comparison to its cultural revival. 
This restricted activity is partly a consequence of government hostility but equally 
the result of deficiencies in the movements' intellectual, organisational and social 
foundations. This section will assess the saliency and strength of indigenous and 
extra-state Islamists as viable political actors, their challenge to the regimes and 
ideas of the state in the two republics, and more explicitly their actual and 
perceived security implications. This is clearly a difficult issue. Government 
statements, inflammatory declarations by Islamists (often spontaneous in nature 
and latter retracted), and the blurred distinction between the natural reaffirmation 
of cultural traditions and the establishment of aggressive ideologies with the 
support of foreign states with their own regional objectives, all make determining 
the true security implications of Islamism difficult. As Splidsboel-Hansen 
recognises, a considerable element of the (perceived) Islamist threat is 
unintentional, a feature shared with environmental security problems. 156 
The Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP), founded in 1990 as an all-Union party, 
fragmented into independent national parties. Only 40 delegates from throughout 
the FSU attended its third all-Union congress in 1992.157 The party's inter- 
republican leadership was divided between political Islamists and neo- 
fundamentalists. It established contacts with Muslim countries including Egypt, 
Iran, Pakistan and Sudan, to increase its financial security, a move which 
understandably concerned the two govemments. 15' It is difficult to determine 
whether its lack of extremism or violence has been the result of successful 
government repression or lack of popular support. 
Its branches in Uzbekistan (and Tajikistan) have been more successful as 
republican movements. Despite not being granted registration in the Uzbek SSR, 
the republic's branch held its founding congress in Tashkent, 26 January 1991. 
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The meeting was broken up by police, who arrested 400 delegates. After its 
suppression under the Law on Public Associations, February 1991 it acted 
clandestinely. Its 1990 policy statement indicated a mixture of democratic and 
Islamic objectives. These included: 
- Opposition to all forms of discrimination, alcoholism, crime and other un-Islamic 
behaviour; 
- The strengthening of relations with the rest of the Muslim world and also with 
other religions on an equal basis; 
- Co-operating with other democratic parties and state bodies; 
- Providing social welfare for all in need; 
- Promoting the principles of an Islamic economy and regain "ecological purity"; 
and 
- Educating the population in Islam and solving "the problems of the people 
according to the holy Koran and hadith. ""' 
It has opposed the authority of state-sponsored religious institutions and 
advocated an alternative decentralised religious framework with greater autonomy 
for regional organisation. 160 This is a clear challenge, not only to Tashkent's 
highly-regulated form of control over religion but in social and political affairs 
too. Tashkent's failure to coopt the IRP with offers of deputy mufti posts 
indicates the difficult that governments face in dealing with ideological committed 
and uncompromising movements. 161 
The Uzbekistani IRP has renounced its stance on the creation of an Islamic state 
and declared that its objective is the establishment of a multi-party system, with a 
universal franchise and legal protection for minorities and private property. 162 
Influential fundamentalism clerics, such as Abdulwali Qari and Aqilbeq Ishanbaev, 
claimed not to be members of the IRP, although given the illegality of the party, it 
would have been unwise for them to publicise this association. 161 
Another key Islamist group in Uzbekistan, Adolat posed a major political 
challenge to the Karimov regime. Formed in 1991, its power-base was in the 
Fergana Valley, principally Narnangan. It acted as a vigilante movement, 
interested in enforcing the adherence to Islan-dc codes of behaviour. Adolat 
temporarily led an Islamist coalition administration in Namangan. This was 
suppressed. (Adolat and the events in Namangan are discussed further in 
5.12. ii. a. 1. ) 
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Islam and Democracy symbolic of the glasnost-era organisations, in that it was 
informal, poorly organised and transient. The movement backed Yusuf's 
appointment and was pan-Islamic and pan-Turkic in objective. It was not, 
however, fundamentalist. Its leader, Almaz Yetekov, an Uzbekistani Kazak even 
denounced the Sharia as obsolete. 164 Haghayeghi believes that its membership was 
absorbed into other Islamist movements during the early 1990s. 165 
A number of clandestine Islamist movements in Uzbekistan have also been 
recorded. Ascertaining their existence, manifestos and significance has, however, 
been problematic due to government mis-information and repression, and the 
organisations' secrecy. The movements include: 
- The People's Front of Uzbekistan, a radical group based in Tashkent; 
- The Islamic Democratic Party, based in Namangan. Its leadership favoured a 
theocracy based upon the Iranian model but refuted force as a means of attaining 
power. 166 During the "golden period" of Uzbekistani politics its party congress 
was broadcast on a local Namangan radio station. 167 
- Hezbollah, a predominately Shi'ite movement, which aimed to establish a 
Sharia-based society in Uzbekistan. It was active during the period of 1989-92.168 
A more uncompromising challenge to Tashkent has been the small but noticeable 
growth in Wahhabism. This neo-fandamentalist doctrine, opposed to mysticism, 
spread fforn its Uzbekistani Fergana centre into Krygyzstan. The debate 
surrounding Wahhabism is deeply confused. The Soviets had traditionally applied 
the term pejoratively to any Islamic group or trend they wished to label as 
seditious. It correctly refers to a Saudi neo-fandamentalist school of thought. The 
security implications of its regional presence-are unclear. It initially arrived in the 
region in the nineteenth century via India but after the late-1980s saw an 
indigenous revival, with Saudi assistance. The sect survived under the tutelage of 
the TaJik Qari Muhammad HaJi I-Endustani (1892-1989). I-Iis disciples Abdulwali 
Qari and AJlama Rahmatullah pursued a more politicised interpretation of its 
teaching. "9 Although I-Endustani's teachings were also used by TaJikistani IRP 
(Hizb-i Nehzat-i Islamic) founders including Abdullah Said Nuri (aka Mirobobo 
Mirrakhamov and Saidov), the Wahhabis have refused to foster links with the IRP 
for ideological and political reasons. They have criticised the IRP for being willing 
to compromise with the government and participate in elections. These 
accusations are, however, academic as Tashkent prevented the IRP from pursing 
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any legitimate political activism and has repressed both movements with equal 
vigour. Abdu Ahd, a leading Uzbek Wahhabi'cleric, stated that, 
"the IRP wants to be in parliament. We have no desire to be in parliament. We 
want a revolution. " 170 
However, it is essentially a neo-fundamentalist and therefore an apolitical 
movement. Its opposition to Sufism and shrine veneration, key features in regional 
religious practices, may deter large-scale support from Central Asian Muslims 
brought up on liberal Hanafi theology and Sufism. Similarly, its explicit militancy 
and ideological differences with the IRP and political Islam in general, may also 
deter mass support. Wahhabists did, however, participate in the Namangan events 
and its members were prominent in the city's short-lived Islamic administration. 
All these factors suggest that whilst Wahhabism may prove a small 
uncompromising and possibly violent irritant to Tashkent and Bishkek, it is 
unlikely to receive widespread support for its. radical ambitions. 
In Kazakstan, Islamist movements have had limited success and failed to establish 
state-wide structures. IRP-associated activities have remained within the southern 
oblasts of Shyrnkent, Zhambyl and Qyzlorda. The IRP has been registered in the 
first tWo. 171 
The most prominent, Alash, was formed in 1990. Islam and "Turkism" were 
described as central to its agenda but it rejected fundamentalism and anti-Russian 
policies. 172 Dave is highly critical of Alash's leader, Aron Atabek, arguing that he 
lacked both political expertise and ideological coherence. 173 The movement has 
had limited political success and faced considerable government hostility. After 
being declared illegal Alash moved its headquarters to Moscow and dropped its 
call for an Islamic state. 
Other explicit Islamist movements have faired poorly in Kazakstan. Zheltoqsan, a 
small movement, whose explicitly anti-Russian nationalist agenda had a strong 
Islamic as well as environmental dimension. Its extreme Islamic and nationalist 
policies proved politically unpopular. 
The contemporary political role and significance of the Sufi brotherhoods in the 
region has been unclear. Decentralisation, localism, and opposition towards 
fanaticism made Sufism an entrenched and widely supported movement. These 
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characteristics also suggest limited accommodation with radical Islan-ýSM. 174The 
brotherhoods were politically active during the Soviet period, publishing samizdat 
material, opposing the "Soviet socialization of the younger generation" and 
encouraging evasion of the military draft and Komsomol membershi P. 175As a rule 
Sufi movements militancy have been more frequently directed towards external 
enemies rather than challenging domestic political authority. 176 This suggests that 
Sufism is unlikely to become a force for political Islam in the region. Their main 
contribution in the post-Soviet period has been in the advancement of individual 
and social piety rather than political action. Although Sufism and neo- 
fundamentalism both share apolitical characteristics, Sufism has itself been a 
target of neo-fundamentalist movements. Sufi-Wahhabi violence was reported in 
Dagestan, in the Caucasus. 177 The presence of these incompatible schools may 
result in similar conflict in Central Asia. 
Whilst the intellectual development of Islamists movements in Kazakstan and 
Uzbekistan has been essentially limited in nature and domestic in origin, research 
on Afghanistan and Tajikistan demonstrates the role of external factors in 
politicising religion. 
In the Afghan war, Islamist politics developed in response to a crisis-situation. 
The intellectual and organisational foundation of Islamist groups underwent a 
modernisation process. The Soviet invasion politicised resistance to central 
authority. Opposition to the central authority of Kabul, traditionally non-political, 
tribal and holding a narrow-conceptualisation of conflict, became politicised and 
constituted an ideological adversary to Marxism-Leninism. The form of conflict 
changed from traditional tribal low-intensity combat, which separated domestic 
and public space and had limited objectives, to total war in which politics and the 
state were the contested ground and objective. Militarisation rather than 
ideological discourse led to the politicisation of Islamic political culture. ' 78 
This example indicates that neo-fundamentalism's political impotence may be 
temporarily dropped when action is required. The combination of an inflexible 
intellectual basis, grassroots appeal and a hostile political milieu created by a 
repressive and ideologically-opposed government may encourage this process. It 
is feasible that a similar process could develop in Uzbekistan. 
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According to Roy, Islam's political radicalisation in Tajikistan occurred via a dual 
process: through indigenous grassroots networks and the assimilation of Islamist 
ideas by the official clergy whilst studying abroad. 
In the case of the former, informal networks were established around clandestine 
religious teachers. The Tajik IRP leadership, Said Nuri, Mohammadsharif 
Himmatzade and figures in the Uzbek Fergana Valley Islamic movement, were 
taught by one such figure, F[industani, the Wahhabi cleric. 179 These groups 
studied both traditional religious literature held by the Tajik mullahs and imported 
pro-reform literature including those by Muslim Brotherhood and Jamaat-i 
Islarni. 180 The invasion of Afghanistan . 
further radicalised the republic's 
movements and enhanced links with the umma via the Afghan mujaheddin. 181 
Nuri's background was similar to that of other Islamists world-wide. Nuri 
opposed the Afghan war, had a modem and scientific education and is described 
by Roy as a "member of the new middle class. " 182 There are disturbing parallels 
for Karimov with Uzbekistan's clergy. Yusuf was trained in Libya, and also 
possibly under Rahmatullah, the Andijon fundamentalist and an influential figure 
in the current growth of regional Wahhabism. 183 
Radicalisation also took place through the native clergy's studies abroad led to 
contact with foreign Islamic thought. Turajonzade was influenced by the literature 
of the Muslim Brotherhood whilst in Amman, for example. A parallel may be 
drawn with contemporary Uzbekistan which has withdrawn its trainee clerics from 
Turkey, whilst Kazakstan has shown no concern about sending clerics to the same 
destination. 184 
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5.10. i. The Structure and Support of Islamist Movements: Very little 
information is available concerning membership structures of Islamist movements. 
This is partly a result of government repression of such movements and partly a 
result of the transient nature of many. Popular support for explicitly political 
movements in both republics is difficult to determine, beyond the fact that it has 
been restricted to a minority. Zheltoqsan's limited support was indicated by the 
inability of its chairman, Hassan Kojakhmetov, to acquire the necessary 100,000 
signatures to qualify for the December 1991 presidential election. 185 There was a 
significant decline in popular awareness of the IRP in Uzbekistan between surveys 
conducted in January 1992 and March 1993. Initially, 57% of those surveyed 
were confident that they could trust the movement whilst 3 1% were not confident 
and 12% had no opinion or were unaware of the movement. In 1993, the figures 
had altered to 19%, 50% and 30%, respectively. 186 As Kangas records, the change 
in attitude either indicated "an effective policy of eliminating Islamic radicalism or, 
more likely, the government had successfully . instilled the fear of reprisal. " 187 
At present, it is unclear whether the typical youthful profile of Islamic movements, 
as witnessed in other cases, has been evident in Central Asia. There has been a 
mild inter-generation division within the region's faithful, which initially dismisses 
the potential for a radicalised Muslim youth. Although Lubin's survey indicated a 
lower level of religious adherence among 18-29 year olds (39% of this age group) 
compared to 50-59 age group (47%), the difference is not huge. "' Critchlow 
believes that the older are more prone to superstition and elaborate rituals, whilst 
the younger believers are more orthodox in their belief"9 It is unclear whether 
this difference in religious behaviour will mean that the young will be susceptible 
to neo-fundamentalism's claims to authenticity, or simply a decline in Sufism and 
greater adherence to mainstream Hanafi principles. The marked youthfulness of 
regional demography suggests that there is, however, a significant potential for a 
linkage to emerge in the near-future. There is some limited information to suggest 
that this is the case. It was estimated, in 1989, that 70% of 18-30 year old in the 
Tajik SSR were believers. '90 Similarly, the 1988 Tashkent demonstrations, which 
Critchlow links to Muslim and secular cultural demands, were student-ted. '91 
Zheltoqsan's membership, in common with Islamist movements throughout the 
world, is young and educated. 192 Other factors also indicate the feasibility of 
Islamism increasing its influence in Central Asia. A generation of glasnost births 
have been educated, socialising and seeking employment in a more Islamic- 
sympathetic society than the two previous generations. Independence and state- 
building replaced atheist and internationalist values with nationalist and Muslim 
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norms. A final factor is the question of employment. Present and future 
opportunities for the burgeoning population are particularly poor for rural Kazaks 
and inhabitants of the Fergana oblasts, essentially those areas with the strongest 
religious identification. This combination of factors may see this and subsequent 
generations adopt a more politicised interpretation of the faith. 
Dave estimates that Alash's power-base has been restricted to perhaps only 3-5% 
of all Kazaks and principally rural. "Urban Kazakhs display a marked aversion 
towards its Islamic platfonn. "19' A government official claimed that Alash only 
had 85 members in the capital. 194 A larger support base has been suggested in 
Shymkent. 195 The Uzbekistani IRP, it was estimated had between 40-50,000 
members in 1992, primarily in the Fergana Valley, especially in Andijon and 
Namangan, and other rural regions. 196 The majority of the TaJik IRP's 40,000 
supporters have come from Dushanbe and its environs' unemployed, and parts of 
Khojent, Garm and Khatlon oblasts. 197 
5.12. Islamism's Association With Other Political Issues 
Whilst the religious consciousness of the two republics' population has been 
limited and superficial, and therefore unlikely to be the fundamental cause of any 
political conflict, "it can be a powerful political tool in fomenting conflict ... 
[acting as) an umbrella or vehicle for expressing other grievances that are far 
more immediate causes of dissension and despair. "198 Its universialist character 
has meant that it has contributed to debates over environmental degradation, and 
economic and social justice, for example. Similarly, regional groups' intellectual 
and physical contacts with extra-republic Islamist movements have aided 
government charges of international conspiracies and perceptions of insecurity. 
These charges must be viewed with scepticism as they are often government 
attempts to detract attention from the domestic origins of political problems. 
5.12j. Islamism's Relationship With Nationalism: As stated previously, the 
Islamic community, the umma, is trans-national, although regional and ethnic 
identities are acknowledged by the religion. Political Islam has been most 
successful when it has been associated with a nationalist agenda. 
In Central Asia, there has been only a cursory relationship between faith and 
ethnicity. Islam has provided a boundary marker between the indigenous 
population and Slavic settlers. Within the indigenous population, with the 
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exception of the Ismaili Pamir Tajiks, religion and ethnicity have not been 
conterminous, although there are differences between ethnic groups over the 
degree to which they have incorporated Islam into their national culture. 
The late-Soviet centre-periphery debate between Moscow and the republics 
contained an element of Muslim protest against their perceived and actual 
inequality in comparison to the Russian Orthodox community. It took over a year 
and then only after public protests by Central Asian Muslims, for Muslims to 
receive the same religious concessions that ýhristians and Jewish believers were 
granted in 1988. "9 Poignantly, the Muslim millennium was not marked in the 
USSR, as it passed prior to this relaxation in religious laws. 
Islam and the concept of thejihad were not, however, incorporated into late- and 
post-Soviet anti-Moscow and anti-Russian discourse to any significant extent. 
The Tajik cleric Said Nuri was perhaps the most explicit and exceptional figure to 
link exclusive nationalism with religion, declaring in 1988 that within ten years 
there would be no Russians within the republic and would become an Islamic 
state. 200 
The absence of Russian-directed Islamist discourse has been particularly 
noticeable in Kazakstan where it would have been particularly divisive. 
Kazakstan's leadership consciously avoided an overt incorporation of Islam into 
its nation- and state-building programmes. Given the sensitive issue of the 
Kazakstani Russians, it has been the ouly Central Asian republic whose 
constitution has not provided Islam with a special significance in the heritage of 
the titular population. 201 
The region's Russians' perception of the contemporary Islamic revival has varied 
from those of the titular populations. Interestingly, 43% of Uzbekistan's Russians 
surveyed agreed with the statement that "in Islam, one can find the solution to 
many of Uzbekistan's problemsý', suggesting only limited apprehension of Islam 
from this community. 202 This curious and benign attitude is, however, countered 
by the fact that Russians in both Kazakstan and Uzbekistan believed that Muslim 
leaders have greater influence and power than the titular respondents ascribe to 
them. Intra-regional migration towards Tashkent and northern Kazakstan from 
rural Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and southern Kazakstan have been partly caused by 
such concerns. 203 
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The nexus between employment, ethnicity and religion have been combined by the 
re-introduction of Islamic values into public life. Employment opportunities for 
ethnic Russian women have been particularly affected. Muslim employers, and 
society in general, have been wary of employing females in perceived male and 
white collar positions. As a consequence, they have been frequently the first to be 
sacked. This has been particularly noticeable in the public sector, a key employer 
of Slav women. The problem is compounded by the introduction of titular 
language requirements, with Slav women having an even lower level of bi- 
lingualism than their male counterpaftS. 204 
Although Islam is a pan-national identity, numerous groups have sought to 
synthesise regional and/or national agendas with Islam into a political force rather 
than establish a pan-Islamic, international construction. This has been most 
evident in Tajikistan. 205 What distinguishes the TaJik example from others is that 
the majority of non-Communist TqJik political parties incorporated Islam into their 
manifestos. TaJik nationalist groups, including Rastokhez, used Islam in their 
construction of a TaJik identity. 206 
In the other four republics, Islamist groups have been most evident in regions with 
sizeable Uzbek communities, emphasising the link between national identity and 
religious affiliation rather than its supposed pan-Islamic, pan-Turkic attributes. 
The southern oblasts of Kazakstan, home to an Uzbek minority, have been the 
centre of the republic's Islamist movements. Similarly, Uzbeks have dominated 
the Wahhabi movement in Kyrgyzstan. As yet the inter-ethnic implications for 
"Uzbek-dorninated" movements in surrounding republics are not clear. These 
groups have not espoused irredentist or ethno-centric policies. 
Mainstream and state promotion of Islam in Kazak nationalism has been modest. 
As well as, a means of distinguishing the Kazaks from other Central Asian groups, 
particularly the Uzbeks, this helped placate Russian concerns and create a Kazak 
Muslim identity free of the alleged dogma and extremism of the Uzbeks. Fringe 
nationalist and Islamist groups have, however, combined the two issues to create 
a perverse and exclusive synthesis. Alash, Attan and Zheltoqsan have used faith in 
a nationalist manner. Thus the president of the Kazak environmental-nationalist 
movement Attan, Amantai Asilbekov, declared that, 
"we [the Kazaks] did not assimilate with others. Our Islam was given to us 
straight from Mohammed, without chauvinism, extremisin or antagonism. " 207 
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As a counter to these discriminatory traits, Islamic discourse has also transcended 
ethnic divisions and promoted positive social goals. An example of this has been 
the Kazakstani movement organised by Oleg. Rubets. Rubets, an ethnic Ukrainian 
and convert to Islam, established an organisation involved with the rehabilitation 
of Afghan war veteranS. 20' Alash attracted Slav and German members, interested 
209 in the group's pro-democracy platform. Similarly, in Uzbekistan the green 
movement Ecostan has used the ulema to promote environmentally responsible 
behaviour amongst their congregations. 210 
5.12. ii. Islamism's Relationship With Regionalism: Connections between sub- 
national identities and divisions and Islamist politics have been evident in the 
region. These contacts have provided the most cohesive and effective form of 
Islamism, and its greatest political challenge to the existing region's regimes. 
Tajikistan's has been most affected by this nexus, although as the examples below 
indicate Kazakstan and Uzbekistans' centre-region relations have contained an 
Islamic dimension. 
A brief examination of the former indicates the political strengths and weaknesses 
of this nexus. Sahib Nazrov, a member of the Communist-domýinated Tajik 
Parliament in 1991, stated that the Civil War was a "battle between two 
ideologies: Islam and Communistn", a widely held interpretation of the conflict. "' 
However, ideology has been determined by the fundamental consideration of 
Tajik politics, namely regional identification. Islamism was not able to provide an 
effective and unifying alternative capable of overcoming the regionalism of Tajik 
politics. The Tajik IRP, in common with all of Tajik politics has contained a 
regional character. Most of its founders are from the Garm Valley and in 
particular from the Garmi population deported to the Kurgan Teppa in the 1950s. 
Non-Garm Islamists have been cautious about renouncing their regional 
affiliations for pan-Tajik Islamic solidarity. 212 political Islam in the republic has 
not been able to overarch such fractures. Regional identities rather than the 
secular-fundamentalist division has determined Tajikistani politics. This regional 
character deconstructs the view that Islam is monolithic or a pan-national 
ideology. It also indicates the manner in which it is applied in an instrumentalist 
manner. 
5.12. H. a. The Fergana Valley: In addition to the Fergana's distinctive 
characteristics - multi-ethnic, contested borders and acute demographic, economic 
and environmental stresses - historically the region was been renowned for its 
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strong association with Islam. In 1993,75% of Uzbekistani Fergana Valley 
residents, where a third of Uzbekistan's population live, considered themselves 
practising Muslims in contrast to the 25% in Tashkent and 20% in western 
Uzbekistan who identified themselves as such. 213 This proclivity has expressed 
itself politically. 
5.12. ii. a. l. Namangan: Islamists in the Valley in 1991-2 posed a serious 
ideological and physical challenge to Tashk6nt's authority. The IRP and Adolat 
were independently active in the Valley. 
IRP-led protest in the Valley which called for the removal of Karimov's 
"Communist" regime and the introduction of the Sharia attracted thousands of 
demonstrators, during late 1991.214 The protest has also been linked to grassroots 
Muslim outrage at the involvement of official clergy in Karimov's presidential 
election campaign. The IRP successfully forced the Namangan hokim to resign, 
26 January 1992, and assumed administrative responsibilities. 
At the same time, Adolat established neighbourhood vigilante patrols in 
Namangan implementing Islamic laws and combating crime. It is probable that the 
local administration provided tacit support for Adolat's activities. By the 
December 1991 presidential election, Adolat's influence in Narnangan was 
considerable. Karimov addressed an Adolat-organised demonstration prior to the 
elections and received a petition, whose demands included the adoption of Islam 
as the state religion. 215 
The Islamic victory was short-lived. Having paid lip-service to the Islamists' goals 
when visiting the region during the election campaign, Karimov instigated a 
crackdown in March 1992. Interior Ministry troops were drafted in to patrol the 
region. On 17 March 1992, the Islamic administration's headquarters, the former 
city Communist Party committee office, was ransacked. This was followed by the 
suppression of the Islamic city government. Birlik members were also arrested, 
suggesting less a fear of Islamic extremism than a drive against any independent 
activity. Numerous Adolat members managed to avoid arrest and went to ground, 
although the IRP leader Abdulla Utaev has not been seen since his arrest in 
December 1992 . 
21' The government's delayed response may have been an 
indication of its initially weak control of the region. Repression of the IRP and 
Adolat could only be implemented once Karimov's position in Tashkent was 
secure. 
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The Namangan events may be seen as the sole breakdown of central authority, the 
only region to have been in open defiance of Tashkent. The incident was easily 
placed within Tashkent's discourse of externally supported and inspired 
extremism which required a strong response and the strict control of religious 
activity. Bohr and Brown both recognise the political benefits Tashkent derived 
from this episode. These were: 
- The repression of independent thinking and action; 
- Legitimisation of authoritarianism; and 
- The stigmatising of alternative approaches as destabilising. 
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Uzbekistan's state television, in 1998, listed a series of other Islamic organisations 
operating in the Valley between 1989-92. - These were the Islam Lashkarlari 
(Islamic Army), Amirlar (Emirs), Tavba (Repentance) and other unnamed 
groupS. 218 It is unclear what happened to these although, interestingly, it was 
claimed that the 1998 killing of four policeman in Namangan was carried out by 
the remnants of these groups with assistance from Tajikistan and Pakistan. 219 This 
may be an admission that the government's repressive measures have failed to 
eliminate all Islamic opposition. 220 In response hundreds of people were detained 
before an alleged Wahhabi activist was arrested. It is unclear if the murders were 
actually carried out by Islamist activists. Other sources suggest the murders were 
crime-related rather than political . 
22 1 As a BBC report stated, 
"[w1hether or not the armed group in Namangan really has anything to do 
with Islam is only part of the point. What's [sic] important is the authorities 
have pinned blame on Muslim elements and despite enormous efforts, have 
not so far managed to restore order. " 222 
5.12. ii. a. 2. Osh and Jalalabad: The rise of religious sects has been cited as a 
primary cause, along with poor governmental policies, for the continued tense 
nature of inter-ethnic relations in the southern Kyrgyzstani towns of Batken, 
Jalalabad and Osh. This, combined with the memory of the 1989 violence and the 
presence of Tajik opposition guerrilla bases in the republic, has concerned 
Bishkek. According to a survey by Bishkek Polytechnical Institute, only 10% of 
Kyrgyzs in Osh oblast favoured the establishment of an Islamic state. The 
223 corresponding figure for the Uzbek minority was 25% . 
Kyrgyzstan's relatively liberal religious laws encouraged the arrival of groups 
expelled from Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Initially, these organisations were 
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dominated by ethnic Uzbeks but, by 1995-6, Kyrgyzs and Tajik refugees were 
also involved. 224 Vecherniy Bishkek argued that these movements and their related 
madrasas were resulting in declining educational standards and a breakdown in 
social relations . 
22' The republic's National Security Council has shown concern 
over this "Muslim offensive. "22' As Nissman concludes, however, it is inter-ethnic 
relations rather than religion that has been the underlying source of instability in 
the republic. 227 
5.12. ii. b. Southern Kazakstan: Just as the southern Kazaks were the more 
dedicated converts to Islam amongst this nation, the contemporary Islamic revival 
has been most pronounced in Zhambyl, Qyzlorda and Shymkent and other 
southern cities. 22' This regional character was highlighted by Azat Perushov, 
Deputy for Staff for Coordination of Political and National Processes Presidential 
Apparat. He commented on the presence of a pro-sharial sect in southern 
Kazakstan . 
229 The north-south migration of Kazakstani Russians has been 
associated with concerns about increased Kizakification and Islamification of the 
south. 
There is confusion over the political challenge to the governments that these 
regional movements pose. National and mainstream political participation and 
support has alluded both the Kazakstani and Uzbekistan groups. "The 
organizational reach and moblization capacity of the IRP have been severely 
hampered by the geographical isolation of the Fergana, ... 
by (the movements] 
predominantly rural constituency, and by its lack of financial resources. As such, 
the party has been less successful than its counterpart in Tajikistan in establishing 
local networks outside its sphere of influence of Fergana. "23' Contradictory, 
Haghayeghi declares elsewhere in his book, Islam and Politics in Central Asia, 
that, 
"[als the most densely populated region of Uzbekistan, the valley has 
historically espoused various religious trends that have spread into other parts 
of Central Asia. " 231 
This argument is also applicable to the Wahhabi expansion in the Valley, although 
its uncompromising radicalism has not encouraged widespread support for the 
sect. The politicisation of regional differences in religious adherence may play a 
decisive and divisive role in centre-periphery relations in both republics, if coupled 
to inter-regional political competition. For both the Fergana and southern 
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Kazakstan. this religious factor has acted as a key means of identification from the 
centre. 
5.12. iii. Islamism and Economic and Social Justice: As in other parts of the 
world, Central Asian Islamism has been associated with other sensitive issues. 
These include: economic inequalities; social hardship; corruption; and the already 
discussed issues of environmental degradation and land and water privatisation, 
for example. 
It has been suggested that the saliency of Islamism, and in particular the 
popularity of Wahhabism, in the Fergana Valley has been as much a consequence 
of the high level of unemployment in this industrialised and densely populated 
region, as it is related to the region's traditional religiosity. 23' Unemployment 
rates in the Valley were as high as 3 5% in 199 1.233 
Throughout Central Asia, the IRP has incorporated economics into its manifesto 
as a means of questioning the legitimacy of the new governments. Paragraph 26 of 
the IRP's programme declared that the party supports "the relegating, on the basis 
of the Sharia over-accumulation of wealth in the hands of some people. 77234 
Muslim demonstrators campaigned against food price rises in Fergana, 1992, and 
unemployment and accommodation issues haye been raised by Islamist activists in 
Tajikistan. 235 
In Kazakstan, Attan, Zheltoqsan and other Islamist groups have organised protest 
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on wages, pensions, unemployment and poor provision of utilities. Nationalist 
Islamist parties have also been vocal about government corruption. Secular 
organisations, including trade unions and the People's Congress, have also been 
active on these issues, indicating that Islamists do not offer the sole means of 
protest in the republic. In fact, most disgruntled and active Kazakstanis preferred 
other organisations to represent their interests. 
Competition for economic and political power have influenced the adoption of 
Islam as a political instrument. This was illustrated in TaJikistan with the Garm 
clan's association with the IRP. As Roy notes, emphasising the nexus between 
regional identity and economic and political objectives, 
"economic competition helps to explain the civil war against a background of 
population growth, poverty, competition for land, and scarcity of water. The 
conflict was one based on both territorial claims between groups (all of them 
Tajiks and Muslims) and on ideological differences Uslam versus post- 
Communism)" 237 
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Political Islam provided a channel for the political aspirations of the alienated 
Garm clan. There is little reason to suggest that it cannot provide a similar vehicle 
for the disposed in Uzbekistan, possibly coupled to a Fergana regional political 
identity. 
The interesting fact is that as yet these issues have not drawn supporters to the 
Islamist cause in either of the republics. Should this connection be bridged then 
the two governments may face a serioqs challenge which provides both 
ideological and social-economic critiques and alternatives. The fear of instability, 
a consistent theme in regional social surveys, and understandable given the 
examples of Afghanistan and Tajikistan, may partially account for the limited 
Islamist agitation on such issues. Another reason for the lack of popular support 
for Islamism may be because enough members of the Muslim community have a 
sufficient economic stake in the republics' development and therefore do not want 
destabilise them. Olcott argues that it is probably not a coincidence that the first 
of the large privatisation auctions, in Uzbekistan, was held in Namangan. 238 
Having acknowledged this, such policies will only have limited success. It is 
difficult to envisage an economic redistribution programme capable of providing 
for the burgeoning population of unemployed, underemployed and "downwardly 
mobile. " 
The economic implications of an Islamist-inspired heightened security 
environment were discussed in the Russian Foreign Policy Doctrine, and Military 
Doctrine, adopted April and November 1993 respectively. "[A]Ithough touching 
only indirectly on the issue of Islam, the doctrines do contain a number of relevant 
provisions suggesting that Islam [is] a threat to be reckoned with. , 239 The 
doctrines highlighted the potential for domestic social unrest and political 
instability from the combined affects of economic boycotts, trade re-alignments, 
increased defence spending, and refugee pressures, often unintentional and 
indirect consequences. 240 The economic threats include: 
- Deterioration in regional trade with the newly established Islamic state, which it 
is alleged would see a decline in its GNP. 
- The economic and social impacts of refugee flows from Islamic-related crises. 
Refugees seeking accommodation, employment and other resources, causing the 
host state financial hardship. 300,000 refugees fled from Tajikistan to Uzbekistan, 
an increase of approximately 1% of the Uzbekistan population. As far as can be 
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ascertained, these refugees have to-date had little impact on Uzbekistan's social 
stability, although the arrival of a smaller number of refugees in northern 
Kazakstan has been less pacific. 
- The establishment of an Islamic state, in Central Asia, would increase regional 
insecurity and require heightened (Russian) military preparedness and hence 
spending. 241 
For Kazakstan, which has not perceived Islamism as a national security threat, a 
military response has not been a high priority. Uzbekistan's military programme 
has, however, been associated with the Islamic threat. 242 
5.13. Islam's External Links: Ideoloeical and Phvsical Threats 
Prior to 1991, indigenous Islan-dsts were continually portrayed as agents of 
external enen-des. The term Wahhabi wasvMely employed by the authorities to 
suggest an alien and radical enemy. Such policies continued after independence, 
particularly in Uzbekistan. The continued restricted nature of politics and the 
clandestine and frequently transient nature of Islamic movements in Central Asia 
make such accusations difficult to qualify, although Soviet and post-Soviet 
concerns about extra-regional influences have to some extent been justified. There 
is evidence that prior to 1991, ideological and physical penetration did take place. 
Islamic broadcasts and literature produced in Afghanistan, Iran and Saudi Arabia 
were received in the region. 243 It was estimated that a third of Turkmen youth 
listened to one of the 38 stations along the Iranian-Soviet border which the Soviet 
media accused of attempting to export the Islamic revolution. 244 
Given the relative relaxation of politics and border controls since the Soviet's 
inability to isolate Soviet Muslims from the rest of the umma, it is to be expected 
that post-independence contact has increaseý dramatically. This has alan-ned the 
regional government, particular Dushanbe and Tashkent, and infused security 
debates. 
The recent establishment and unsecured legitimacy of the governments, concerns 
over social-political stability, and lack of experience in managing domestic civil 
society and foreign and diplomatic relations, have meant that the leaderships have 
been uneasy about the influence of foreign Muslim actors in their republics. The 
external situation has some valid causes for concern. Islamism has been influential 
in Afghanistan and Tajikistans' civil wars, whilst. external patrons of Central 
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Asia's Islamic revival - Iran, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia - each have had distinct 
assertive political interpretations of the faith in their domestic and foreign policies. 
Almaty and Tashkent have approached foreign assistance to their indigenous 
religious expansion with caution. Financial aid when directed to state-sponsored 
activities, including mosque building, has been welcomed as it is relatively ease to 
control. Tashkent approved Iranian Tajik and Uzbek language broadcasts in the 
region and its ftinding of Shi'ite mosques in Bukhara, Samarkand and Tashkent. 245 
A new mosque under construction in Almaty, has been funded by Saudi Arabia. 246 
In line with the governments' attitudes towards all autonomous political activities, 
foreign assistance to non-state religious groups has been regarded with suspicion. 
The governments have benefited from attempts to associate regional Islamists 
with external Islamic states. As an example, one Uzbekistani imarn who received 
financial and material support from Saudi Arabia for his mosque was questioned 
by the police on why his mosque rather than the state should receive this aid. "' 
The same cleric was accused of aiding the opposition in Tajikistan, and of failing 
to read the Directorate's official statements at Friday prayers. 248 Equally alarming 
for Tashkent has been the financial and ideological support that Wahhabists in the 
Fergana Valley have received from the Saudi Arabian Ahl-e Sunnah origination. 
The organisation provided an estimated $1.3. million for the construction of 
mosques and madrasas by the end of 1993, with the objective of training a 
regional Wahhabi cadre. 249 
Numerous Uzbekistani politicians, defence officials and analysts have sought to 
portray Islamic fundamentalism as the key threat to Uzbekistan's stability. 
Uzbekistan's Foreign Minister, Abdulaziz Komilov warned Islamic states not to 
"expand their influence' in the region . 
250 This statement may be as much to do 
with Uzbekistan's regional interests as much as fears about political Islamism's 
encroachment. When interviewed at the time of the Taliban's major drive 
northwards in late 1996, Rafik Saifulin, Uzbekistani Institute of Strategic and 
Regional Studies, cited the conflicts in Afghanistan and Tajikistan and Islamic 
fundamentalism in the Fergana Valley as -the main threats to the republic's 
security. He blamed the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in the Valley upon the 
involvement of Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan. 251 
Despite the limited and moderate Islamic nature of the Tajikistani opposition, 
Karimov portrayed it as a springboard for a fundamentalist penetration of Central 
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Asia which would incite similar trends in Uzbekistan, even after he entered into 
dialogue with the UTO. 252 Tashkent's negotiations and accommodation with the 
UTO from April 1995 onwards suggests that either the Islamic threat diminished 
or never existed . 
25' This volte-face dialogue with the UTO undermines Tashkent's 
proclaimed fear of Islamic fundamentalism. Kangas argues that Uzbekistan was 
keen to see an end to the conflict because of the fear of the export of Islamic 
fundamentalism and violence from TaJikistan. 254 This argument does not 
correspond with its political and material interventions in the conflict and in 
Afghanistan. 255 Uzbekistan, "the staunch enemy of the [TaJik] Islamic opposition 
and the key promoter of Islamic threaf', has accepted accommodation with the 
UTO as a means of retaining influence in TaJik domestic politics and of checking 
Russian regional ambitions . 
256 This suggests its anti-Islamic policy has been 
principally an instrument for its own regional objectives. It can be removed when 
it no longer provides political benefits. 
As part of their response to the alleged external physical Islamist threat, 
Kazakstan and Uzbekistan have both been party to collective and bilateral military 
measures, including the CIS Collective Security Treaty, May 1992. The Treaty, 
together with subsequent bilateral agreements between Russia, and Kazakstan and 
Uzbekistan respectively, signed within weeks of the initial treaty, were regarded 
as a direct response to Tajik Civil War. 257 
Interestingly, Splidsboel-Hansen states that Russian analysts accept that whilst it 
is feasible to temporarily halt or lessen the potency of Islamic extremism in the 
region, a comprehensive bulwark against the ideology is impossible. 2'8 Security 
policies, even outright repression, have proved incapable of preventing the less- 
tangible political threat, including the dissemination of Islamic fundamentalism 
into the region . 
259 As Novoe Vremya stated, the CIS agreement was an attempt 
"to resist the 'Islarnification' of the region which would take place through the 
conduit of Tajikistan, according to Karimov. )7260 
The practical affects of these security agreements has, however, been limited. 
Kazakstan was unwilling to meet its CIS commitment in Tajikistan, indicating a 
lack of immediacy of the Islamic threat to the northern republic as well as the 
poor material basis of its Armed Forces. "' Unlike Uzbekistan, Islamism has not 
be perceived as the most pressing external security threat. For Kazakstan, China 
and Russia have been seen as more immediate concerns. Uzbekistan's partisan 
involvement in the Afghan and Tajik Wars have questioned its professed 
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commitment to resolving the conflicts via peaceful means. Tashkent was criticised 
by Kyrgyzstan, a fellow contributor to the peacekeeping operation, for escalating 
tensions in the republic. 262 
The Tajik Civil War has had domestic implications for Uzbekistan. Had the 
democratic-Islan-dc movement been successful in TaJikistan in 1992, Uzbekistan 
may have been vulnerable to similar reforn-dst pressures. One international 
observer, sceptical of Karimov's real intentions for intervention, has stated that "it 
is evident that Karimov was not too worried about the Islamic neo-Communist 
conflict but he objected to the IRP being incorporated into a coalition 
government. ))263 The presence of the I" in the government highlighted 
Karimov's greatest fear. Islam was, and remains, the only viable popular source of 
competition to his regime, and thus it could not be allowed to succeed in a 
neighbouring state. It was therefore in Tashkent's interests to discredit and 
264 destroy any potential regional challenge at its source, TaJikistan. Whilst 
Dushanbe was controlled by the Islarnic-democratic coalition, Uzbekistan jammed 
broadcasts from TaJikistan's capital, indicating the considerable concern that 
Tashkent had about alternative information being received by its own 
population. 265 
Uzbekistan's anti-Islarnic perception of the war provided a means of attacking the 
ideological challenges to the Karimov government. Uzbekistan sought to portray 
TaJikistan's democratic and Islamic movements as radical, inherently unstable and 
ill-suited for Central Asia in this transitional period. Tajikistan was "an object 
lesson of what could happen to other ... states" according to Tashkent's 
analysis. 266 Under these conditions domestic. authoritarian rule was justified as a 
temporary measure which will provide a firm. and stable basis for gradual political 
and economic reforms. 267 In the Uzbekistani conservative analysis of events in 
TaJikistan, it was the proliferation of political movements and demands for 
"radicar' political reforms that were responsible for the collapse into civil war. 
Domestic groups were associated with external enemies attempting to destabilise 
Uzbekistan, who by "making threats, spreading rumours, ... are seeking to sow 
the seeds of confrontation and strife and draw us into the orbit of Islamic 
FundamentaliSM. "268 
Karimov immediately condemned the Islamic-democratic government as 
"tantamount to a Muslim fundamentalist take-over", and thus established a 
climate of imminent instability in which it was possible to launch a counter-attack 
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on the nascent pluralist political culture in Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan's domestic 
opposition, including Islamist groups, quickly felt the pressure of this association. 
Other forms of government repression included accusations of financial assistance 
by Uzbekistan's Muslim community to "fundamentalists" in Tajikistan. 270 
A Nezavisimaya gazeta article in 1994 claimed that governmental reports warned 
Karimov of an upsurge in Islamic activism, using Tajikistan and the Fergana 
Valley as an entrance into the republic. The report stated that, in 1993,53 Islamic 
fundamentalists were expelled from Uzbekistan. 27' A more reliable source alleged 
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that Uzbeks from Namangan fought against the Tajikistani government . 
In 
1998, Deputy Interior Minster, Major-General Kutbitdin Burkhonov, re-iterated 
the accusations of close co-operation between Uzbekistani Islamist and the TaJik 
opposition in 1991-3 period. He claimed that the latter were attempting to 
destabilise Uzbekistan during the said period, having "lured young Uzbeks and 
trained them as saboteurs and propaganda workers. "27' The Minister suggested 
that many of these activists who had "committed grave crimes on the territory of 
Uzbekistan" returned via Kyrgyzstan. 274 The underlying implication of this 
suggestion is that it was Kyrgyzstan's liberal laws and security that have lead to 
increased Islamic activism in the region . 
27' Kyrgyzstan, in response, criticised 
Uzbekistan's over-zealous anti-fundamentalist drive. 
Elements in the Russian leadership have voiced similar fears to Tashkent. Interfax, 
in May 1995, cited an unspecified Russian MFA source which claimed massive 
fundamentalist penetration of the region by unnamed Islamic states, and Saudi and 
Iranian financial support "to virtually every mosque, ' in Uzbekistan . 
276 The same 
report claimed that Afghanistani Uzbeks were providing military and theological 
training for Uzbekistani radicals, with Egyptian and Saudi assistance. 277 At the 
end of 1996, at the same time as its military advances in Afghanistan, the Taliban 
made claims on Bukhara and Samarkand and expressed a desire to export its 
brand of Islarn beyond Afghanistan. 278 In response, Russia and Uzbekistan 
increased their support for General Dostum'sr anti-Taliban forces . 
279The Taliban's 
fundamentalist position on society is far removed from current Central Asian ideas 
and practices and is unlikely to receive popular support in the region. The fact 
that the Taliban are ethnic-Pushtan and that the opposition forces are Tajik and 
Uzbek also deters the spread of such a form of fundamentalism into Central Asia. 
The Taliban has since recanted its claims on Bukhara and Samarkand. 280 
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The situation in Afghanistan and TaJikistan has without doubt been serious 
security concerns for Uzbekistan, but there has been a credibility gap between 
rhetoric and practice. Numerous domestic and international commentators have 
criticised Tashkent for exaggerating the regional threat of Islamic 
fijndamentaliSM. 281 Tashkent's rhetoric and iepression seem to have elevated the 
sense of danger and radicalised rather than incorporated political Islam that exists 
with in the republic. Interviews conducted by the author and Petersen demonstrate 
that Uzbekistan's political elite have regarded "the strengthening and maintenance 
of regional stability" as the paramount objective of the republic's security 
policy. 282 The same group, however, did not feel that their position was militarily 
threatened. 283 Defence Minister, Rustam. Akmyedov, supported this view of a 
secure Uzbekistan, capable of countering any potential aggressor. 284 The fact that 
Uzbekistan flouted its own peace proposals in both Afghanistan and TaJikistan 
questions its own alleged concerns about the proliferation of conflict, regionally. 
Uzbekistan's military strength would be capable of halting the Taliban's 
ambitious, and possibly entirely rhetorical, goal of incorporating Bukhara and 
Samarkand into a greater Afghanistan. 28' The neighbouring conflicts and Islamic 
states have, however, offered a feasible and potent ideological challenge rather 
than a physical threat to the two republics. This was emphasised by Saifiddin 
Jurayev, a member of the Progress of the Homeland Party, who stated that "[t]he 
threat from Afghanistan is the inj%ence of Islamic fundamentalism. 1)286 
The case of Iran illustrates the ambiguities of foreign involvement in Central 
Asia. 287 Transnational cultural affinity with Tajikistan; Iranian "assertive" foreign 
policy since 1979; and the historical cultural competition between Persian and 
Turkic have made Almaty and Tashkent wary of its regional interests. Allegations 
of an Iranian pro-Islamic regional policy are, however, difficult to defend. Rather 
than seek to export revolution, Iran has pursued a moderate pragmatic policy with 
economic relations prominent in its agenda. Its policy towards Tajikistan, 
"especially in the critical months between May and October 1992, when the 
opposition might have had a chance [of success), was hesitant if not passive. ""' 
Tehran (correctly) perceived that the war was a power struggle between 
competing regions rather than between neo-Communist and Islamist ideologues. 
Tehran also felt that the Tajik opposition was insufficiently Islamic in character. 
As a result Tehran felt that the promotion ýf a Islamist and revolutionary policy 
was not advantageous and not likely to be successful. It "portray[ed] the crisis in 
Ta ikistan in non-ideological terms, as an internal conflict with disturbing regional 
consequences. v1289 Iran refused to arm the Tajik opposition and provided only 
268 
cursory diplomatic assistance . 
290 The discussion of Iranian foreign policy 
demonstrates that the republic was extremely cautious about advancing an 
explicitly ideological and revolutionary policy. Nor did it use cultural solidarity in 
its foreign policy discourse, even though these would have been advantageous for 
its relationship with Afghan and Tajik groupS. 291 Instead Iran acted as a traditional 
regional power, partly concerned about countering pan-Turkism and Sunni 
fundamentalism, the latter supported by Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. 292 Iranian 
influence in the region should not therefore be regarded as an Islamic ideological 
threat, but rather in a typical Realist manner. 
Similarly, Tajik politicians have been very cautious about emphasising the nation's 
association with Iran and Iranian-ness. The Iranian association with Shi'ism and 
"fundamentalism" proved problematic for the majority of TaJik nationalists and 
politicians. This has been a particularly sensitive issue for TaJik-Uzbek relations. 
The Iranian component of the TqJik identity has therefore focused upon cultural 
rather that religious or ideological links. 293 
A final external consideration for Almaty and Tashkent has been the potential for 
domestic Islamist-nationalist criticism of their associations with foreign secular 
states. Given Russia's previous colonial role in Kazakstan, the republics' close 
economic and political relations have produced very little explicit Islamist- 
nationalist hostility in the southern republic. The stark economic and diplomatic 
realities that Kazakstan is confronted by, together with the limited Islamist and 
nationalist element in its politics may account for this. The situation for Tashkent 
has been more inflammatory. Uzbekistan's post-independent regional policy has a 
distinct anti-Islamic fundamentalist posture. This aided its recognition by the 
international community, particularly Russia and the USA. Uzbekistan's 
pragmatic and autonomous foreign policy enabled the US to view it as "an island 
of stability" capable of resisting Islamic and Russian ambitions in the region. 294 
The benefits for Uzbekistan were twofold: confirming its international stature, 
assisting the promotion of its self-image for internal and external consumption; 
and forcing the international community to temper its criticisms of the 
government's domestic oppression. Uzbekistan's political and n-fflitary alliance 
with Russia and its recent rapprochement with the USA, both secular states, may 
provide a key source of criticism for domestic Islan& and (nationalist) critics. 
However the careful promotion of an assertively independent foreign policy, and 
the lack of reliable news may prevent this. 
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5.14. Conclusion: Assessine the Islamic Threat 
There has clearly been a revival in "folk Islam", the re-integration of Islam into 
national cultural identities and as a religious practice. The popular commitment to 
these trends has been ambiguous, with many believers lacking a well-grounded 
knowledge of fundamental religious tenets and adhering only cursorily to 
principles such as the prohibition on consuming alcohol or pork. Equally, there is 
some evidence to suggest that popular interest in Islam may have declined since 
its peak between the late-1980s and early-1990s, when identification with the 
religion was a symbolic gesture of the independence and nationalist trends. These 
inconsistencies have been most noticeable in Kazakstan, where traditional 
religious adherence was cursory. However, it must be remembered that 
throughout the Soviet period a committed minority continued to practice the faith 
in a relatively unadulterated and comprehensive manner, whilst the wider 
community was influenced by Muslim values. After independence a more Islamic- 
sympathetic environment was created in both republics. Domestic and foreign 
clerics, literature and finances have assisted in the dissemination of more genuine 
Islamic information to a wider and receptive audience. 
It is uncertain whether the relatively benign contemporary cultural and spiritual 
trends, frequently superficial, will transform into political Islam, echoing Roy's 
conclusions on contemporary Islam's retreat from politics. 29' Political Islam, and 
Islamic fundamentalism have not dominated the political cultures of either of the 
republics and the governments have emphasised the secular nature of their 
political systems whilst acknowledging the traditional influence of Islam in their 
cultures. 
The modest Islan-ýification of the two societies and the governments' careful 
regulation of Islam has not prevented either Almaty or Tashkent from regarding 
Islamism as a challenge to regime and state security. In fact, the authorities' 
careful regulations indicated these apprehensions. 
To what extent are these concerns about an Islamist threat justified? Autonomous 
Islamist movements and popular activism have had a role in the political affairs of 
both republics. They have campaigned on a variety of issues including the 
appointments of the Chief Muftis, official corruption and economic grievances 
over wages, pensions and food prices. The established clergy have not always 
remained acquiescent. The Chief Muftis' forays into politics and contacts with 
270 
independent Islamic movements have forced the governments to realise that their 
patronage of Islam is equivocal. However, unlike several Nfiddle Eastern states 
and others in closer proxin-fity - Afghanistan; Iran and Tajikistan - political Islam 
has not, either through the political process -or military/direct methods, been able 
to challenge central authority in a sustained republican-wide manner. To some 
extent Almaty and Tashkents' pro-active policies have contributed to this. Islamist 
parties have been harassed and outlawed in both republics, although in the case of 
Kazakstan it is likely that Islamism would have been a ftinge activity anyway. 
Similarly, popular support for explicit radical Islan-dst groups has been lacking. 
Whilst surveys indicated modest interest in an enhanced role for Islam in politics 
and society, the respondents held confused opinions about both the political and 
religious characteristics of Islam. The majority of republics' Muslims have 
favoured the Islamic revival remaining in the cultural and spiritual spheres. They 
have percieved that Islamic politics, based on the examples of Afghanistan and 
Tajikistan, are unable to provide social stability and economic progress . 
296 This 
has deterred pro-Islamic sympathies. The involvement of Islamist movements in 
the collapse of Tajikistan, and the radical nature of the Taliban, have harmed its 
image in the region. This perceptual factor has been highly significant. This 
argument has been an integral component of the governments' maintenance of 
authoritarian politics. 
The Islamist groups themselves weakened their political salience. Insufficient 
popular support, poor organisational and ideological structures, and serious 
government censure restricted their development. None have been able to offer 
consistent and popular manifestos. In Kazakstan the overtly anti-Russian and 
sharia-state objectives of Zheltoqsan alienated support. Alash's involvement in the 
anti-Ratbek violence and its confused stance on the shariat signified a small, 
ideologically weak and unpopular movement. Islamist parties in Uzbekistan have 
faced far greater government harassment, with the arrest and disappearance of 
party leaders and independent clerics. This is probably the key reason for the 
Islamists' political failure in Uzbekistan. 
The movements have also been constrained by internal deficiencies, primarily the 
regional character of the three main groups, Adolat, the IRP and the Wahhabist; 
and the unwillingness to form a tactical alliance between the latter two. In both 
republics, memberships has been minimal and lacked nation-wide appeal. Party 
ideologies and manifestos have been confused, particularly in relation to the issue 
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of the end-goal - the Islamic state. When the full force of the government, 
including security services, has been directed against them, the Islamist parties 
have been easily defeated. The Islamists, forced underground and denied 
participation in the political process, have not, as yet, resorted to terrorist action. 
A convincing factor in suggesting the limited politicisation of faith in the region is 
that historically parallel Islam has not been antagonistic. It has acted rather as a 
means of continuing religious customs and rites. "Underground Islam was a 
stable, not radical, force in [Soviet] Central Asia. "297 Hanafi and Sufi traditions 
influenced this apolitical character. The respected position of Sufism in Central 
Asian faith with its focus upon prayer, individual piety and "neo-fundamentalist" 
activist may encourage an apolitical future. The brotherhoods are not centralised, 
with loyalty directed to an individual pir (spiritual leader) rather than the order. 
There is the potential for Sufi-led political activism as the Brotherhoods have 
historically acted as a vanguard of militant resistance to non-Muslim invaders. it is 
unclear whether this could be re-directed towards indigenous Muslim targets. 
The key consideration for the poor standing of Islamic politics in Uzbekistan has 
been government censure. In Kazakstan, similar though less forceful opposition 
has been less influential because of the already restricted appeal of political Islam. 
This factor is, however, equivocal. Bezanis' suggestion that Islamic politics has 
not emerged because of the present leaderships' hostility to Islamic extremism 
negates the near-consensus of academic research on the development and 
radicalisation of Islamic PolitiCS. 298 It is these deliberate state policies, presently 
restricting the movement's influence, that will ultimately prove the single most 
important catalyst for political Islam in the region. Political Islam is reactive, a 
source of inspiration for opposition to secular politics. Almaty and Tashkent have 
implemented wholesale opposition to all independent Islamist groups, rather than 
selective accommodation. This is liable to create the political environment for 
political Islam to adopt radical methods and objectives. OSCE Chairman, the 
Polish Foreign Minister Bronislov Geremek, informed Karimov that Islamic 
Fundamentalism's political credibility and popular support are enhanced by 
government repression. This action he argued transforms moderate Islamist 
politics into extrerniSM. 299 
The banning of Islamist movements, including Adolat, Attan and the IRP, has 
reduced their political strength considerably. There is considerable consensus 
amongst observers that the repression of Islamism has simply forced the 
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movements underground rather than eradicate thern. 300 The long-term 
implications of this are liable to be negative. Particularly in Uzbekistan, the 
suppression of moderate secular and Muslim opponents may produce a vacuum 
into which underground radical Islamic movements can establish themselves. "The 
repression of democratic Uzbek nationalists [Birlik and Erk] may prove to have 
removed an important moderating force from the political scene. 1)301 Moderate 
domestic opposition has been eliminated whilst the only credible challenger to the 
regime, political Islam, has been forced underground. Ironically, the very ideology 
that the repression was directed against may have been strengthened and 
radicalised. The lack of political alternatives, a consequence of government 
actions, may lessen the possibility for compromise between the incumbent and its 
rivals. The distinctions between democratic and undemocratic, and moderate and 
extremist methods and objectives have not been used as criteria for inclusion or 
exclusion. Haghayeghi is explicit about the counter-effect consequences of 
extreme repression of Islamist movements in Uzbekistan. He argues that, 
"[elxpereince has shown that such authoritarian policies, almost invariably, 
strengthen the legitimacy of such organizations while at the same time 
adversely affecting the legitimacy of the government, with devastating long- 
term consequences. This has been the case in Egypt, Algeria, Tunisia, and 
Morocco; Central Asia may not been much different. " 302 
Haghayeghi's proposed solution, re-iterating Tal's conclusions, is 
303 democratisation. This would help to undermine Islamists' populist appeal and 
reduce their radicalism by forcing Islamic groups to adhere to the political 
process. Other ideologies and parties would diminish their strength too. The 
opposing cases of the creation of an Islamic opposition to the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan and Jordan's use of political inclusion also indicate such conclusions. 
If the Uzbekistani press reports of the existence of underground Islamic groups in 
the Fergana Valley in 1998 are correct, and the groups are remnants of the overt 
movements extant in 1992, this indicates Tashkent's failure to control politics 
through coercive actions. As late as 1996, popular independent Islamic activism, a 
considerable feat in Uzbekistan, was reported. Parishioners interrupted a pro- 
Kafimov speech by Toxtabi mosque's imam, in February 1996, and called for the 
return of their previous imam, Abud Khan Kori. This took place whilst the 
mosque was surrounded by the Uzbekistani Secret Services, the SNB, and 
Interior Nfinistry troopS. 304 According to InformalsionWi bitilleten', 200 believers 
later protested outside the 01i Majlis over the latter disappearance of imam 
Kori. 305 
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Other factors also indicate that Islamism's present weak position in the two 
republics may only be temporary. One of these is the acknowledgement by the 
fundamentalist clergy that their present goal is the establishment of a committed 
cadres "properly versed in Islam" before seeking the pursuit of an Islamic state. "' 
The typical demographic features for an Islan-dst growth have been evident in 
Central Asia. Students and the young have been central to the cadres of 
contemporary Islamist movements. Burgeoning populations, related decline in 
employment opportunities and the replacement of internationalist educational and 
social norms with narrower national values provide the potential for increased 
association between the region's youth and Islamism. Neo-fundamentalism rather 
than political Islam is likely to be the chief beneficiary of these trends, as Roy's 
research has indicated. Large-scale Saudi investment in the region and the 
corresponding increase in Wahhabi activities -support this conclusion. This author 
would argue, however, that whilst neo-flandamentalism has traditionally been 
apolitical, Sufl-Wahhabi violence in the Caucasus and the politicisation of 
Afghanistan's Muslim community in response to the ideological as well as 
military, Soviet onslaught indicate that it can also evolve into a physical political 
force. 
The uneven dissemination and adoption of Islam in the region may prevent a 
regional revival capable of crossing national and state affiliationS. 307 In the 
twentieth century, however, Islamist movements have been most successful when 
operating from within a national or regional context. Central Asia has not be an 
exception to this trend. Stalin explicitly established four spiritual directorates in 
1941 to prevent a pan-Soviet Muslim identity. Within Central Asia political and 
religious authority was nationalised with the establishment of republican religious 
directorates, in the independent republics. 
Where political Islam has been successful, the Fergana Valley and Tajikistan most 
notably, it has assumed either an ethnic or regional characteristic. Combined with 
national or regional affiliations such a renaissance could prove more appealing but 
also exclusive and antagonistic. The possibility of Uzbekistan like Tajikistan 
fragmenting along ethnic or regional lines is an understandable concern for 
Tashkent. Adolat-IRPs' temporary control of Namangan was an indicator of the 
limited identification with central authority in the republic in 1991-2, although 
irredentism within the republic has not attracted much support. '08 Nazarbaev's 
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chief concerns about regional divisions within the republic have focused upon the 
division between the Russian-populated north and Kazak southy to the extent that 
Kazak migration and the transfer of the capital to the north have been 
implemented. As yet there does not appear to be concern about a southern, 
Islamic-infused, challenge to the state's integrity. 
The final consideration that may increase Islamism as an instrument of opposition 
is the economic development of the republics. Given the region's economic 
dislocation since the Soviet period and economic inequalities and accusations of 
nomenklatura corruption, the Islamists have singularly failed to use this issue to 
their advantage. The future politicisation of this issue will be event-led, with 
Islamists able to draw sustenance from popular disquiet over their material 
position which, as Azar and Moon have argued, frequently preclude the erosion of 
regime legitimacy. "9 
Domestically, rather than act as a source of tension between Muslims and non- 
Muslim groups, Islam has been more effective in defining national groups and 
acting as a weapon against Muslim governments or other Muslim groups. 
Although, therefore, Islam has acted as a boundary marker between Slavs and 
"indigenous" communities conflict along this fracture has been minimal. In fact, all 
inter-ethnic violence witnessed in the region during the last two decades, with the 
exception of Alma-Ata December 1986, has been between Muslims. Muslim-non 
Muslim tensions have not resulted in violence. 
With the exception of Namangan, domestic Islamist activities have remained 
within the normal remit of legitimate political debate. As such, it is difficult to 
conclude that it has constituted a national security threat. Whilst Almaty has not 
attempted to portray it as such, Tashkent has. This was essentially a self- 
interested regime response and recognised as such by Ibrahim Pulatov, co-chair of 
Birlik and participant in the establishment of the IRP. 310 Pulatov noted that the 
Islamic opposition has been able to reach the population through the mosque far 
more successfully than the urban and intellegensia based and outlawed Erk and 
Birlik. 311 Pulatov also recognised the greater ideological strength and popular 
resonance of Islamism than secular movements in Uzbekistan, stating that "people 
who have already lost their faith in the Communist regime are afraid to join the 
democrats but not the Islamic movement. ýiM Islamism is essentially a legitimate 
political challenge to Karimov. The government's refusal to allow it to participate 
in the political process may transfer it from this position to a security one. Lacking 
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any broad grassroots status in Kazakstan, its contemporary and future political 
and security affects will be minimal. 
The security implications for the two republics from external Islamism diverge 
quite considerably. Conflicts in neighbouring Afghanistan and Tajikistan clearly 
required political and military responses. Uzbekistan's behaviour towards events 
in these states has been partially motivated by justifiable threats to its integrity and 
stability. As Carlisle notes, although Tashkent may have exaggerated the Islamic 
threat this does not necessary imply thai such concerns have been totally 
unfounded. 313 The existence of these problems cannot be ignored although those 
emanating from the TaJik conflict have been manipulated in order to legitimise the 
continuation of authoritarianism and to discredit and repress domestic Islamic 
politics. 
Although beyond the period of study, if current agreements can lead to long-term 
peace in Tajikistan, with the incorporation of the UTO into a post-war 
government, and the Taliban maintain their advances in northern Afghanistan, this 
would locate ideological opponents to Karimov's rule in enhanced positions on 
Uzbekistan's borders. Although Tashkent, after 1993, sought a more conciliatory 
role in Tajikistan's affairs, Karimov's emphatic linkage between domestic and 
regional adversaries, and the predominantly confrontational manner employed 
against them may prove disadvantageous now that the regional political map has 
altered. A reappraisal of its foreign policy with repercussions for the domestic 
situation may be expedient. 
The UTO's incorporation into a post war coalition government in Dushanbe may 
see it moderate its Islamist platform as it is forced to become involved in the 
compromises of mainstream politics. This would counter popular perceptions of 
Islan-dsm as inherently radical and conflictual, a view regional governments have 
been keen to perpetuate. This transformation is dependent upon the provision of 
reliable and unbiased news, itself a rare commodity in the region. As yet it is 
unclear what the Taliban's regional policy will be. It may seek to export its 
revolutionary ideology or support similar movements, partly as a means of 
securing its own position, as was the case of Khomeini-era Iran. 
The effect of these changes are indirect and less significant for Kazakstan. Mmaty 
was less implacably opposed to Tajikistan's Islamists, to the extent that its 
involvement in CIS operations in the republic was circumspect. As Sadit Zhisipov, 
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of the Kazakstan Institute of Strategic Studies noted, "Afghanistan is explicitly a 
problem for Uzbekistan, it is not an immediate security concern for us, " although 
he was concerned about the domino effect upon Central Asia. 314 
Interestingly, Kazakstan, with its a combined Christian-Muslim and ethnic division 
and more secular leadership, has managed political Islam more successful than 
Uzbekistan, with its more established Muslim culture and a leadership keen to 
claim this legacy. Even though Almaty forcibly responded to Islamist movements, 
particularly Alash, it is clear that the government has not perceived Islam as 
serious a threat as its colleagues in Tashkent have. Zhisipov stated that, "Islam is 
not a major problem in Kazakstan [because] Islam is like a hybrid in 
Kazakstan. ))315 Presently, Islam's political influence has remained limited in 
Kazakstan. Govermnent policies, the underlying modest Kazak identification with 
the religion, and the poor standing of radical groups because of their internal 
weaknesses and popular resistance to their ideologies, have all deterred Islam's 
greater and more extreme role. 
Islam's long-term influence on the social stability of the two republics is likely to 
be different. The less intense adoption of Islam by the Kazaks historically, the 
presence of a large non-Muslim community, more democratic political culture and 
the small number of Islamist movements in Kazakstan indicates a limited and 
relatively benign role for Islam. On the most dangerous ftacture, Russian-Kazak 
relations, religion has played a minor role. In Uzbekistan, Islam is liable to play a 
far greater role in social and political affairs. It has been influential and positive in 
the re-interpretation of the Uzbek national and state-identities. Politically, 
however, it has become a contentious issue. Government hostility towards 
independent thought, Islamism included, have polarised attitudes. The present 
growth in interest in Islamic culture and education in the republic, combined with 
the suppression of informal Islam may provide a breeding ground for the 
emergence of a strong, well-informed and radical form of Islamism. 
Uzbekistan, due to its demographic size, and Islam's historical importance is 
central to the development of political Islam in the region. "In short, without 
Uzbekistan in turmoil, the prospect of a region-wide Islamic wave being 
unleashed is reduced virtually to zero. ""' "Whether there really is an Islamic 
threat ... 
is perhaps secondary to the leadership's perception of it. 017 
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6. Conclusion 
The thesis has highlighted the ambiguities and difficulties that confront states 
during the initial stage of independence. Security issues were examined because 
they were a key and confused concern during this period and were illustrative of 
the wider political environment. This was a consequence of the new regimes 
seeking to establish their authority and legitimacy whilst defining their 
relationships with and responsibilities to the other components of the state, 
society and territory, and other actors. 
The Pluralist/Comprehensive Security perspective has proved applicable for the 
analyses of Kazakstan and Uzbekistans' political and security situations. Based 
upon this perspective the thesis has demonstrated the internal dynamics and 
contradictions of the state and the resultant implications for political stability. The 
government's responsibility as the central administration, and domestic and 
international representative of the state totality imbue it with moral, legal and 
physical authority. It is this status that places the government as a central concern 
of the thesis. The ambiguous government-state association and manner of 
government relations with and responsibilities towards the social and territorial 
elements are essential in determining the development and stability of the state. 
The Comprehensive Security analysis which recognises the multiplicity of actors 
and trends which influence the security milieu are particularly valid for this 
regional examination. The subjective, indirect and non-specific character of the 
threats and vulnerabilities examined and the importance of contextualising them 
are acknowledged by this perspective. 
The saliency of the threats and vulnerabilities that the NISs have faced are 
essentially consequences of their recently established and unsecured statehood. 
With time and concerted government policies, the republics may develop into 
strong states capable of managing their security milieu more effectively and 
confidently, particularly in relation to internal concerns. Until Kazakstan and 
Uzbekistan can achieve this status, however, their political stability remains 
uncertain. Challenges and vulnerabilities assume a degree of significance and 
threat beyond their actual potency. As a result, the governments' perceptions and 
responses are often alarmist, confrontational and consequently unconstructive. 
As each of the case-study chapters has included an individual conclusion it is the 
aim of this chapter to draw together the significant themes in origins, character 
and implications between the case-studies. 
In terms of their origins, the contemporary regional significance of inter-ethnic 
relations, the environment and Islam all share two common traits. The first is the 
role of Soviet politics. Decision-making from the divisive construction of 
nationalities and territories of the 1920s and 1930s, to the massive expansion of 
irrigation agriculture and the dual cooption and hostility towards Islam have left 
strong legacies in contemporary Central Asian politics. The continuation of 
broader political attitudes, norms and personnel have been influential. The second 
cause is the influence of the transition from SSR to sovereign republic, and the 
political and economic changes (albeit limited) from Communism to post- 
Communism. The long-term affects of this are more unpredictable. The pinnacle 
of activism concerning the case-studies during the period of inter-regnum can be 
seen as associated with the temporary freedom and uncertainty of this period. 
After the early 1990s there was a marked decline in the volatility of the subjects. 
As Olcott notes, 
"Central Asia has suffered virtually every social ill, hyperinflation, rising unemployment, 
rising death rates, falling birth rates, deteriorating health care, government corruption 
and crumbling infrastructure which could be expected to increase social tension and so 
make inter-ethic violence more likely, yet Central Asia has recorded no large-scale inter- 
ethnic-based disturbances since 199 F" 
This resilience to extreme political and social distress has been a noticeable feature 
of regional politics. With the exception of Tajikistan, disputes on all of the issues 
have remained essentially in the realm of political debate and when they have 
escalated into physical violence they have remained sub-state and limited in 
character. The diminishment of the issues in the post-Soviet period can be 
accounted for by political changes which have undercut their relevance. These 
are: the loss of the exkrnal enemy (Moscow); euphoria of independence; and 
superficial regime change. In reality, however, expedient and wholesale reform of 
the subjects under examination and politics in general have not been attempted. 
Consequently their political sensitivity if not volatility has only been temporarily 
annulled and they are liable to re-emerge with renewed vigour. 
There have been common characteristics, and cross-fertilisation and interaction 
between the political articulation of ethnicity, environmentalism and Islam. A 
significant common trait has been their ideological and functional proximity, 
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which assisted their individual and combined saliency. All provided valid and 
effective critiques of the Soviet system but also created less benign political 
processes. Environmental activism, for example, played a seminal role in 
transforming late-Soviet polity in Central Asia. It acted as a catalyst and pretext 
for other political demands and movements. Its relationship with nationalism 
proved particularly important in eroding the legitimacy of Moscow. Its association 
with nationalism, however, also enhanced the salience of group identification with 
and competition over land and water. 
Popular and political identification with the issues under examination have been 
cursory, ill-defined, and frequently transient. In both Kazakstan and Uzbekistan, 
the boundary markers between the titular and minority groups have been blurred. 
Assimilation and shared historical experiences have weakened exclusive 
nationalist traits. Given the reversals in fortunes between the Kazaks and 
Russians, the lack of Kazak triumphalism or calls for retribution have been 
noticeable by their absence. Whilst Almaty has pursued a moderate nationalist 
policy for pragmatic political considerations, radical Kazak nationalist groups 
have found the Kazak community unreceptive to their platforms. Similarly, the 
bellicose and irredentist rhetoric of ethnic Russians in the early period of 
Kazakstan's independence has been transformed into political accommodation and 
apathy, and emigration. The community has increasingly accepted Kazakstan as a 
sovereign state and their own distinct Kazakstani Russian identity, separate from 
that of ethnic Russians in the RF. ' 
In Uzbekistan, the indistinct boundaries between Tajik and Uzbeks and the 
weakness of the Tajik identity have restricted the minority from establishing an 
effective political consciousness. Ethnicity has not been perceived by the minority 
as determining their political fate, apart from a small group of ethnic Tajik 
intellectuals and political activists linked to the Samarkand movement. The 
externally-imposed politicisation and radicalisation of the Tajik identity by 
Tashkent may, however, ultimately be counter-productive for Karimov. 
Constitutional methods have failed to provide benefits for the minority. 
The political and popular strength of Islamism has numerous comparisons with 
the issue of ethnic identity. In the religious revival that accompanied the collapse 
of the USSR, bellicose statements calling for the implementation of the Sharia and 
the expulsion of Russians from the republics were articulated. These did not 
evolve into a coherent radical political force. The level of religious adherence and 
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knowledge has been cursory, modest and moderate. As with the extremist 
nationalist groups, Islamist movements have been widely perceived as radical and 
violent by the region's population and therefore not attracted broad support. 
The nexus between the case-studies is illustrated effectively by the existence of 
regional "hotspots". The disputed areas of the lower Zeravshan, the two southern 
oblasts of Kazakstan and the Fergana Valley, as recorded in the previous chapters, 
have each borne witness to a complex of problems. These include inter-ethnic and 
land/water-inspired tensions and/or physical violence, and the expansion of 
Islamist influence. In the cases of the Fergana Valley and the lower Zeravshan 
latent border disputes are also evident. The absence of the majority of Kazakstan 
from this list, emphasises the marked differences between the two republic's 
security environments. 
As well as creating areas of complex vulnerability, the nexus between ethnicity, 
religions and water problems poses a problem for managing the issues individually 
and the affects of one issue upon the others. This is highly evident in the case of 
economic reform and privatisation. Nomadic and Muslim sensibilities have been 
popular restraints to expedient reforms on land privatisation and water-pricing. 
Almaty's relatively successfully management of Islam has been at least equally a 
means of reassuring the Russian minority as it was a concern about a political 
Islamist challenge. Similarly Tashkent's policies towards its domestic Tajik 
minority, and Islamist and secular opposition have been difficult to disengage 
from its foreign policy discourse on Islamic Fundamentalism and involvement in 
Afghanistan and Tajikistan. 
What the thesis has demonstrated is that the subjects of study are not intrinsically 
destabilising. None have been able to maintain the political heights that they 
attained prior to 1991. Inter-ethnic relations have been fluid and highly 
contextual. Equally, the temporal application of Islam has proved diverse. 
Interpretations of the religion's political and social implications have ranged from 
the conservative and apolitical Sufism and Wahhabism, to the politicised 
radicalism of Adolat and Alash, and the attempts by Almaty and Tashkent to 
coopt and regulate the faith. Similarly the political and security implications of 
environmental scarcity are highly dependent upon subjective factors. Absolute 
scarcity has not provoked dispute, rather conflict has been a result of perceptions 
of economic injustice. As a result it is evident that ethnicity, religious affiliation 
and environmental awareness are not primordial, essentialist or conflictual in 
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themselves. Rather they have been used in a instrumentalist manner. This does not 
mean, however, that they will not re-emerge as sources of political dispute. In 
fact, the fluctuating and manipulative attentions that the two governments have 
directed towards the issues are legitimate sources of concern for the region's 
future development. The absence of the case-studies' intrinsic security (negative) 
implications and the economic, political and social context have been key themes 
of the thesis. 
It is, in fact, these external issues that lead the author to argue that the region's 
long-term stability is not secure. The three generic factors contributing to this 
conclusion are: the behaviour of central government; economic trends; and social 
factors. 
As the Nfinority at Risk Project and Tal have noted, the methods selected by the 
governments in managing inter-ethnic and Islamist problems are central to the 
long-term development of these concerns. Soviet authoritarianism, with its 
repression of dissent, one party system and hierarchical power structures, has 
been indelibly marked upon Central Asia's political consciousness. Lubin's 
research has demonstrated that this legacy has had both psychological and 
structural consequences. ' A moderate degree of elite continuity, from the Soviet 
to post-Soviet regimes, it has been suggested, is compatible with and conducive 
for democratisation. The period of transition could have "presented a golden 
opportunity for varying groups outside the old Communist network to compete 
for a greater share of power. "' This has, however, not been the case, because "[i]n 
the zero sum game of politics, political opposition has been actively or passively 
repressed since independence. "' A large-scale retention of the nomenklatura has, 
6 however, been associated with serious deficiencies in democracy. 
To date stability has been as much a consequence of suppression of independent 
movements as it has been an expression of political acquiescence and apathy. As 
such it is essentially artificial and temporary. "[T]he calm and the stability that 
seem to reign in the region are illusory ... [and] the region's stability is mostly a 
short-term development. "' It is widely regarded by commentators that the present 
restrictions on political life are counter-productive. ' In Uzbekistan, moderate 
domestic opposition has been eliminated whilst the only credible challenger to the 
regime, political Islam, has been forced underground. It has possible been 
radicalised and strengthened by this process. The lack of political alternatives, a 
consequence of government actions, may lessen the possibility for compromise 
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between the incumbent and its rivals. As Brown points out, "the repression of the 
democratic Uzbek nationalists may prove to have removed an important 
moderating force from the political scene. "9 Even in Kazakstan, political culture 
has been stifled by a centralised power structure. 
A recurrent theme in all of the case-studies has been the omnipresent influence of 
economics. Inter-ethnic violence in the late-1980s was associated with resource 
competition ranging from access and "ownership" of land and water to indigenous 
hostility towards the Meskhetian Turks and Caucasians' niches in the region's 
economy. 
Post-1991, neither of the republics witnessed major economic-related social 
unrest. This stability, the author believes, cannot be maintained indefinitely. 
Escalating domestic and industrial demands will further increase the need to 
resolve these issues whilst restricting the room for manoeuvre. The financial costs 
of improving and/or reducing the economic reliance upon irrigation agriculture 
makes the likelihood of committed and decisive redress unlikely. The 
contemporary and predicted expansion of political Islam and Wahhabism in the 
Fergana Valley has been associated with the region's high rates of under- 
employment and unemployment. In southern Kazakstan the combination of rural 
under-employment, economic backwardness, Islamic proclivity and lack of 
political representation at the centre may establish a comparable though less acute 
security complex. As the case of Karakalpakistan, however, demonstrates "simple 
deterministic models" are unable to predict the areas of conflict accurately. The 
AR has the worst environmental situation in Uzbekistan and an economic growth 
rate which exceeds only that of Jizzak and Sirdarya viloyets. " It has, however, not 
witnessed inter-ethnic violence or anti-Tashkent moves. Political and social 
factors have to be consulted to understand this. The issues of indistinct ethnic 
identity, poor political mobilisation and the extreme hardships of the AR's 
inhabitants make survival rather than struggle the norm. 
There is considerable debate over the relative merits and implications for social 
stability of the two republics' economic programmes. Kazakstan which has 
embraced economic reform more comprehensively, has seen considerable 
economic hardship and resultant demonstrations. Uzbekistan which has pursued a 
more gradualist reform programme, has seen only limited protest. Whilst 
Kazakstan appears to have withstood the limited political discontent that 
economic transformation and dislocation have provoked, the author is less 
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sanguine about Uzbekistan's progress. Its economy remains state-regulated with a 
non-convertible currency. Reform of its economic system is liable to prove more 
difficult due to the detrimental combination of a declining industrial base and 
demographic growth. 
A final economic feature liable to escalate social tensions is the redistribution of 
wealth from the new economic system. Privatisation and the role of the 
nomenklatura in this process are particularly sensitive issues. Critiques of this 
process may acquire a nationalist (Russian) dimension in Kazakstan and an 
Islamist one in Uzbekistan given the ethnic and nominal Muslim composition and 
character of the two respective elites. 
The social factors can be divided between demography and social-political 
attitudes. The first has been markedly different in the two republics. Kazakstan 
saw a net population decline of 3.5% between 1993-96, whilst Uzbekistan 
witnessed an average annual growth rate of 2.1%. " As noted previously the 
region's 2025 predicted population is expected to be in excess of 100 million. 
Under these conditions, the incongruity between the aspirations of this burgeoning 
population and the bleak prospects for educational, political and social 
advancement will become more apparent in the southern republic. The 
opportunities for Islamist activism in Uzbekistan and to a lesser extent nationalist 
movements in Kazakstan, is enhanced by this trend. 
The social and political attitudes of the republics' populations whilst important are 
difficult to ascertain. Civil society in both republics has been particularly weak. A 
plethora of factors may account for this deficit. These range from the Soviet 
legacy, a tradition of deference, to the opposition's weak intellectual and 
organisational status, political apathy, and the present circumstances in which 
"immediate" problems such as employment and food take precedent over political 
activism. All of these explanations are credible and have serious implications for 
the development of a vibrant and stable political culture. 
Autonomy and protest has been costly for the individual. This ranges from 
arbitrary arrest and physical assaults to employment blacklists, and the financial 
costs and efforts that such activism entails. This partly explains the limited nature 
of political activism in the two republics. In addition there appears to have been a 
considerable degree of consent, or at least acquiescence, by all social groups 
towards the existing regimes. This is illustrated in several surveys. In one, 63% of 
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Kazakstani respondents and 49% of Uzbekistani respondents said they would 
accept any political system provided that it brought order. " As ITAR-TASS 
reported, within Kazakstani society an uncritical attitude towards authority has 
existed, especially prevalent in the Kazak rural areas, implying that custom and 
deference have contributed to the republic's peace. " Similar social acceptance 
have been evident in Uzbekistan. 
Whilst the previous factors explain the low level of political activism to some 
extent, there also appears to be a deep-seated problem, related to the absence of a 
civil society tradition and the continuation of authoritarian political and deferential 
social cultures. As one Uzbekistani official noted "it is impossible to change the 
population's mentality by commanding. "" The role of local initiative, crucial to 
more efficient and sustainable water management, has been hampered by the lack 
of subsidiarity and autonomous decision-making. In conversation with the author, 
one international organisation representative described the region's political 
consciousness as one in which the private and the public (political) are divorced 
to the extent that "it is not just fatalism but an active abdication of political 
involvement because this is seen as an irrelevance. "" In this milieu, politics has 
not been perceived as essential to the broader issues of economic and social 
welfare. The interviewee concluded that there is no appreciation that "if politics 
goes the right way then the rest of society will too. "" Similar sentiments of 
popular disinterest in and distrust of politics were regularly expressed to this 
author. " One interesting example of this trend was the deliberate absence of party 
politics at the demonstrations organised by the Federation of Trade Unions of 
Kazakstan, in Almaty, October 1996. " This was partially to reduce accusations 
from Almaty that the protest was a political challenge to Nazarbaev. " The 
decision was also undertaken because of the low regard in which politicians are 
held by members of the public. " Similar popular mistrust of politicians was 
displayed in Lubin's research, which found that 61% of Kazakstanis surveyed 
believed that "highly placed state officials" were either members of or were 
connected to the mafia. " Interestingly, a higher percentage of ethnic Russians 
regarded government and business relations with the mafia as close, perhaps 
suggesting non-titular concerns over the indigenous patronage networks in 
Kazakstani politics. " 
Kazakstan rather than Uzbekistan initially appeared to be the state most 
vulnerable to instability. It was subjected to serious challenges and vulnerabilities 
including: nuclear pollution; a large vocal and potentially iffedentist minority; and 
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a neighbour with regional interests and a bellicose foreign policy. However its 
contemporary and future situation are relatively stable and benign. Almaty has 
through pragmatic and conciliatory policies and a relatively benign political and 
social basis been able to achieve a more stable security position than Tashkent 
has. " 
Given Tashkent's assertive policy towards domestic and external threats, this is 
particularly ironic although not totally unexpected. External difficulties have 
accompanied domestic problems. Tashkent's behaviour has been partially 
motivated by justifiable threats to its integrity and stability. Intra-Uzbek divisions, 
the presence of a sizeable minority, and the instability of neighbouring Afghanistan 
and Tajikistan all presented Uzbekistan with serious security challenges. As 
Carlisle notes, although Tashkent may have exaggerated the Islamic 
Fundamentalist threat, this does not necessarily imply that such concerns were 
totally unfounded. " The existence of these problems cannot be ignored but as this 
thesis has demonstrated, Tashkent has manipulated these in order to legitimise the 
continuation of authoritarianism and to discredit and repress potential adversaries. 
If current agreements can lead to long-term peace in TaJikistan and the Taliban 
maintain their advances in northern Afghanistan, this would locate ideological 
opponents to Karimov's rule in enhanced positions on Uzbekistan's borders. 
Karimov's emphatic linkage between domestic and regional adversaries and the 
predominantly confrontational manner employed against them may prove 
disadvantageous now that the regional political map has altered. A reappraisal of 
its foreign policy with repercussions for the domestic situation may be expedient. 
Given the bleak predictions for Uzbekistan, and by implication the rest of the 
region, the implementation of a comprehensive security agenda appraisal would 
be an expedient measure for both capitals. As Ayoob notes regime self-interest 
can be enhanced by such a move. He argues that, 
"[the] recent wave of democratization in the Third World arose largely from 
the realization by ruling elites that the survival of their states and regimes 
depend upon defusing the crisis of legitimacy they face. Others ... have resisted 
this trend at what may turn out to be greater cost to their states and societies. 
They refuse to countenance political participation largely because they know 
they will lose power if the political systems in their countries become 
genuinely participatory. In such cases, considerations of regime security- 
which are shortsighted even for the interests of the ruling elites- clash directly 
with those of state security, and in the view of ruling elites, take precedent 
over state security. This situation threatens the survival of the state. "25 
295 
The implementation of such a perspective in Central Asia is problematic. Regional 
politicians and security advisors have recognised the complexity of the problem 
facing Central Asia and the need for relevant management policies. Whilst the 
leaderships "are making the right noises" it is clear that their true commitment to 
reform and pluralism, expedient in addressing the problems discussed in the thesis, 
have been circumspect. " "Comprehensive security, human rights and pluralism in 
general are perceived [solely] as a way to strengthen ties with the West. It is the 
price that [Karimov and Nazarbaev] have to pay. "" During the 1991-6 period the 
two governments did not successfully address security threats and vulnerabilities. 
Based on this study it is uncertain whether they are sufficiently committed to and 
capable of managing these in the future. 
1 Olcott, M. B. "Ethnic Violence in Central Asia: Perceptions and Misperceptions" in Sagdeev, 
I- & Eisenhower, S. (eds. ) Central Asia, Conflict, Resolution, and Change CPSS, Chevy Chase, 
1995, p 116. 
2 See Pilkington, H. A. "Going home? the implications of forced migration for national identity 
formation in post-Soviet Russia" BASEESAnnual Conference, Cambridge, 30/3-2/4/96, p 8. 
3 Lubin, N. Central Asians Take Stock. - Reform, Corruption and Identity, USIP, Washington, 
1995, p 2. 
4 Haghayeghi, M. op cit., p 134. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Higley, J. Kullberg, J. & Pakulsk, J. "The Persistence of Post-Communist Elites" Journal of 
Democracy, Vol. 7, No. 2, p 138. 
7 Panarin, S. A. op cit., p 86. 
8 See Haghayeghi, M. op cit., p 209; Brown, B. op cit., pp 4-6. (i); & RFE/RL Newsline Vol. 2, 
No. 87, pt 1,7/5/98. 
9 Brown, B. "Tajik Civil War Prompts Crackdown in Uzbekistan" RFEIRL, Vol. 2, No. 11, 
1993, p 6. (i) 
'0 The Government of the Republic of Uzbekistan/TACIS, Uzbekistan Economic Trends 1997 
(First Quarter), Tashkent, 1998, p 36. 
11 The Government of the Republic of Kazakstan Table 2 Population, Employment, GDP and 
GNP & Table 4.1 Selected Time Series of Employment op cit., pp. 20 & 84; 
Uzbekistan)TACIS, op cit., p 43. 
12 Lubin, N, op cit. Figure 1, p 5. 
13 ITAR-TASS, 1019 gmt 21/4/95. SWI3 SU 2285, G 1,24/4/95.. 
14 Khabibalaev, A. Chairman of Uzbekistan's Goskompriroda (State Committee for Nature 
Conservation, ) OSCE Seminar on Sustainable Development in the Aral Sea Basin Region, 
Tashkent, 31/10/96. 
1-5 Author's interview, Tashkent, 4/11/96. 
16 Ibid. 
17 In conversation with the author one Uzbek student for example stated that "[wle have too 
much politics in Uzbekistatf ' Tashkent, 3 1/10/96. 
18 "Demonstrations in Kazakhstan: Political or non-political" Labyrinth Vol. 3, No. 4, p 3. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Lubin, N. op cit. p 10 
22 Ibid. 
23 There are some contributory factors that the two governments have little ability to influence. 
As Berik Abdigaliev stated "a small population in a big country aids inter-ethnic relations, 
whilst unemployment and poor education aid conflict. " Abdigaliev, B. Kazakstan Institute of 
Strategic Studies. Author's interview, Almaty 2/10/96. 
296 
24 Carlisle, D. "Geopolitics and Ethnic Problems of Uzbekistaif' in Y. Ro'i, (ed. ) Muslim 
Eurasia: Conflicting Legacies, Frank Cass, London, 1995, p91. 
25 Ayoob, M. The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conjlict, and the 
International System, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, 1995, p 180. 
26 Author's Interview, Tashkent, 4/11/96. 
27 Ibid. 
297 
Appendix 
Chronolozy of Political Events 
1917 February First Revolution establishes the Provincial government under 
Kerensky. 
October Second Revolution leads to the establishment of Bolshevik power. 
I November Bolsheviks seize Tashkent. 
15 November Third All Muslim Conference in Tashkent demands autonomy for 
Turkestan. 
1918 Basmachi rebellion follows treaty between Emir of Bukhara and the 
Tashkent Soviet. 
April Turkestan Autonomous Soviet Republic created. 
May Kazakh (Kirgiz) AR established. 
1920 Khorezm becomes People's Soviet Republic. 
26 August Kazak (Kirgiz) AR elevated ASSR established. 
General France captures Bukhara, People's Soviet Republic 
established. 
1924 Stalin becomes General Secretary of Russian Communist Party 
(Renamed Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1925). 
October Major territorial reforms in Central Asia. The Turkmen and Uzbek 
SSRs created from the Bukhara and Khorezrn People's Soviet 
Socialist Republics and the Turkestan ASSR. Kazak (Kirgiz) ASSR 
transferred to the RSFSR. 
1929 June TaJik ASSR granted SSR status, and Khojent (Leninabad) oblast 
transferred to it. 
1930-1 Forced collectivisation of nomads, thousands killed or migrate. 
1936 December Kazak SSR established. 
1941 June Germany invades USSR. 
1943 October The Four Spiritual Directorates are created. Tashkent becomes the 
central Directorate The other directorates were located in Ufa 
(Bashkir), Baku and Makhachkala (Dagestan). 
1953 Stalin dies, replaced by Nikita Khushchev as First Secretary of the 
CPSU. 
1954 Virgin Lands Scheme is initiated in the Kazak SSR. 
1959 Sharif Rashidov becomes First Secretary of zbek CP. 
1960 Dinmukhanad Kuneav becomes First Secretary of Kazak CP. 
1979 February Islamic Revolution in Iran. 
December Soviet invasion of Afghanistan begins. 
1983 October Rashidov is removed from office and charged with corruption. Dies in 
the same month. 
1985 12 March Gorbachev appointed CPSU First Secretary. 
1986 
February Gorbachev launches glasnost and perestroika. and intensifies the anti- 
corruption drive at the Twenty-seventh CPSU Congress. 
17 December Dinmukhamed Kunaev replaced as party leader of the Kazakh 
Communist Party, by Gennardi Kolbin. Demonstrations which 
transmute into riots follow. 
1988 
Celebration of a millennium of Christianity in Russia. 
February Gorbachev agrees to withdraw all Soviet troops from Afghanistan 
within a year. 
I December Two major reform bills passed in the USSR Supreme Soviet, law 
on elections and constitutional amendment. 
1989 
January Demonstration against Mufti Sharnsuddin lead to his resignation as 
head of Spiritual Directorate in Tashkent. 
26 February Muhammed Sadiq Muhammed Yusuf becomes Mufti of DUMSAK 
after popular protests. 
28 February Nevada- Semipalatinsk environmental movement established. 
March Elections held for the USSR congress of People's Congress. 
April Uzbek nationalist demonstrations in Tashkent. 
23 May Birlik Party founded. 
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23 June Karimov elected First Secretary of the Central Committee of the 
Communist Party of Uzbekistan. 
June Nazarbaev becomes First Secretary of CP of Kazakstan. 
June Violence between Uzbeks and Meskhetian Turks takes place in 
Fergana region, and between Kazaks and Caucasians in Novy Uzen 
Kazakstan. 
Karimov replaces Nishanov as First Secretary of the Uzbek CP- 
August Balts commemorate 50th anniversary of Nazi-Soviet Pact with human 
chain across Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Lithuania declares 1940 
Soviet annexation invalid. 
December Lithuanian Communist party secedes from USSR CP. 
1990 
January Fighting breaks out between Annenians and Azerbaijanis after 
Armenian Supreme Soviet votes to unite with Nagorno-Karabkh. 
12 January Ratbek Nysanbai Uli appointed Chief Mufti of Kazakstan after 
establishment of Kazakstani Muslim Directorate (DUMK). 
February Thousands of Tajiks riot in Dushanbe after rumours that Armenians 
were to be given preferential treatment for housing in the capital. 
Uzbeks demonstrations in Samarkand over official suppression of the 
Uzbek Popular Front results in violence. 
22 February Nazarbaev re-elected as First Secretary. 
Erk splits from Birlik. 
12 March USSR Congress of People's Deputies opens, the first popular elected 
deliberative assembly since 1918. Gorbachev elected President by 
the Congress. 
Lithuanian Supreme Soviet declares Lithuania independent. Moscow 
responds with military occupation. 
Estonia declares its independence. 
24 March Islam elected as President. 
II June RSFSR Congress of Peoples' Deputies votes for sovereignty. 
20 June Uzbekistan declares sovereignty. 
Violence between Kyrgyzs and Uzbeks takes place in Osh oblast. 
Islamic Renaissance Party founded as an All-Union organisation. 
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1991 
January Soviet troops kill 14 Lithuanian whilst attempting to regain control of 
Vilnius. 
19-21 August Coup staged by conservative Communists. Gorbachev under house 
arrest. Coup fails to gain popular and military support. 
President Niyazov of Turkmen SSR declares coup authority in 
republic. 
Karimov declares coup invalid. 
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuanias' independence are recognised. 
31 August Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan declare 
independence. 
23 September Rakhmon Nabiev becomes head of Tajikistan. Anti-govemment 
protests begin in Dushanbe. 
October 94% of popular referendum vote for Turkmenistan's independence. 
26 October Kazakstan declares its sovereignty. 
24 November Tajikistan hold presidential elections Nabiev wins. 
I December Nazarbaev elected President of Kazakstan. (Nazarbaev was the sole 
candidate and received 99.8% of the vote. ) 
8 December Leaders of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus propose the creation of CIS. 
II December IRP seize Namangan oblast CP headquarters and demand 
establishment of Islamic state. 
16 December Kazakstan declares independence. 
21 December Commonwealth of Independent States established by Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, 
TaJikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. 
25 December Gorbachev resigns and USSR formally dissolved. 
29 December Presidential Elections in Uzbekistan. Karimov wins with 85.6%. 
30 December FSU states possessing nuclear weapons, Belarus, Kazakstan, Russia, 
and Ukraine sign agreement on non-proliferation. 
31 December USSR officially ceases to exist. 
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1992 
16 January Student-led riots in Tashkent. 
30 January All five Central Asian republics become members of the Conference 
on Security and Cooperation in Europe. 
Demonstrations by Tajik opposition movement in Dushanbe. 
17 March Crackdown on Islamists in Namangan begins. 
20 March CIS Military and Security Summit in Kiev signed by all Central Asian 
republics except for Turkmenistan. 
26 March Demonstration begin outside the Presidential palace in Dushanbe. 
23 April Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan meet in Bishkek to co-ordinate 
regional security. 
5 May Nabiev declares state of emergency after armed groups attempt to 
occupy the Presidential palace. 
7 May National Reconciliation government formed in Tajikistan. Violence 
begins in the republic. 
15 May Collective Defence Treaty signed between Russian, Armenia, 
Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan at the Tashkent 
CIS Summit. 
20 May Leninabad authorities raise the issue of assimilation with Uzbekistan, 
as sign of their opposition to government in Dushanbe. 
25 June President Karimov and Nazarbaev sign mutual-assistance treaty and 
pledge cooperation on economic, cultural and environmental issues. 
30 June Head of Birlik, Abdurlrahirn Pulatov, assaulted. 
28 July Cease-fire agreed in Tajikistan and Nabiev's resignation demanded. 
7 September Nabiev forced to resign. Kulyab forces attack Kurgan Tiube. 
24-5 October Kulyab coup attempt. 
19 November Ali Rahmanov replaces Akbarsho Iskandorov as President of 
Tajikistan. 
4-10 December Pro-Communist forces capture Dushanbe. 
8 December New Constitution passed in Uzbekistan. 
9 December Birlik and Samarkand members kidnapped from Bishkek human rights 
conference. Birlik is banned. 
II December Communist militias seize Dushanbe. Fighting continues throughout 
December and early months of 1993. Uzbekistan and Russian 
involved. 
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1993 
January CIS troops deployed along Tajik-Afghan border. 
28 January Kazakstani Parliament passes new constitution, Kazak made 
official language. 
9 August Yeltsin urges Dushanbe to enter dialogue with UTO. 
December Kazkastan's Supreme Kenges, the successor to the Communist 
Supreme Soviet resigned to prepare for elections to the MajUs and 
Senate. 
1994 
I January Presidents of the republics meet in Nukus to sign agreement on create 
fund to save the Aral Sea. 
7 March Elections take place in Kazakstan for the Majlis, the Lower House. 
Observers note irregularities. 
3 June Mass strikes in Karaganda, Kazakstan, which are revived throughout 
1995 and 1996. 
5 June Protest against social spending cuts, in Almaty. 
22 June Demonstrations in Almaty against Lop Nor nuclear test. 
18 September Temporary cease-fire agreed in Tajikistan. Negotiations follow. 
25 December Elections to the 01i Majilis in Uzbekistan. 
1995 
13 January In excess of 100,000 miners strike in northern Kazakstan over lack of 
wages. 
7 February Treaty between Russia and Kazakstan on joint force for patrol of 
Chinese border. 
II March Kazakstan's Constitutional Court declares 1994 elections invalid. 
Parliament dissolved. 
26 March Karimov's presidency extended until 2000.99.6% vote in favour. 
7 April Opposition forces in Tajikistan start new offensive. 
29 April Karimov's mandate extended until 2000 by popular vote of 99.6%. 
31 May Three month cease-fire agreed in TaJikistan. 
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6 September New Kazakstani Constitution adopted. Presidency provided with 
increased powers. 
5-23 December Senate elections held in Kazakstan. 
1996 
25-6 January Makmud Khudaberdiyev mutinies in the Kurgan-Tiube, and troops 
under Ibudollo Boimatov enter the Khojent from Uzbekistan. 
September Taliban capture Kabul. 
3 October Russian and Central Asian govemments attend regional summit, in 
Almaty, in response to the Taliban's advances in Afghanistan. 
17 October Demonstrations held in Almaty and other cities to highlight the 
government's failure to address social problems including wage and 
pension arrears. 
Additional Sources: Bremmer, 1. & Taras, R- (eds. ) Nations andPolitics in the Soviet 
Successor States, CUP, Cambridge, 1993; Gleason, G The Central Asian States: 
Discovering Independence, Westview Press, Boulder, 1997; The Government of 
Kazakstan/TACIS, Kazakstan Economic Trends 1997, (Quarterly), Center for 
Economic Reforms/TACIS, Almaty, 1997; Labyrinth, Vols. 1-3.1994-6; Rashid, A. 
The Resurgence of Central Asia: Islam or Nationalism? Zed Books London, 1994. 
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